

Constituting the Cold War Commonplace:
U.S. Presidential Public Address and the Inventional Possibilities of Speaking *In Situ*

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Dedication

To Jason,
for believing in me, with me, and for me

and to Oliver,
our *apodeixis* of grace

Abstract

Although the “spatial” turn has generated significant advances in many areas of rhetorical theory and criticism, few scholars have considered how speakers (and specifically U.S. presidents) have drawn on the symbolic and physical elements of the speech setting as a material means of persuasion. The purpose of this study, therefore, is to demonstrate how U.S. presidents have invoked place as a rhetorical strategy. I contend that recent rhetorical approaches to space and place offer a fruitful theoretical and methodological perspective that enlarges and enriches our understanding of U.S. presidential public address as rhetoric designed for and delivered *in situ*, or in place. In this dissertation, I analyze three examples of Cold War presidential discourse: Harry S. Truman’s 1947 speech to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People at the Lincoln Memorial, John F. Kennedy’s 1963 “Ich bin ein Berliner” address at the Rudolph Wilde Platz in West Berlin, and Ronald Reagan’s 1984 commemoration of D-Day at Pointe du Hoc, France. I argue that Truman, Kennedy, and Reagan invoked place to (1) invest the speech setting with symbolic meaning; (2) harness always already present political and cultural symbols to build conceptual and literal commonplaces (*topoi*) for ideological metaphors, analogies, and networks of shared meaning embedded in that place; (3) constitute a specific geopolitical vision of the world and the United States’ role in it; and (4) reaffirm their role as moral leader and head of state. This study also offers a theoretical and methodological framework—specifically, a rhetorical theory of deixis—for analyzing the persuasive power of rhetoric *in situ*.

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Chapter One: The Significance of Place in U.S. Presidential Public Address

On March 22, 2016, President Barack Obama spoke in Havana, Cuba, to an immediate audience of 1,100 (including Cuban president Raúl Castro) and to the 11 million people living on the island via national television.¹ As the first sitting U.S. president to visit the communist country in eighty-eight years, Obama frequently invoked his presidential presence in Cuba as a symbolic gesture of his determination to reconcile the U.S.-Cuban relationship. In his opening remarks, the president declared, “I have come here to bury the last remnant of the Cold War in the Americas. I have come here to extend the hand of friendship to the Cuban people.”² Obama described his trip in literal and metaphorical terms, stating, “Havana is only 90 miles from Florida, but to get here we had to travel a great distance—over barriers of history and ideology; barriers of pain and separation.” This narrative recognized the tense history between the United States and Cuba, a history shaped by Cold War crises such as the 1961 Bay of Pigs incident and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Yet despite the many years of strained diplomatic ties between the two countries, the president articulated his hopeful vision for the Cuban people even as he argued for the merits of democracy, equality, and human rights. Through his rhetoric in place, Obama declared it “a new day—es un nuevo día” for the two countries, one that represented an end of Cold War diplomatic tensions and the

¹ Ryan Teague Beckwith, “Read President Obama’s Speech to the Cuban People,” March 22, 2016, accessed March 22, 2016, <http://time.com/4267933/barack-obama-cuba-speech-transcript-full-text/>.

² Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama to the People of Cuba,” March 22, 2016, accessed March 22, 2016, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/22/remarks-president-obama-people-cuba>.

beginning of “a better and brighter future for both the Cuban people and the American people.”³

Obama’s recent visit to Cuba is just one example of the persuasive power of presidential rhetoric in place. Perhaps the most famous instance is Abraham Lincoln’s dedication of a bloodied battlefield in Pennsylvania on November 19, 1863. Garry Wills writes that “[t]he tragedy of the macerated bodies, the many bloody and ignoble aspects of this inconclusive encounter, are transfigured in Lincoln’s rhetoric. . . . The nightmare realities have been etherealized in the crucible of his language.”⁴ Lincoln’s brief address transformed Gettysburg from a bloodied battlefield to a place that represented (and still represents) the ideals of the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution. Since 1789, U.S. presidents have relied on the physical and material aspects of certain speech situations to persuade their audiences. In fact, because nineteenth-century presidents often embarked on presidential tours throughout the country to address the U.S. public personally, the presence of the president was a powerful rhetorical force prior to the mass-mediated images of the president visiting particular places or audiences.⁵

³ Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama and President Raul Castro of Cuba in a Joint Press Conference,” March 21, 2016, accessed March 24, 2016, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/21/remarks-president-obama-and-president-raul-castro-cuba-joint-press>.

⁴ Garry Wills, *Lincoln at Gettysburg: The Words that Remade America* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 37.

⁵ For example, George Washington understood the significance of how the U.S. public saw or experienced presidential address. As Stephen E. Lucas observes, Washington was “[a] master of political ceremony . . . [and] staged the presentation of his speeches with great care. He also gave extraordinary attention to his self-presentation, cultivating a blend of regality and republicanism that, in combination with his magnetic physical presence and personal charisma, captivated those who saw and heard him.” Stephen E. Lucas, “Present at the Founding: The Rhetorical Presidency in Historical Perspective,” in *Before the Rhetorical Presidency*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), 39. For more on presidential travel and presidents speaking in place during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see Richard Ellis, *Presidential Travel: The Journey from George Washington to George W. Bush* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2008); Lucas, “Present at the Founding: The Rhetorical Presidency in Historical Perspective”; Amy R. Slagell, “The Challenges of Reunification: Rutherford B.

Throughout the 19th century, U.S. presidents used their presidential presence in place as a rhetorical gesture—even though their exposure was limited. For example, in 1877, Rutherford B. Hayes embarked on a speaking tour of the South in an attempt to reunify the nation. Hayes became a physical representative of the rhetorical goals he hoped to accomplish. Amy R. Slagell writes that Hayes used his trip to acknowledge the nation's bitter divisions while “articulating both a vision of a united nation in the future as well as a list of the principles he asserted were held in agreement across sections, races, and parties. . . . But the master stroke of his plan to use rhetoric and symbolic action to reunite the nation was seen in the trips he took around the country.”⁶ In this instance, Hayes' physical presence in place and the circulation of the presidential body⁷ throughout the country offered a physical display of the domestic policy goals he was trying to achieve—specifically, his desire to work towards reunification. However, in this and other instances of presidential presence in place, these situated rhetorical appeals had a limited audience; only those physically present could appreciate fully the symbolic aspects of the speech's location.

The visual optics of twentieth-century political speechmaking further amplified the persuasive impact of presidential presence in place. Because the U.S. public could physically see the president speaking in place, his location became a symbolic backdrop that the audience experienced alongside the spoken discourse. The rise of television only

Hayes on the Close Race and the Racial Divide,” in *Before the Rhetorical Presidency*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), 243-266.

⁶ Slagell, “The Challenges of Reunification: Rutherford B. Hayes on the Close Race and the Racial Divide,” 254.

⁷ For more on this concept of the circulation of the presidential body, see Zoë Hess Carney, “The Constitution of the President as Global Virtual Representative: Obama's International Town Hall Meetings,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the National Communication Association, Las Vegas, NV, November 22, 2015.

increased the symbolic significance of place within U.S. presidential public address.⁸ As Kathleen Hall Jamieson notes, eloquence in the electronic age “is visual, not verbal,”⁹ and the “television now transports the actual landscape to the nation’s living rooms. . . . the spoken word is attached to images almost like a caption.”¹⁰ These visual images of presidential presence in place—be it through print journalism, live news coverage, or the Internet—contribute to the overall persuasive impact of the rhetorical act.¹¹ Bruce Gronbeck argues that presidents require not only “the right words, but [they need] to be well-positioned, well-timed, well-tuned, and well-framed visually.”¹² “[W]ell-positioned” also suggests “well-*placed*,” for Gronbeck challenges rhetorical critics to expand our concept of political rhetoric beyond the merely verbal to the visual aspects of the rhetorical act. Similarly, Cara Finnegan and Jennifer L. Jones Barbour identify the

⁸ In a fascinating study published in 1967, political scientist Bernard Rubin explained how television influenced political life in the United States. “First and perhaps foremost,” he wrote, “the medium can transmit sounds and sights from the locales where news events are unfolding. Consequently . . . interest in on-the-spot news reporting has grown tremendously. Before World War II, it was difficult for the average person to picture news events in real-life settings. Today, most Americans can visualize a civil rights demonstration, a political party convention, a Presidential address, or a rocket launching through television presentations.” For Rubin, the “where” (or the place) of a particular rhetorical act or news event was particularly important, and the visual images that act provided became a powerful form of public education and persuasion. Bernard Rubin, *Political Television* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1967), 1-2. For more on the relationship between television and politics, see, for example, Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana and Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1964); Erik Barnouw, *Tube of Plenty: The Evolution of American Television* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); William C. Spragens, *The Presidency and the Mass Media in the Age of Television* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1979); Murray Edelman, *Constructing the Political Spectacle* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1988); David E. Fisher and Marshall Jon Fisher, *TUBE: The Invention of Television* (Washington, DC: Counterpoint, 1996); Stephen Cushion and Justin Lewis, eds., *The Rise of the 24-Hour News Television: Global Perspectives* (New York: Peter Lang, 2010).

⁹ Kathleen Hall Jamieson, *Eloquence in an Electronic Age: The Transformation of Political Speechmaking* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 44.

¹⁰ Jamieson, *Eloquence in an Electronic Age*, 57.

¹¹ The claim that certain places, sites, or backdrops of political acts can have a persuasive impact is not new, however. Political scientist Murray Edelman criticized politicians who exploited political scene or setting for their own ideological ends, writing that political actors take “[g]reat pains . . . to call attention to settings and to present them conspicuously, as if the scene were expected either to call forth a response of its own or to heighten the response to the act it frames.” Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*, 95.

¹² Bruce E. Gronbeck, “The Presidency in the Age of Secondary Orality,” in *Beyond the Rhetorical Presidency*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1996), 42.

challenges and opportunities visual rhetoric provides and urge students of public address “[to adapt] our critical practices to the challenges of the visual” and analyze how “[t]echnologies of communication . . . enable or constrain the movement of rhetorical discourse.”¹³ For scholars of presidential rhetoric, the linkages between the verbal and the visual provide rich sites for rhetorical analysis, particularly in thinking about how U.S. presidents utilize and even exploit the images that accompany their rhetorical acts. Attending to what we can see of a rhetorical act—the place, the speech setting, the audience members, the objects located in the place—helps us understand how the visual and the verbal collide in U.S. presidential public address. Moreover, by considering how U.S. presidents point to or gesture towards these places, settings, people, and objects as evidence, rhetorical critics can uncover how orators use language to trigger rhetorical vision and memories of the past by directing their audiences to what is physically present before them.

In this dissertation, I argue for the significance of place in analyzing U.S. presidential public address. Although the “spatial” turn has generated significant advances in many areas of rhetorical theory and criticism, few scholars have considered how speakers (and specifically U.S. presidents) have drawn on the symbolic and material elements of the speech setting as a means of persuasion. The purpose of this study, therefore, is to demonstrate how U.S. presidents have invoked place as a rhetorical strategy. I contend that recent rhetorical approaches to space and place offer a fruitful theoretical and methodological perspective that enlarges and enriches our understanding

¹³ Cara A. Finnegan and Jennifer L. Jones Barbour, “Visualizing Public Address,” *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 9, no. 3 (2006): 504; 503.

of presidential rhetoric as designed for and delivered in place. To do this, I analyze three examples of Cold War presidential rhetoric: Harry S. Truman's 1947 speech to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People at the Lincoln Memorial, John F. Kennedy's 1963 "Ich bin ein Berliner" address at the Rudolph Wilde Platz in West Berlin, and Ronald Reagan's 1984 commemoration of D-Day at Pointe du Hoc, France. I argue that Truman, Kennedy, and Reagan invoked place to (1) invest the location with symbolic meaning through speech; (2) harness always already present political and cultural symbols to build conceptual and literal commonplaces (*topoi*) for the ideological metaphors, analogies, and networks of shared meaning embedded in that place; (3) constitute a specific geopolitical vision of the world and the United States' role in it; and (4) reaffirm their role as moral leader and head of state. This study extends beyond these three cases, however, in that it offers a theoretical and methodological framework for analyzing the persuasive power of rhetoric *in situ*—or in place.

In this introductory chapter, I situate the project within the relevant scholarly literature on U.S. presidential rhetoric and spatial theory and offer a preview of my three case studies. In what follows, I first consider how conceptualizing presidential presence as linked to and established in place reveals how chief executives amplify the persuasive potential of particular locations simply by being there physically. I then discuss how various scholarly works on the relationship between rhetoric, space and place, memory, visual rhetoric, and geopolitics inform this project. Finally, I discuss how the classical concept of *topos* (or the commonplace) offers a helpful framework for analyzing the Lincoln Memorial, West Berlin, and Normandy as Cold War commonplaces,

metaphorical and literal “places of return” from which and in which U.S. presidents activated their location as a material means of persuasion.¹⁴ To conclude, I outline the key methodological assumptions guiding this project and preview the remaining chapters of the dissertation.

Presidential *Ethos* and Presence in Place

Because the U.S. president speaks on behalf of and to the nation, his¹⁵ rhetorical authority is special and unique. When the president speaks, we listen. As Roderick P. Hart notes, “[p]residential speech is speech for the record, speech that cannot fade, speech whose echo will never cease. . . . In short, speech talks; presidential speech talks even louder.”¹⁶ But presidential speech does more than command the U.S. public’s attention. Presidents use rhetoric to interpret and even define who we are as a people. As Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson observe, “all presidents have the opportunity to persuade us to conceive of ourselves in ways compatible with their views of government and the world.”¹⁷ Indeed, according to Vanessa B. Beasley, U.S. presidents become “symbolic guardians of national unity in the United States” and use their bully pulpit “to promote the *idea* of an American people *to* the American people.”¹⁸ Presidents also define political realities for, as David Zarefsky notes, the president’s

¹⁴ Christa J. Olson, *Constitutive Visions: Indigeneity and Commonplaces of National Identity in Republican Ecuador* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2014), 5.

¹⁵ I use the male pronoun here (and, when necessary, throughout this project) to reflect the current state of the institution.

¹⁶ Roderick P. Hart, *The Sound of Leadership: Presidential Communication in the Modern Age* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 6, 32.

¹⁷ Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, *Presidents Creating the Presidency: Deeds Done in Words* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 8.

¹⁸ Vanessa B. Beasley, *You, The People: American National Identity in Presidential Rhetoric* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2004), 22.

“prominent political position and his access to the means of communication” enables him to “[define] a situation . . . [and] shape the context in which events or proposals are viewed by the public.”¹⁹ When U.S. presidents invoke place as a rhetorical strategy, they tap into the symbolic resonances of that location to demonstrate their innate understanding of U.S. political culture and public life and define the meaning of that place. Simply put, speaking in place offers chief executives the opportunity to display the material and symbolic resonances of that location to the nation and the world.

This connection between presidential authority and place is captured in the etymology of the word *ethos*. Although commonly understood as the “character” or “good will” of the speaker, *ethos* actually describes a speaker’s ability “to manifest the virtues most valued by the culture to and for which one speaks.”²⁰ S. Michael Halloran suggests that “[t]he most concrete meaning given for [*ethos*] in the Greek lexicon is ‘a habitual gathering place.’” This definition suggests an “image of people gathering together in a public place, sharing experiences and ideas.”²¹ Michael J. Hyde extends this definition, arguing,

one can understand the phrase “the *ethos* of rhetoric” to refer to the way discourse is used to transform space and time into “dwelling places” (*ethos*; pl. *ethea*) where people can deliberate about and “know together” (*con-scientia*) some matter of

¹⁹ David Zarefsky, “Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 34, no. 3 (2004): 611.

²⁰ S. Michael Halloran, “Aristotle’s Concept of Ethos, or If Not His Somebody Else’s,” *Rhetoric Review* 1, no. 1 (1982): 60.

²¹ Halloran, “Aristotle’s Concept of Ethos, or If Not His Somebody Else’s,” 60.

interest. Such dwelling places define the grounds, the abodes or habitats, where a person's ethics and moral character take form and develop.²²

Ethos, then, is as much a reflection of the speaker's ability to identify the shared values of the community, and where these values dwell, as it is a description of the speaker's own character. This extended notion of *ethos* is significant for this project because it suggests that presidents can cultivate and even create metaphorical and literal "dwelling places" that represent U.S. ideals. I argue that U.S. presidents often demonstrate their inherent understanding of communal virtues by locating certain speeches in places that symbolize political, cultural, and social customs and shared values. As my analysis chapters will demonstrate, when presidents speak in place about these shared values, they also bolster their own rhetorical authority as a moral leader and head of state.

Presidential rhetoric in place also works as a means of presence, a way to underscore or amplify the symbolic significance of a particular location for the U.S. public. Within rhetorical studies, the concept of presence usually refers to the ways in which rhetors make certain pieces of evidence particularly salient for the audience.²³

What is particularly interesting about the concept of presence, however, is the variety of meanings one can assign to it. Outside of this traditionally rhetorical interpretation, one

²² Michael J. Hyde, "Introduction: Rhetorically, We Dwell," in *The Ethos of Rhetoric*, ed. Michael J. Hyde (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2004), xiii.

²³ "Presence," write Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, "acts directly on our sensibility." Robert D. Tucker explains the concept of presence as "a property that a speaker gives to images, symbols, words, phrases and larger argumentative structures. This 'property' can be best thought of as 'standing-out-ness.'" To make something present to the audience, whether through speech or direct experience, means that the rhetor uses language to direct his/her audience toward, as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca put it, "what he considers important to his argument or . . . to enhance the value of some of the elements of which one has actually been made conscious." See Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), 116, 117; Robert E. Tucker, "Figure, Ground and Presence: A Phenomenology of Meaning in Rhetoric," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 87, no. 4 (2001): 397.

of the most common understandings of presence is the embodiment of an individual or thing; the presence of someone or something denotes that they are there. The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines the term as the “fact or condition of being present; the state of being with or in the same place as a person or thing; attendance, company, society, or association.” A second definition is particularly useful for thinking about presidential presence: “The place or space in front of or around a person; the immediate vicinity of a person; the company or society of someone. Freq. with reference to ceremonial or formal attendance on a distinguished, esp. royal, person.”²⁴ This type of presence—the physical proximity of a head of state, celebrity, or all-star athlete—often evokes heightened feelings and/or sensations from the audience such as excitement, nervousness, or even fear simply because that person is *there*. For the purposes of this project, I use the concept of presidential presence to suggest that when presidents travel to a particular location and speak in place, they lend their rhetorical authority and *ethos* to that place and mark it as significant in U.S. political culture. Even as U.S. presidents amplify a site’s importance in the public imaginary, they also bolster their own rhetorical authority and *ethos* by speaking in that place. Ultimately, I argue that presidential presence in place reveals a co-constitutive relationship between presidential authority and rhetoric in place, a back and forth exchange between presidential authority as a function of *ethos* and the symbolism embodied in the history and memory of a place itself.

To summarize, when U.S. presidents speak, they embody a certain type of *ethos*, one that reflects their understanding of the nation’s virtues and ideals even as they foster

²⁴ *Oxford English Dictionary*, s.v. “presence, n.,” accessed March 18, 2016, <http://www.oed.com.ezp3.lib.umn.edu/view/Entry/150669>.

a shared communal *ethos* through their rhetoric. As my analyses of Truman, Kennedy, and Reagan will demonstrate, this *ethos* often manifests itself on the political stage as presidents respond to particular rhetorical exigencies and situational demands. In each of my case studies, the president situated his address in a location that was linked inextricably to his overarching rhetorical purpose. In this way, then, U.S. presidents utilize the physical elements of the speech setting—or the political stage—to reflect the communal values they wish to advance. Because presidents play multiple rhetorical roles, they have special powers to invest places with symbolic meaning. Moreover, when they harness the persuasive power of place through speech, their rhetorical acts linguistically bond the spoken word with the physical place, marrying the verbal with what is immediate to the senses.

Place and the U.S. Presidency

The recent “spatial” turn has pushed scholars within a variety of disciplines to examine how certain spaces and/or places gain political and cultural significance.²⁵ A parallel conversation has been occurring within rhetorical studies, with critics examining

²⁵ Some of the most important works include Yi-Fu Tuan, *Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1977); Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984); Michel Foucault and Jay Miskowicz, "Of Other Spaces," *Diacritics* 16, no. 1 (1986): 22-27; Edward Soja, *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertation of Space in Critical Social Theory* (New York, NY: Verso, 1989); Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1991); Gearóid Ó Tuathail and John Agnew, "Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy," *Political Geography* 11, no. 2 (1992): 190-204; Doreen Massey, *Space, Place, and Gender* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1994); Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan 2nd ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1995); Pierre Nora, *Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Edward S. Casey, *The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997); Doreen Massey, *For Space* (London: Sage Publications Ltd., 2005).

how space and/or place can work rhetorically.²⁶ Although most of these studies within rhetoric analyze the persuasive capacity of the space or place *itself*, scholars have paid less attention to how speakers can invest certain spaces or places with shared values, cultural identities, and political ideologies through speech. In this dissertation, I build on these perspectives to argue that critics should consider how speakers employ the symbolic and material elements of the speech setting as a means of persuasion. This approach takes place seriously while also analyzing where and how orators use language to activate the scenic or situational elements of the immediate historical and socio-political context for their persuasive purposes. In this section, I discuss several important conceptual themes within the space and place literature and describe how I use these

²⁶ There are numerous studies that are important. See, for example: Ronald Walter Greene, "Another Materialist Rhetoric," *Critical Studies in Mass Communication* 15, no. 1 (1998): 21-40; Carole Blair, "Contemporary U.S. Memorial Sites as Exemplars of Rhetoric's Materiality," in *Rhetorical Bodies*, ed. Jack Selzer and Sharon Crowley (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1999), 16-57; Carole Blair, "Reflections on Criticism and Bodies: Parables from Public Places," *Western Journal of Communication* 65, no. 3 (2001): 271-294; Roxanne Mountford, "On Gender and Rhetorical Space," *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 31, no. 1 (2001): 41-71; Ronald Walter Greene, "Rhetorical Pedagogy as a Postal System: Circulating Subjects through Michael Warner's 'Publics and Counterpublics'," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 88, no. 4 (2002): 434-443; Roxanne Mountford, *The Gendered Pulpit: Preaching in American Protestant Spaces* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2003); Raka Shome, "Space Matters: The Power and Practice of Space," *Communication Theory* 13, no. 1 (2003): 39-56; Elizabethada A. Wright, "Rhetorical Spaces in Memorial Places: The Cemetery as a Rhetorical Memory Place/Space," *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 35, no. 4 (2005): 51-81; Kenneth S. Zagacki and Victoria J. Gallagher, "Rhetoric and Materiality in the Museum Park at the North Carolina Museum of Art," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 95, no. 2 (2009): 171-191; V. William Balthrop, Carole Blair, and Neil Michel, "The Presence of the Present: Hijacking 'The Good War'?", *Western Journal of Communication* 74, no. 2 (2010): 170-207; Carole Blair, Greg Dickinson, and Brian L. Ott, "Introduction: Rhetoric/Memory/Place," in *Places of Public Memory: The Rhetoric of Museums and Memorials*, ed. Greg Dickinson, Carole Blair, and Brian L. Ott (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2010), 1-54; Greg Dickinson, Carole Blair, and Brian L. Ott, eds., *Places of Public Memory* (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2010); Ronald Walter Greene, "Spatial Materialism: Labor, Location, and Transnational Literacy," *Critical Studies in Media Communication* 27, no. 1 (2010): 105-110; Danielle Endres and Samantha Senda-Cook, "Location Matters: The Rhetoric of Place in Protest," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 97, no. 3 (2011): 257-282; Christopher Reid, *Imprison'd Wranglers: The Rhetorical Culture of the House of Commons, 1760-1800* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Robert J. Topinka, "Resisting the Fixity of Suburban Space: The Walker as Rhetorician," *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 42, no. 1 (2012): 65-84.

perspectives in the project. I have limited my scope to authors, theories, and approaches that directly inform my study of how U.S. presidents invoke place as a rhetorical strategy.

Rhetorical scholars generally approach *place* as a physical site or location that can be geographically identified and *space* as a fluid, unbounded, metaphorical description of some area, region, or shared ideological network. Carole Blair, Greg Dickinson, and Brian L. Ott observe that space and place are often used “to emphasize a difference in how physical situatedness is experienced. In such usages, a *place* that is bordered, specified, and locatable by being named is different from open, undifferentiated, undesigned *space*.”²⁷ Similarly, Danielle Endres and Samantha Senda-Cook observe that “[p]lace refers to particular locations (e.g., a city, a particular shopping mall, or a park) that are semi-bounded, a combination of material and symbolic qualities, and embodied” whereas “[s]pace refers to a more general notion of how society and social practice are regulated (and sometimes disciplined) by spatial thinking (e.g., capitalist modes of production or gendered notions of private and public spaces).”²⁸ For most rhetorical scholars, the concept of place suggests a physical site or location one can identify through definitive geographical and spatial boundaries. In this project, I define *place* as a physical location identified by certain material characteristics that often functions as a storehouse of political symbols and cultural memories—places like the Lincoln Memorial, West Berlin, and Normandy. I see *space* as a complex set of social and political relations that condition and even govern certain ways of being and acting in that *place*. I approach space and place as distinctive entities, yet also mutually

²⁷ Blair, Dickinson, and Ott, "Introduction: Rhetoric/Memory/Place," 23.

²⁸ Endres and Senda-Cook, "Location Matters: The Rhetoric of Place in Protest," 259-260.

constitutive; that is, they are always informed by each other and subject to constant negotiation and renegotiation.²⁹

In this dissertation, I focus specifically on how U.S. presidents have invoked place—that is, a geographically definable and physically located site that is always imbued with symbolic meaning—as a rhetorical strategy. From the outset, however, it is essential to note that each of my case studies reveals how the mediation and circulation of presidential rhetoric in *place* quickly extends beyond its physical situatedness within spatial and geographical borders into the broader *space* of the Cold War global imaginary. In the chapters that follow, I consider the ways in which the president, the White House, the U.S. State Department, and other governmental agencies saw the place or location of the president’s address not merely as a means of invention, but as a physical symbol of U.S. democracy during the Cold War that the president could activate and amplify because of his physical presence in that place. In turn, the mediation and circulation of presidential rhetoric *in situ*—be it through photographs, radio broadcasts, newsreel footage, or live television—extended the local (or place) into the global (or space) as the U.S. president used his location to argue for a specific way of being and acting in the Cold War world. This perspective builds on Ronald Walter Greene and Kevin Douglas Kuswa’s argument for performing a rhetorical cartography of place in

²⁹ For example, the Lincoln Memorial is a *place* located within the District of Columbia on the south side of the National Mall. We can point to it on a map and give directions for how one can get there via car or Metro. Its physical location invites certain rhetorical action because of its placement on the National Mall, its proximity to political officials, and its status as an important symbol of the Civil Rights Movement. The monument’s material qualities—white marble, high columns, a statue of Abraham Lincoln—also render it as a place of national importance. To describe the Lincoln Memorial as a *space*, however, we must consider it as one point in a larger spatial network of symbols and ideologies “that is under constant construction, reconstruction, and sometimes subject to deconstruction.” In other words, *places* can work as physical sites where cultural, political, and ideological *spatial structures* can be negotiated, contested, and transformed. Endres and Senda-Cook, “Location Matters: The Rhetoric of Place in Protest,” 260.

protest. In their reading of the Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street movements, Greene and Kuswa consider “how a ‘place in protest’ . . . travels beyond its own location, pulling and pushing different places, people, and practices into ‘maps of power.’”³⁰ Although my case studies do not address place in protest, they do offer another example of how the rhetorical invocation of place (and the symbols that always already present in that place) can constitute citizen-subjects and create geopolitical realities. Speaking in place, therefore, does not mean that rhetorical acts are bound to their location. Instead, it is the very placed-ness of these rhetorical encounters that makes them ripe for mediation, circulation, and extension over time and space.³¹

³⁰ Ronald Walter Greene and Kevin Douglas Kuswa, "From the Arab Spring to Athens, From Occupy Wall Street to Moscow: Regional Accents and the Rhetorical Cartography of Power," *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 42, no. 3 (2012): 273. For more on spatial materialism and critical/cultural rhetorical approaches to space and place, see Soja, *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertation of Space in Critical Social Theory*; Greene, "Another Materialist Rhetoric"; Greene, "Rhetorical Pedagogy as a Postal System: Circulating Subjects through Michael Warner's 'Publics and Counterpublics'"; Raka Shome and Radha Hegde, "Culture, Communication, and the Challenge of Globalization," *Critical Studies in Media Communication* 19, no. 2 (2002): 172-189; Shome, "Space Matters: The Power and Practice of Space"; James Hay, "Between Cultural Materialism and Spatial Materialism: James Carey's Writing About Communication," in *Thinking with James Carey: Essays on Communications, Transportation, and History*, ed. Jeremy Packer and Craig Robertson (New York: Peter Lang, 2005), 29-55; Donovan Conley and Greg Dickinson, "Textural Democracy," *Critical Studies in Media Communication* 27, no. 1 (2010): 1-7; Greene, "Spatial Materialism: Labor, Location, and Transnational Literacy"; Ronald Walter Greene, "Rhetorical Materialism: The Rhetorical Subject and the General Intellect," in *Rhetoric, Materiality, & Politics*, ed. Barbara A. Biesecker and John Lewis Lucaites (New York, NY: Peter Lang, 2010), 43-65.

³¹ For more on rhetorical circulation, see Michael Warner, *Publics and Counterpublics* (Cambridge: Zone Books, 2002); Greene, "Rhetorical Pedagogy as a Postal System: Circulating Subjects through Michael Warner's 'Publics and Counterpublics'"; Benjamin Lee and Edward LiPuma, "Cultures of Circulation: The Imaginations of Modernity," *Public Culture* 14, no. 1 (2002): 191-213; Lester C. Olson, "Pictorial Representations of British America Resisting Rape: Rhetorical Re-Circulation of a Print Series Portraying the Boston Port Bill of 1774," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 12, no. 1 (2009): 1-35; Catherine Chaput, "Rhetorical Circulation in Late Capitalism: Neoliberalism and the Overdetermination of Affective Energy," *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 43, no. 1 (2010): 1-25; Mary E. Stuckey, "On Rhetorical Circulation," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 15, no. 4 (2012): 609-612; Darrel Allan Wanzer, "Delinking Rhetoric, or Revisiting McGee's Fragmentation Thesis through Decolonality," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 15, no. 4 (2012): 647-657; Megan Foley, "Sound Bites: Rethinking the Circulation of Speech from Fragment to Fetish," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 15, no. 4 (2012): 613-622; Stephen Heidt, "The Presidency as Pastiche: Atomization, Circulation, and Rhetorical Instability," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 15, no. 4 (2012): 623-633.

Much of the work connecting rhetoric and place focuses on the persuasive powers of certain physical sites or geographical locations—memorials, museums, public spaces—in and of themselves. Endres and Senda-Cook use the term “place-as-rhetoric” to define this approach, one that “refers to the material (physical and embodied) aspects of a place having meaning and consequence, be it through bodies, signage, buildings, fences, flags, and so on. . . . place-as-rhetoric assumes that place itself is rhetorical.”³² Put another way, “place-as-rhetoric” suggests that places have rhetorical significance—or the ability to persuade—apart from spoken discourse. Another perspective is that rhetoric constitutes and reconstitutes place even as place enables and constrains particular ways of being in the world. Kirt H. Wilson underscores this point in his work on the reconstruction desegregation debate, writing that in the Deep South, “[p]lace existed as a kind of condensation symbol; it signified a person’s identity and location within the organic communities of the South. Individual and communal, place determined the spaces that a person could occupy and how one could interact, privately or publicly, with others.”³³ Both concepts—“place-as-rhetoric” and the enabling and/or constraining function of place—are important for this dissertation. I argue that when U.S. presidents (and rhetors more broadly) situate a speech act in a geographical location central to their argument, they activate the rhetorical resonances of that place, be it the argument that

³² Endres and Senda-Cook, “Location Matters: The Rhetoric of Place in Protest,” 265.

³³ Kirt H. Wilson, *The Reconstruction Desegregation Debate: The Politics of Equality and the Rhetoric of Place, 1870-1875* (Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2002), 12. See also Kirt H. Wilson, “The Politics of Place and Presidential Rhetoric in the United States, 1875-1901,” in *Civil Rights Rhetoric and the American Presidency*, ed. James Arnt Aune and Enrique D. Rigsby (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2005), 16-40.

place makes in and of itself or the symbolic associations and limitations that place provides.

Another important aspect of rhetoric in place is how particular locations function as storehouses of public memory, places that trigger a community's remembrance of a shared history.³⁴ In fact, the very reason that a particular site or location can perform a "place-as-rhetoric" function is because it represents some trace of the past. French historian Pierre Nora's seminal work on memory studies, *Lieux de Mémoire*, grounds many of these projects. In the introduction, Nora writes, "*Lieux de mémoire* are complex things. At once natural and artificial, simple and ambiguous, concrete and abstract, they are *lieux*—places, sites, causes—in three senses: material, symbolic, and functional. . . . These three aspects of embodied memory—the material, the symbolic, and the functional—always coexist."³⁵ It is precisely the physical, tangible, touchable nature of memory places that renders them a concrete manifestation of the past. These places

³⁴ See, for example, Edward Tabor Linenthal, *Sacred Ground: Americans and Their Battlefields* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1991); John Bodnar, *Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); John R. Gillis, ed. *Commemorations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); Steven H. Browne, "Reading, Rhetoric, and the Texture of Public Memory," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 81, no. 2 (1995): 237-265; Nora, *Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past*; Blair, "Contemporary U.S. Memorial Sites as Exemplars of Rhetoric's Materiality"; Edward S. Casey, *Remembering: A Phenomenological Study* 2nd ed. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2000); Blair, "Reflections on Criticism and Bodies: Parables from Public Places"; Edward S. Casey, "Public Memory in Place and Time," in *Framing Public Memory*, ed. Kendall R. Phillips (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2004), 17-44; Kendall R. Phillips, ed. *Framing Public Memory* (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2004); Benjamin Hufbauer, *Presidential Temples: How Memorials and Libraries Shape Public Memory* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005); Denise M. Bostdorff and Steven R. Goldzwig, "History, Collective Memory, and the Appropriation of Martin Luther King, Jr.: Reagan's Rhetorical Legacy," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 4 (2005): 661-690; Blair, Dickinson, and Ott, "Introduction: Rhetoric/Memory/Place"; Balthrop, Blair, and Michel, "The Presence of the Present: Hijacking 'The Good War'"; Dickinson, Blair, and Ott, *Places of Public Memory*; Bradford Vivian, *Public Forgetting: The Rhetoric and Politics of Beginning Again* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010); Kendall R. Phillips and G. Mitchell Reyes, eds., *Global Memoryscapes: Contesting Remembrance in a Transnational Age* (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2011).

³⁵ Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History," in *Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past*, ed. Pierre Nora (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 14.

become sites “in which memory is crystalized, in which it finds refuge. . . . in which a residual sense of continuity remains.”³⁶ Similarly, Edward S. Casey argues that place “is integral to public memory” because being in place facilitates the very act of remembering and, at times, even “embodies the memory itself.”³⁷ For Casey, places provide an “active material inducement . . . drawing out the appropriate memories in that location.”³⁸ Both Nora and Casey suggest that being in a particular location activates the memories we associate with that place. Thus, when U.S. presidents speak *in situ*, they harness the symbolic resonances of their speech setting while simultaneously contributing new memories to that place. In the chapters that follow, I consider how Truman, Kennedy, and Reagan used their rhetoric *in situ* to appropriate the material and symbolic elements of their location as a means of evidence. By speaking in place, these presidents harnessed the memories and ideologies associated with the Lincoln Memorial, West Berlin, and Normandy as inducement for their specific proposals.

Because places are “always already rhetorical” and “assume an identity precisely in being recognizable—as named, bordered, and invented in particular ways,” it is critical to recognize that U.S. presidents play a central role in constituting geopolitical realities and, in this instance, the dominant narrative of the Cold War.³⁹ When presidents speak in or about place, they legitimize that place and give it credence on the world stage. Cultural geographers Gearóid Ó Tuathail and John Agnew argue that the simple act of describing “a foreign-policy problem is to engage in geopolitics, for one is implicitly and tacitly

³⁶ Nora, “Between Memory and History,” 1.

³⁷ Casey, “Public Memory in Place and Time,” 32.

³⁸ Casey, “Public Memory in Place and Time,” 32.

³⁹ Blair, Dickinson, and Ott, “Introduction: Rhetoric/Memory/Place,” 24.

normalizing a particular world. One could describe geopolitical reasoning as the creation of the backdrop or setting upon which ‘international politics’ takes place but such would be a simplistic view. The creating of such a setting is itself a part of world politics.”⁴⁰ For rhetorical scholars this point is particularly important. Describing, characterizing, or naming a place does much more than create a backdrop for a speech act or even define the symbolic significance of the place itself. When U.S. presidents speak *in situ* and link their rhetorical act to the symbols that are always already present in place, they contribute to the “dramas, subjects, histories and dilemmas” that are always already present in that particular location.⁴¹

Although most studies focus on the rhetoricity of the place itself, several works highlight an under-theorized dimension of the relationship between rhetoric and place: how a speaker can rely on and even exploit various aspects of the speech setting such as the position of the speaker in relation to the audience, the physical construction of the stage, and other physical aspects of the geography or design that characterize the near environment of the delivery space. In a 2001 article published in *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*, Roxanne Mountford argued for a critical examination of what she termed “rhetorical space”:

Rhetorical space is the geography of a communicative event and, like all landscapes, may include both the cultural and material arrangement,

⁴⁰ Ó Tuathail and Agnew, "Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy," 194.

⁴¹ Ó Tuathail and Agnew note that within “American geopolitics” specifically, the president is “the chief *bricoleur* of American political life, a combination of storyteller and tribal shaman” with “the power to describe, represent, interpret and appropriate.” Ó Tuathail and Agnew, "Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy," 194, 195-196.

whether intended or fortuitous, of space. The cultural is the grid across which we measure and interpret space, but also the nexus from which creative minds manipulate material space. The material—a dimension too little theorized by rhetoricians—often has unforeseen influence over a communicative event and cannot always be explained by cultural or creative intent.⁴²

Here Mountford emphasizes the rhetorical significance of the material arrangement of the speech setting, arguing that this “rhetorical space” reflects “a physical representation of relationships and ideas.”⁴³ This approach is helpful because it suggests that orators can fuse verbal discourse with what is materially real by referring to physical objects, bodies, and spaces within the speaking environment—objects, bodies, and spaces that condition the invention and reception of public address.

Speaking in place, however, involves more than being somewhere physically. Instead, it suggests that the place or location of a speech act becomes a scenic and symbolic backdrop that is both verbal and visual. This visual component of presidential rhetoric in place is crucially important for this project, for, as each of my case studies demonstrates, the visuals associated with rhetoric *in situ* are profoundly rhetorical. When the president speaks in a certain place or location, we see him. He performs on a stage, whether metaphorical or literal, before an audience that is either physically or virtually

⁴² Mountford, “On Gender and Rhetorical Space,” 42.

⁴³ Mountford, “On Gender and Rhetorical Space,” 42. Another scholar who employs Mountford’s notion of rhetorical space, Christopher Reid, considers how the arrangement of podiums, gavels, desks, and bodies in the British House of Commons suggested certain hierarchical relationships between Members of Parliament (MPs). Reid extends Mountford’s work when he describes how MPs invoked cultural and political memories located in that space by gesturing towards or pointing to objects and bodies through their speech. See Reid, *Imprison’d Wranglers: The Rhetorical Culture of the House of Commons, 1760-1800*.

present.⁴⁴ Throughout this dissertation, I approach my case studies as texts that are simultaneously verbal, visual, and material, rhetorical acts made up of what is spoken, seen, and immediate to the senses. In that vein, I find Cara Finnegan's description of the visual rhetoric project particularly helpful in thinking about how to analyze the rhetorical act in its textual, visual, and material totality. She writes,

The visual rhetoric project relies upon critiques of vision and visibility to illuminate the complex dynamics of power and knowledge at play in and around images. It embraces the complexities of the relationships between images and texts and argues that visual images should not be artificially separated from texts for analysis. And it seeks a "recovery" of the image that avoids the privileging of language over image, of verbal over visual. The goal of the visual rhetoric project, then, is to determine how visual images participate in public discourse—to understand in a historically specific, systematic fashion how images become inventional resources for public argument.⁴⁵

Here Finnegan stresses the complex and interwoven relationship between the verbal and the visual.⁴⁶ As I will detail more fully in the next chapter and demonstrate through my

⁴⁴ Similarly, David Zarefsky observes that a text of presidential rhetoric "refers not only to the words the president speaks but to the entirety of the presidential performance. For example, the fact that a State of the Union address is delivered to a joint session of Congress, with the president appearing before a giant U.S. flag in the chamber of the House of Representatives, is as much a part of his speech as are the words he speaks." Zarefsky, "Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition," 609.

⁴⁵ Cara A. Finnegan, "Documentary as Art in U.S. Camera," *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 31, no. 2 (2001): 39-40.

⁴⁶ For more on this important relationship and visual rhetoric more broadly, see Paul Messaris, *Visual "Literacy": Image, Mind, and Reality* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); W.J.T. Mitchell, *Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1994); Paul Messaris, *Visual Persuasion: The Role of Images in Advertising* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1997); Keith V. Erickson, "Presidential Rhetoric's Visual Turn: Performance Fragments and the Politics of Illusionism," *Communication Monographs* 67, no. 2 (2000): 138-157; Cara A. Finnegan, *Picturing Poverty: Print Culture and FSA Photographs* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Books, 2003);

three case studies, presidential rhetoric in place activates the material realities of the rhetorical situation as a means of evidence—including the visuals that accompany their body in place. When presidents speak *in situ*, the placement of their presidential body within a particular location triggers not only the symbolic dimensions of that place, but it also provides visual images to the immediate and extended audience of how and why that particular place is significant rhetorically. In turn, as images of the president speaking in place circulate in the United States and around the world via newspaper coverage, television, cable news, and the Internet, the president's rhetorical act extends beyond spoken discourse. It becomes a text that is simultaneously verbal and visual, one that circulates *in place* while simultaneously moving *through place* to (re)constitute the rhetorical significance of that place for present and future action.

Where many studies of visual rhetoric focus particularly on the rhetoricity of visual images themselves, this project analyzes how presidential presence in place works persuasively precisely because it is both verbal and visual. In the chapters that follow, I argue that Truman, Kennedy, and Reagan used their physical *placement* at the Lincoln Memorial, the Rudolph Wilde Platz in West Berlin, and the beaches of Normandy to

Cara A. Finnegan, "Review Essay: Visual Studies and Visual Rhetoric," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 90, no. 2 (2004): 234-256; Charles A. Hill and Marguerite Helmers, eds., *Defining Visual Rhetorics* (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 2004); Cara A. Finnegan, "Recognizing Lincoln: Image Vernaculars in Nineteenth-Century Visual Culture," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 8, no. 1 (2005): 31-57; Finnegan and Barbour, "Visualizing Public Address; Cara A. Finnegan, "What Is This a Picture Of?: Some Thoughts on Images and Archives," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 9, no. 1 (2006): 116-123; Robert Hariman and John Lewis Lucaites, *No Caption Needed: Iconic Photographs, Public Culture, and Liberal Democracy* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2007); Davi Johnson, "Martin Luther King Jr.'s 1963 Birmingham Campaign as Image Event," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 10, no. 1 (2007): 1-26; Lester C. Olson, Cara A. Finnegan, and Diane S. Hope, "Visual Rhetoric in Communication: Continuing Questions and Contemporary Issues," in *Visual Rhetoric: A Reader in Communication and American Culture*, ed. Lester C. Olson, Cara A. Finnegan, and Diane S. Hope (Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 2008); Paul Messaris, "Review Essay: What's Visual about 'Visual Rhetoric'?", *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 95, no. 2 (2009): 210-223; Cara A. Finnegan, *Making Photography Matter: A Viewer's History from the Civil War to the Great Depression* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2015).

amplify the symbolic dimensions of these particular locations while constituting the United States' presence on the world stage as a global leader. Presidential presence in place, therefore, is not only physical; it is inherently symbolic. Each of my three case studies is unique, not only because they deal with three different U.S. presidents and particular rhetorical exigencies, but because they also represent distinct moments in the transformation of mediated presidential discourse and in the Cold War struggle between U.S. democracy and Soviet communism. However, all three chapters provide important theoretical and methodological insights into the ways that critics must analyze how visual images address publics while also considering how publics visualize the various dimensions of presidential rhetoric in place.

The Cold War Commonplace

As U.S. presidents engaged in Cold War rhetoric in favor of U.S. democracy and against Soviet communism, they frequently used metaphorical and ideological interpretations of the world to motivate civic action and broad national support for U.S. policies at home and abroad.⁴⁷ According to Lynn Boyd Hinds and Theodore Otto Windt,

⁴⁷ For more on the Cold War from a rhetorical perspective, see, for example, John F. Cragan, "The Origins and Nature of the Cold War Rhetorical Vision 1946-1972," in *Applied Communication Research: A Dramatic Approach*, ed. John F. Cragan and Donald C. Shields (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, Inc., 1981); Wayne Brockriede and Robert L. Scott, *Moments in the Rhetoric of the Cold War* (New York, NY: Random House, 1970); G. Thomas Goodnight, "Ronald Reagan's Re - Formulation of the Rhetoric of War: Analysis of the "Zero Option," "Evil Empire," and "Star Wars" Addresses," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 72, no. 4 (1986): 390-414; Martin J. Medhurst, "Rhetoric and Cold War: A Strategic Approach," in *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst, et al. (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1990), 19-27; Martin J. Medhurst et al., eds., *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1990); Lynn Boyd Hinds and Theodore Otto Windt, *The Cold War as Rhetoric: The Beginnings, 1945-1950* (New York, NY: Praeger, 1991); Shawn J. Parry-Giles, "Rhetorical Experimentation and the Cold War, 1947-1953: The Development of an Internationalist Approach to Propaganda," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 80, no. 4 (1994): 448-467; Mary E. Stuckey, "Competing Foreign Policy Visions: Rhetorical Hybrids after the

the Cold War was “a rhetorically constructed ideological reality that was first accepted within the ruling circles of government, then publicly conveyed through major speeches and writings to Americans who generally accepted it as the reality of both foreign and domestic politics.”⁴⁸ Yet this “rhetorically constructed ideological reality” was reinforced by the metaphorical and the literal. As Martin J. Medhurst writes,

Cold War, like its “hot” counterpart, is a contest. It is a contest between competing systems as represented, for example, by the Soviet Union and the United States. It is a contest involving such tangibles as geography, markets, spheres of influence, and military alliances, as well as such intangibles as public opinion, attitudes, images, expectations, and beliefs about whatever system is currently in ascendancy. The contest, in other words, is both material and psychological in nature. The currency of Cold War combat—the tokens used in the contest—is rhetorical discourse: discourse intentionally designed to achieve a particular goal with one or more specific audience. While the weapons of a hot

Cold War," *Western Journal of Communication* 59, no. 3 (1995): 214-227; Ernest G. Bormann, John F. Cragan, and Donald C. Shields, "An Expansion of the Rhetorical Vision Component of the Symbolic Convergence Theory: The Cold War Paradigm Case," *Communication Monographs* 63, no. 1 (1996): 1-28; Martin J. Medhurst, "Afterword: Rhetorical Perspectives on the Cold War," in *Critical Reflections on the Cold War: Linking Rhetoric and History*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst and H.W. Brands (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2000); Shawn J. Parry-Giles, *The Rhetorical Presidency, Propaganda, and the Cold War, 1945-1955* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002); Denise M. Bostdorff, *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: A Cold War Call to Arms* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2008); Timothy Barney, "Power Lines: The Rhetoric of Maps as Social Change in the Post-Cold War Landscape," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 95, no. 4 (2009): 412-434; Ned O'Gorman, "'The One Word the Kremlin Fears': C.D. Jackson, Cold War 'Liberation,' and American Political-Economic Adventurism," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 12, no. 3 (2009): 389-427; Ned O'Gorman, *Spirits of the Cold War: Contesting Worldviews in the Classical Age of American Security Strategy* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2011); Timothy Barney, "'Gulag'-Slavery, Inc.: The Power of Place and the Rhetorical Life of a Cold War Map," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 16, no. 2 (2013): 317-353; Timothy Barney, "Diagnosing the Third World: The 'Map Doctor' and the Spatialized Discourses of Disease and Development in the Cold War," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 100, no. 1 (2014): 1-30; Ned O'Gorman, *The Iconoclastic Imagination: Image, Catastrophe, and Economy in America from the Kennedy Assassination to September 11* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2016).

⁴⁸ Hinds and Windt, *The Cold War as Rhetoric: The Beginnings, 1945-1950*, 5.

war are guns, bombs, missiles, and the like, Cold War weapons are words, images, symbolic actions, and, on occasion, physical actions undertaken by covert means. For the most part, however, Cold War is a matter of symbolic action, action intended to forward the accomplishment of strategic goals—social, political, economic, military, or diplomatic.⁴⁹

Medhurst's description of Cold War rhetorical discourse helpfully articulates the relationship between metaphorical representations of the U.S.-Soviet conflict and specific tangible instantiations of this clash. Because the Cold War was a war of words, images, and movements, I argue that presidential rhetoric in place functioned as a rhetorical move that was both material and symbolic.

In this section, I discuss how classical and contemporary perspectives of the *topos* support a view of the commonplace that is both conceptual (a place one can go to find or discover the right argument for a specific situation) and physically real. This approach, I argue, extends not only our understanding of the *topos* in relation to the rhetoricity of place, but also reveals how U.S. presidents speak in place to build conceptual and literal storehouses for the ideological metaphors, analogies, and networks of shared meaning. In the analysis chapters that follow, I argue that Harry S. Truman, John F. Kennedy, and Ronald Reagan spoke at the Lincoln Memorial, the Rudolph Wilde Platz in West Berlin, and the beaches of Normandy to activate the symbolism embedded in the rhetorical history of that place even as they (re)constituted that place as a metaphorical and literal instantiation of the United States' place in the world at three distinct moments during the Cold War. Ultimately, I argue that these U.S. presidents used their speech to activate the

⁴⁹ Medhurst, "Rhetoric and Cold War: A Strategic Approach," 19.

memories, symbols, and ideologies housed within these commonplaces as a material means of persuasion.

Within classical rhetorical theory, the idea of a topic (Greek *topos*, which literally means “place” in Greek) or the commonplace (*locis communis* in Latin) referred to specific metaphorical place or “seat” where rhetors could find argumentative resources.⁵⁰ As Sharon Crowley and Debra Hawhee explain, “this graphic meaning of *place* was applied conceptually, to mean an intellectual source or region harboring a proof that could be inserted into any discourse where appropriate.”⁵¹ In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle used the term to describe particular metaphorical locations where a speaker could look for arguments.⁵² George A. Kennedy explains that for Aristotle, *topos* suggested “metaphorically [the] location or space in an art (more literally perhaps the place in a handbook) where a speaker can look for ‘available means of persuasion,’” and also notes that prior to Aristotle, the term “may also already have been used in mnemonic theory of the physical setting against which an object or idea could be remembered.”⁵³ For Aristotle, notes Ralph Citrón, the topics provided “a flexible set of mental procedures that could be applied to any issue at hand so as to generate a more rigorous dialectics and

⁵⁰ For broad histories of *topos* and the commonplace, see Richard McKeon, “Creativity and the Commonplace,” *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 6, no. 4 (1973): 199-210; Heinrich F. Plett, “Rhetoric and Intertextuality,” *Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric* 17, no. 3 (1999): 313-329; Lynette Hunter, ed. *Toward a Definition of Topos: Approaches to Analogical Reasoning* (London: MacMillan, 1991).

⁵¹ Sharon Crowley and Debra Hawhee, *Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students* 4th ed. (New York, NY: Pearson Longman, 2009), 117.

⁵² Aristotle, *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*, trans. George A. Kennedy 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 1.2.

⁵³ Aristotle, *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*, George Kennedy commentary, 45. Edward S. Casey writes that Aristotle saw place “not as an empty and endless space but as an embracing Place, filled to the brim with snugly fitting proper places. The firmament that encircles the world-whole is at once a paradigm for all lesser places and filled with these very same places. Everything, or almost everything, is in place. To be an existing sensible thing is never not to be in some place.” Casey, *The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History*, 71.

better logic and, if possible, proof in different disciplines.”⁵⁴ Notice here that Aristotle’s emphasis, at least as interpreted by Citrón, was on assembling stock arguments, an approach that left little room for rhetorical invention.⁵⁵

Later rhetoricians made similar criticisms of Aristotle’s topical system. Cicero was careful to emphasize that commonplaces were to be relatively abstract and thus applicable to a wide variety of rhetorical situations. As James M. May and Jakob Wisse observe, Cicero “repeatedly reject[ed] the practice of providing lists of standard arguments (‘commonplaces’ or ‘topics’)” and instead suggested “‘commonplaces’ of a different kind: abstract argument patterns, which help the orator to devise all his arguments himself.”⁵⁶ This approach encouraged orators to draw on the commonplaces as an inventional resource, not a rigid set of rules for each and every occasion.⁵⁷ Richard McKeon writes that Quintilian, like Cicero,

complained that many orators made collections of sayings and arguments

concerning subjects likely to recur in the practice of their art instead of fortifying

⁵⁴ Ralph Citrón, "Democracy and Its Limitations," in *The Public Work of Rhetoric: Citizen-Scholars and Civic Engagement*, ed. John M. Ackerman and David J. Coogan (Columbia, SC: The University of South Carolina Press, 2010), 100.

⁵⁵ Lane Cooper, a professor of English literature at Cornell University from 1902-1943, offers another view of Aristotle’s use of *topos*, explaining, “To Aristotle *topos* means a place, and when with him it is a live metaphor, he thinks of a place in which the hunter will hunt for game. If you wish to hunt rabbits, you go to a place where rabbits are; and so with deer or with pheasants. Each kind of game has its haunt to which you go when you wish to fetch that sort of creature out. And similarly with arguments. They are of different kinds, and the different kinds are found in different places, from which they may be drawn. . . . When the speaker has informed himself, there will be a place in his mind—‘in the back of his head’—to which he can go for what he wants. . . . A good writer or speaker, constantly learning, has a full, well-ordered mind; his memory is charged with living forms; and in it he usually can find what he needs. At all events, when he seeks for an argument he will know where to look in his own mind or in the mind of another.” Lane Cooper, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle* (New York, NY: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1932), xxiv-xxv.

⁵⁶ James M. May and Jakob Wisse, "Introduction," in *Cicero: On the Ideal Orator (De Oratore)*, ed. James M. May and Jakob Wisse (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001), 34.

⁵⁷ For more on Roman perspectives of the commonplace, see Michael Leff, "Up from Theory: Or I Fought the Topoi and the Topoi Won," *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 36, no. 2 (2006): 203-211; Michael C. Leff, "The Topics of Argumentative Invention in Latin Rhetorical Theory from Cicero to Boethius," *Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric* 1, no. 1 (1983): 23-44; McKeon, "Creativity and the Commonplace."

themselves with places by which to discover new arguments that had never occurred to them before. Commonplaces were memorized rather than used for invention, and they were recited when the occasion arose rather than used when the circumstances required.⁵⁸

For Quintilian, the *topoi* or commonplaces lost their persuasive value when orators simply deployed them without any thought to the particular needs of the rhetorical situation.

More recent work in rhetorical scholarship reveals how commonplaces offer rhetors a creative means of rhetorical invention even as they reflect the *doxa* of a particular group or community. Christa J. Olson underscores this connection when she defines the *topoi* as “nodes of social value and common sense that provide places of return for convening arguments across changing circumstances.”⁵⁹ Following Ralph Citrón’s discussion of *topoi* as “storehouses of social energy. . . . [that] organize our sentiments, beliefs, and actions in the lifeworld,”⁶⁰ Olson writes:

Those content-filled storehouses allow actors from a wide range of subject positions to bring a shared sense of the world “before the eyes” of the publics they convene. . . . [T]his understanding of the commonplace makes it particularly applicable to the material and symbolic constitutions of national life. The very idea of the nation relies on expansive, layered commonplaces that appear to preexist any given rhetorical moment but are also generated from each use in

⁵⁸ McKeon, “Creativity and the Commonplace,” 201.

⁵⁹ Olson, *Constitutive Visions: Indigeneity and Commonplaces of National Identity in Republican Ecuador*, 6.

⁶⁰ Citrón, “Democracy and Its Limitations,” 100.

context. Understanding the commonplaces of nationalism, then, requires seeking out those topics and topoi that, as Citrón suggests, “have sufficient *umpha* to actualize the body politic.”⁶¹

This view of the commonplace suggests that citizens identify with and return to certain metaphors, enthymemes, and, following Cicero, “seats” of arguments that describe and define who they are as a people. It is this shared understanding that makes the commonplace a metaphorical and physical place reflecting the *sensus communis*—the “common sense that is shared among members of a community” and easily recognized by the body politic.⁶² As Crowley and Hawhee observe, “[t]he distinguishing characteristic of a commonplace is that it is commonly believed by members of a community. These beliefs are ‘common’ not because they are cheap or trivial but because they are shared ‘in common’ by many people.”⁶³ In this view, topoi not only reflect and even embody shared values, but they can also provide a space in which and from which the orator can uncover all the available means of persuasion the rhetorical situation requires, whether these exist within the mind of the speaker or within the material realities of the rhetorical situation—a physical, locatable, definite place.

Building on these discussions of topoi and commonplaces from classical and contemporary rhetorical theory, I argue that rhetorical scholars should conceptualize topoi not simply as metaphorical places where rhetors can find arguments, but as material locations that function as arguments in and of themselves. If we take seriously the idea

⁶¹ Olson, *Constitutive Visions: Indigeneity and Commonplaces of National Identity in Republican Ecuador*, 8.

⁶² Crowley and Hawhee, *Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students*, 128.

⁶³ Crowley and Hawhee, *Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students*, 20-21.

that “location matters” and that places offer a unique form of rhetorical action, than it makes perfect sense to conceptualize the topoi as “seats” of argument that are both metaphorical and physically real.⁶⁴ If certain locales can activate and even embody communal memories, then certainly these places offer a conceptual and material schema from which rhetors can speak to, for, and about the broader community.⁶⁵ Carolyn R. Miller conceptualizes the commonplace in this vein, describing the topos as “a space, or a located perspective, *from* which one searches,” a place that is “particularly rich in connectivity to other significant or highly connected points. . . . [points that] can serve as intellectual tools that yield new viewpoints.”⁶⁶ For William L. Nothstine, topos “can suggest not simply location of objects separate and independent from the self, but rather *the situation of the self within a world of things and possibilities*. The ‘place’ metaphor may refer to *a position affording a particular point of view, a perspective, from which one regards one’s world*. This ontological metaphor places the individual at the center of a horizon, defined by a unique, but necessarily limited, viewpoint.”⁶⁷ Both Miller and Nothstine emphasize the creative work a rhetor does to *search within* and *speak from* “a space,” “a located perspective,” of “the situation of the self within a world of things and

⁶⁴ Endres and Senda-Cook, “Location Matters: The Rhetoric of Place in Protest.”

⁶⁵ Similarly, Greg Dickinson underscores the spatial connotations of the commonplace, writing, “Conceptualized as the starting place of rhetoric, as the place that contains necessary rhetorical resources, or as the lines of argument that can structure rhetoric, topos suggests that rhetorical performances are structured by and built out of existing resources. . . . In spite of the obvious connections to material place encoded into the term, topos is not often imagined as a material place to which rhetors go to find rhetorical resources. Instead, it is a conceptual way of helping rhetors memorize and store common and special argumentative forms. In this sense, topos is related to the architectural mnemonics so important to classical, medieval, and Renaissance rhetorical theory and practice.” Greg Dickinson, *Suburban Dreams: Imagining and Building the Good Life* (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 2015), 2-3.

⁶⁶ Carolyn R. Miller, “The Aristotelian *Topos*: Hunting for Novelty,” in *Rereading Aristotle’s Rhetoric*, ed. Alan G. Gross and Arthur E. Walzer (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2000), 141, 142.

⁶⁷ William L. Nothstine, “‘Topics’ as Ontological Metaphor in Contemporary Rhetorical Theory and Criticism,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 74, no. 2 (1988): 155 (emphasis mine).

possibilities.” Positioning oneself within this conceptual space or physical place suggests that the orator has identified that location as particularly persuasive. Indeed, as Scott Consigny argues, topos functions “both as instrument and situation; the instrument *with* which the rhetor thinks and the realm in and *about which* he thinks.”⁶⁸ And, I would add, *from which* the orator speaks, for speaking in place is a rhetorical choice in itself, a persuasive strategy rhetors adopt to amplify the symbolic dimensions of that place through speech while simultaneously contributing new meanings to that particular location.

Throughout this project, I argue that Truman, Kennedy, and Reagan used their rhetoric in place to constitute the Lincoln Memorial, West Berlin, and Normandy as metaphorical and literal commonplaces of U.S. democracy during the Cold War, locations that provided a physical instantiation of U.S. Cold War ideology. As the first section of this chapter discussed, the U.S. president is uniquely qualified to speak to and for the nation. “The President has become the nation’s chief storyteller,” writes Mary E. Stuckey, “its interpreter-in-chief. He tells us stories about ourselves, and in so doing he tells us what sort of people we are, how we are constituted as a community. We take from him not only our policies but our national self-identity.”⁶⁹ As part of this interpretative, story-telling role, the president draws on lessons of the past to make sense of the present and future. By returning to the commonplace—understood both as a conceptual storehouse and a physical locale—the U.S. president “open[s] up the perception of new meanings and applications even in a familiar text [or place], which in turn uncovers

⁶⁸ Scott Consigny, “Rhetoric and Its Situations,” *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 7, no. 3 (1974): 182.

⁶⁹ Mary E. Stuckey, *The President as Interpreter-In-Chief* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1991), 1.

previously unperceived lines of arguments to unnoticed conclusions which were not there until they were made facts by discovery.”⁷⁰ In each of my case studies, when the president spoke in place, he pointed his audience toward the familiar features of that location (and what that place had previously symbolized) while also introducing new “lines of argument” based upon the exigencies of the moment. Perhaps, then, studying U.S. presidential rhetoric in place at these distinct historical moments reveals the ways in which *topoi* are both metaphorical and literal seats of argument, places commonly shared and well-known and yet ripe for rhetorical (re)appropriation.

Guiding Assumptions and Outline of Chapters

In this introductory chapter, I have examined the rhetorical significance of presidential rhetoric in place. This discussion has focused on the unique ability U.S. presidents have to amplify the symbolic dimensions of a particular location, the rhetorical dimensions of places in and of themselves, the importance of visualizing presidential rhetoric in place, and the rhetorical salience of the Cold War commonplace. Before previewing my three case studies, I want to outline the motivating assumptions guiding this project. Although I engage these questions and assumptions more directly in the chapters that follow, it is important to articulate these claims as a starting points from which I build my argument. They are organized under six conceptual areas or schemas: place, the presidency, *topoi* or commonplaces, mediation and circulation, rhetoric *in situ*, and a rhetorical theory of deixis.

⁷⁰ McKeon, "Creativity and the Commonplace," 209.

Presidential invocations of place build upon prior symbolic resonances even as they (re)appropriate such resonances for present and future purposes. To study presidential rhetoric in place requires critics to consider the rhetorical history of the place *itself*⁷¹ before attending to the traditional contextual elements of a rhetorical act (e.g., analyzing the rhetor's persona and rhetorical goals, consulting archival materials related to the planning, writing, and delivery of the speech, and the specific historical exigencies to which the rhetor was responding). Critically analyzing how certain geographic locations (such as the Lincoln Memorial, West Berlin, and the beaches of Normandy) have functioned persuasively throughout history reveals how places condition rhetorical acts even as rhetoric in place shapes, refashions, and even transforms the symbolic significance of that particular location.

Presidential presence and oratorical performance in place amplify the rhetorical dimensions of that location even as the physical speech setting contributes to the president's own authority and ethos. Presidential presence in place—as expressed in and through presidential *ethos*, rhetorical authority, and physical embodiment—works rhetorically and does not necessarily require spoken discourse to be persuasive. When we see the president in a particular location, the simple fact that he is there suggests that this particular occasion (and this place) is important enough to warrant his attention. Of

⁷¹ For more on doing rhetorical history, see Bruce E. Gronbeck, "Rhetorical History and Rhetorical Criticism: A Distinction," *The Speech Teacher* 24, no. 4 (1975): 309-320; Kathleen J. Turner, "Rhetorical History as Social Construction: The Challenge and the Promise," in *Doing Rhetorical History: Concepts and Cases*, ed. Kathleen J. Turner (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 1998), 1-15; David Zarefsky, "Four Senses of Rhetorical History," in *Doing Rhetorical History*, ed. Kathleen J. Turner (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 1998), 19-32; E. Culpepper Clark and Ramie E. McKerrow, "The Rhetorical Construction of Hstory," in *Doing Rhetorical History*, ed. Kathleen J. Turner (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1998), 33-46; Bruce E. Gronbeck, "The Rhetorics of the Past: History, Argument, and Collective Memory," in *Doing Rhetorical History*, ed. Kathleen J. Turner (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1998), 47-60.

course, presidential rhetoric amplifies the importance of a chief executive's physical presence. But even if a president never opens his mouth, the very fact that he is *there* says something (although inaudibly) about the merits of this event, audience, and moment in time. Moreover, because U.S. presidents speak to, for, and on behalf of the U.S. public, they are uniquely qualified to activate, constitute, and (re)define the memories, symbols, and ideologies located in place. As such, there is a co-constitutive relationship between presidential authority and the rhetorical potentialities of place. U.S. presidents speak in place to harness the symbolic power of that location as a material means of persuasion and to bolster their own rhetorical authority and *ethos* on the national and global stage.

When U.S. presidents travel to and speak from a place, they constitute civic commonplaces that are physically real, using their presidential authority to transform what was once a symbolic conceptual resource into a literal storehouse of shared values, ideologies, and ways of being in the world. Understanding the commonplace (or *topos*) as both metaphorical and literal enables critics to uncover how physical places can function as “seats” of argument, sites that offer rhetors the opportunity to uncover networks of meaning that change over time and yet remain rooted in place.⁷² If the commonplace provides particular discursive resources when orators speak about shared values and ideals, putting the *topoi* in place requires a reexamination of the particular places—sites, memorials, geographic locations—that represent and re-present these shared values and ideals to the body politic.

The mediation and circulation of presidential rhetoric in place fuses spoken discourse with the physical and material elements of the speech setting. When

⁷² Olson, *Constitutive Visions: Indigeneity and Commonplaces of National Identity in Republican Ecuador*.

presidential rhetoric extends beyond the immediate geographic location and moment in time and is circulated through radio, newspaper, television, and/or the Internet, audiences literally “see” the speech setting as an irreducible element of the rhetorical act—whether or not the rhetorical act happened yesterday or fifty years ago. Although the specific features and functions of this circulation change based on the mediated technologies available at the time, a critical reading of presidential rhetoric in place must consider how these texts circulate in and through place, over time, and to various publics.

Rhetoric in situ provides a conceptual storehouse—a commonplace—for organizing these separate but interrelated themes of place, presidential presence, and mediation and circulation.⁷³ The phrase *in situ* comes from the Latin “situ,” a term that means “place, situated, present.” It also suggests an intentionality behind where a person, object, or thing is located or placed.⁷⁴ To be *in situ* is to be in one’s own place; to put a thing or object *in situ* is to return it to its original place.⁷⁵ Today, art historians use the phrase to describe a work of art designed for a specific location, a place that highlights the qualities or attributes the artist wishes to feature. As I use the phrase throughout this project, rhetoric *in situ* signals the importance of where a rhetorical act occurs and assumes that locating a speech act in a particular place is a rhetorical choice in itself—a

⁷³ I am grateful to Art Walzer and Richard Graff for helping me think through this concept. For more on “in situ” as it relates to classical rhetoric, see Richard Graff and Christopher Johnstone, “Greek Rhetoric In Situ: Reconstructing Ancient Sites of Oratorical Performance,” keynote address at the American Society for the History of Rhetoric Symposium, Philadelphia, PA, May 25, 2012. For recent discussions of in situ criticism as a field method, see Michael K. Middleton, Samantha Senda-Cook, and Danielle Endres, “Articulating Rhetorical Field Methods: Challenges and Tensions,” *Western Journal of Communication* 75, no. 4 (2011): 386-406.

⁷⁴ Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, s.v. “Situ,” *A Latin Dictionary* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879), accessed March 18, 2016, <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l=situ&la=la#lexicon>.

⁷⁵ *Oxford English Dictionary*, s.v. “in situ, prep.,” accessed March 18, 2016, <http://www.oed.com.ezp1.lib.umn.edu/view/Entry/92971>.

means of invention. It suggests that the rhetorical act defines and, in some cases is defined by, the cultural and political symbols and memories associated with that place. The phrase suggests that, just as rhetoric is placed and works rhetorically to transform a place, a rhetor can also draw on the physical and material elements of the speech setting to harness the power of place as a persuasive strategy. It communicates the idea that rhetorical acts respond to, negotiate with, (re)appropriate, and even transform the places in which rhetors speak. And finally, rhetoric *in situ* reminds the critic that all rhetorical acts are situated and performative—that is, they are emplaced.

An analysis of rhetoric as designed for and delivered in place requires a theoretical and methodological intervention that accounts for the variety of ways speakers use language to activate the material realities of the rhetorical situation and link text with context. As I detail more fully in chapter two, a rhetorical theory of deixis draws on the principles of close textual criticism to analyze how the relational, spatial, and temporal coordinates of a speech act—both the symbolic coordinates within the text and the tangible bodies, locations, and times that comprise the physical speech situation—constitute a shared social world that is both linguistically constructed and also materially real. Identifying the deictic references within an orator’s speech act provides tangible evidence of the historical events, social relationships, symbolic places, shared communities, and dimensions of temporality the rhetor invokes through speech. This approach allows the critic to identify where and how the speakers use language to activate the scenic or situational elements of the immediate historical and socio-political

context for their persuasive purposes while uncovering how oratorical texts activate, operate within, and speak through their contexts.

A common thread connecting each of these assumptions is my interest in uncovering the variety of ways that U.S. presidents speak in place, exposing how immediate and extended audiences (both U.S. citizens and those in other countries around the world) interpret these *in situ* performances, and determining what exactly makes presidential rhetoric in place rhetorically persuasive. More broadly, however, these guiding principles offer important insights for close textual criticism, rhetorical theory, U.S. presidential rhetoric, and spatial theory in that they push the critic to reconsider the relationships between text, context, materiality, and place. In the chapters that follow, I build on these concepts to argue that presidential rhetoric *in situ* was a particularly effective weapon in the ideological struggle between U.S. democracy and Soviet communism. Chapter two outlines the theoretical and methodological approach I take in this project. Drawing on scholarship from classical rhetorical theory and linguistics, I argue toward a rhetorical theory of deixis, an approach that interrogates how speakers employ language to activate the scenic elements of the physical speech situation and linguistically bond text and context. This orientation provides a framework for identifying how orators “access . . . the context of speech at the moment of utterance” and thus invite their audiences to fuse the spoken text with its relational, spatial, and temporal contexts.⁷⁶ Ultimately, this perspective pushes scholars to consider the ways in which these elements of context—bodies, places, temporalities, objects, and sensations—provide a material

⁷⁶ William F. Hanks, "The Indexical Ground of Deictic Reference," in *Rethinking Context: Language as an Interactive Phenomenon*, ed. Alessandro Duranti and Charles Goodwin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 61.

means of persuasion when activated in and through speech. I then turn my attention to my three case studies.

In chapter three, I analyze Harry Truman's June 29, 1947, speech to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) at the closing session of their 38th annual conference. Speaking from the steps of the Lincoln Memorial, Truman stated that the United States had a moral duty to extend the full benefits of citizenship to all U.S. Americans, regardless of race, color, religion, or creed. But Truman's speech was more than a domestic appeal. It was an argument for maintaining the United States' leadership role in the Cold War struggle against totalitarianism. In my analysis, I explore how Truman's references to speaker/audience, location, and time activated the contextual elements of the immediate speech situation as physical proof. This critical sensitivity to bodies, places, and temporalities reveals how Truman linked his presidential *ethos* to a particular location, the Lincoln Memorial, and interpreted this particular moment as a critical juncture in U.S. history, a time that was ripe for political action. This approach reveals how Truman's rhetorical authority and *ethos*—as displayed through speech—activated, interacted with, and ultimately transformed the symbolic significance of the Lincoln Memorial in U.S. political culture and the global imaginary.

Chapter four examines the significance of John F. Kennedy's trip to West Berlin and his famous "Ich bin ein Berliner" Address at the Rudolph Wilde Platz on June 26, 1963. Perhaps more than any other geographical location during the Cold War, West Berlin provided a physical and metaphorical symbol of the ideological struggle between democracy and communism. In this chapter, I show how the Kennedy Administration

saw the president's physical presence in West Berlin as a rhetorical act in itself, a symbolic move that demonstrated his commitment to West Berliners and reinforced his status as the leader of the Western Alliance. Through my analysis of the White House's preparations for the president's trip, the media coverage of Kennedy's visit to West Berlin, and the chief executive's speech at the Rudolph Wilde Platz, I argue that the persuasive aspects of presidential rhetoric *in situ* include and yet extend beyond spoken oratory to encompass the physical, material, and psychological dimensions of the president's presence in place. This analysis also reveals the potential of these dimensions to work rhetorically on audiences and even speakers themselves.

In chapter five, I analyze Ronald Reagan's June 6, 1984, address at Normandy on the fortieth anniversary of D-Day as an exemplar of commemoration in place. I argue that Reagan used the place of his address—Pointe du Hoc—to anchor his audience in the present moment while also transporting them back to the events of D-Day forty years earlier and projecting a specific course for future action. Where Truman and Kennedy relied on physical but inanimate evidence for their argument, Reagan drew on a more emotionally potent rhetorical resource: sixty-two of the U.S. Army Rangers who had climbed the cliffs forty years earlier. In his speech, the president used active language, vivid imagery, and the physical presence of bodies in place to help his audience look back into the past and "see" the events of D-Day unfold before their eyes. These visual images and the physical composition of the speech setting amplified Reagan's spoken text and made the story of D-Day literally come alive through a sensory *accumulatio*. The physical display of bodies in place also provided a living link between past and present

even as they offered the underlying value for continuing efforts to free Europe from Soviet communism in 1984.

The final chapter of this dissertation summarizes the guiding assumptions of this study and discusses how my analyses of Truman at the Lincoln Memorial, Kennedy in West Berlin, and Reagan at Pointe du Hoc offer new theoretical and methodological insights for studying presidential rhetoric in place. I conclude by outlining how this study contributes to rhetorical scholarship more broadly and suggest avenues for future research.

Chapter Two: Toward a Rhetorical Theory of Deixis

In recent years, the spatial, material, visual, affective, and sensory “turns” have pushed critics beyond the bounds of the speaker-audience model characterizing the public address tradition. These “turns,” and the scholarship resulting from them, have included studies that extend our understanding of the available means of persuasion at various times, in certain places, and on specific occasions.⁷⁷ This burgeoning and important scholarly emphasis on bodies, objects, sensation, materiality, ethnography, and in situ criticism necessitates a discussion of how critics are to analyze oratorical texts within and as a product of their material, historical, and symbolic contexts. How are we to account for the material dimensions of a speech designed for and delivered in place? How do we define context, particularly in light of new methodological approaches such as rhetorical field methods, ethnography, autoethnography, and audience studies? And what is the critic’s job in “recovering” the materiality of historical texts—the bodies, sensations,

⁷⁷ See, for example, Carole Blair, Marsha S. Jeppeson, and Enrico Pucci, "Public Memorializing in Postmodernity: The Vietnam Veterans Memorial as Prototype," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 77, no. 3 (1991): 263-288; Greene, "Another Materialist Rhetoric; Blair, "Contemporary U.S. Memorial Sites as Exemplars of Rhetoric's Materiality; Finnegan, "Documentary as Art in U.S. Camera; Mountford, "On Gender and Rhetorical Space; Greg Dickinson, "Joe's Rhetoric: Finding Authenticity at Starbucks," *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 32, no. 4 (2002): 5-27; Finnegan, *Picturing Poverty: Print Culture and FSA Photographs*; Shome, "Space Matters: The Power and Practice of Space; Debra Hawhee, "Rhetorics, Bodies, and Everyday Life," *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 36, no. 2 (2006): 155-164; Debra Hawhee, "Review Essay: Somatography," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 93, no. 3 (2007): 365-374; Richard Marback, "Unclenching the Fist: Embodying Rhetoric and Giving Objects Their Due," *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 38, no. 1 (2008): 46-65; Messaris, "Review Essay: What's Visual about 'Visual Rhetoric'"; Zagacki and Gallagher, "Rhetoric and Materiality in the Museum Park at the North Carolina Museum of Art; Chaput, "Rhetorical Circulation in Late Capitalism: Neoliberalism and the Overdetermination of Affective Energy; Conley and Dickinson, "Textural Democracy; Dickinson, Blair, and Ott, *Places of Public Memory*; Endres and Senda-Cook, "Location Matters: The Rhetoric of Place in Protest; Debra Hawhee, "Looking Into Aristotle's Eyes: Toward a Theory of Rhetorical Vision," *Advances in the History of Rhetoric* 14, no. 2 (2011): 139-165; Brian L. Ott and Diane Marie Keeling, "Cinema and Choric Connection: *Lost in Translation* as Sensual Experience," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 97, no. 4 (2011): 363-386; Thomas Rickert, *Ambient Rhetoric: The Attunements of Rhetorical Being* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2013); Debra Hawhee, "Rhetoric's Sensorium," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 101, no. 1 (2015): 2-17; Cory Holding, "The Rhetoric of the Open Fist," *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 45, no. 5 (2015): 399-419.

locations, and temporalities addressed and constituted through speech? I argue that a rhetorical theory of deixis offers a way to theorize how speakers employ language to activate the scenic elements of the physical speech situation and linguistically bond text and context. This approach offers the critic a theoretical and methodological tool for “[u]npacking a text, probing its dimensions and possibilities” to better understand how orators use language to activate “the richness of a very specific situation that already has passed and will not return in exactly the same way.”⁷⁸ It is this richness, this ability to uncover the “text and texture”⁷⁹ of a rhetorical act within its historical and spatio-temporal contexts that makes the practice of close reading (and a deictic approach to textual criticism) still relevant and necessary for rhetorical scholarship. Ultimately, this approach invites scholars to consider the ways in which these elements of context—bodies, places, temporalities, objects, and sensations—provide a material means of persuasion when activated in and through speech.

Although strands of deixis can be identified in earlier works by C. S. Peirce, Philipp Wegener, Karl Brugmann, and Sir Alan Gardiner, contemporary linguists most often credit German psychologist Karl Bühler as first organizing and systemizing a formal theory of deixis. In 1934, Bühler published *Theory of Language: The Representational Function of Language* and defined the communicative encounter, or what he also referred to as the “concrete speech event,” as composed of three primary elements: the person doing the speaking (“I”), the place or location of the interaction

⁷⁸ Zarefsky, “Presidential Rhetoric and the Power of Definition,” 610.

⁷⁹ G. P. Mohrmann, “Elegy in a Critical Grave-Yard,” *Western Journal of Speech Communication* 44, no. 4 (1980): 273.

(“here”), and the time this interaction occurred (“now”).⁸⁰ These three terms or axes (the “I/here/now” triad) constitute the “deictic field” and also represent deictic or “pointing” words. For Bühler, these indicators (words such as “I,” “you,” “here,” “there,” “this,” and “now,” to name a few) operate as “expedient ways to guide the partners” and direct audience members to “the details of the situation.”⁸¹ Put simply, deictic indicators operate as verbal gestures within the speech act and enable speakers to direct their audience to the “persons, objects, events, processes and activities being talked about, or referred to, in relation to the spatiotemporal context created and sustained by the act of utterance and the participation in it.”⁸² For many linguists, deixis offers a way to identify which elements of context the speaker implicates through language. However, these studies too often limit contextual parameters to the immediate conversational exchange, thereby neglecting the political, ideological, and ultimately rhetorical implications of privileging certain people, places, and times through speech.

In this chapter, I advance a rhetorical theory of deixis, a theoretical and methodological orientation that infuses the linguistic concept of deixis with rhetorical understandings of *ethos*, place, and time. As a discipline, rhetoric is uniquely qualified to interrogate how these relational, spatial, and temporal axes implicate each other. A *rhetorical* approach to deixis does not simply identify these coordinates; it asks why they are there, what they symbolize, and how this symbolization constitutes specific audiences, geopolitical realities, ideologies, and ways of being in the world. This

⁸⁰ Karl Bühler, *Theory of Language: The Representational Function of Language*, trans. Donald Fraser Goodwin and Achim Eschbach (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2011), 93.

⁸¹ Bühler, *Theory of Language: The Representational Function of Language*, 121.

⁸² John Lyons, *Semantics*, vol. I and II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 637.

rhetorical appropriation of Bühler's deictic field also thickens our contextual understanding of the rhetorical situation by adding bodies, physical locations, and temporalities into the equation. It pushes us to consider the text in its historical, spatial, and temporal totality, as a speech act designed for and delivered in place, within a specific historical/temporal moment, to real people—bodies in their lived experiences. Here my aim is to begin a conversation about how public address scholars might incorporate these sensory aspects—what we can see, hear, touch, and imagine—into our analysis of rhetorical texts.

Debra Hawhee underscores the importance of “rhetoric’s sensorium” when she describes it as “the corporeal limn that guides sensory perception. It is the participial stem of the Latin *sentire*, a physical verb that means to *discern by the senses, to feel, hear, see, etc.; to perceive, be sensible of.*”⁸³ Of course, one way to interpret this sensory turn within rhetorical studies is to consider rhetoric’s affective qualities—that is, what rhetoric causes us to feel, hear, and see, but this approach often treats affect as a *product of, yet distinctive from*, the spoken text. My approach, however, asks how rhetors might accomplish persuasion by pointing their audience to places, bodies, and objects that induce specific affective responses. Because the spoken word plays an integral role in producing affect, audience members then experience emotional affect *within* and *as a result of* oratory. What if our sensory experiences of rhetorical action are in some way induced by discourse? What if rhetors used their spoken word to point us to the elements they most wanted us to sense? What if we approached public address as a verbal and

⁸³ Hawhee, “Rhetoric’s Sensorium,” 5.

material act, one that appropriates the physical elements of the speech situation as a primary form of evidence?

If we consider rhetoric's classical origins, these conjectures are not so radical or remarkable. In fact, they describe what classical orators knew all along—that the physical location and speech setting of a rhetorical act provide invaluable evidence and a powerful means of persuasion. Although multiple studies demonstrate that the physical location and/or speaking space for an oratorical performance worked as an important “means of persuasion” in Greece and Rome,⁸⁴ modern rhetorical critics virtually have ignored this relationship in studies of contemporary public address.⁸⁵ Christopher Lyle Johnstone argues that because

[t]he criticism of public address during the past decade or more has become increasingly preoccupied with text. . . . [l]ittle if any attention has been paid to the physical context within which oratory is presented and experienced. The setting for public address, nonetheless, is an important

⁸⁴ Ann Vasaly, *Representations: Images of the World in Ciceronian Oratory* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993); Christopher Lyle Johnstone, "Greek Oratorical Settings and the Problem of the Pnyx: Rethinking the Athenian Political Process," in *Theory, Text, Context: Issues in Greek Rhetoric and Oratory*, ed. Christopher Lyle Johnstone (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996), 97-127; Gregory S. Aldrete, *Gestures and Acclamations in Ancient Rome* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); Anthony Corbeill, *Nature Embodied: Gesture in Ancient Rome* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004); James Fredal, *Rhetorical Action in Ancient Athens: Persuasive Artistry from Solon to Demosthenes* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2006); M.P. de Bakker, "Demosthenes," in *Space in Ancient Greek Literature: Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative*, ed. Irene J.F. de Jong (Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill, 2012), 393-412; Kathleen S. Lamp, *A City of Marble: The Rhetoric of Augustan Rome* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2014).

⁸⁵ Important exceptions to this include Wills, *Lincoln at Gettysburg: The Words that Remade America*; Mountford, "On Gender and Rhetorical Space; Mountford, *The Gendered Pulpit: Preaching in American Protestant Spaces*; Wilson, "The Politics of Place and Presidential Rhetoric in the United States, 1875-1901; Slagell, "The Challenges of Reunification: Rutherford B. Hayes on the Close Race and the Racial Divide; Reid, *Imprison'd Wranglers: The Rhetorical Culture of the House of Commons, 1760-1800*; Paul Stob, "Lonely Courage, Commemorative Confrontation, and Communal Therapy: William James Remembers the Massachusetts 54th," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 98, no. 3 (2012): 249-271; Vanessa B. Beasley, "Speaking at Selma: Presidential Commemoration and Bill Clinton's Problem of Invention," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 44, no. 2 (2014): 267-289.

consideration in understanding and appraising oratory. If the invention of techniques of persuasion, arrangement, and expression is best understood in term of the historical and cultural circumstances in which speech occurs, clearly the verbal style and active presentation of the matter of speech owe at least something to physical setting.⁸⁶

In other words, the physical setting can reveal much about how an orator delivers—and how the audience experiences—a rhetorical act. I argue that although theorists outside of rhetoric provide important perspectives on how places can work rhetorically in and of themselves, critics must attend to a rhetor's verbal references to locations, bodies, and objects if we are to understand fully the relationship between rhetoric and place.

My argument proceeds in four stages. First, I turn to classical rhetorical theory to show that rhetoric has always been placed; that is, that the ancients understood the physical location and speech setting of a rhetorical act as an integral and irreducible aspect of oratorical performance. Second, I consider how place has functioned within the public address tradition during the twentieth century, paying specific attention to the debates over text, context, and materiality. Third, I provide an overview of Bühler's initial theory of deixis and then detail how a uniquely rhetorical approach to deixis extends our understandings of *ethos*, place, and temporality.

Classical Invocations of Place

Ancient rhetorical theorists recognized the power of place or scene—either imagined or physically present—as an effective means of persuasion. Aristotle first

⁸⁶ Johnstone, "Greek Oratorical Settings and the Problem of the Pnyx," 97-98.

introduced the concepts of *energeia*, bringing-before-the-eyes, and *phantasia*, all of which suggest that a speaker can use various rhetorical techniques to communicate lively activity and prompt the audience to see the events of a certain situation in their mind's eye. Although classical theorists focused primarily on the rhetorical powers of mental imagery or sight, they also hinted at the possibility that physical and material objects, people, places, and things could work persuasively. We see this not just in oratorical practices in Greece and Rome, but also in Aristotle's initial definition of what rhetoric does or accomplishes.

In the first pages of the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle writes that the orator's task is "to see the available means of persuasion" in each particular case.⁸⁷ George Kennedy extends this definition, parsing out the Greek to explain that we can understand Aristotle to understand rhetoric as "an ability [*dynamis*; 'ability, capacity, faculty'], in each particular case [*peri hekaston*; [that] 'refers to the fact that rhetoric deals with specific circumstances (e.g. particular political or judicial decisions)'], to see [*theōrēsai*; 'to be an observer of and to grasp the meaning or utility of'] the available means of persuasion [*endekhomenon pithanon*; 'what is inherently and potentially persuasive' in the facts, circumstances, character of the speaker, attitude of the audience, etc.'].⁸⁸ To paraphrase, then, rhetoric can be defined as one's ability, capacity, or faculty to observe and grasp what is inherently and/or potentially persuasive in a specific circumstance. I note that Aristotle's understanding of rhetoric suggests that one potential vehicle for persuasion in a specific case is the rhetor's surroundings; that is, where the rhetorical act is placed.

⁸⁷ Aristotle, *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*, 1.2.1.

⁸⁸ Aristotle, *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*, George Kennedy commentary, 37.

This idea of physical places or objects working persuasively continues throughout the *Rhetoric*. For example, in book II, Aristotle implies that orators can use as the arrangement of one's body, projection of the voice, and one's clothing as a way to help the audience physically see what the orator describes.⁸⁹ Later, in book III, he discusses the rhetorical strategy of "bringing before the eyes," or the idea that words should enable the audience to mentally envision what the speaker describes.⁹⁰ In one of his examples, Aristotle notes how Lycoleon, a famed Attic orator, alluded to the bronze statue of Chabrias, a mighty Athenian warrior, to remind the people that the statue would protect the city in battle. Speaking about the statue of Chabrias, Lycoleon said he was "not ashamed of his suppliant attitude in that bronze statue." Aristotle adds that "it was a metaphor at the time it was spoken, but not at all times, but it [the statue] was before-the eyes, for when he [Lycoleon] was in danger, the statue [seemed to] supplicate, the lifeless for the living, the memorial of his deeds for the city."⁹¹ This example is significant because it references a physical, *literal* statue located outside the city walls, and Aristotle

⁸⁹ Aristotle, *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*, 2.8.

⁹⁰ The idea of "bringing-before-the-eyes" treated in 3.10-11, and even the very same verbal formula for it, occurs in one other passage of the *Rhetoric*. In 2.8, Aristotle describes how orators can make things "appear before the eyes" of the audience when describing events that are pitiable. Although at first glance this seems identical to the discussion of "bringing-before-the-eyes" in 3.10-11, the Greek suggests that Aristotle describes rhetorical techniques to make things "appear before the eyes" in both a metaphorical and a literal way. Aristotle argues that pity can be aroused by "signs and actions, such as the dress of those who have suffered, and all such objects, and the words, and everything else" that "come immediately under our observation" and increases feelings of pity "because the suffering is before our eyes." It is important to note here that the Greek for "before our eyes" is "*kai en ophthalmois phainomentou*" which can be translated literally, "the suffering is in our very eyes" or "in our eyeballs." This Greek is different from what Aristotle uses in 3.10-11 to describe "bringing-before-the-eyes" (*pro ommatōn poiein*). Thus, Aristotle's description of making things "appear close at hand" and "before our eyes" in 2.8 suggests that there is a physical element of rhetorical vision that has gone unnoticed by rhetorical scholars. Aristotle, *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*.

⁹¹ Aristotle, *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*, 3.10.

notes that by referring to this statue and its physical location or *place*, Lycoleon used its physicality as evidence.⁹²

Other classical theorists saw the physically real as a way to trigger rhetorical vision (or mental “sight”) and advance their persuasive purposes. In her analysis of Demosthenes’ funeral oration, Debra Hawhee describes how Demosthenes used the material aspects of the rhetorical situation—the dead bodies, cypress caskets, grieving family members—to activate “the visual capacity of *phantasia*, thereby effecting a shift in focus from the corpses of the present to activities of the past and future.”⁹³ These physical sensations—the smell of dead bodies, the sight of cypress caskets, the sound of weeping women—became material evidence for Demosthenes’ argument while triggering rhetorical vision and public memory. “The lifeless, sacred bodies of the war dead are reanimated, their memory vivified, *energeia* projected into the future, all by means of rhetorical vision, all before the eyes of the audience.”⁹⁴ In this instance, Demosthenes utilized what was immediately present to spark mental images in his audience. Roman orators also understood the rhetorical power of the physically real. Quintilian acknowledges the power of physical objects when he referenced the potential emotional power of the orator’s display of a bloody toga.⁹⁵ In her study of Roman oratory, Kathleen S. Lamp observes that “things like scars can serve as symbols to move

⁹² Kennedy’s footnote to this section reads, “Lycoleon indicated the bronze statue of the kneeling Chabrias; although not visible from the court, it would be familiar to the jurors. The statue commemorated his ordering his troops to await the enemy on their knees.” Aristotle, *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*, footnote 113.

⁹³ Hawhee, “Looking Into Aristotle’s Eyes: Toward a Theory of Rhetorical Vision,” 156.

⁹⁴ Hawhee, “Looking Into Aristotle’s Eyes: Toward a Theory of Rhetorical Vision,” 156-157.

⁹⁵ Quintilian, *Institutiones oratoriae*, trans. D. A. Russell (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 6.2.32.

an audience in the same way speech can or even in a way speech alone cannot.”⁹⁶ In other words, that which is physically real (such as a bloody toga or a scar) can have *greater* persuasive powers than words alone.

This reliance on the physically real also impacted the orator’s choice of a speaking space or site of delivery in ancient Greece. Christopher Lyle Johnstone examines the explicit linkage between oratorical settings and epideictic, forensic, and deliberative occasions in ancient Athens, noting that spaces such as gravesites, law courts, and large public forums provided the orator with rhetorical opportunities and obstacles. In his discussion of deliberative or political speeches in Athens, Johnstone notes that “the topographical features of the site provided both speaker and auditor with significant reference points for invoking civic duties, accomplishments, and aspirations.”⁹⁷ In other words, the speech setting featured physical reminders of Athenian political ideology. These civic values—as represented in monuments, temples, memorials, and the like—were literally “before the eyes” of the audience as they listened to an orator’s speech in the Agora. M.P. de Bakker also documents the important function of speech settings in Greek oratory, praising Demosthenes’ “ability to draw links between the space outside the law courts and the Assembly and the space of those venues themselves where the speeches were delivered.” In his speeches, the famed Greek orator would refer frequently to the “immediate urban environment, the political and religious centre of the city and its monuments” to evoke emotions and “manipulate the feelings of

⁹⁶ Lamp, *A City of Marble: The Rhetoric of Augustan Rome*, 26.

⁹⁷ Johnstone, “Greek Oratorical Settings and the Problem of the Pnyx,” 108-109.

the audience.”⁹⁸ What was physical and tangible helped the audience imagine previous events. In this sense, then, the material aspects of the speech setting—the objects, monuments, and people directly in front of the audience—triggered the mental faculties (*phantasia*) responsible for rhetorical vision.

The physical place and location of a rhetorical act also carried persuasive powers in Roman oratory. Ann Vasaly writes that Cicero worked to “mediate the audience’s interpretation of what they saw through the words of the speech,” and through his “presentation, the manner of description or allusion, the role played by places and things in various kinds of appeals,” Cicero attempted to “manipulate the audience’s images of the real world and their interpretation of those images.”⁹⁹ Vasaly recounts multiple instances in which Roman orators saw the physical location of their speeches as a vital part of their persuasive appeal. For example, the Roman historian Livy wrote that Manilius Capitolinus was acquitted because of “the site” rather than his own rhetorical defense. Livy explained that Manilius’s trial took place at the Campus Marcus, a public field in Rome, which Manilius had previously defended from the Gauls. According to Livy, the jurors in the case “realized that it would be hopeless to attempt to secure a conviction in a place where people could be visually reminded of Manilius’s glorious deeds.”¹⁰⁰ Vasaly argues that this connection between a speech and its location was an important component of rhetorical training in ancient Rome.

It seems clear that a Roman orator was trained (*a*) to observe and describe concrete details of a place in order to provide his listeners with a vivid and

⁹⁸ de Bakker, “Demosthenes,” 395, 399.

⁹⁹ Vasaly, *Representations*, 12.

¹⁰⁰ Vasaly, *Representations*, 16.

moving description of a particular scene and the actions that occurred there, (b) to consider the objective and subjective characteristics of particular places in creating a convincing narration, (c) to draw on these same characteristics in claiming the inevitability of his version of events in the *argumentatio*, and (d) use associations of specific places to manipulate the feelings of the audience. An orator trained and practiced in using these techniques to exploit the associations of places and monuments not visible to his audience would obviously be well equipped to draw on the characteristics of the place where he gave his speech as well, in order to amuse, convince, or arouse his listeners.¹⁰¹

Vasaly's observation reveals how Roman orators utilized their physical location and the objects, monuments, and bodies situated in that location to support their argument.

To direct audience members toward a particular object or statue, classical orators incorporated physical gestures into their rhetorical performance. "Orators in Rome routinely gestured to their surroundings, including buildings, statues, and monuments, to harness the memory or emotion of a certain structure," writes Lamp. "[T]hey used the built environment as a means of invention, thus suggesting the potential of the built environment to shape or even control the oratorical act."¹⁰² Lamp's account suggests that the material elements of a speech setting worked not only as a means of rhetorical invention, but they also triggered cultural memories and political symbols associated with these buildings, statues, and monuments. Gregory S. Aldrete extends this discussion,

¹⁰¹ Vasaly, *Representations*, 24.

¹⁰² Lamp, *A City of Marble: The Rhetoric of Augustan Rome*, 32.

writing that the “buildings and spaces themselves that formed the background or setting [of rhetorical performances] were often loaded with symbolic meanings or powerful associations.” He continues,

An orator speaking in a temple, for example, could simply gesture toward the cult statue to allude to virtues associated with that deity. . . . Roman orators speaking in [the Forum] were surrounded by statues, temples, war trophies, altars, sacred sites, monuments, buildings, and other physical objects possessing powerful emotional associations with Roman religion and identity. . . . By a simple pointing motion, a speaker could use these settings to emphasize, elaborate upon, or even convey messages.¹⁰³

By pointing to or gesturing towards various sites, spaces, and objects, Roman orators utilized their material surroundings to advance their spoken argument. In addition, this physical “pointing” linked the orator’s spoken word to the buildings, objects, bodies, and memories located in that setting. As Lamp puts it, what was physically and materially real “became part of the speech through the orator’s gestures.”¹⁰⁴ Lamp’s final observation here is important for this project because it suggests that the act of referring or pointing to what is physically and literally “before the eyes” fuses the verbal text with its physical location and speech setting.

My aim here has been to demonstrate that classical oratory was a performative art in the most literal sense. The physical location and scene / setting of the speech act were an important means of persuasion in Greece and Rome—the stage on which the orator

¹⁰³ Aldrete, *Gestures and Acclamations in Ancient Rome*, 18-20.

¹⁰⁴ Lamp, *A City of Marble: The Rhetoric of Augustan Rome*, 33.

presented his argument to the assembled audience. Moreover, the rhetorical act was not limited to the verbal; instead, it included what was immediate to the senses. Although scholars of classical oratory have turned their attention to understanding the physical and material aspects of Greek and Roman oratorical practice, students of contemporary public address rarely include an analysis of the site of delivery. One reason for this oversight is rooted in disciplinary history and debates over how (and how much) critics should focus on the historical and contextual elements of a particular rhetorical act. In the next section, I trace the role of place within rhetoric's disciplinary history to show that the performative aspects of rhetoric are an important element of the public address tradition. Ultimately, I argue that that by analyzing the significance of place in public address, critics return to a rich disciplinary orientation first set out by Aristotle, Demosthenes, Cicero, and Quintilian and continued by Herbert Wichelns, Marie Hochmuth Nichols, G.P. Mohrmann, Stephen E. Lucas, Michael Leff, and Michael Calvin McGee.

(Re)Locating Place in the Public Address Tradition

In 1925, Herbert A. Wichelns published his seminal essay, "The Literary Criticism of Oratory," as a chapter in a book honoring James A. Winans.¹⁰⁵ Wichelns' essay represents the moment at which public address emerged as a discipline separate and distinct from literary criticism.¹⁰⁶ Wichelns contended that "[w]e have not much serious criticism of oratory," and noted that while literary critics assessed oratorical discourse for

¹⁰⁵ Herbert A. Wichelns, "The Literary Criticism of Oratory," in *Landmark Essays in American Public Address*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst (Davis, CA: Hermagoras Press, 1995), 1-32.

¹⁰⁶ Martin J. Medhurst, "The Academic Study of Public Address: A Tradition in Transition," in *Landmark Essays on American Public Address*, ed. Martin J. Medhurst (Davis, CA: Hermagoras Press, 1993), xv.

its enduring nature or aesthetic appeal, they ignored one of rhetoric's chief ends: effect.¹⁰⁷

If critics were to take rhetoric seriously, Wichelns argued that it was not enough to describe the literary or historical aspects of a rhetorical act. Instead, the rhetorical critic needed to "conceive of the public man as influencing the men of his own times by the power of his discourse."¹⁰⁸ To do this, Wichelns put forth the study of rhetoric as "concerned with effect. It regards speech as a communication to a specific audience, and holds its business to be the analysis and appreciation of the orator's method of imparting his ideas to his hearers."¹⁰⁹ Wichelns defined the rhetorical critic as one who studied the methods by which speakers imparted ideas to their audiences. As such, Wichelns argued for a "scheme of rhetorical study" that assessed the speaker's character (or "what he was thought to be"), the assembled audience, and the main ideas, topics, and proofs the speaker employed to persuade the audience.¹¹⁰ He also noted that critics should consider the stylistic and performative aspects of delivery: "the speaker's mode of arrangement and his mode of expression . . . his habit of preparation and his manner of delivery from the platform."¹¹¹ Although Wichelns suggested that delivery was not as important as arrangement or expression, it is still important to note that Wichelns saw rhetoric as a

¹⁰⁷ Wichelns, "The Literary Criticism of Oratory," 2.

¹⁰⁸ Wichelns, "The Literary Criticism of Oratory," 29.

¹⁰⁹ Wichelns, "The Literary Criticism of Oratory," 26.

¹¹⁰ Wichelns, "The Literary Criticism of Oratory," 28-29.

¹¹¹ Wichelns, "The Literary Criticism of Oratory," 29. Medhurst describes the "fifteen-point scheme" that Wichelns put forth as including the following: "(1) The speaker's personality as a conditioning factor; (2) The public character of a man—what he was thought to be; (3) A description of the audience; (4) The leading ideas with which he plied his hearers; (5) The topics he drew upon; (6) The motives to which he appeals; (7) Proofs offered in his speeches; (8) The relation of surviving texts to what was actually uttered; (9) The adaption to two audiences—that which heard and that which read; (10) The speaker's mode of arranging ideas; (11) The speaker's mode of expression; (12) The speaker's habits of preparation; (13) The manner of delivery from the platform; (14) The speaker's style, especially diction and sentence movement; (15) The effect of the discourse on its immediate hearers." Medhurst, "The Academic Study of Public Address: A Tradition in Transition," xvi-xvii.

performative act—one that was located in a certain place and speaking space (the platform). I use Wichelns' essay to show that rhetoric's disciplinary identity is rooted in a quest to understand the ways in which rhetoric persuades audiences in particular contexts throughout history. From its inception, therefore, the public address tradition has been concerned with the relationship between texts, their historical and situational contexts, and the performative aspects of delivery.

After Wichelns, however, rhetorical scholars in the 1920s and 1930s wrote “virtually nothing about the speech itself as an artistically structured message,” and it was not until 1937 that the first analysis of a single speech text was published in *Quarterly Journal of Speech*.¹¹² Robert D. King's analysis of Franklin D. Roosevelt's second inaugural was only five pages in length.¹¹³ In 1943, William Norwood Brigance edited and published *A History and Criticism of American Public Address*, a two-volume work that he characterized as examining “the influence of American public address on the flow of history.”¹¹⁴ The essays dealt primarily with the biographies of individual orators and the historical contexts in which they spoke. Eight years later, in 1955, Marie Hochmuth edited and published the third volume of *A History and Criticism of Public Address*. In her introductory essay, Hochmuth argued that “[t]he criticism of speeches must proceed from a clear conception of the nature of a speech.”¹¹⁵ To aid critics in a rhetorical (and not literary) analysis of speeches, Hochmuth compared the speech act to “a multi-celled

¹¹² Medhurst, “The Academic Study of Public Address: A Tradition in Transition,” xviii.

¹¹³ Robert D. King, “Franklin D. Roosevelt's Second Inaugural Address: A study in Text Authenticity,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 23, no. 3 (1937): 439-444.

¹¹⁴ William Norwood Brigance, “Preface,” in *A History and Criticism of American Public Address*, ed. William Norwood Brigance (New York: Russell & Russell, 1943), vii.

¹¹⁵ Marie Hochmuth, “The Criticism of Rhetoric,” in *A History and Criticism of American Public Address*, ed. Marie Kathryn Hochmuth (New York: Russell & Russell, 1955), 6.

organism, whose units consist of speaker, audience, place, purpose, time, and form.” She continued, “[i]n order to evaluate the speech, all these elements, verbal and nonverbal, must be examined.”¹¹⁶ Although Wichelns referenced the speech location indirectly, Hochmuth singled out place as an element *on par* with speaker, audience, purpose, time, and form. In fact, Hochmuth listed place right after speaker and audience—and before purpose, time, and form. Her treatment of place is worth quoting in length:

[W]e must consider the function of *place*. Place, of course, is not merely a physical condition. It is also a metaphysical condition, an ideological environment. We hear much of the “industrial” East, the “conservative” Midwest, the “progressive” Far West, “rumor-ridden” Washington. Speeches take place in halls, to be sure, but halls are “sacred halls,” “smoke-filled rooms,” places “hallowed by the memory of the sacred dead.” The church is an “atmosphere” as well as a place. Place conditions both the speaker’s method and the audience’s reaction. People do not react in a smoke-filled room the way they do in the restrained atmosphere of the Senate gallery. I do not intend to minimize the purely physical aspect of place, for this is sometimes important, of course. Comfort and discomfort, audibility or inaudibility may take on considerable proportions. . . . an inaugural crowd in a chill wind is not likely to be giving itself completely to the speaker no matter how superlative his genius. . . . In evaluating

¹¹⁶ Hochmuth, “The Criticism of Rhetoric,” 9.

speeches, the aspect of place must be recognized as a conditioning factor.¹¹⁷

Here Hochmuth explicitly linked place—both the physical location and the speaking environment—to the invention and reception of public address. One year earlier, in her essay on Lincoln's First Inaugural, Hochmuth illustrated her method by providing a richly detailed account of the physical scene and setting on March 4, 1861.¹¹⁸ In both theory and critical practice, Hochmuth's discussion of place pushed the critic to attend to the physical and material aspects of a speech situation, and to consider how these elements impacted the speaker and the audience. After Hochmuth, however, a treatment of place in relation to discourse virtually vanished from public address scholarship. Although these studies almost universally consider the speaker, audience, purpose, time, and form of a speech act, critics have overlooked the significance of place.¹¹⁹ I believe the primary reason for this oversight is because place is often compartmentalized in terms of the historical and contextual elements surrounding the speech situation, whereas the speaker, audience, purpose, time, and form can be examined—to some extent, although not fully—through an analysis of the verbal text of a speech. Thus, I see the exclusion of physical place and speech setting from critical rhetorical analysis—both of which were integral elements of ancient rhetorical practice—as a casualty of the rigorous debates over text, context, and rhetoric's disciplinary identity as a whole.

¹¹⁷ Hochmuth, "The Criticism of Rhetoric," 11.

¹¹⁸ Marie Hochmuth Nichols, "Lincoln's First Inaugural," in *Methods of Rhetorical Criticism: A Twentieth-Century Perspective*, ed. Bernard L. Brock, Robert Lee Scott, and James W. Chesebro (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1990), 36-40.

¹¹⁹ For example, Karlyn Kohrs Campbell suggested that critics should attend to seven "elements of rhetorical action" in their analysis. These include (1) purpose; (2) audience; (3) persona; (4) tone; (5) structure; (6) evidence; and (7) strategies. Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, *The Rhetorical Act* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Group, 1982).

Of course, the history of rhetoric's attempt to determine "what we are about" is lengthy.¹²⁰ However, a few moments are important for the purposes of this project. Following Edwin Black's scathing critique of neo-Aristotelian criticism in 1965, and amid other political and social changes of the 1960s and 1970s, many scholars turned their attention from "traditional" analyses of "great speeches" (read, historical and biographical studies of white male speakers with little attention to the text itself) to ideologically driven critical practice. One of the results of this turn, however, was a hasty rejection of rhetorical history for an exclusive focus on critical method and theory. In 1980, G.P. Mohrmann chastised rhetoricians for rejecting their own intellectual tradition. "We do not all have to be critics," he wrote, "but when we set up shop for a critic, we ought to know what we are about."¹²¹ Mohrmann argued that by failing to learn their own discipline, critics had "not done much more than achieve a nervous novelty."¹²² Rhetoricians had either veered towards historical and biographical examination of "Old Dead Orators" or turned to other disciplines to produce critical methods by which to explain rhetorical action, neither of which was successful.¹²³ Instead, Mohrmann called on critics to draw on the "common topics available in the rhetorical tradition and employ those topics to make close and careful inspection of rhetorical texts."¹²⁴ Mohrmann's insistence that critics return to *the study of rhetoric itself* is important for the purposes of this project because he argued that applying traditional rhetorical methods with

¹²⁰ Mohrmann, "Elegy in a Critical Grave-Yard," 271.

¹²¹ Mohrmann, "Elegy in a Critical Grave-Yard," 271.

¹²² Mohrmann, "Elegy in a Critical Grave-Yard," 272.

¹²³ Mohrmann, "Elegy in a Critical Grave-Yard," 271.

¹²⁴ Mohrmann, "Elegy in a Critical Grave-Yard," 272.

“intelligence and imagination” would enable critics “to appreciate the text and texture of messages.”¹²⁵

Where Mohrmann lamented the discipline’s denial of its own rich oratorical tradition, Stephen E. Lucas identified another problem that pertains to this project: the disciplinary divide between text and context, one he described as the “schism in rhetorical scholarship.” In 1981, one year after Mohrmann’s essay appeared, Lucas observed that “[t]here appears now to be crystallizing a keen sense of schism between history and criticism, as the two are increasingly characterized—formally and informally, in published writings and private colloquies—as conflicting rather than complementary activities.”¹²⁶ Here it is important to note that this divide between “doing history” and “doing criticism” reflected rhetoric’s implicit rejection of the historical and biographical approach best demonstrated in the three volumes of *A History and Criticism of American Public Address*. But Lucas’ observation also underscored Mohrmann’s concern. If rhetoricians did not “know what [they] were about,” how could they expect to understand, much less successfully utilize, the relationship between historical context and textual criticism? In response, Lucas proposed joint consideration of both history and criticism. For Lucas, the task of the rhetorical historian was the same as the rhetorical critic: “to explicate how rhetorical communication works.”¹²⁷ To do this, Lucas and others argued for a close attention to and critical examination of the text itself.

¹²⁵ Mohrmann, “Elegy in a Critical Grave-Yard,” 272-273.

¹²⁶ Stephen E. Lucas, “The Schism in Rhetorical Scholarship,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 67, no. 1 (1981): 1.

¹²⁷ Lucas, “The Schism in Rhetorical Scholarship,” 20.

Five years later, in an essay memorializing G.P. Mohrmann, Michael Leff called on critics to adopt Mohrmann's view of "oratory [as] an art form" and consider the rhetorical artifact on its own terms.¹²⁸ Rejecting previous critical approaches that divorced text from context, Leff argued that "[t]o rely exclusively either upon a formal/intrinsic or a representational/extrinsic criterion is to distort the rhetorical integrity of the discourse." Leff continued,

Though rhetorical analysis can separate these dimensions, the fact is that they occur simultaneously and work cooperatively within the fabric of the discourse. . . . From this perspective, the oration achieves unity as it formulates a response to circumstances and events in public consciousness and deploys its own internal resources to alter public consciousness about these circumstances and events. This rhetorical process negotiates between the symbolic action manifested by the text and the more ambiguous symbolic world based in the plurality of ordinary public experience.¹²⁹

According to Leff, one of rhetoric's distinguishing features was the interrelationship between the text and the "symbolic world" to which it responded. He argued that critics could appreciate discourse only by attending to what Mohrmann had called "the text and texture of messages."¹³⁰ Rhetorical analysis *by its very nature* must examine the speech act within its historical, situational, and material realities. This approach, what Leff called "a program of close textual analysis," pushed critics to analyze rhetorical discourse "on

¹²⁸ Michael Leff, "Textual Criticism: The Legacy of G. P. Mohrmann," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 72, no. 4 (1986): 381.

¹²⁹ Leff, "Textual Criticism: The Legacy of G. P. Mohrmann," 381-382.

¹³⁰ Mohrmann, "Elegy in a Critical Grave-Yard," 273.

the particulars of the case—the *local circumstances* that frame and motivate the work and the unique blend of *formal and material elements* that constitute its substance.”¹³¹ For Leff, the “local circumstances that frame and motivate” the rhetorical act and the “formal and material elements that constitute its substance” are crucial to our study of contemporary public address. Moreover, it is only by adopting this perspective that critics can understand the “text and texture”¹³² of the rhetorical act. I argue that analyzing the physical place and scene / setting of rhetorical discourse is an obvious component in understanding the “local circumstances” and “material elements” of a speech. Doing so points critics to the intertextual dynamics at work between text and context, or rhetoric both as delivered and situated.

Emphasis on the “material elements” of a speech setting also pushes the critic to consider debates over rhetoric’s materiality. As Leff called rhetorical scholars to return to their primary object of study—the oratorical text—Michael Calvin McGee advocated approaching rhetoric as “a thing, a material artifact of human interaction” requiring not just an analysis of abstract theoretical principles of how rhetoric ought to work, but a careful consideration of how speakers “acted in and on the real world.”¹³³ Since McGee’s initial introduction of rhetorical materialism in 1982, many scholars have debated what such a concept might look like in theory and practice. As Carole Blair notes, the materialist “turn” within rhetorical studies has produced at least three “camps”: “a traditional one that insists upon considering the material conditions of discourse, another

¹³¹ Leff, “Textual Criticism: The Legacy of G. P. Mohrmann,” 382 (emphasis mine).

¹³² Mohrmann, “Elegy in a Critical Grave-Yard,” 273.

¹³³ Michael Calvin McGee, “A Materialist’s Conception of Rhetoric,” in *Rhetoric, Materiality, & Politics*, ed. Barbara A. Biesecker and John Lewis Lucaites (New York: Peter Lang, 2009), 38.

that focuses upon the lived-in body as a condition and consequence of rhetoric, and still another that understands rhetoric as itself material.”¹³⁴ My aim is not to rehash these debates. Instead, my goal is to highlight how McGee’s initial foray into materialism pushed scholars to consider the lived experiences, embodied sensations, and everyday practices that accompany rhetorical action.

To understand rhetoric’s materiality, McGee argued, was to recognize that “rhetoric is ‘material’ by measure of human *experiencing* of it.”¹³⁵ This focus on the human experience of rhetoric—real bodies interacting in real places in real time—was transformative. More recent moves toward rhetorical field methods, ethnography, and audience studies have extended our understanding of “context” beyond the historical/biographical work that characterized the discipline’s early years. Although questions of speaker’s personal background, his/her persuasive agenda, and a specific historical narrative are still quite relevant, these are not the only elements of context that deserve our critical attention. As Michael K. Middleton, Samantha Senda-Cook, and Danielle Endres observe, “rhetoric is not constituted simply by texts or textual fragments, but through a combination of material contexts, social relationships, identities, consciousnesses, and (interrelated) rhetorical acts that produce meanings and that are coconstructed between rhetor, audience, and particular contexts.”¹³⁶ The authors posit that “in situ rhetorical analysis can create a focused starting point for debate on the

¹³⁴ Blair, "Reflections on Criticism and Bodies: Parables from Public Places," 288. For several important essays theorizing material rhetoric(s), see Dana Cloud, "The Materiality of Discourse as an Oxymoron: A Challenge to Critical Rhetoric," *Western Journal of Communication* 58, no. 3 (1994): 141-163; Greene, "Another Materialist Rhetoric."

¹³⁵ McGee, "A Materialist's Conception of Rhetoric," 23.

¹³⁶ Middleton, Senda-Cook, and Endres, "Articulating Rhetorical Field Methods: Challenges and Tensions," 391.

questions posed by a shift from analysis of objectified texts to a critique of ‘live’ rhetorics”—or rhetorical action happening in the here and now.¹³⁷ To be sure, critics who participate in the rhetorical action they study are able to provide unique insights into the practices and processes of particular groups engaged in persuasive movements simply—and perhaps most especially—because they are *there*. And yet, is it possible to include these questions of materiality, bodies, and sensation into our analysis of historical texts? Put another way, how might critics of historical texts uncover the “smells, sounds, time, space, and other factors” that Middleton, Senda-Cook, and Endres claim are “excluded by a focus on text”?¹³⁸

I argue that a rhetorical theory of deixis helps scholars discover and recover a text’s materiality even as it reveals how spoken oratory responds symbolically to the world around it because “deixis links language to context in distinguishable ways, [and] the better we understand it, the more we know about context.”¹³⁹ A rhetorical theory of deixis draws on the principles of close textual criticism to analyze how the relational, spatial, and temporal coordinates of a speech act—both the symbolic coordinates within the text and the tangible bodies, locations, and times that comprise the physical speech situation—constitute a shared social world that is both linguistically constructed and also materially real. Identifying the deictic references within an orator’s speech act provides tangible evidence for the historical events, social relationships, symbolic places, shared communities, and dimensions of temporality the rhetor invokes through speech. This

¹³⁷ Middleton, Senda-Cook, and Endres, "Articulating Rhetorical Field Methods: Challenges and Tensions," 387.

¹³⁸ Middleton, Senda-Cook, and Endres, "Articulating Rhetorical Field Methods: Challenges and Tensions," 396.

¹³⁹ Hanks, "The Indexical Ground of Deictic Reference," 48.

approach allows the critic to identify where and how the speaker uses language to activate the scenic or situational elements of the immediate historical and socio-political context for his/her persuasive purposes. Ultimately, I argue that a deictic approach to close textual criticism offers one way to understand how oratorical texts activate, operate within, and speak through their contexts.

Beata Stawarska underscores the symbolic (and inherently rhetorical) potential of deixis when she observes,

[D]eixis is *not* to be narrowly construed as an exclusively linguistic category, for it denotes a social and corporeal expertise which harnesses and mobilizes our abilities to orient in a shared spatial environment using the repertoire of available perceptual and motor skills. That is why deixis . . . cannot be accounted for in terms of syntax and semantics alone, but also requires explanation in terms of embodied existence embedded in the shared natural and social world.¹⁴⁰

This is why a specifically rhetorical approach to deixis is more than a simple counting exercise of the number of times a speaker says “I” or “here” or “now.” Instead, deixis provides a link between what is spoken and what is seen—what the audience experiences during, because of, and through a speech act. Deictic indicators reveal the potential of speech to activate its sensory dimensions even as it constitutes our social and political worlds. They “establish a direct referential link between the world and language,”

¹⁴⁰ Beata Stawarska, "'You' and I, 'Here and 'Now': Spatial and Social Situatedness in Deixis," *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 16, no. 3 (2008): 402 (emphasis original).

revealing the symbolic and material links between the spoken word and its material situation—or, the text and its context.¹⁴¹

Toward a Rhetorical Theory of Deixis

In this section, I trace the etymological and conceptual linkages between rhetoric and deixis to argue that deixis has always been a part of rhetoric. Second, I consider how Bühler's conceptions of the "deictic field of language" and three "modes" of deixis interact with rhetorical perspectives on situation, place, and vision. Third, I extend these linkages by detailing how a specifically rhetorical theory of deixis might enrich our perspective on (1) rhetoric in place and place-as-rhetoric; (2) rhetorical authority and *ethos*; (3) *chronos* and *kairos* in space-time; (4) rhetorical vision and the mediation of public discourse.

Deixis: Always Already Rhetorical

From the outset, it is important to note that deixis is a rhetorically loaded term. The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines deixis as noun that refers to an "indication" or "pointing out."¹⁴² But this term has a much longer history, one that is rooted in classical rhetorical theory. Deixis is the English version of δειξις (*deixis*), a Greek noun that classical translators Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott define as a "mode of proof,"

¹⁴¹ Holger Deissel, "Deixis and Demonstratives," in *An International Handbook of Natural Language Meaning*, ed. Claudia Maienborn, Klaus von Heusinger, and Paul Portner (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2012), 1.

¹⁴² Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. "Deixis, n," accessed March 21, 2016, <http://www.oed.com.ezp2.lib.umn.edu/view/Entry/49214>.

“specimen,” “display,” or “exhibition.”¹⁴³ Both deixis and δειξις (*deixis*) come from the Greek verb δείκνυμι (*deiknūmi*), which Liddell and Scott translate as “to bring to light, display, exhibit,” “to set before one,” and “to point out by words, to tell, explain, teach.”¹⁴⁴ Richard McKeon explains that Aristotle used two Greek words to describe speech that accomplished the goals of showing forth or making known: *apodeiktikos* and *epideiktikos*. The first, *apodeiktikos* (or *apodeixis*), referred to speech that proves or shows forth *from* or *by* something. This most often referred to scientific or logical proof. The second, *epideiktikos* (or *epideixis*), described speech that displays or shows forth *on* or *for* something.¹⁴⁵ Debra Hawhee argues that “[t]he very term *epideixis* displays the necessary relation between showing and telling. . . . *epideixis* primarily meant a material or bodily display. . . . display [that] itself becomes manifest via discourse.”¹⁴⁶ A speaker’s *epideixis* suggested a rhetor’s ability to display or show forth what was materially real or physically present to the audience. Similarly, Barbara Cassin writes that *epideixis* connotes the idea of a public show such as a military parade or crowd demonstration: “by putting an object on display, one makes use of it as an example or a paradigm.” *Epideixis*,

¹⁴³ Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, s.v. “δειξις,” *A Greek-English Lexicon* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940), accessed March 21, 2016, <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0057%3Aentry%3Ddei%3Dci>.

¹⁴⁴ Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, s.v. “δείκνυμι,” *An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1889), accessed March 21, 2016, <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0058%3Aentry%3Ddei%2Fknumi>.

¹⁴⁵ Richard McKeon, “The Uses of Rhetoric in a Technological Age: Architectonic Productive Arts,” in *The Prospect of Rhetoric*, ed. Lloyd F. Bitzer and Edwin Black (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971), 58. See also Lawrence J. Prelli, “Rhetorics of Display: An Introduction,” in *Rhetorics of Display*, ed. Lawrence J. Prelli (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2006), 2-3; Edward E. Schiappa, *The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999), 198-199.

¹⁴⁶ Debra Hawhee, *Bodily Arts: Rhetoric and Athletics in Ancient Greece* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2004), 175.

Cassin explains, “is a matter, then, in the broad sense, of a performance; it may be improvised or planned, written or spoken, but it is always related to the show, the public.”¹⁴⁷ Central to both these descriptions is the idea of showing forth or displaying through speech, and deixis is the primary means by which this showing and telling happens.

As discussed previously, one way this display took place in classical oratory was through bodily gesture and vivid, active language. Interestingly enough, when Karl Bühler systematized the theory of deixis in 1934, he connected deixis with the Latin term for “showing, pointing out, description,”¹⁴⁸ *demonstratio*: “Our own feel for language is quite adequate to help us understand why the Greek word ‘*deixis*’ and its Latin translation, ‘*demonstratio*’, also mean logical proof,” Bühler wrote. “[T]he person being guided is supposed somehow to reach an ‘insight’, either a sensory one or a logical one.”¹⁴⁹ Here Bühler gestured toward a key rhetorical concept first introduced in *Rhetorica ad Herennium* to describe a speaker’s ability to describe an event in vivid detail, amplifying its emotional weight.¹⁵⁰ As a technique of rhetorical vision, *demonstratio* achieves clarity and vividness through language, a brilliance so striking that the audience cannot help but feel as if the event—and the people, objects, places, and times within that event—is physically before them. Jeanne Fahnestock, one of the few scholars to connect contemporary linguistic concepts of deixis with rhetoric, observes

¹⁴⁷ Barbara Cassin, “Sophists, Rhetorics, and Performance; or, How to Really Do Things with Words,” *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 42, no. 4 (2009): 354.

¹⁴⁸ Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, s.v. “*Demonstratio*,” *A Latin Dictionary* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1879), accessed March 21, 2016, <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.04.0059:entry=demonstratio>.

¹⁴⁹ Bühler, *Theory of Language: The Representational Function of Language*, 44-45.

¹⁵⁰ *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, trans. Harry Caplan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954), 4.68-64.69.

that deixis plays a direct role in “conjuring up an external setting, moment, and participants in an ambient ‘as if’ situation. . . . Every description of a person, object, or act in a text, and every reference to an accompanying visual, can be thought of as the creation of an interactive encounter signaled with deictic elements.”¹⁵¹ Each and every time a speaker uses vivid language to describe a particular scene or event, the deictic indicators—words that orient the audience to the speaker, the place, and the time—activate this mental sight.

If rhetoric is the art of seeing or discovering all the available means of persuasion, deixis—the act of displaying, exhibiting, showing forth—reveals these elements to an audience. But what makes the linguistic approach to deixis particularly fruitful for rhetorical scholars is that it offers a way of identifying how speakers use language to invite listeners to actively engage with the spoken discourse to identify the people, locations, and spatio-temporal moments being physically displayed through speech.

Bühler’s Theory of Deixis

In 1934, German psychologist Karl Bühler introduced the concept of deixis as the linguistic equivalent of physically gesturing towards or pointing to someone or something in a speech situation. From the outset, it is imperative to note that Bühler’s conception of a “deictic utterance,” or a speaker’s “pointing” with words, is quite similar to the classical idea of gesturing towards places and objects the rhetor deemed important. Although

¹⁵¹ Jeanne Fahnestock, *Rhetorical Style: The Uses of Language in Persuasion* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 340.

Bühler does not connect his theory of deixis with classical oratory, he compares the deictic utterance to a speaker's physical gesture:

The arm and finger gesture of man, to which the index finger owes its name, recurs when the signpost imitates the outstretched "arm"; in addition to the arrow symbol, this gesture is a widespread sign to point the way or the direction. . . . There is more than one way to point with gestures; but let us dwell on the signpost: where the pathway branches, or in countryside lacking pathways an "arm" or an "arrow" is erected so that it can be seen from far off; an arm or arrow that normally bears a place-name. If all goes well it does good service to the traveler; and the first requirement is that it must be correctly positioned in its *deictic field*. Not much more than this trivial insight need be retained, and the question posed as to whether spoken language contains signs that function as signposts. The answer is yes, deictic words such as *here* and *there* have a similar function.¹⁵²

In this introductory passage, Bühler argues that just as a person or a signpost directs an individual to a certain place or location, words can also "function as signposts" and point the listener to a certain person, location, or object within a "concrete speech event." In this way, then, deictic indicators operate as verbal gestures within a rhetorical act.

The meaning of deictic indicators (or pointing words) is defined completely by each individual speech situation, or what Bühler refers to as the "deictic field." Pointing words are, according to Bühler,

¹⁵² Bühler, *Theory of Language: The Representational Function of Language*, 93.

symbols (and not only signals); *da* and *dort* (there) symbolize, they name an area, they name the geometrical location, so to speak, that is, an area around the person now speaking within which what is pointed to can be found; just as the word *heute* (today) in fact names the totality of all days on which it can be spoken, and the word *I* [refers to] all possible senders of human messages, and the word *thou* the class of all receivers as such. But one difference still remains between these names and the other naming words of language; it lies in the fact that they expect their meaning to be made definite from case to case in the deictic field of language and in what the deictic field is able to provide for the senses.¹⁵³

Here Bühler argues that pointing words are not just directional signals; they are symbols that name, describe, and define the world around them. This is an important distinction for rhetoric because it not only aligns with Kenneth Burke's view that all language is symbolic action, but it explains why pointing words are more than a simple linguistic device. Deictic indicators point the audience to places, people, and temporal dimensions while simultaneously naming and defining the historical context and symbolic meaning imbedded in these places, people, and times.

For Bühler, this "deictic field" was comprised of three primary elements: the person speaking ("I"), the place or location of the interaction ("here"), and when this interaction occurred ("now"). These three terms or axes (the I/here/now triad) constitute the "deictic field" and define the communicative encounter. For Bühler and contemporary linguists, all deictic words "expect their meaning to be made definite from case to case in

¹⁵³ Bühler, *Theory of Language: The Representational Function of Language*, 104-105.

the deictic field of language and in what the deictic field is able to provide for the senses.”¹⁵⁴ This view of a “concrete speech event”—what critics might call the rhetorical situation—requires the co-presence of a rhetor (“I”) and his/her audience (“you”) in the same place (“here”) within the same historical-temporal moment (“now”). And yet, as rhetoricians know, rhetorical acts are never quite this simple. Indeed, more recent work theorizing the rhetorical situation reminds us that rhetoric can be much more than a communicative exchange between speaker and audience.¹⁵⁵ Instead, rhetoric shifts and moves and circulates within, between, and among persons, communities, organizations, campaigns, and social movements. It persuades through monuments and museums, flows through marches, protests, and rallies. It constitutes political actors and constrains political subjects. In short, much of the rhetoric we encounter today quickly extends beyond the exigence-audience-constraints model described by Lloyd Bitzer in 1967. Jenny Edbauer observes that such “element-based theories of discourse” that focus on distinct, containable elements miss how these elements interact, shift, and change “in a wider sphere of active, historical, and lived processes.” Instead, Edbauer calls rhetorical critics to consider these elements “in their temporal, historical, and lived fluxes” and “add

¹⁵⁴ Bühler, *Theory of Language: The Representational Function of Language*, 105.

¹⁵⁵ See, for example, Lloyd F. Bitzer, “The Rhetorical Situation,” *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 1, no. 1 (1968): 1-14; Richard E. Vatz, “The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation,” *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 6, no. 3 (1973): 154-161; Barbara A. Biesecker, “Rethinking the Rhetorical Situation from Within the Thematic of *Différance*,” *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 22, no. 2 (1989): 110-130; Mary Garret and Xiaosui Xiao, “The Rhetorical Situation Revisited,” *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 23, no. 2 (1993): 30-40; Craig R. Smith and Scott Lybarger, “Bitzer’s Model Reconstructed,” *Communication Quarterly* 44, no. 2 (1996): 197-213; Jenny Edbauer, “Unframing Models of Public Distribution: From Rhetorical Situation to Rhetorical Ecologies,” *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 35, no. 4 (2005): 5-24; Chaput, “Rhetorical Circulation in Late Capitalism: Neoliberalism and the Overdetermination of Affective Energy; Heather Ashley Hayes, *Violent Subjects and Rhetorical Cartography in the Age of the Terror Wars* (United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

the dimensions of history and movement (back) into our visions/versions of rhetoric's public situations, reclaiming rhetoric from artificially *elementary* frameworks."¹⁵⁶

Building on the work of Edbauer and others, I contend that this emphasis on the material and lived processes suggests that the place or location of a rhetorical encounter and its historical/temporal moment is quite significant. What if we conceptualized the rhetorical situation in its most literal sense and examined the significance of where a speech act is located or placed? As noted earlier, classical notions of *epideixis* involved a displaying or showing forth *on* something. *Epideixis* required a situation that was materially real. Contemporary linguists use deixis to uncover how a speaker describes and defines the immediate situation (or an imaginary scene) through language. A rhetorical theory of deixis advocates a similar approach to the rhetorical situation. Identifying how a speaker names and describes himself/herself, the audience he/she is addressing, the place of the rhetorical act, and the historical/temporal moment in which it takes place tells us something about how rhetorical situations circulate *in place* while simultaneously moving *through place* to (re)define what that place means for present and future action.

The second concept of particular interest for scholars of rhetoric is the three types (or "modes") of deixis: (1) "ocular demonstration"; (2) "imagination-oriented *deixis*"; and (3) "anaphoric *deixis*." These terms are important for rhetoricians because they describe deixis as a faculty of language carrying sensory dimensions, particularly those related to sight. Deictic words direct gazes, activate perception, and trigger "readiness for

¹⁵⁶ Edbauer, "Unframing Models of Public Distribution: From Rhetorical Situation to Rhetorical Ecologies," 8, 9.

sensory reception.”¹⁵⁷ It is no accident that Bühler invoked vision as a key element of deixis, for all three of his “modes” of deixis are in some way related to what the audience can see or imagine.

The first mode, “ocular demonstration,” describes situations in which deictic words point the audience to places, people, and temporal dimensions that are physically present within the immediate speech situation.¹⁵⁸ In his original German work, Bühler used the Latin phrase “*Deixis ad oculos*” to describe this first mode; “ocular demonstration” is the English translation for this phenomenon. In Latin, *oculos* refers to the physical eye; *ad oculos* can be roughly translated “in/near our very eyes” or “in/near our eyeballs.”¹⁵⁹ Classicist Lowell Edmunds argues that “*Deixis ad oculos*” insinuates: “I point to (something) which you can see.”¹⁶⁰ Thus, this first mode of deixis refers to what is physically present before the audience—locations, people, and objects that can “be found with the external eye and ear.”¹⁶¹ The second mode of deixis, “imagination-oriented *deixis*,” describes how a speaker refers the audience to imaginary scenes created through language, “lead[ing] the hearer into the realm of what is absent and can be remembered or into the realm of constructive imagination. . . . Not with the external eye,

¹⁵⁷ Bühler, *Theory of Language: The Representational Function of Language*, 121.

¹⁵⁸ This usage of “ocular demonstration” is a bit confusing for scholars of rhetoric, particularly because classical orators used the term to describe rhetorical techniques of speech that achieved vivid description or clarity. This is not what Bühler meant (although his second mode of deixis, “imagination-oriented deixis” describes a similar phenomenon). For Bühler, “ocular-demonstration” describes what the audience can see physically.

¹⁵⁹ *Oculus* is version of the same noun Quintilian and Cicero use when describing things seeming as if they appear “before our eyes” [*est in oculis habere*]. See Quintilian, *Institutiones oratoriae*, 6.2.32.

¹⁶⁰ Lowell Edmunds, “Deixis in Ancient Greek and Latin Literature: Historical Introduction and State of the Question,” *Philologia Antiqua* (2008): 85.

¹⁶¹ Bühler, *Theory of Language: The Representational Function of Language*, 141

ear, and so on, but with what is usually called the ‘mind’s’ eye.”¹⁶² It should be immediately apparent that this second mode of deixis is strikingly similar to classical ideas of rhetorical vision or *phantasia*.¹⁶³ In fact, Bühler used the Latin “*Deixis am Phantasma*” (later translated “imagination-oriented *deixis*” in English) for this second mode of verbal pointing. Edmunds explains that “*Deixis am Phantasma*” contains the proposition: “I point to (something) which you can see in your mind’s eye.” According to Edmunds, if “*Deixis ad oculos*” and “*Deixis am Phantasma*” are to be read in conjunction with one another, then “*phantasma* has to be understood as *phantasia*.”¹⁶⁴ Just as the Greeks and Romans believed that an orator could use language to trigger the mental ability to see images (*phantasia*) and create images through vivid description (*enargeia*), Bühler argued that “imagination-oriented *deixis*” provides a “visual account of absent objects” in the minds of the audience.

The third type of deixis, what Bühler terms “anaphoric *deixis*” and more contemporary scholars call “intertextual *deixis*,” describes how a speaker directs the audience “to something that is to be looked for and found not at places in the space of actual perception but rather at places within the totality of speech.”¹⁶⁵ What is particularly interesting about this third mode is that listeners do not find what they are looking for in the immediate vicinity; they do not see it before their literal eyes, and they do not enter

¹⁶² Bühler, *Theory of Language: The Representational Function of Language*, 141.

¹⁶³ For more on *phantasia*, see Ned O’Gorman, “Aristotle’s ‘Phantasia’ in the ‘Rhetoric’: ‘Lexis’, Appearance, and the Epideictic Function of Discourse,” *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 38, no. 1 (2005): 16-40; Hawhee, “Looking Into Aristotle’s Eyes: Toward a Theory of Rhetorical Vision.”

¹⁶⁴ Edmunds, “Deixis in Ancient Greek and Latin Literature: Historical Introduction and State of the Question,” 85. Edmunds goes on to describe Bühler’s two senses of *Deixis am Phantasma*, “memories” (*Erinnerungen*) and “constructive fantasy” (*Konstruktive Phantasie*), writing that “[w]hat can be seen in the mind’s eye is either something remembered, i.e. something already seen in reality, or it is a construct.”

¹⁶⁵ Bühler, *Theory of Language: The Representational Function of Language*, 137.

into an imaginary scene created through language. Instead, anaphoric deixis triggers something else: memory of what has come before or anticipation of what might come in the future. Bühler specified that “every anaphoric use of deictic words presupposes one thing: that the sender and the receiver *have the flow of the speech in front of them* and can reach ahead and back to its parts.”¹⁶⁶ In order to remember what has been said and “reach ahead” (or anticipate) what will come next, the audience must draw on their past experiences and the present moment to remember the past and anticipate future utterances. Although Bühler conceived of anaphoric deixis as linked to the spoken text, I argue that one way to understand various moments within the text is to attend to the multiplicity of texts delivered in a particular location. Just as a written text encourages readers to remember what happened earlier in the text and to anticipate what might happen in the future, the place or location of a rhetorical act anchors the spoken word while also harnessing memories of what has happened in that place and what may happen occur in that place in years to come.¹⁶⁷

Although there are additional concepts from deixis that might be useful to scholars of rhetoric, I have chosen to focus on these two specific aspects because they directly address two critical dimensions of rhetorical action: what constitutes a rhetorical encounter, and how language can activate physical people, places, and objects, imaginary scenes, and the faculties of memory to persuade. I now turn to describing how a

¹⁶⁶ Bühler, *Theory of Language: The Representational Function of Language*, 138 (emphasis original).

¹⁶⁷ A footnote in Bühler’s description of anaphoric deixis supports this claim: “The Greek scribes spoke of ‘above’ and ‘below in the text’ . . . as we do; they had every right to speak like this considering their scrolls . . . Supposing the way goes ‘upward’ back into the past, then the gaze ahead in the future must be directed ‘downward’ – unless, of course, the Greeks imagined the present moment as the bottom from which the way goes up on both sides. Only then would the single term anaphora be justified for both as far as the sensory image it suggests is concerned. How do the peoples of the earth look into the past and into the future?” Bühler, *Theory of Language: The Representational Function of Language*, 138.

rhetorical theory of deixis works together with more recent scholarship on *ethos*, place, temporality, and mediation and circulation. This perspective takes into account the unique insights linguistics might offer to rhetoric even as it outlines how a specifically rhetorical approach to deixis extends its theoretical and methodological potential.

Rhetorical Authority and Ethos Rooted in Place

A rhetorical theory of deixis reveals how the speaker defines the social relationship between a speaker and audience not simply in terms of strategies of identification, but in how speakers create a relationship with the audience through symbolic language and embodied presence in place. Although rhetorical scholars long have examined how inclusive or exclusive pronouns establish relationships, invite identification, create division, and constitute publics, deixis extends this analysis to the embodied existence of individuals present within the speech setting. A careful consideration of the pronouns embedded in spoken texts not only reveals how language physically links bodies together in time and place, but it also marks “characteristic[s] of the sender,”¹⁶⁸ suggesting that audience members will recognize “characteristics” or qualities they associate with the speaker—*ethos*. A rhetorical theory of deixis asks how a speaker’s rhetorical authority is linked to (and perhaps even established in) that place or location.¹⁶⁹ The decision to situate a speech in a particular location is one way that

¹⁶⁸ Bühler, *Theory of Language: The Representational Function of Language*, 118.

¹⁶⁹ For more on the relationship between *ethos* and location, see Risa Applegarth, “Genre, Location, and Mary Austin’s Ethos,” *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 41, no. 1 (2011): 41-63; Julie Nelson Christoph, “Reconceiving Ethos in Relation to the Personal: Strategies of Placement in Pioneer Women’s Writing,” *College English* 64, no. 6 (2002): 660-679; Halloran, “Aristotle’s Concept of Ethos, or If Not His Somebody Else’s,” 58-63; Hyde, “Introduction: Rhetorically, We Dwell,” xiii-xxviii; Nedra Reynolds,

speakers can bolster their own *ethos*, for, as Risa Applegarth notes, “*ethos* is a situated practice.” Understanding *ethos* in relation to place reveals how speakers “draw on places to meet their rhetorical aims and to position themselves persuasively—in material contexts and in genres which shape relations between rhetors and audiences in significant ways.”¹⁷⁰ Michael J. Hyde describes the rhetor as one “whose symbolic constructions both create and invite others into a place where they can dwell and feel at home while thinking about and discussing the truth of some matter that the rhetor/architect has already attempted to disclose and show-forth (*epi-deixis*) in a specific way with his or her work of art.”¹⁷¹ Orators, then, have the ability to symbolically construct the meaning of their rhetoric *in situ* in both senses—what that rhetoric means because it is located in that place, and what that place comes to represent because of their rhetorical action. In turn, rhetors invite their audiences to deliberate together over what they have heard and seen in that place.

A rhetorical theory of deixis also offers another way to conceptualize the relationship between a speaker’s persona or *ethos* and the responsibilities he/she assigns to the assembled audience. Aristotle described the epideictic audience not as judges (*kritês*) but as witnesses (*theôros*), a term that Jeffrey Walker translates as “one who is to make ‘observations’ (*theôriai*) about what is praiseworthy, preferable, desirable, or worthy of belief in the speaker’s *logos*. . . . The role of the *theôros*, in short, is not to

"Ethos as Location: New Sites for Understanding Discursive Authority," *Rhetoric Review* 11, no. 2 (1993): 325-338.

¹⁷⁰ Applegarth, "Genre, Location, and Mary Austin's Ethos," 49, 59.

¹⁷¹ Hyde, "Introduction: Rhetorically, We Dwell," xxi.

make rulings but to form opinions about and in response to the discourse presented.”¹⁷²

Note here that the primary responsibility of an epideictic audience is to bear witness to an orator’s display (*epideixis*) of past virtue or vice and, if necessary, reorient the community toward what is good and just. As Megan Foley observes, “epideictic points toward a moment of movement. Epideictic points toward the promise of change.”¹⁷³ The community bearing witness, then, also assumes a responsibility for preserving past greatness for generations to come, for “the *theōros* sees what could be.”¹⁷⁴ Rhetorically understood, deixis works in tandem with *epideixis* to display people, places, and events that are worthy of this communal reflection. It invites the audience to observe and bear witness to the past and respond accordingly. It is the means by which a speaker can “unshroud men’s notable deeds in order to let us gaze at the aura glowing from within.”¹⁷⁵ A rhetorical theory of deixis helps the critic pinpoint the ways in which the speaker uses the material and symbolic dimensions of a place to remind the audience of previous events and future possibilities. Thus, when rhetors speak in place about what that place symbolizes for the community, their language constitutes the assembled audience as *theōros* responsible for living and acting in such a way that the lessons of the past might be (re)constituted for future generations.

¹⁷² Jeffrey Walker, *Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 9 (emphasis original).

¹⁷³ Megan Foley, “Time for Epideictic,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 101, no. 1 (2015): 211.

¹⁷⁴ Foley, “Time for Epideictic,” 211.

¹⁷⁵ Lawrence W. Rosenfield, “The Practical Celebration of Epideictic,” in *Rhetoric in Transition: Studies in the Nature and Uses of Rhetoric*, ed. Eugene E. White (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1980), 135.

Rhetoric in Place and Place-as-Rhetoric

A rhetorical theory of deixis pushes the critic to include the location or place of public address as a key analytic and to consider the mutually constitutive relationship between rhetoric as delivered in place and place-as-rhetoric. As noted previously, rhetoric always has been designed for a particular location or place. Classical rhetors situated their performances in front of scenic landscapes and directed their audiences to monuments, statues, and temples that symbolized specific civic virtues and political ideologies. This approach saw place, location, and/or situation as a primary element of rhetorical invention—rhetoric that was designed for and delivered *in situ*, or in place. Linguists conceptualize the “here” or location of a speech act in terms of how spatial deictics establish joint attention of both the speaker and the audience “on concrete entities in the surrounding situation.”¹⁷⁶ But these spatial deictics (terms such as “here,” “there,” “this,” or “that”) also “may indicate whether the referent is visible or out-of-sight,” suggesting that a listener’s bodily presence in that place—what they may not directly see but intuitively know is there—also contributes to the meaning of a concrete speech event.¹⁷⁷ A rhetorical theory of deixis, then, conceptualizes place not simply as a geographical location or physical marker, but also as a symbolic construct that can operate as a means of invention (rhetoric in place) and as a persuasive argument in and of itself (place-as-rhetoric).

Recent work articulating the connections between rhetoric and place reveals, as Greg Dickinson, Carole Blair, and Brian L. Ott note, that place “assume[s] an identity

¹⁷⁶ Deissel, “Deixis and Demonstratives,” 11.

¹⁷⁷ Deissel, “Deixis and Demonstratives,” 14.

precisely in being recognizable—as named, bordered, and invented in particular ways. . . . [and] rendered recognizable by symbolic, and often material, intervention.”¹⁷⁸ These studies also provide a helpful framework for thinking about how a place or location can come to represent civic patriotism, social moments, or ideology—“place-as-rhetoric.”¹⁷⁹ A rhetorical theory of deixis builds on this understanding of place-as-rhetoric, and yet suggests that a co-constitutive relationship exists between rhetors locating their speech acts in a particular location and the rhetorical dimensions of that place. It attends to the placement of situated public addresses, extending our understanding of how speakers draw on place-as-rhetoric as one way to advance their rhetoric in place. Put another way, deixis helps the critic to account for the ways rhetors invoke the material and symbolic dimensions of where their speech is placed as a rhetorical strategy, a way of persuading a specific audience within a particular historical/temporal moment. Deixis is concerned with “speakers and hearers in a *situation*, taking this word in its original sense of being *in situ* or in a location. Needless to say, the location is not to be taken in a purely objective, geographical sense, but rather as the natural and social context of communicative practice shared, and in part created, by the interlocutors.”¹⁸⁰

To understand the inventive possibilities of place, a rhetorical theory of deixis approaches the rhetorical situation both as a symbolic construct and as materially real. In what ways is this place “always already rhetorical?”¹⁸¹ That is, what prior symbolic meanings has this place accrued? What does speaking in this place—and thus linking a

¹⁷⁸ Blair, Dickinson, and Ott, "Introduction: Rhetoric/Memory/Place," 24.

¹⁷⁹ Endres and Senda-Cook, "Location Matters: The Rhetoric of Place in Protest," 265.

¹⁸⁰ Stawarska, "'You' and I, 'Here and 'Now': Spatial and Social Situatedness in Deixis," 402 (emphasis original).

¹⁸¹ Blair, Dickinson, and Ott, "Introduction: Rhetoric/Memory/Place," 24.

rhetorical act to this place—signify? And what will the bodies—both of speaker and audience—see, hear, sense, and experience when they are in this place?¹⁸² In what ways does the physical makeup of the speech location encourage visitors to be still and reflect, to engage in controversy, to listen attentively? A rhetorical theory of deixis helps critics to identify how rhetors use the spoken word to invoke the rhetorical possibilities of a place while simultaneously rooting their discourse in that particular location. It examines how the text directs the audience to what is particularly meaningful and consequential about that place. It emphasizes the centrality of place to all rhetorical action, whether immediate or imaginary, and provides a method for identifying how rhetors invest places, people, things, and temporal dimensions with symbolic meaning while simultaneously appropriating these symbols for their overall rhetorical purposes.¹⁸³

Chronos and Kairos in Space-Time

A rhetorical theory of deixis understands time as both a specific temporal marker on a timeline of history (quantitative time, or *chronos*) and as a symbolically constructed moment that is ripe or opportune for rhetorical action (qualitative time, or *kairos*). This approach also underscores the relationship between time and place, paying specific attention to how rhetorical acts link speech to physical locations, historical/temporal moments, and the bodies that interact with them. From this perspective, deixis

¹⁸² For further discussion on the sensory and affective qualities of speaking spaces, see Mountford, "On Gender and Rhetorical Space; Mountford, *The Gendered Pulpit: Preaching in American Protestant Spaces*; Reid, *Imprison'd Wranglers: The Rhetorical Culture of the House of Commons, 1760-1800*.

¹⁸³ For a helpful discussion of how place has played a vital role within the Western intellectual tradition, see Edward Casey, *The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997).

understands texts as radically temporal and yet also extendable across space and time.

Deixis, then, encourages the critic to read a text within its particular historical moment while also accounting for how the meaning of a place can shift over time, in and through rhetorical action.

Identifying the deictic references to time within a speech text reveals how speakers create historical narratives and kairotic encounters that are also rooted in place. “Time, in the *chronos* sense, permits . . . a chronology to be constructed, and therefore a chronicle of events which forms the initial material for the writing of history.”¹⁸⁴ This *chronos* view of time is also reflected in scholarly treatments of deixis, where “[t]ime is commonly conceptualized as a straight line providing the conceptual ground for a fictive observer.”¹⁸⁵ For example, temporal deictics such as “now,” “yesterday,” or “tomorrow” orient the listener to a specific point along a historical trajectory. “Now” becomes the anchoring point (or the “deictic centre”) for the speech act, with “yesterday” coming before the “now” and “tomorrow” coming after it. And because this concept of linear time is profoundly spatial, linguists also recognize that “spatial deictics can function to ‘locate’ an event on the time line relative to the moment of the speech event.”¹⁸⁶ A rhetorical theory of deixis approaches *chronos* time as both a temporal and a spatial phenomenon, a concept that is defined both by its location along the timeline of history and its physical situatedness in a particular location, a place that is often profoundly rhetorical. *Kairos* adds an additional layer to this understanding of time, the idea of a right or perfect time. Where *chronos* describes time that can be marked or measured on a

¹⁸⁴ John E. Smith, “Time, Times, and the ‘Right Time’,” *The Monist* 53, no. 1 (1969): 3.

¹⁸⁵ Deissel, “Deixis and Demonstratives,” 17.

¹⁸⁶ Deissel, “Deixis and Demonstratives,” 19.

continuum, *kairos* expresses the significance of a certain moment within a larger historical flow. According to Eric Charles White, *kairos* refers “to a passing instant when an opening appears which must be driven through with force if success is to be achieved.”¹⁸⁷ To achieve *kairos*, a rhetor must approach the “the present as unprecedented, as a moment of decision, a moment of crisis,” and adapt his/her speech to the particular needs of the occasion, to the uniqueness of the moment.¹⁸⁸

A rhetorical theory of deixis understands time in both the quantitative and qualitative senses, revealing how speakers use temporal indicators to stress both historical (or linear) time and the appropriateness of the moment. A speaker’s description of “now” also can refer to both historical time (*chronos*) and the appropriateness of the occasion (*kairos*), communicating both the exact historical moment of a speech act and also the larger time period in which the speech occurs. Although *chronos* and *kairos* may operate separately or simultaneously within a particular speech text, orators can shift the interpretation of a particular moment from a simple historical event to “a point in time filled with significance, charged with a meaning derived from its relation to the end.” As speakers use language to evoke past memories, address present realities, and created a shared vision for the future, “that which was conceived of as simply successive [time] becomes charged with past and future: what was *chronos* becomes *kairos*.”¹⁸⁹ A rhetorical theory of deixis identifies the transformative potential of language to accomplish this shift. Locating the temporal deictic indicators within a speech text (those

¹⁸⁷ Eric Charles White, *Kaironomia: On the Will to Invent* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 13.

¹⁸⁸ White, *Kaironomia: On the Will to Invent*, 14.

¹⁸⁹ Frank Kermode, *The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 47, 46.

that describe time in both a *chronos* and a *kairos* sense) enables the critic to analyze how speakers use language to create kairotic encounters that are both timely and timeless, rooted in places that are symbolically constructed and materially real.

Finally, a rhetorical theory of deixis acknowledges that the “concrete speech event”¹⁹⁰ is a product of the social, temporal, and spatial relations. This view corresponds with Doreen Massey’s conception of space-time, or the idea that “space and time are inextricably interwoven. . . . [and] the definitions of both space and time in themselves must be constructed as the result of interrelations.”¹⁹¹ Massey underscores this relationship between social actors, space, and time, writing that if “the spatial is thought of in the context of space-time and as formed out of social interrelations at all scales, then one view of a place is as a particular articulation of those relations, a particular moment in those networks of social relations and understandings.”¹⁹² Massey’s description of the relationship between space, place, and time suggests that the meaning of place is constantly changing and is defined not just by what is physically present in that place, but by how that place is linked to and defined by broader social and political relations, networks, and ideologies. A rhetorical theory of deixis adds to this discussion by uncovering how texts accrue meaning over time in and through place. Deixis helps critics approach rhetoric as a product of a specific historical/temporal moment and a physical location. This approach reveals the potential for texts to constitute themselves in place and, in so doing, invite future rhetorical action linked to that place. As Michael Leff notes, “rhetorical discourses are themselves temporal phenomena. They emerge in time;

¹⁹⁰ Bühler, *Theory of Language: The Representational Function of Language*, 93.

¹⁹¹ Massey, *Space, Place, and Gender*, 261.

¹⁹² Massey, *Space, Place, and Gender*, 5.

they are conditioned by other discourses and by the progression of events, but they are also constructed things that occupy a span of time. . . . The rhetorical text, then, is a historical development occurring within a broader context of historical developments.”¹⁹³

A rhetorical theory of deixis is concerned with how a speaker defines his/her rhetorical act within both senses of time (*chronos* and *kairos*), place, and space-time while also attending to the ways a discourse might change over time in response to historical events, moments that often define, and are defined by, their placement.

Rhetorical Vision and the Mediation of Public Discourse

Finally, a rhetorical theory of deixis reveals how texts activate the sensory dimensions of rhetoric in at least three ways: (1) how language points the audience to what they see and feel in the rhetorical situation; (2) how these physical elements of the speech setting spark mental images and trigger memories of the past; and (3) how the visual mediation of public rhetorical acts amplifies its *placement*. As discussed earlier, Bühler linked deixis with *demonstratio*, a term that describes a rhetorical technique of pointing out, displaying, or showing forth through language, physical movement, or both. Deixis extends this understanding in that it provides a theoretical frame for thinking about the potential words *themselves* have to gesture to people, places, objects, and imaginary realms that the speaker deems important. Debra Hawhee notes that “a host of bodily processes are enlisted in a speaker-audience exchange, most of them sensuous.”¹⁹⁴

How might we understand rhetoric’s role in activating this sensorium? I argue that one

¹⁹³ Leff, "Textual Criticism: The Legacy of G. P. Mohrmann," 384-385.

¹⁹⁴ Hawhee, "Rhetoric's Sensorium," 3.

way to think about how rhetoric and sensation interact is to analyze the moments when language activates the sensory realm either through what is immediately present (*Deixis ad oculos*) or what can be seen imaginatively with the “mind’s eye” (*Deixis am Phantasma*). A rhetorical theory of deixis reminds us that spoken oratory continually asks the audience to look at the particulars of a rhetorical situation and experience the verbal text alongside the visual images (either immediate or imaginary) that the speech act provides.

A rhetorical theory of deixis also offers insight into how rhetorical vision might be sparked by the physically real. Bühler’s description of imaginary-oriented deixis (*Deixis am Phantasma*) explains how orators can use language to situate the audience in an imaginary place or scene. This discussion, as noted earlier, mirrors classical ideas of rhetorical vision in a remarkable way. Similarly, Bühler explains that deictic indicators prepare the audience “for sensory reception” through “clues” that point and orient them to “the details of the situation.”¹⁹⁵ Just as rhetorical vision traditionally prompts mental images to members of the audience, *Deixis am Phantasma* works “to make something that is [physically] absent present” to the audience.¹⁹⁶ Often, these images are triggered by what is immediate to the senses. A rhetorical theory of deixis suggests that critics must attend more closely to the sensory elements of persuasion, particularly the relationship between verbal imagery and physical sight. Just as Greek and Roman orators physically gestured to their material surroundings, deixis describes how rhetors use words to point to the physical elements of the speech setting.

¹⁹⁵ Bühler, *Theory of Language: The Representational Function of Language*, 121.

¹⁹⁶ Bühler, *Theory of Language: The Representational Function of Language*, 142.

Finally, a rhetorical theory of deixis considers how the mediation of texts—through television, the Internet, social media, You Tube, and other avenues—amplifies the visual components of the rhetorical situation. Classical conceptions of *epideixis* and *demonstratio* included the possibility that orators could amplify or enumerate details to such a degree that the description of an event would achieve more emotional power than the actual event itself. Deictic utterances also accomplish this work when speakers repeatedly direct their audiences to what is physically before them or the mental images sparked by the immediate context. A rhetorical theory of deixis considers how texts amplify the visual dimensions of their contexts, but it also examines how mediated images of the text’s context—that is, the visual images a rhetorical act provides—circulate in and through place. How do texts “speak” through the images they provide? How do rhetors amplify these visuals by continually directing audiences to what is physically present before them? What role does deixis play in helping orators spark visual images through what the speaker and the audience both “see,” whether those shared images are made possible through television, the internet, or a (re)circulation of a speech on YouTube? Deixis provides one way for scholars of rhetoric to discover where, and how, speakers rely on what their audience can see—physically and mentally—as a way to induce specific action and help them, quite literally, “‘visualize’ public address.”¹⁹⁷

Taken together, rhetorical understandings of *ethos*, place, temporality, and the mediation and circulation of texts enrich and extend the linguistic concept of deixis.

Where Bühler’s initial theory focused on identifying the discrete bounds of the “concrete

¹⁹⁷ Finnegan and Barbour, "Visualizing Public Address," 504; 503.

speech event,” a rhetorical theory of deixis reveals the dynamic interplay between text and context by examining how speakers use language to activate the people, places, and times embedded in the concrete speech situation as a material means of persuasion.¹⁹⁸

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that a rhetorical theory of deixis reveals the rhetorical dynamics within the fabric of spoken discourse, dynamics that often refer to what is outside the text to make sense of what is within it. Simply put, a rhetorical theory of deixis points to, displays, and shows forth how texts speak in and through their contexts. Because every rhetorical act is unique, a deictic approach to close textual criticism will operate differently in every instance. In the analysis chapters that follow, however, deixis reveals the persuasive power of presidential rhetoric in place.

¹⁹⁸ Bühler, *Theory of Language: The Representational Function of Language*, 93.

Chapter Three: Truman at the Lincoln Memorial

On June 29, 1947, Harry S. Truman became the first U.S. president to address the NAACP in person.¹⁹⁹ Speaking from the steps of the Lincoln Memorial at the closing session of the organization's thirty-eighth annual meeting, Truman argued that the United States had a moral duty to extend the full benefits of citizenship to all citizens, regardless of race, color, religion, or creed. Historian David McCullough writes that Truman's NAACP speech was "the strongest statement on civil rights heard in Washington since the time of Lincoln,"²⁰⁰ and rhetorical critic Garth E. Pauley observes that Truman's speech was significant because he was "the first president to define civil rights as a crisis."²⁰¹ Truman's argument for federal civil rights legislation was notable, particularly because this speech came a full year before his decision to make race a central issue of his 1948 presidential campaign.²⁰² Far from simply a political calculation, Truman's insistence that the U.S. government take active steps to secure civil rights for "all Americans" was a bold step as

¹⁹⁹ According to one newspaper account found in the Philleo Nash Papers at the Truman Library, President Franklin D. Roosevelt "spoke in a similar capacity over a national hookup in 1942, but not from the seat of the conference." However, there is no record of this address "over a national hookup" in the NAACP papers available to me. There is, however, a record of a "greeting" that Roosevelt sent to the 1942 conference in Los Angeles, California. It appears as if this was read aloud to the group at its opening session on July 14, 1942. Press Release, "Government Will Accept Responsibility to Minorities, FDR Tells NAACP," July 10, 1942, found in Annual Convention, 1942, including World War II and segregation in the military, Feb 15, 1942 – Aug 20, 1942, Folder: 001412-011-0000, Papers of the NAACP, Part 01: Meetings of the Board of Directors, Records of Annual Conferences, Major Speeches, and Special Reports, ProQuest History Vault, accessed July 2015, <http://congressional.proquest.com/histvault?q=001412-011-0000>.

²⁰⁰ David McCullough, *Truman* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 1992), 569.

²⁰¹ Garth E. Pauley, "Harry Truman and the NAACP: A Case Study in Presidential Persuasion on Civil Rights," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 2, no. 2 (1999): 213. See also Garth E. Pauley, *The Modern Presidency & Civil Rights: Rhetoric on Race from Roosevelt to Nixon* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2001).

²⁰² Clark Clifford to Harry S. Truman, "Memorandum for the President, Subject: The 1948 Campaign," August 17, 1948, Clark M. Clifford Papers, Political File, Harry S. Truman Library, accessed (December 17, 2015, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/1948campaign/large/docs/documents/index.php?pagenumber=1&documentdate=1948-08-17&documentid=1-2&studycollectionid=Election.

police brutality, lynchings, and Jim Crow transcended any supposed promise of racial justice on both sides of the Mason-Dixon Line.

To understand fully the rhetorical significance of the president's address to the NAACP, it is essential to examine Truman's spoken text within its larger context. Specifically, I utilize a rhetorical theory of deixis to uncover how references to speaker/audience, location, and time activated the contextual elements of Truman's speech situation as a material means of persuasion. Critical sensitivity to bodies, places, and temporalities reveals how Truman linked his presidential *ethos* to a particular location, the Lincoln Memorial, and interpreted this particular moment as a critical juncture in U.S. history, a time that was ripe for political action. This approach reveals how Truman's rhetorical authority and *ethos*—as displayed through speech—activated, interacted with, and ultimately transformed the symbolic significance of the Lincoln Memorial in U.S. political culture and the global imaginary. More broadly, this chapter provides an example of the transformative potential of presidential rhetoric in place, demonstrating how a chief executive's institutional authority can challenge, (re)affirm, and (re)constitute the symbolic meaning of place for the U.S. public and the larger geopolitical community. At the same time, this case study reveals how presidential authority can be linked to and established in place even as it transforms the symbolic potential of that place-as-rhetoric.

Here I first focus on the historical/contextual background of this particular moment in Cold War U.S. history. I then examine Truman's history with the issue of race relations to explain why his physical presence at the Lincoln Memorial on June 29, 1947, was so remarkable and describe the symbolic significance of the Lincoln Memorial

within U.S. political culture at the time of Truman's speech, paying particular attention to President Warren G. Harding's dedication of the site in 1922 and Marian Anderson's outdoor concert in 1939. I then offer a close reading of Truman's address to show how spatial, relational, and temporal coordinates operate within and extend beyond Truman's speech text into the material realities of his rhetorical situation. Finally, I consider some of the responses to the speech from the news media and the broader U.S. public.

Setting the Scene: From World War II to the Cold War

President Truman's Address to the NAACP on June 29, 1947, was not just a statement on U.S. race relations. Instead, it represented a pivotal moment in U.S. foreign policy as the nation's political leaders struggled to formulate a response to what Winston Churchill famously described as the "iron curtain" descending over Eastern Europe.²⁰³ Although FDR, Churchill, and Soviet premier Josef Stalin had agreed to free elections in their "Declaration on Liberated Europe" at Yalta in February 1945, the Soviet leader quickly rescinded his promise, and U.S. State Department officials argued over the best way to respond to obvious Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe. Before Roosevelt could chart out a plan of action, he died of a massive stroke on April 12, 1945, and Truman was elevated to the highest office in the land after serving only eighty-two days as Vice President.²⁰⁴ The former U.S. Senator from Missouri had little to no foreign policy

²⁰³ Martin Gilbert, *Churchill and America* (New York, NY: Free Press, 2005), 353. The first time Churchill used this particular phrase was in a secret memorandum to President Harry Truman on May 12, 1945. The phrase would be popularized after Churchill's commencement address at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946. For more on this speech, see McCullough, *Truman*, 486-490.

²⁰⁴ McCullough reports that FDR and Truman had met just twice in private since the January 20, 1945 inauguration—once on March 8 and once on March 19—and at neither meeting did they discuss anything significant. In fact, on January 22, FDR sent Truman a message asking him to limit his communications to

experience and was excluded from war planning meetings, even as Vice President. “To the country, the Congress, the Washington bureaucracy, to hundreds of veteran New Dealers . . . the news of Franklin Roosevelt’s death, followed by the realization that Harry Truman was President, struck like massive earth tremors in quick succession, the thought of Truman in the White House coming with the force of a shock wave,” historian David McCullough has written. “To many it was not just that the greatest of men had fallen, but that the least of men—or at any rate the least likely of men—had assumed his place.” Upon receiving the news of FDR’s death in Marburg, Germany, General George Patton wrote, “It seems very unfortunate that in order to secure political preference, people are made Vice President who are never intended, neither by Party or by the Lord to be Presidents.”²⁰⁵ Yet when Truman took office after FDR’s sudden death, he became the chief U.S. diplomat responsible for working with Stalin and Churchill to end the Second World War—a relationship that would quickly shift from World War II allies to Cold War enemies.

On May 8, 1945, less than a month after FDR’s death, Germany agreed to an unconditional surrender in Europe (“Victory in Europe” Day), and Japan surrendered four months later. In the weeks and months following the Allied victory, the U.S. public was eager to return to a war-free, “normal” life. As historian Tony Judt explains,

The United States in 1945 and for some time to come seriously expected to extricate itself from Europe as soon as possible, and was thus understandably

“*absolutely urgent*” items and keep messages “as brief as possible in order not to tie up communications.” See McCullough, *Truman*, 333, 339; Michael Neiberg, *Potsdam: The End of World War II and the Remaking of Europe* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2015), 11.

²⁰⁵ McCullough, *Truman*, 349, 350.

keen to put in place a workable settlement that would not require American presence or supervision. This aspect of American post-war thinking is not well remembered or understood today, but it was uppermost in American calculations at the time—as Roosevelt had explained at Yalta, the U.S. did not expect to remain in occupation of Germany (and thus in Europe) more than two years at most.²⁰⁶

With the Soviet Union’s steady advance across Eastern Europe and a flurry of heated rhetoric, it was clear that Stalin had no intention of holding up his end of the post-war commitments made at Yalta. In a rare speech to the Russian Politburo on February 9, 1946, Stalin declared that capitalism and communism could not coexist and predicted another war within the next fifteen to twenty years.²⁰⁷ The State Department asked George Kennan, the deputy chief of mission at the U.S. embassy in Moscow, for an analysis of Stalin’s speech and its implications for U.S.-Soviet relations.²⁰⁸ Sent to Washington on February 22, 1946, Kennan predicted in his “Long Telegram” that the Soviet Union would direct its efforts “toward deepening and exploiting the differences and conflicts between capitalist powers” and believed it to be “desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be

²⁰⁶ Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2005), 109.

²⁰⁷ McCullough, *Truman*, 486.

²⁰⁸ John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (New York, NY: The Penguin Press, 2005), 29; Arnold A. Offner, *Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 133.

secure.”²⁰⁹ In response to this growing international threat, Kennan outlined specific recommendations for how the United States could combat this ideological attack, and several of his comments are particularly pertinent in thinking not just about Truman’s speech to the NAACP in 1947, but analyzing how later U.S. presidents returned to these rhetorical themes (or “commonplaces”) to advance a particular vision of the United States during the Cold War.

First, Kennan argued that the United States needed to attend to the “health and vigor of our own society. World communism is like [a] malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue. . . . Every courageous and incisive measure to solve internal problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiqués.”²¹⁰ Although Kennan did not mention the issue of race specifically, President Truman used his address to the NAACP to argue that the United States needed to “put [its] own house in order” if it were to advance the principles of democracy in the rest of the world.²¹¹

Second, Kennan argued that the United States needed to articulate a specific vision of why U.S. democracy was the better alternative to Soviet communism. It is particularly important to note Kennan’s use of visual metaphors in the passage below:

²⁰⁹ George Kennan to James F. Byrnes, “Long Telegram,” February 22, 1946, , National Security Archive, George Washington University, accessed December 17, 2015, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm>.

²¹⁰ Kennan, “Long Telegram.”

²¹¹ Harry S. Truman, “Address Before the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,” June 29, 1947, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed March 21, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12686>.

We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive picture of [the] sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in the past. It is not enough to urge people to develop political processes similar to our own. Many foreign peoples, in Europe at least, are tired and frightened by experiences of past, and are less interested in abstract freedom than in security. They are seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than [the] Russians to give them this. And unless we do, [the] Russians certainly will.²¹²

Here Kennan suggested that it was only through specific “positive and constructive picture[s]” that the rest of the world would “see” the merits of democracy, and it was up to the United States to provide this international leadership, moral resolve, and “guidance.” To present such a picture, Kennan argued, the nation would need to “have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society. After [all], the greatest danger than can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.”²¹³

Praised by top State Department officials in the United States, Kennan’s report was circulated to diplomatic posts around the world. Denise M. Bostdorff notes that although Kennan’s Long Telegram “did not lead immediately to a change in U.S. foreign policy . . . it planted the seeds for such a change.”²¹⁴ George Elsey, a White House special counsel to the president, discussed the document with Truman, although his reaction to

²¹² Kennan, “Long Telegram.”

²¹³ Kennan, “Long Telegram.”

²¹⁴ Bostdorff, *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: A Cold War Call to Arms*, 23.

the document is unknown. Similar themes would be reflected in the president's "Truman Doctrine" pronouncement of March 12, 1947, in which Truman not only implored the U.S. Congress to send military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey so that these countries could withstand communist takeover, but argued that the United States had a moral imperative to "the free peoples of the world" who looked to the United States "for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership," Truman warned, "we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of this Nation."²¹⁵ This bold pronouncement, writes Bostdorff, "articulated a new policy—the Truman Doctrine—and marked a turning point in U.S. foreign policy, setting a new course for the nation's relationship with the Soviet Union and the rest of the world," including the Marshall Plan which Truman Administration officials would introduce later that year.²¹⁶

For the purposes of this chapter, however, it is most important to recognize that a crucial element of Kennan's "Long Telegram" and Truman's March 12, 1947, speech was its emphasis on the place—both literal and metaphorical—that the United States would occupy in the Cold War. Both documents underscore how important it was for the nation to offer a clear picture of democracy to peoples tempted by Soviet communism. This theme continued throughout Truman's speech to the NAACP on June 29, 1947. Even as he articulated his domestic civil rights program to the nation and to the world, Truman directly refuted critics—most notably, the Soviet Union—who claimed that the

²¹⁵ Harry S. Truman, "Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine," March 12, 1947, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed July 31, 2015, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12846>.

²¹⁶ Bostdorff, *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: A Cold War Call to Arms*, 12.

United States had no business preaching democracy to the rest of the world when it disenfranchised its own citizens. Mary Dudziak observes, “[a]t a time when the United States hoped to reshape the postwar world in its own image, the international attention given to racial segregation was troublesome and embarrassing. The focus of American foreign policy was to promote democracy and to ‘contain’ communism, but the international focus on U.S. racial problems meant that the image of American democracy was tarnished.”²¹⁷ Thus, when Truman delivered the closing address at the NAACP conference, he spoke to a global audience—citizens and nations choosing between democracy and communism, the “two ways of life” that Truman had described in his address to Congress on March 12, 1947. Although much more could be said about this period in U.S. history, I now turn my attention to Truman’s political *ethos* and, more specifically, his personal history with the issue of race, to reveal the symbolic potential of presidential presence in place.

Harry S. Truman, a Son of the South

When Truman delivered the keynote address at the closing session of the thirty-eighth annual conference on June 29, 1947, his physical presence—both as President of the United States and as border-state Democrat whose grandparents were proud slave owners—lent executive and political authority to the issue of civil rights in the United States. Indeed, Truman’s southern upbringing and his own history with race relations made this particular address at the Lincoln Memorial to the NAACP all the more

²¹⁷ Mary L. Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 12.

remarkable—and transformative.

Harry S. Truman was born in Lamar, Missouri, just eighty miles from the Arkansas border. All four of Truman's grandparents were born in the South and owned slaves.²¹⁸ The War Between the States affected Truman's grandparents and parents in very personal ways. Union soldiers looted Solomon Young's farm on five separate occasions between 1861 and 1863, setting fire to barns, slaughtering chickens and hogs, and confiscating \$21,442 in possessions, "the equivalent in present-day money of a quarter of a million dollars." After these attacks came General Order No. 11. Issued on August 25, 1863, by Brigadier General Thomas Ewing, the Union commander in Kansas City, the directive forced all residents of Jackson, Cass, and Bates counties—including Truman's mother, Martha Ellen Young, and her family—to abandon their homes with only one wagonload of possessions. Martha Ellen was only eleven, and would remember walking behind her family's wagon to their "bitter exile" in Kansas City.²¹⁹ William E. Leuchtenburg writes that Truman "literally learned at his mother's knee to share the South's view of the War Between the States. . . . [and] acquired an abiding belief in white

²¹⁸ In an interview post-presidency, Truman explained, "They all had slaves. They brought them out here with them from Kentucky. Most of the slaves were wedding presents. . . . it was quite common. When a young couple got married, they got a few slaves to start out housekeeping with." Merle Miller, *Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman* (New York, NY: Berkley Publishing Corporation, 1973), 59. For more on Truman's familial history with race relations and early attitudes on civil rights, see William E. Leuchtenburg, "The Conversion of Harry Truman," *American Heritage* 42, no. 7 (1991): accessed December 2015, <http://www.americanheritage.com/content/conversion-harry-truman>; Robert H. Ferrell, *Harry S. Truman: A Life* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1994); Alonzo L. Hamby, *Man of the People: A Life of Harry S. Truman* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995); Michael R. Gardner, *Harry Truman and Civil Rights: Moral Courage and Political Risks* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2002); William E. Leuchtenburg, *The White House Looks South: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, Lyndon B. Johnson* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2005); Raymond H. Geselbracht, *The Civil Rights Legacy of Harry S. Truman* (Kirksville, MO: Truman State University Press, 2007); Richard Stewart Kirkendall, *Civil Liberties and the Legacy of Harry S. Truman* (Kirksville, MO: Truman State University Press, 2013); David Goldfield, "Border Men: Truman, Eisenhower, Johnson, and Civil Rights," *Journal of Southern History* 80, no. 1 (2014): 7-38.

²¹⁹ McCullough, *Truman*, 30-32.

supremacy.” Years later, when Truman’s mother Martha visited her son in the White House and was offered the Lincoln bedroom, she said, “You tell Harry if he tries to put me in Lincoln’s bed, I’ll sleep on the floor.”²²⁰

Truman’s initial attitudes on race mirrored those of his parents and grandparents. Perhaps nowhere else is this more evident than in a letter he wrote to Bess Wallace in 1911:

I think one man is just as good as another so long as he’s honest and decent and not a nigger or a Chinaman. Uncle Will says that the Lord made a white man from dust[,] a nigger from mud, then He threw up what was left and it came down a China man. He does hate Chinese and Japs. So do I. It is race prejudice I guess. But I am strongly of the opinion that negros [sic] ought to be in Africa, yellow men in Asia[,] and white men in Europe and America.²²¹

Shocking as these comments are, however, they reflect the social and political mores of Independence, Missouri, a town that Truman biographer Merle Miller described as “a Southern town, a border town, one of whose more prominent organizations had been the United Daughters of the Confederacy.”²²² Although he would continue to make similar racially charged comments throughout his life and even post-presidency,²²³ Truman took

²²⁰ Leuchtenburg, "The Conversion of Harry Truman."

²²¹ Leuchtenburg, "The Conversion of Harry Truman."

²²² Miller, *Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman*, 183.

²²³ Miller notes that throughout his interviews with Truman between 1961 and 1962, the former president “always said ‘nigger’; at least he always did when I talked to him. That’s what people in Independence said when he was growing up.” Leuchtenburg writes that the former president “not only opposed the 1960s sit-ins but thought they might well be Communist-inspired. In 1961 he told reporters that Northerners who went south on Freedom Rights were meddling outsiders bent on stirring up mischief where they did not belong, and in 1965 he called the Selma to Montgomery march ‘silly’ and Martin Luther King, Jr., a ‘troublemaker.’” Miller, *Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman*, 183; Leuchtenburg, "The Conversion of Harry Truman."

steps that were, at the time, notable toward securing civil rights for African Americans, particularly in the border-state of Missouri.²²⁴ As U.S. Senator, Truman supported a progressive civil rights agenda in the Senate, including anti-lynching legislation, eliminating discrimination in the armed forces, and outlawing the poll tax.²²⁵ At the same time, however, although Truman supported “legal equality” for African Americans “because [they were] human being[s] and . . . natural born American[s],” he did not believe in the equality of the races.²²⁶ In an address to a black audience in Chicago in 1940, Truman made this point explicit: “I wish to make clear that I am not appealing for social equality of the Negro. The Negro himself knows better than that, and the highest types of Negro leaders say quite frankly that they prefer the society of their own people.”²²⁷ Yet in the end, Truman saw his constitutional oath as paramount to any sectional affiliation—including his Southern upbringing. “Truman’s reading in history and in documents such as the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights had led him to question the assumptions on which he was raised,” writes Leuchtenburg. “He acted as he did not because he believed in the social equality of the races, not because he was ‘anti-South,’ but because he took solemnly the oath he had sworn to sustain the

²²⁴ Leuchtenburg observes that Truman’s actions on race relations as a public official in Missouri and as U.S. senator “appears to have derived both from conviction and from self-interest. . . . Truman always had to bear in mind that there were a great many African-American voters in Missouri.” Leuchtenburg, *The White House Looks South: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, Lyndon B. Johnson*, 157.

²²⁵ Leuchtenburg, *The White House Looks South: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, Lyndon B. Johnson*, 157.

²²⁶ Harry S. Truman in a speech at the 1940 Democratic National Convention in Chicago, Illinois (quoted in Leuchtenburg, *The White House Looks South: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, Lyndon B. Johnson*, 158.

²²⁷ Leuchtenburg, *The White House Looks South: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, Lyndon B. Johnson*, 158.

Constitution.”²²⁸ In his address to the NAACP and other public statements, Truman made it clear that he represented neither the North nor the South. Instead, he spoke as President of all the United States, to and for both the North and the South. Any sectional allegiance to the South was eclipsed by a larger commitment to the nation as a whole.

When Truman assumed the presidency in April 1945, he inherited Roosevelt’s less than stellar record on civil rights. During his construction of the New Deal during the 1930s, FDR catered to Southern Democrats. Ira Katznelson, Kim Geiger, and Daniel Kryder argue that the president and congressional leaders “reached an implicit *modus vivendi*: southern civil society would remain intact and southern representatives would support the key elements of the administration’s program. There would be no attempt to build a mass biracial base in the South; nor would even the most heinous aspects of regional repression, such as lynching, be brought under the rule of law.”²²⁹ Thomas Borstelmann writes that although FDR was “[p]ersonally inclined against colonialism and racial discrimination, Roosevelt was foremost a pragmatist who accepted the necessity of working with reactionary allies for common ends.”²³⁰ Political scientist Kevin J. McMahon summarizes, “FDR did not lack the opportunity to improve the plight of African Americans, just the will.”²³¹ Throughout the Roosevelt Administration, it was First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt who championed the issue of civil rights and became the moral conscience of the nation, meeting often with black political leaders and urging her

²²⁸ Leuchtenburg, “The Conversion of Harry Truman.”

²²⁹ Ira Katznelson, Kim Geiger, and Daniel Kryder, “Limiting Liberalism: The Southern Veto in Congress,” *Political Science Quarterly* 108, no. 2 (1993): 297.

²³⁰ Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 29.

²³¹ Kevin J. McMahon, *Reconsidering Roosevelt on Race: How the Presidency Paved the Road to Brown* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 12.

husband to support anti-lynching legislation in the U.S. Congress (something that FDR would never agree to do). After Roosevelt's sudden death in April 1945, Southern Democrats were confident that on the race question, Truman had their back. As South Carolina Senator Burnet Maybank told a friend, "Everything's going to be all right—the new President knows how to handle the niggers."²³² Although Truman lacked experience, he made up for it with conviction and moral resolve. Despite his own familial history and fully aware that his civil rights program could cost him reelection in 1948, Truman was determined to enact change. In the end, "Harry Truman would come to be seen as a president who put civil rights firmly on the nation's agenda."²³³

Although Truman took steps to support civil rights legislation as U.S. Senator, it was a meeting with delegates from the National Emergency Committee Against Mob Violence (which included NAACP Executive Secretary Walter White) in September 1946 that instigated decisive action from President Truman on the issue of race. Following a series of brutal beatings and lynchings of African Americans in the South (including U.S. service members returning from World War II), the committee decided to petition Truman for his help in an Oval Office meeting on September 19. This was not the first time that the group had made similar requests. White later recalled his skeptical view of the meeting, noting that he had been a part of such events in the past: "Either individually or as a member of a delegation, I had been to the White House on numerous occasions to discuss this question with presidents from Coolidge to Roosevelt. I frankly doubted that our efforts on this occasion would be any more rewarding than had been

²³² Leuchtenburg, "The Conversion of Harry Truman."

²³³ Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy*, 24.

those we had made with any of Truman's predecessors."²³⁴ When White recounted various incidents of racial violence and hate crimes around the country, including the police beating and blinding of Sergeant Isaac Woodward who was returning home to his wife and child after three years of military service, Truman was horrified. With his hands clenched and the color drained from his face, "My God! I had no idea it was as terrible as that! We've got to do something!"²³⁵

The next day, the president recounted the meeting to his attorney general, southerner Tom Clark from Texas, in a letter dated September 20, stating, "I have been very much alarmed at the increased racial feeling all over the country and I am wondering if it wouldn't be well to appoint a commission to analyse [sic] the situation and have a remedy to present to the next Congress. . . . I think it is going to take something more than the handling of each individual case after it happens – it is going to require the inauguration of some sort of policy to prevent such happenings."²³⁶ Less than three months later, on December 5, 1946, Truman signed Executive Order 9808, creating the President's Committee on Civil Rights (PCCR). Truman appointed a diverse body of fifteen individuals to the committee and told them that he wanted to see the "Bill of

²³⁴ Walter White, *A Man Called White: The Autobiography of Walter White* (New York, NY: The Viking Press, 1948), 330.

²³⁵ White, *A Man Called White: The Autobiography of Walter White*, 330-331. Although this particular incident seemed to spur Truman to action, this was just one of numerous instances of racial violence against African American citizens in 1946 and 1947. For a fuller account, see Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena*, 45-84; Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy*, 18-46.

²³⁶ Harry S. Truman to Tom Clark, September 20, 1946, Papers of David K. Niles, Harry S. Truman Library, accessed December 17, 2015, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/flip_books/index.php?pagenumber=2&titleid=250&tldate=1946-09-20&collectionid=ihow&PageID=1&groupid=3721. Dudziak notes that although "Truman appeared to be acting spontaneously upon Walter White's suggestion that he set up a committee on civil rights, William Berman has written that Truman and his advisors had previously decided to set up a committee and used the meeting with the National Emergency Committee against mob violence as the vehicle to announce the decision." See Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights*, 260, note 13.

Rights implemented in fact as well as on paper. . . . There are certain rights under the Constitution of the United States which I think the Federal Government has a right to protect, and I want to find out just how far we can go.”²³⁷ The Commission would deliver its report to Truman in October 1947, just four months after the president’s speech to the NAACP.

The president’s creation of the PCCR was the first of many steps he would take to extend civil rights on a national scale. On February 2, 1948, the president sent a special message on civil rights to Congress outlining comprehensive reform.²³⁸ On July 26 that same year, Truman ended the policy of segregation in the U.S. military through executive order 9981, which declared in no uncertain terms that “there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin.”²³⁹ Although black political leaders and the NAACP were thrilled to finally have an ally in the White House, southern Democrats were furious. After Truman’s special message to Congress in February 1948, a U.S. Congressman from Georgia said his state had been “kicked in the teeth” by the president.

²³⁷ Leuchtenburg, *The White House Looks South: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, Lyndon B. Johnson*, 167. William E. Juhnke writes that “the Committee included two corporation heads; two labor representatives; two Jews, two Catholics, and two Protestants (in each case one clergyman and one prominent layman); two college presidents; two southerners; two Negroes; and two women. Truman’s appointees, fifteen altogether, represented breadth, respectability, and sympathy to civil rights reform.” William E. Juhnke, “President Truman’s Committee on Civil Rights: The Interaction of Politics, Protest, and Presidential Advisory Commission,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 19, no. 3 (1989): 594.

²³⁸ Harry S. Truman, “Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights,” February 2, 1948, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed March 24, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13006>.

²³⁹ Executive Order 9981 as printed in Geselbracht, *The Civil Rights Legacy of Harry S. Truman*, 183. For more on Truman’s desegregation of the U.S. military, see Colin Powell, “Truman, Desegregation of the Armed Forces, and a Kid from the South Bronx,” in *The Civil Rights Legacy of Harry S. Truman*, ed. Raymond H. Geselbracht (Kirkville, MO: Truman State University Press, 2007), 117-124; Richard M. Yon and Tom Lansford, “Political Pragmatism and Civil Rights Policy: Truman and the Integration of the Military,” in *The Civil Rights Legacy of Harry S. Truman*, ed. Raymond H. Geselbracht (Kirkville, MO: Truman State University Press, 2007), 103-116.

Rep. William M. Colmer of Mississippi stated: “Not since the first gun was fired on Fort Sumter, resulting as it did in the greatest fratricidal strife in the history of the world, has any message of any President of these glorious United States . . . resulted in the driving of a schism in the ranks of our people, as did President Truman’s so-called civil rights message.” Another Congressman from Mississippi, Rep. John Bell Williams, agreed, stating that the president “has . . . run a political dagger into our backs and now he is trying to drink our blood.”²⁴⁰

But Truman was resolute, believing that he had a moral duty to ensure that all citizens enjoyed the rights laid out in the U.S. Constitution. When Democratic leaders asked him to back down on his civil rights agenda, the president replied:

My forebears were Confederates. . . . Every factor and influence in my background—and in my wife’s for that matter—would foster the personal belief that you are right. But my stomach turned over when I learned that Negro soldiers, just back from overseas, were being dumped out of Army trucks and beaten. Whatever my inclinations as a native of Missouri might have been, as President I know this is bad. I shall fight to end evils like this.”²⁴¹

In another letter to a southern friend, Truman referenced the beating and blinding of Sergeant Woodward by local authorities as evidence that “something is radically wrong with the system. I can’t approve of such goings on and I shall never approve of it, as long as I am here . . . I am going to try to remedy it and if that ends up in my failure to be

²⁴⁰ Leuchtenburg, "The Conversion of Harry Truman."

²⁴¹ Leuchtenburg, "The Conversion of Harry Truman."

reelected, that failure will be in a good cause.”²⁴² In an interview after he left office, Truman explained,

All those Southern fellas were very much surprised by my program for civil rights in 1948. What they didn’t understand was that I’d been for things like that all the time I was in politics. I believe in the Constitution, and if you do that, then everybody’s got to have their rights, and that means *everybody*, doesn’t matter a damn who they are or what color they are. The minute you start making exceptions, you might as well not have a Constitution. So that’s the reason I felt the way I did, and if a lot of folks were surprised to find out where I stood on the colored question, well, that’s because they didn’t know me.²⁴³

Truman saw the U.S. Constitution as a sacred document and believed it was his job as President to ensure that the rights of citizenship extended to every U.S. citizen, regardless of their race. Truman’s allegiance to these founding documents and the nation transcended any sectional identity. He considered himself a President of *all* the people of the United States, and took decisive steps to extend civil rights to “all Americans”—a phrase that Truman would emphasize again and again when he spoke to the NAACP from the steps of the Lincoln Memorial.

²⁴² Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy*, 24.

²⁴³ Miller, *Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman*, 155-156. In his memoirs, Truman later reflected that his decision to issue a governmental report on civil rights marked “[t]he beginning of this splinter opposition” within the Democratic Party, a splinter that would almost cost him the 1948 election. “In the Executive Order creating the committee, I pointed out that the nation was losing ground in civil rights and that the preservation of the liberties was the duty of every branch of government and every public official—state, federal, and local. The constitutional guarantees of individual liberties and of equal protection under the law clearly place on the federal government the duty to act when state or local authorities abridge or fail to uphold these guarantees.” Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman: Volume Two, Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1956), 180.

The Lincoln Memorial and the Rhetorical Power of Place

When Truman spoke at the closing session of the NAACP's thirty-eighth convention, he became the first president to address the organization in person since its founding in 1909 and, of more importance, he was the "first modern president to make an open and public commitment to civil rights."²⁴⁴ Part of what made Truman's speech so remarkable was the persuasive power of its physical location—the Lincoln Memorial. This physical site had not always been associated with Lincoln's stance on slavery and emancipation. In fact, the memorial's designers planned a site that would emphasize national unity rather than the politically divisive issue of race. It was only after Marian Anderson's historic concert in 1939 that the Lincoln Memorial began to be associated with civil rights activism. Thus, when Truman strode to the podium on the afternoon of June 29, 1947, he not only lent institutional authority to the cause of civil rights within the United States, but he built upon previous rhetorical action in this particular location, the Lincoln Memorial, while challenging previous presidential rhetoric in this place. To understand how Truman's address worked to rededicate this monument to civil rights progress in the United States, I examine the rhetorical history of the Lincoln Memorial, particularly its creation from 1911 to 1922, the dedication ceremonies of May 30, 1922, and Marian Anderson's 1939 Easter Sunday concert. These previous rhetorical moments reveal why Truman's decision to speak *in situ* was so radical.

²⁴⁴ Raymond Frey, "Truman's Speech to the NAACP, 29 June 1947," in *The Civil Rights Legacy of Harry S. Truman*, ed. Raymond H. Geselbracht (Kirksville, MO: Truman State University Press, 2007), 93.

Building a Memorial “To the Memory of Abraham Lincoln”

From its inception, the Lincoln Memorial was designed as a space for citizens to reflect on Lincoln’s symbolic sacrifice and to rededicate themselves to the cause for which he died. In every respect, the memorial was to be a commonplace, a site that was set apart as sacred in U.S. civil religion and yet was accessible for present and future generations to come to learn from the past. As the analysis below will demonstrate, there was some disagreement over which Lincoln the public should commemorate and what virtues they should seek to emulate.

The idea of a national monument honoring Abraham Lincoln was first introduced in 1867, two years after the former president was assassinated. On March 29, Congress approved the formation of the Lincoln Monument Association, a group of individuals tasked with “erecting a monument in the city of Washington, commemorative of the great charter of emancipation and universal liberty in America.”²⁴⁵ This language is notable because the act specifically stated that Lincoln’s stance on “emancipation and universal liberty” would be a key component of national memory. His abolition of slavery was to be the focal point of the commemorative site. For reasons that are unclear, the plan fizzled and “no practical results appear to have been accomplished from this legislation.” In 1901, one of Lincoln’s contemporaries, U.S. Senator Shelby Moore Cullom from Illinois, introduced a bill “to provide a commission to secure plans and designs for a monument or memorial to the memory of Abraham Lincoln.”²⁴⁶ Although this specific bill was postponed, the U.S. Congress eventually approved Senate Bill 9449 on February

²⁴⁵ Edward Franklin Concklin, ed. *The Lincoln Memorial in Washington* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1927), 15.

²⁴⁶ Concklin, *The Lincoln Memorial in Washington*, 16.

8, 1911, an “[a]ct to provide a commission to secure plans and designs for a monument or memorial to the memory of Abraham Lincoln.”²⁴⁷ The bill was signed into law by President William Howard Taft on February 9, and planning of the memorial began immediately.

An important shift in national memory and U.S. civil religion is reflected in the language of these two bills. Where the 1867 proposal made Lincoln’s stance on slavery the focal point, the 1911 act made no mention of emancipation. As historian Scott Sandage has written, “The early twentieth century celebrated the economic and political reunion of North and South. Lincoln’s ties to black freedom waned as politicians and scholars sculpted him into a ‘pro-Southern conservative’ honored on both sides of the Mason-Dixon line. . . . As Lincoln assumed the role of Christ in American religion, signifying national redemption, it seemed he could not be both the Great Emancipator and the Savior of the Union.”²⁴⁸ As the Lincoln Memorial Commission planned their national shrine, they were explicit about which Lincoln it would honor. In a 1912 report to Congress, the commission referred to “the man who saved the Union” twenty times and only used the phrase “emancipator” once.²⁴⁹ The architect of the Lincoln Memorial, Henry Bacon, said that the goal of his design was to portray the slain president in such a way “that devotion, integrity, charity, patience, intelligence, and humane-ness will find incentive to growth, and by contemplation of a monument to his memory and to the Union the just pride that citizens of the United States have in their country will be

²⁴⁷ Concklin, *The Lincoln Memorial in Washington*, 19.

²⁴⁸ Scott A. Sandage, "A Marble House Divided: The Lincoln Memorial, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Politics of Memory, 1939-1963," *The Journal of American History* 80, no. 1 (1993): 139.

²⁴⁹ Sandage, "A Marble House Divided: The Lincoln Memorial, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Politics of Memory, 1939-1963," 140-141.

supplemented by increasing gratitude to Abraham Lincoln for saving it to them and to their children.”²⁵⁰ This was to be, to all intents and purposes, a national shrine where citizens could come to reflect on Lincoln’s example and rededicate themselves to national unity. One crucial element of Bacon’s design was where the Lincoln Memorial would be placed.

The placement of the monument was of utmost importance to the commission, so much so that they delegated to the Commission of Fine Arts the task of making recommendations “as to the locations, plans, and designs for a monument or memorial in the city of Washington.”²⁵¹ The group considered several locations within Washington, D.C., including several spots near the U.S. Capitol building or along Delaware Avenue, “one of the great radial thoroughfares converging on the dome of the Capitol.”²⁵² But the Commission of Fine Arts finally settled on Potomac Park, an empty plot of land overlooking the Potomac River at the western-most side of the District of Columbia. In a report dated July 17, 1911, the group explained its rationale for selecting this location, noting that “[a] monumental structure standing in a broad plain surrounded by an amphitheater of hills is as widely seen and is as impressive as one upon a hilltop. From the hills of the District of Virginia the constantly recurring views of a great Lincoln Memorial, seen in association with the Washington Monument and the dome of the

²⁵⁰ Henry Bacon, “Appendix B: Report of the Architect on the Preliminary Design for a Memorial on the Potomac Park Site,” in *Lincoln Memorial Commission Report* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1912), 27, accessed July 27, 2015, <https://archive.org/stream/lincolnmemoryalcunit>.

²⁵¹ *Lincoln Memorial Commission Report* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1912), 8, accessed July 27, 2015, <https://archive.org/stream/lincolnmemoryalcunit>.

²⁵² Concklin, *The Lincoln Memorial in Washington*, 32.

Capitol, would be impressive to the highest degree.”²⁵³ Notice that the commission was explicit about what citizens from Virginia, a former Confederate state, could see across the Potomac. What the commission did not state explicitly, but most surely implied, was that one of the most prominent houses within these “amphitheater of hills” in “the District of Virginia” was Arlington House, a plantation home built by George Washington’s step-grandson and Robert E. Lee’s home for thirty years before the Civil War.²⁵⁴ Although it was now the site of Arlington National Cemetery, Bacon commented on the close proximity of the Lincoln Memorial to the former South, noting that when the bridge between the nation’s capital and Virginia was complete, it “could be made a striking symbol of reunion between the North and the South, a most appropriate symbol leading to and from the Memorial of the man who said in his first inaugural address: ‘We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies.’”²⁵⁵

Not only was the monument’s physical location important to Bacon and the commission, but the Lincoln Memorial’s architect underscored the symbolic linkages between this national shrine to the slain president and the two other prominent landmarks in the nation’s capital: the Washington Monument and the U.S. Capitol building. In a

²⁵³ D. H. Burnham, “Appendix A: Report of the Commission of Fine Arts on the Site and Selection of a Designer for the Lincoln Memorial,” July 17, 1911, in *Lincoln Memorial Commission Report* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1912), 22, accessed July 27, 2015, <https://archive.org/stream/lincolnmemorialsunit>.

²⁵⁴ This Virginia plot of land was owned by George Washington Parke Custis, the grandson of Martha Washington and step-grandson of George Washington. Custis built Arlington House as a memorial to the nation’s first president. When Custis’s daughter, Mary Anna Randolph Custis, married Robert E. Lee in 1831, the couple moved to the plantation’s estate, Arlington House. General and Mrs. Lee lived on the estate for thirty years until 1861, when the Civil War broke out. The Union Army confiscated the land soon after, and a portion of the estate became a military cemetery in 1864. See “History of Arlington National Cemetery,” Arlington National Cemetery, accessed July 26, 2015, <http://www.arlingtoncemetery.mil/Explore-the-Cemetery/History/History-of-Arlington-National-Cemetery>.

²⁵⁵ Henry Bacon, “The Architecture of the Lincoln Memorial,” in *The Lincoln Memorial*, ed. Edward Franklin Concklin (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1927), 41.

report to the Lincoln Memorial Commission citing his support for the Potomac Park location, Bacon wrote:

Terminating the axis which unites it with the Washington Monument and the Capitol, [Potomac Park] has a significance which that of no other site can equal, and any emulation or aspiration engendered by a memorial there to Lincoln and his great qualities will be immeasurably stimulated by being associated with the like feelings already identified with the Capitol and the Monument to George Washington. Containing the national legislative and judicial bodies, we have at one end of the axis a beautiful building, which is a monument to the United States Government. At the other end of the axis we have the possibility of a memorial to the man who saved that Government, and between the two is a monument to its founder. All three of these structures, stretching in one grand sweep from Capitol Hill to the Potomac River, will lend, one to the others, the associations and memories connected with each, and each will have its value increased by being on the one axis and having visual relation to the others.²⁵⁶

In this passage, Bacon explicitly stated that he designed the Lincoln Memorial to be interpreted in relation to the two other monuments clearly visible from its location. The architect believed that one of the ways the Lincoln Memorial would persuade audiences was through what they would see from this place. The symbolic linkages between this national shrine to the slain president and two other enduring symbols of U.S. democracy

²⁵⁶ Bacon, "Appendix B: Report of the Architect on the Preliminary Design for a Memorial on the Potomac Park Site," 25.

were meant to inspire citizens to renew their commitment to patriotic ideals and virtues manifest by great saints of U.S. civil religion: Washington and Lincoln.

Even the monument's architectural design testified to the unification of North and South. Bacon described the Memorial as "composed of four features—a statue of the man, a memorial of his Gettysburg speech, a memorial of his second inaugural address, and a symbol of the Union of the United States, which he stated it was his paramount object to save, and which he did save."²⁵⁷ This "symbol of the Union" would be a Greek Doric temple featuring thirty-six columns, one for every state in the Union at the time of Lincoln's death. The inscription above the statue is also instructive: "IN THIS TEMPLE / AS IN THE HEARTS OF THE PEOPLE / FOR WHOM HE SAVED THE UNION / THE MEMORY OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN / IS ENSHRINED FOREVER." The author of these words, Royal Cortissoz, explained his intention to Bacon: "The memorial must make a common ground for the meeting of the north and the south. By emphasizing his saving the union you need to appeal to both sections. By saying nothing about slavery you avoid the rubbing of old sores."²⁵⁸

Construction on the Lincoln Memorial continued during the First World War, and many politicians at home and abroad drew on Lincoln's symbolic status as justification and inspiration for the United States' pledge to ensure that "the world be made safe for

²⁵⁷ Henry Bacon, "Appendix G: Report of the Architect on the Final Design for the Lincoln Memorial," in *Lincoln Memorial Commission Report* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1912), 39, accessed July 27, 2015, <https://archive.org/stream/lincolnmemorialsunit>.

²⁵⁸ Royal Cortissoz to Henry Bacon, April 6, 1919, as quoted in Sandage, "A Marble House Divided: The Lincoln Memorial, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Politics of Memory, 1939-1963," 141.

democracy.”²⁵⁹ As Merrill D. Peterson has observed, “The identification of American ideals with the Allied cause in the First World War gave a new dimension to Lincoln’s fame,” and U.S. political leaders held up Lincoln as an example for the entire world.²⁶⁰ Speaking in the U.S. Senate on February 12, 1917, to mark the 108th anniversary of Lincoln’s birth, Senator J. Hamilton Lewis proclaimed that “when the blood-drenched events have come to their close, those who would take increased devotion to the new day will turn to the United States and dedicate their people to those holy standards burning in the sky of the redeemed earth—Lincoln and America.”²⁶¹ In a ceremony held in Springfield, Illinois, the president of Princeton University, John Grier Hibben, described Lincoln’s iconic status not just in the United States but around the world, noting that “Lincoln has become indeed the type, the symbol, and the incarnation to other peoples the world. . . . Yearning for some great ideal to steady and inspire them, some great memory, some vision of a spirit standing within the shadow of this terrible war, they find their longing realized in the noble nature and oracular words of Lincoln.”²⁶² Just as political leaders during World War I would hold up the United States and its sixteenth president as an example to the rest of the world seeking safe haven from the terrors of war, Truman would extend Lincoln’s political legacy to the international stage in 1947 when he argued that the civil rights Lincoln championed were applicable not just to U.S. citizens, but to the rest of the world.

²⁵⁹ Woodrow Wilson, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress Requesting a Declaration of War Against Germany,” April 2, 1917, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed March 21, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=65366>.

²⁶⁰ Merrill D. Peterson, *Lincoln in American Memory* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1994), 195.

²⁶¹ “‘America to Light’ Earth, Says Lewis: Europe will Turn to Ideals of U.S. Democracy and Lincoln After War,” *Washington Post*, February 13, 1917.

²⁶² “Congress Honors Memory of Lincoln,” *New York Times*, February 13, 1917.

“Here is a Shrine at Which All Can Worship”: Dedication the Lincoln Memorial

On May 30, 1922, President Warren G. Harding and Chief Justice William Howard Taft (himself a former U.S. president) presided over the dedication ceremonies of the Lincoln Memorial before an immediate audience of thousands and an untold number of radio listeners in the United States and around the world. Because of their national prominence and political authority, the speeches by Taft and Harding played a crucial role in interpreting and defining the nature and meaning of this particular site for U.S. citizens and the rest of the world. The *New York Times* noted that “[thousands] assembled at the approaches to the memorial and the crowd extended down along the quarter-mile long mirror basin in which the Washington Monument was reflected with the background of a cloudless sky,” and the *Washington Post* explained that a “huge amplifier established through the splendid generosity of the electric and telephone company” projected sound across the National Mall.²⁶³ What this news coverage obscured was the segregated seating at the dedication ceremony, a visible symbol of just how determined the Lincoln Memorial Commission was to obscure Lincoln’s views on slavery and emancipation. The black press took notice, however. One African American newspaper, the *Chicago Defender*, wrote that “[t]he venomous snake of segregation reared its head at this dedication. At a memorial to the Great Emancipator!” A small number of seats were available to “distinguished Colored ticket holders” in a “Jim Crow section of seats” at the very back.²⁶⁴

²⁶³ "Harding Dedicates Lincoln Memorial; Blue and Gray Join," *New York Times*, May 31, 1922; "2,000,000 to Hear Lincoln Addresses," *Washington Post*, May 29, 1922.

²⁶⁴ J. Le Count Chestnut, "Mock Ideal of Lincoln at Memorial," *Chicago Defender*, June 10, 1922. Chestnut also noted that these seating arrangements were made by Lt. Col. Sherill of North Carolina, the same

Those who could not be physically present in Washington D.C. for the ceremony could listen via radio. The Navy Department broadcast the speeches of President Harding and Chief Justice Taft to U.S. cities and “to the farthest stations of the world.”²⁶⁵ “It is officially estimated that fully 2,000,000 Americans will hear distinctly the great program of the Lincoln memorial,” Colonel John Temple Graves, resident commissioner of the Lincoln Memorial Commission, confidently asserted. Graves also declared that the dedication would be “the greatest and most thrilling memorial ever staged in the capital of the country which is the capital of the world.”²⁶⁶ The press also noted the monument’s placement within the city. “[T]he Lincoln memorial occupies a very remarkable place in its relation to the Capitol and the Washington monument,” observed the *Washington Post*. “Many have said that this site seems to have been destined for the Lincoln Memorial, situated as it is in the midst of Potomac park, on the axis of the Mall, with the Capitol two miles distant and the Washington monument intervening, and with parkways and drives radiating to the various parts of the city.”²⁶⁷ It was almost as if Providence had saved this location from previous development so that a temple could be erected to honor Lincoln, the Savior of the Union.

The dedication ceremony consisted of speeches by Taft, Harding, and Dr. Robert R. Morton, the “principal of the Tuskegee Institute.”²⁶⁸ Those listening via radio, however, would have heard only the speeches from Taft and Harding; Robert Morton’s

individual “who was responsible for the placing of Jim Crow signs in Rock Creek Park” and “who persists in endeavoring to place the Race bathing beach in an out-of-the-way spot.”

²⁶⁵ “Lincoln Memorial to be Dedicated Tomorrow,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, May 29, 1922.

²⁶⁶ “2,000,000 to Hear Lincoln Addresses.”

²⁶⁷ “Mall the Predestined Site for Lincoln Memorial,” *Washington Post*, May 14, 1922.

²⁶⁸ Concklin, *The Lincoln Memorial in Washington*, 78.

address was excluded from radio coverage of the event.²⁶⁹ In his speech, Morton invoked Lincoln's status as a national martyr and argued that the best way the nation could repay their debt to the fallen president was by "establish[ing] in fact what his death established in principle—that a nation conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal can endure and prosper and serve mankind." In this obvious recitation of Gettysburg Address, Morton appropriated Lincoln's most famous words for his own rhetorical purposes, even though he most certainly knew how Taft and Harding would dispute his argument. Morton concluded:

As we gather on this consecrated spot, [Lincoln's] spirit must rejoice that sectional rancors and racial antagonisms are softening more and more into mutual understanding and effective cooperation. And I like to think that here to-day, while we dedicate this symbol of our gratitude that the Nation is dedicated anew by its own determined will to fulfill to the last letter the task imposed upon it by the martyred dead, that here it firmly resolves that the humblest citizen, of whatever color or creed, shall enjoy that equal opportunity and unhampered freedom for which the immortal Lincoln gave the last full measure of devotion.²⁷⁰

Here Morton made every attempt to use this occasion of civic ritual to dedicate Lincoln's shrine not just to his status as Savior of the Union, but to call the nation people to also commit themselves to ensuring that all citizens had access to the "equal opportunity and unhampered freedom" for which Lincoln sacrificed his life.

²⁶⁹ "Lincoln Memorial to be Dedicated Tomorrow."

²⁷⁰ Dr. Robert R. Morton, "Address," May 30, 1922, in Concklin, *The Lincoln Memorial in Washington*, 81.

Chief Justice Taft spoke next, drawing an explicit comparison between Lincoln and Jesus Christ and further cementing this monument as a sacred site of U.S. civil religion. Lincoln had shown “patience under grievous disappointment,” suffered “agony of spirit in the burden he had to carry . . . [and] the abuse and ridicule of which he was the subject.” All of these qualities formed “the story of a passion,” much like the Passion of the Christ. “The influence he still wields, one may say with all reverence, has a Christ-like character,” Taft continued. “It has spread to the four quarters of the globe.”²⁷¹ Much like the gospel of Christ that was carried out from Jerusalem to all nations, so also was Lincoln’s fame. Taft then spoke as chairman of the commission, describing the planning and building process of the Memorial and then presenting it to President Harding as “the culmination of the highest art of which America is capable, and therefore fit to commemorate a people’s love for the Nation’s savior and its greatest leader.” To conclude, Taft commented on why this particular spot was significant for this shrine dedicated to Lincoln’s memory:

Here on the banks of the Potomac, the boundary between the two sections whose conflict made the burden, passion, and triumph of his life, it is peculiarly appropriate that it should stand. Visible in its great beauty from the Capitol, whose great dome typifies the Union which he saved; seen in all its grandeur from Arlington, where lie the nation’s honored dead who fell in the conflict, Union and Confederate alike, it marks the restoration of the brotherly love of the two sections in this memorial of one who is as dear to the hearts of the South as to

²⁷¹ William Howard Taft, “Address of William Howard Taft, Chief Justice of the United States, Chairman of the Lincoln Memorial Commission in Presenting the Memorial to the President of the United States,” May 30, 1922, in Concklin, *The Lincoln Memorial in Washington*, 83-84.

those of the North. . . . Here is a shrine at which all can worship, here an altar upon which the supreme sacrifice was made in the cause of liberty, here a sacred religious refuge in which those who love country and love God can find inspiration and repose.²⁷²

It is difficult to imagine a more pointed description of a site of U.S. civil religion. This was to be a national shrine, a sacred altar, a religious refuge that would inspire acts of worship, reflection, comfort, and inspiration, a memorial dedicated to the Savior of the Union.

The final speaker, President Warren G. Harding, was the most explicit about rejecting Lincoln's status as the Great Emancipator. "The supreme chapter in history is not emancipation," he stated bluntly.

The simple truth is that Lincoln, recognizing an established order, would have compromised with the slavery that existed, if he could have halted its extension. Hating human slavery as he did, he doubtless believed in its ultimate abolition through the developing conscience of the American people, but he would have been the last man in the Republic to resort to arms to effect its abolition.

Emancipation was a means to a great end—maintained union and nationality.

Here was the great purpose, here the towering hope, here the supreme faith.²⁷³

Harding then quoted from Lincoln's First Inaugural Address (where Lincoln quoted himself) to further support his argument: "I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to

²⁷² Taft, "Address," in Concklin, *The Lincoln Memorial in Washington*, 86.

²⁷³ Warren G. Harding, "Address by the Hon. Warren G. Harding, President of the United States," May 30, 1922, in Concklin, *The Lincoln Memorial in Washington*, 87. Curiously, this speech does not appear online at *The American Presidency Project*.

interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so.” Harding then explained that Lincoln “recognized the conflicting viewpoints, differing policies, and controverted questions” concerning slavery. And yet, Harding argued, Lincoln proclaimed “deliberate public opinion as the supreme power of civilization, easily to be written into law when conviction should command.” There was a lesson in this for the present, the president argued. “It ought to be a tonic to the waning confidence of those of to-day who grow impatient that emphasized minority views are not hurried into the majority expressions of the Republic. Deliberate public opinion never fails.”²⁷⁴ In this passage, Harding invoked Lincoln’s memory and even his own rhetoric to argue that the “minority views” on civil rights in 1922 should not grow impatient, but simply wait for U.S. public opinion to support racial progress. Of course, in Harding’s view, this change would (and should) never happen.

To close, Harding stated that the Lincoln Memorial was “less for Abraham Lincoln than those of us to-day, and for those who follow after,” to learn from his example and find inspiration in his memory. “Fifty-seven years ago this people gave from their ranks, sprung from their own fiber, this plain man, holding their common ideals. They gave him first to service of the Nation in the hour of peril, then to their Pantheon of Fame. With them and by them he is enshrined and exalted forever. To-day, American gratitude, love, and appreciation, give to Abraham Lincoln this lone white temple, a pantheon for him alone.”²⁷⁵

²⁷⁴ Harding, “Address,” in Conklin, *The Lincoln Memorial*, 88.

²⁷⁵ Harding, “Address,” in Conklin, *The Lincoln Memorial*, 91.

The speeches by Taft and Harding offer insight into what this particular place would come to represent in U.S. political culture and public memory. Physically embodying two of the three branches of U.S. government, the chief executive and the chief justice presided over the dedication ceremony as chief priests of U.S. civil religion and used their rhetoric in place to interpret the Lincoln Memorial's symbolism for the nation and the world, to forward this place-as-rhetoric. Because presidential rhetoric carries symbolic weight virtually unmatched in U.S. political culture, another presidential declaration in place—Truman's speech to the NAACP on June 29, 1947—would be required before the Lincoln Memorial could be (re)dedicated as a site for civil rights activism. Yet Truman's civil rights declaration would not have been possible apart from Marian Anderson's 1939 concert on Easter Sunday. Although Truman never mentioned Anderson in his address, the NAACP saw the June 29, 1947, as a direct continuation of Anderson's strategic deployment of Lincoln's memory eight years earlier.

“In This Great Auditorium Under the Sky, All of Us are Free”: Marian Anderson's Concert at the Lincoln Memorial

After the Lincoln Memorial's dedication in 1922, U.S. politicians began the tradition of holding ceremonies at the site every year on Lincoln's Birthday and “reaffirmed the primacy of Savior over Emancipator.”²⁷⁶ African American leaders contested this view. In 1926, 2,000 black citizens gathered at the Memorial for a religious service, and Bishop E. D. W. Jones told the audience, “the immortality of the great

²⁷⁶ Sandage, “A Marble House Divided: The Lincoln Memorial, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Politics of Memory, 1939-1963,” 143.

emancipator lay not in his preservation of the Union, but in his giving freedom to the negroes of America.”²⁷⁷ Although these previous marches and rallies deployed Lincoln’s symbolic status as the Great Emancipator for their purposes, it was not until Marian Anderson’s 1939 concert that the Lincoln Memorial became linked inextricably with civil rights protests in the United States. “By invoking and reinterpreting a national icon,” writes Sandage, “black protestors explored the ambiguities and possibilities of American society in the mid-twentieth century. Their protests at the Lincoln Memorial were repeated, standardized rituals that evolved from experience and ultimately constituted a formidable politics of memory.”²⁷⁸

In January 1939, the Daughters of the American Revolution banned world-renowned singer Marian Anderson from performing at Constitution Hall.²⁷⁹ At the time, Anderson was one of the most revered singers in the world, having performed for President and Mrs. Roosevelt in the United States and in many other countries abroad. As Anderson’s booking manager searched for other options that might accommodate a large crowd, Lulu Childers, the director of music at Howard University, suggested the idea of an outdoor concert.²⁸⁰ Walter White and the NAACP Board of Directors enthusiastically supported this plan. In a formal resolution dated March 13, 1939, the board wrote, “It

²⁷⁷ Jones as quoted in Sandage, “A Marble House Divided: The Lincoln Memorial, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Politics of Memory, 1939-1963,” 143.

²⁷⁸ Sandage, “A Marble House Divided: The Lincoln Memorial, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Politics of Memory, 1939-1963,” 143.

²⁷⁹ For more on Marian Anderson and the 1939 Easter Sunday Concert, see Marian Anderson, *My Lord, What a Morning* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1956); Alan Keiler, *Marian Anderson: A Singer's Journey* (New York, NY: A Lisa Drew Book/Scribner, 2000); Raymond Arsenault, *The Sound of Freedom: Marian Anderson, the Lincoln Memorial, and the Concert that Changed America* (New York, NY: Bloomsbury Press, 2009).

²⁸⁰ Arsenault, *The Sound of Freedom: Marian Anderson, the Lincoln Memorial, and the Concert that Changed America*, 145.

would be far better for Miss Anderson to sing out-of-doors, for example, at the Lincoln Memorial erected to commemorate the memory of Abraham Lincoln, the Great Emancipator, or not to sing in Washington at all until democracy can surmount the color line in the nation's capitol.”²⁸¹ In a personal letter to Anderson, White recommended the Lincoln Memorial “because of the peculiar appropriateness of that place under the present circumstances.”²⁸² Yet as historian Raymond Arsenault observes, “the choice of the Lincoln Memorial as the backdrop for the Anderson recital was a calculated gamble. The organizers could not be certain how the American public would respond to the juxtaposition of a black concert singer and a white Republican president from Illinois.”²⁸³ Indeed, just seventeen years after the Lincoln Memorial dedication ceremonies in 1922, Marian Anderson's presence would symbolically shift the meaning of the Lincoln Memorial from a site that honored Lincoln as Savior of the Union to an explicit recognition of Lincoln the Great Emancipator.

The NAACP secured permission from Harold Ickes, the Secretary of the Interior and the former president of the Chicago branch of the NAACP, to use the Lincoln Memorial for Anderson's concert—the first time an artist had ever sung at the national

²⁸¹ “Resolution Passed by the Board of Directors of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, March 13, 1939, found in Walter White correspondence, including Marian Anderson Lincoln Memorial concert, Mar 02, 1939 – Mar 17, 1939, Folder: 001469-019-0686, Papers of the NAACP, Part 02: 1919-1939, Personal Correspondence of Selected NAACP ProQuest History Vault, accessed July 2015, <http://congressional.proquest.com/histvault?q=001469-019-0686>.

²⁸² Walter White to Marian Anderson, March 24, 1939, Walter White correspondence, including Marian Anderson Lincoln Memorial concert, Mar 02, 1939 – Mar 17, 1939, Folder: 001469-019-0686, Papers of the NAACP, Part 02: 1919-1939, Personal Correspondence of Selected NAACP ProQuest History Vault, accessed July 2015, <http://congressional.proquest.com/histvault?q=001469-019-0686>.

²⁸³ Arsenault, *The Sound of Freedom: Marian Anderson, the Lincoln Memorial, and the Concert that Changed America*, 148.

shrine.²⁸⁴ The Interior Department predicted that a crowd of 50,000 would hear Anderson sing on Easter Sunday; after the event, the U.S. Capitol Park Police put the number at 75,000. The concert was broadcast down the National Mall through large speakers and over the NBC Blue radio network.²⁸⁵ A staff writer for the *Washington Post* observed that the gathering “was one of the largest assemblages Washington had seen since Lindbergh came back from Paris in ’27, a gaily-dressed Easter throng that stretched from the Lincoln Memorial to the Washington Monument Hill, and sent its northern flank as far as Constitution Avenue.”²⁸⁶ The timing of the concert was not coincidental. Where Taft and Harding had underscored Lincoln’s symbolic status as a national sacrifice that bridged the gulf between North and South, this Easter Sunday concert suggested that Lincoln instead had died to atone for the nation’s sin of slavery. Here, at the temple dedicated to Lincoln’s memory, Marian Anderson, whose voice Maestro Arturo Toscanini described as heard “once in a hundred years,” would honor the Great Emancipator with her talent.²⁸⁷ For the assembled audience, this moment provided an opportunity to reassess what Lincoln meant in U.S. public memory and, by extension, (re)dedicate themselves to securing liberty and justice for all.

Secretary Ickes introduced Marian Anderson to the crowd himself, and took the opportunity to make a public statement on race relations in the United States. “In this great auditorium under the sky, all of us are free,” he began. This opening comment

²⁸⁴ “The Triumph of Marian Anderson,” *Chicago Defender*, April 22, 1939.

²⁸⁵ “Miss Anderson to Sing at Lincoln Shrine,” *Washington Post*, March 31, 1939; Edward T. Folliard, “Ickes Introduces Contralto at Lincoln Memorial,” April 10, 1939.

²⁸⁶ Folliard, “Ickes Introduces Contralto at Lincoln Memorial.”

²⁸⁷ “75,000 Hear Marian Anderson Sing from Lincoln Memorial,” *Christian Science Monitor*, April 10, 1939.

subtly implied that although all were free under the sky—and thus, under God—the same could not be said for man-made buildings, such as Constitution Hall. Ickes then praised Lincoln for “[restoring] freedom to those from whom we had disregardfully taken it. In carrying out this task, Abraham Lincoln laid down his life, and it is as appropriate as it is fortunate that today we stand reverently and humbly at the base of this memorial to the Great Emancipator while glorious tribute is rendered to his memory by a daughter of the race from which he struck the chains of slavery.”²⁸⁸ Here Ickes was explicit about what Lincoln’s death accomplished. Nowhere did the Secretary reference Lincoln as Savior of the Union. Instead, he was the “Great Emancipator” who “laid down his life” to “restore freedom to those from whom we had disregardfully taken it.”

Marian Anderson appeared on the steps after Ickes and sang a short program, including “America,” “La Favorita,” “Ave Maria,” and four spirituals: “Gospel Train,” “Trampin’,” “My Soul is Anchored in the Lord,” and “Nobody Knows the Trouble I’ve Seen.” In total, the concert lasted forty-five minutes. “When she had finished,” wrote a *Washington Post* correspondent, “a thunderous burst of applause broke out around her, and continued to roll up from the far reaches of the crowd for several minutes.”²⁸⁹ In a strikingly accurate editorial published almost two weeks after the concert, the *Chicago Defender* predicted that “[w]hen, on Easter Sunday, Marian Anderson lifted her matchless contralto voice on the steps of the Grecian Temple to the great emancipator—Abraham Lincoln—a new chapter was added to America’s social history. A chapter that outlines broadly a new social transition—the passing of the cold, intransigent, intolerant

²⁸⁸ Harold L. Ickes, “Address,” April 9, 1939, in “Text of Secretary Ickes Speech at Anderson Easter Recital,” *Chicago Defender*, April 15, 1939.

²⁸⁹ Folliard, “Ickes Introduces Contralto at Lincoln Memorial.”

cast and the emergence of a new, progressively democratic group.”²⁹⁰ Eight years later, on June 29, 1947, President Harry S. Truman would join the ranks of this new order and begin the process of enacting civil rights legislation that would forever change race relations in the United States.

Planning and Writing Truman’s Address to the NAACP

To audiences at home and abroad, the Lincoln Memorial offered a space where Truman could link his civil rights program to his larger Cold War foreign policy and argue that equality of all peoples, regardless of race, was a central plank of his domestic and international agenda. Although Truman was not the first U.S. president to speak from the steps of this sacred location, his June 29, 1947, address rejected the reading of the Lincoln Memorial that Taft and Harding advocated in 1922 and instead reaffirmed Marian Anderson’s strategic deployment of the Lincoln Memorial in 1939. As the previous sections demonstrated, Truman’s address to the NAACP was notable not simply because of what he said, but precisely because he, a son of the South, was speaking on behalf of the organization at a site originally designed to promote national unity—and silence Lincoln’s stance on slavery and emancipation. Archival materials from the Truman Library and the papers of the NAACP reveal how the NAACP and the Truman Administration understood the rhetorical significance of this particular occasion and how the NAACP executive secretary and the Truman White House staff worked to link the president’s speech to the symbolic significance of the Lincoln Memorial (including

²⁹⁰ “The Triumph of Marian Anderson.”

previous rhetorical action in this place) and to connect the current civil rights crisis at home to the United States' foreign policy.

Staging Presidential Presence in Place: Walter White and the NAACP

On April 1, 1947, NAACP Executive Secretary Walter White sent a letter to Matthew Connelly, secretary to the President. White had met with the president the previous September as a spokesman for the National Emergency Committee Against Mob Violence.²⁹¹ In his message to Connelly, White explained that there were “several pressing matters which I would like very much to discuss with the President at his earliest convenience. Would you be good enough to arrange an appointment for me and let me know as soon as possible when I may come down.”²⁹² On April 7, Connelly wired back and told White he had an appointment for Wednesday, April 9, at 11:30 am.²⁹³ It was at this meeting that White would invite Truman to speak to the 38th Annual Conference of the NAACP on June 29, 1947. In his autobiography, White described the encounter:

Although I knew it was unnecessary to do so, I reminded the President of how acts of discrimination against minorities were being used abroad to discredit the United States and convince the people of the world that Americans were incurably addicted to bigotry. A forthright and unequivocal statement by the President was necessary, I urged, to let the people of the world know that while Americans

²⁹¹ White, *A Man Called White: The Autobiography of Walter White*, 329-332.

²⁹² Walter White to Matthew Connelly, April 1, 1947, White House Central Files, Official File 413 – National Association for the Advancement of Colored People [1 of 2], Box 1382, Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

²⁹³ Matthew J. Connelly to Walter White, April 7, 1947, White House Central Files, Official File 413 – National Association for the Advancement of Colored People [1 of 2], Box 1382, Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

frequently failed to live up to their declarations of democracy, we were constantly at work to narrow the margin between our protestations of freedom and our practice of them.²⁹⁴

White's description of his meeting with Truman is invaluable, because it suggests that the president and other White House officials saw the NAACP speech as an important component not just of their domestic civil rights agenda, but as a key element of the president's developing foreign policy at the beginning of the Cold War. According to White's autobiography, Truman told White to send him a list of the items he thought the president should emphasize in his speech. "We both laughed," recalled White, "as I told him that if he included even one half of the things I thought he ought to say, the Southern Democrats would probably want to run him out of the country."²⁹⁵

On April 11, two days after White's meeting with Truman, the NAACP executive secretary wrote to the president, thanking him for his initial agreement to speak at the closing session in June:

My dear Mr. President: I was doubly delighted on Wednesday – first, to see you looking so well despite the strain of national and World affairs during this trying period and second, that you tentatively agreed to speak at the closing session of our Annual Conference at the Lincoln Memorial on Sunday, June 29th. . . . This will be one of the greatest occasions in the history of the Association and one in

²⁹⁴ White, *A Man Called White: The Autobiography of Walter White*, 347-348.

²⁹⁵ White, *A Man Called White: The Autobiography of Walter White*, 348.

which your address will have not only nation-wide but World-wide significance.²⁹⁶

White's last comment reflects his argument that Truman's speech would not only support the NAACP's mission, but would also align with the president's Cold War foreign policy. That same day, White also wrote to David K. Niles, the administrative assistant to President Truman, to provide an overview of the event. A tentative program listed several items of note, including ten minutes of singing by none other than Marian Anderson, a brief address by U.S. Senator Wayne Morse (R-OR), and a ten-minute speech by Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt. White also explained that the NAACP intended to have "a distinguished platform party. Invitations will be sent to members of the Cabinet, the United States Supreme Court, to the Ambassadors to the United States, to a selected list of members of the Congress," and individuals associated with the NAACP. "Arrangements will also be made to have the ceremony photographed for newsreels and possibly to have the entire occasion televised."²⁹⁷ This particular emphasis on who would attend the event and the NAACP's plans to have images and live coverage of the event circulated to a broader audience underscore the importance not just of Truman's physical presence at the event, but the symbolic significance of where the event would be placed.

The NAACP's plan to strategically align its thirty-eighth annual conference with Marian Anderson's 1939 concert was evident from the very beginning. The same day that

²⁹⁶ Walter White to Harry S. Truman, April 11, 1947, White House Central Files, Official File 413 – National Association for the Advancement of Colored People [1 of 2], Box 1382, Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

²⁹⁷ Walter White to David K. Niles, April 11, 1947, White House Central Files, Official File 413 – National Association for the Advancement of Colored People [1 of 2], Box 1382, Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

White followed up with Truman, he also penned a note to Oscar L. Chapman, now the Under Secretary of the Department of the Interior under Harold Ickes, on April 11. In it, White enclosed a formal letter of application for the NAACP's use of the Lincoln Memorial on June 29.²⁹⁸ White also added his "very warm personal thanks for your very helpful suggestions," a comment that seems to imply that he had discussed the request with Chapman prior to meeting Truman.²⁹⁹ On April 28, David Niles called Oscar Chapman to let him know that Truman had agreed to speak at the NAACP event. Chapman then wrote to Arthur Demaray, Director of the National Park Service: "Will you please reserve the Lincoln Memorial for this date and have acknowledgements to the attached letters prepared for my signatures approving the use of the Memorial for this occasion."³⁰⁰ Thus, it seems that Truman's agreement to speak at the closing session helped to secure the monument for the NAACP's usage.

On May 16, the NAACP announced that the final session of their 38th Annual Conference would be held at the Lincoln Memorial on the afternoon of June 29. In the press release, the organization explicitly connected the upcoming "huge outdoor meeting in front of the Lincoln Memorial" with Marian Anderson's concert eight years earlier:

The site will be the same as that used by Marian Anderson in April, 1940 [sic], when she sang to 75,000 people after being refused the use of Constitution Hall, owned by the D.A.R. Permission to use it has been secured by the NAACP from the Department of the Interior and plans are being arranged with the National

²⁹⁸ Although White mentions this formal letter in his note to Chapman, the document is not in the archives.

²⁹⁹ Walter White to Oscar Chapman, April 11, 1947, Papers of Oscar L. Chapman, Box 37, Folder: National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

³⁰⁰ Oscar Chapman to Mr. [Arthur] Demaray, April 28, 1947, Papers of Oscar L. Chapman, Box 37, Folder: National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

Capital Parks. In addition to several nationally-known speakers, there will be a distinguished Negro soloist, a chorus and a band.³⁰¹

Truman's participation in the event was not made public until June 3. The NAACP followed up with its own announcement, noting that Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, Senator Wayne Morse (R-OR), and Walter White would join the president on the speaker's platform. "It is expected that an audience as large as that which heard Marion [sic] Anderson at the historic 1939 Easter Sunday concert, will again fill the Lincoln Memorial," the press release read. "The President's speech, which will be broadcast over several major networks, is being eagerly anticipated in domestic as well as international circles, since it is expected that Mr. Truman will make a major declaration of government policy on racial tensions both at home and abroad."³⁰²

Although the NAACP anticipated at least 100,000 people in attendance at the Lincoln Memorial gathering, the organization also planned for a much broader audience in the United States and around the world. In a letter sent to radio stations around the country, the NAACP asked local managers to broadcast the June 29 event. "It is estimated that at least 100,000 persons will be present to join in re-dedicating America to the principles of democracy irrespective of race which in turn will give part of the answer to those who attack democracy because of racial discrimination," the letter read. "We are

³⁰¹ Press Release, "Lincoln Memorial Meeting to Close NAACP Conference," May 16, 1947, found in Annual Convention, 1947, including program and resolutions, Mar 25, 1947 – Jun 29, 1947, Folder: 001412-012-0000, Papers of the NAACP, Part 01: Meetings of the Board of Directors, Records of Annual Conferences, Major Speeches, and Special Reports, ProQuest History Vault, accessed July 2015, <http://congressional.proquest.com/histvault?q=001412-012-0000>.

³⁰² Press Release, "Pres. Truman to Speak at NAACP 38th Conference," May 30, 1947, found Annual Convention, 1947, including program and resolutions, Mar 25, 1947 – Jun 29, 1947, Folder: 001412-012-0000, Papers of the NAACP, Part 01: Meetings of the Board of Directors, Records of Annual Conferences, Major Speeches, and Special Reports, ProQuest History Vault, accessed July 2015, <http://congressional.proquest.com/histvault?q=001412-012-0000>.

informing you of this program with the hope that the entire program or at least part of it may be carried by your station. Will you be good enough to inform us if this is possible.”³⁰³ In a June 6 press release, the NAACP described Truman’s address as the “[f]ocal point of the gigantic meeting” and stated that the president would “deliver a major declaration of government policy on racial tensions.” The meeting would be broadcast around the country to “NAACP branches in practically every section of the United States These meetings, with an expected 4 to 5 hundred thousand persons attending, will be joined to form one gigantic mass meeting linked together by radio. All of the major networks will broadcast the President’s speech and parts of the meeting.”³⁰⁴ This event was not limited to those who were physically present at the Lincoln Memorial. Instead, the NAACP and the Truman Administration saw this occasion as one in which the U.S. public and people in other nations would listen to the president deliver a bold statement on race relations in the United States.

Walter White underscored this global aspect in a press conference, stating that the NAACP would “meet in the fitting shadow of the Abraham Lincoln monument to rededicate all of its resources and energies to the people of all nations who fought and are still fighting to secure the rights of all men.”³⁰⁵ In a press release issued a week later, on

³⁰³ “Draft of Letter to Be Sent to Independent Radio Stations,” June 1947, found in Annual Convention, 1947, including program and resolutions, Mar 25, 1947 – Jun 29, 1947, Folder: 001412-012-0000, Papers of the NAACP, Part 01: Meetings of the Board of Directors, Records of Annual Conferences, Major Speeches, and Special Reports, ProQuest History Vault, accessed July 2015, <http://congressional.proquest.com/histvault?q=001412-012-0000>.

³⁰⁴ Press Release, “Largest Mass Meeting in Nation’s History Planned by NAACP,” June 6, 1947, found in Annual Convention, 1947, including program and resolutions, Mar 25, 1947 – Jun 29, 1947, Folder: 001412-012-0000, Papers of the NAACP, Part 01: Meetings of the Board of Directors, Records of Annual Conferences, Major Speeches, and Special Reports, ProQuest History Vault, accessed July 2015, <http://congressional.proquest.com/histvault?q=001412-012-0000>.

³⁰⁵ Press Release, “Largest Mass Meeting in Nation’s History Planned by NAACP.”

June 13, the NAACP noted that “[w]ith public sentiment, not only in the United States but in many other parts of the globe as well, aroused against the barbaric American institution of lynching, unprecedented attention will be focused upon the NAACP’s 38th annual convention. Intense official and diplomatic interest has already been indicated in President Truman’s speech to the convention’s closing session.” Truman’s address would be broadcast on the four major radio networks (CBS, NBC, ABC, and Mutual), and the U.S. Department of State made arrangements to send the program by short wave radio around the globe.³⁰⁶ In a column for the *Chicago Defender* published June 14, Walter White told readers that President Truman would “state the position of America to the world on the so-called race question both at home and abroad.”³⁰⁷

Prominent black newspapers of the day also underscored the relationship between Truman’s speech on civil rights and his broader Cold War foreign policy. The *New York Amsterdam News* predicted that the June 29, 1947, event would be the “largest rally of American citizens ever staged anywhere in the nation’s history” and even went so far as to designate it a “march-on-Washington.” However, the newspaper noted that the purpose of this march was

not to badger the President but rather to give him an opportunity to deliver what should be the most important, the most significant, and the most courageous

³⁰⁶ Press Release, “NAACP 38th Conference Held Internationally Important,” June 13, 1947, found in Annual Convention, 1947, including program and resolutions, Mar 25, 1947 – Jun 29, 1947, Folder: 001412-012-0000, Papers of the NAACP, Part 01: Meetings of the Board of Directors, Records of Annual Conferences, Major Speeches, and Special Reports, ProQuest History Vault, accessed July 2015, <http://congressional.proquest.com/histvault?q=001412-012-0000>; White, *A Man Called White: The Autobiography of Walter White*, 348.

³⁰⁷ Walter White, “Join a Great Demonstration,” *Chicago Defender*, June 14, 1947, found in Papers of Philleo Nash, Box 58, Folder: Minorities – Negro – Organizations – NAACP – Walter White Testimony, Harry S. Truman Library.

speech on a major problem of his career. In his fight for democracy and human liberty in far-off Greece, Hungary, Turkey, Italy, France, Korea, China, and elsewhere[,] Mr. Truman certainly cannot afford to ignore the crimes against democracy and humanity being committed against the nation's 13,000,000 Negro citizens, and the limitation which has been placed upon the freedom, liberty, and self-respect of the American Negro by the immoral laws, customs and practices of some of the states of the American Union.³⁰⁸

The Pittsburgh Courier commented on plans to broadcast Truman's speech around the country and explained that "this will bring all of these folks, who cannot come to Washington in person, all together in spirit, drawn into a common bond by this excellently arranged broadcast."³⁰⁹ This event was to be, in the words of one radio audience member who would later write to President Truman, "a very good church service."³¹⁰

Writing Truman's Address to the NAACP

As the NAACP publicized the president's upcoming speech at the closing session of their annual conference, the White House speechwriting staff worked behind the scenes to formulate Truman's remarks. The speechwriting files at the Truman Library reveal a substantial internal dialogue not just about what Truman would say, but how this

³⁰⁸ "Await U.S. Policy on Racial Tensions," *New York Amsterdam News*, June 14, 1947.

³⁰⁹ Johnson, "So the President Speaks!," *Pittsburgh Courier*, June 28, 1947.

³¹⁰ Mable A. Jamison to Harry Truman, June 29, 1947, PPF 200, Folder: 6/29/47 – Speech at the Closing Session of the 38th Annual Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Pro), Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

particular occasion would function within the president's larger domestic civil rights initiatives and his larger Cold War foreign policy.

An undated, untitled memo found in the Longhand Notes file for President Truman's speeches offers a helpful articulation of the Truman Administration's view of its public statements on civil rights. The memo lists twenty-one instances in which Truman discussed his support for civil rights. Because this memo is contained in the folder specifically dedicated to "April – June 1947," it is probable that it was written or circulated in preparation for Truman's speech to the NAACP. The introduction and conclusion to the memo are particularly insightful.

In his messages to Congress and in public statements and speeches, President Truman has always strongly advocated and reaffirmed his views regarding minorities. His belief that our land can make no greater contribution to this troubled world than to establish brotherhood as the rule of life among all citizens of every religion, race or national origin, runs like a thread through his public papers and this principle has been reiterated on the following occasions.

The memo then listed out twenty-one instances between January 1945 and February 1947 when Truman affirmed these principles. "President Truman's philosophy is best summed up in his recent order creating the President's Committee on Civil Rights," the memo concluded, a committee tasked with compiling "a written report, designed to strengthen

the inadequate civil rights statutes in order to make our Constitution and Bill of Rights a reality.”³¹¹

Throughout the speechwriting process, it is clear that the Truman Administration wanted to coordinate the president’s address to the NAACP with the views and later recommendations of the PCCR, who would submit their final report, *To Secure These Rights: The Report of the President’s Committee on Civil Rights*, to the president in October 1947. Two staff members of the PCCR, executive director Robert K. Carr and director of research Milton D. Stewart, wrote the first version of Truman’s speech.³¹²

This initial draft was “a strong statement that emphasized urgency in acting on civil rights problems and the PCCR’s role in advising the president.”³¹³ Although this first draft would be revised by White House staff members (including George Elsey, Clark Clifford, and David Niles), Carr and Milton articulated important policy positions that carried over into the final version of Truman’s speech to the NAACP.³¹⁴ Of particular note is a passage describing United States as a symbol to the rest of the world:

It is sad, but true, that we do not need to look halfway around the world for an opportunity to better our civil rights record. In our own city of Washington, our national capital, there is much to be done. It is beyond argument that a nation which believes in civil liberty, must practice what it preaches in its own capital.

³¹¹ Untitled Document on the President’s Stance on Civil Rights, no date, President’s Secretary’s Files, Box 38, Folder: 1945-1953 Pres. Speeches – Longhand Notes, April-June 1947, Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

³¹² Untitled Draft (with “From Rbt Carr & Milton Stewart” across top), no date, Papers of George Elsey, Box 17, Folder: 1947 – June 29 – NAACP Speech, Harry S. Truman Library.

³¹³ Pauley, “Harry Truman and the NAACP: A Case Study in Presidential Persuasion on Civil Rights,” 223.

³¹⁴ Pauley, “Harry Truman and the NAACP: A Case Study in Presidential Persuasion on Civil Rights,” 223.

We must make this city a living symbol of American freedom and equality both to our own people and to the outside world.³¹⁵

Although this exact passage was removed during the editing process by White House speechwriters, its emphasis on improving civil rights at home so that the nation could become a “living symbol” to the rest of the world revealed the Truman Administration’s understanding of the United States as a metaphorical and literal place of refuge for the rest of the world at the dawn of the Cold War.

The White House speechwriters also emphasized the symbolic significance of the Lincoln Memorial in relation to Truman’s foreign policy. In a June 16, 1947, memo to Matthew J. Connelly, appointments secretary to the President, administrative assistant David K. Niles noted the significance of the speech’s physical setting.³¹⁶ He noted that the introduction of the speech, which was to last only a “half-minute to a minute,” should mention the “significance of meeting on the grounds of Lincoln memorial. ‘He died to make men free.’ His problem: One Nation. Our problem: One world. The problem of freedom in the modern world; our goal, to maintain the greatest possible freedom for the individual, while perfecting through the UN a system of international security.”³¹⁷ Niles’ suggestion is particularly interesting because he focused primarily on the linkages between Lincoln’s status as Great Emancipator and the current world crisis. Although one can read his mention of the nation’s goal of “maintain[ing] the greatest possible

³¹⁵ Untitled Draft (with “From Rbt Carr & Milton Stewart” across top), 5.

³¹⁶ Interestingly, Niles’ memo to Connelly is identical to an earlier memo Niles received from Philleo Nash, a special assistant in the White House who was also an African American. For more discussion of Nash’s role in writing this speech, see Pauley, “Harry Truman and the NAACP: A Case Study in Presidential Persuasion on Civil Rights,” 223.

³¹⁷ David K. Niles to Matthew J. Connelly, “Memorandum, Subject: Proposed Speech by the President to the NAACP,” June 16, 1947, Papers of George Elsey, Box 17, Folder: 1947 – June 29 – NAACP Speech, Harry S. Truman Library.

freedom for the individual” as support for domestic civil rights initiatives, the rest of Niles’ memo privileged U.S. foreign policy over the current state of race relations at home. “I suggest that the body of the speech should be devoted to our policy in the government of dependent areas, a problem which as long been an interest of this organization,” wrote Niles. “However, the recent events in North and South Carolina³¹⁸ will make it difficult to avoid reference to civil rights, regardless of the fact that the matter is under study by a Presidential Committee. Accordingly, I am suggesting that the closing paragraph of the speech, not to exceed one minute, should be devoted to civil rights.”³¹⁹ Obviously, the president did not follow Niles’ advice on this point. In fact, according to a hastily scribbled note in the files, Truman had a mixed response to Niles’ memo: “some good; some not so good.”³²⁰

These internal memos leading up to Truman’s speech to the NAACP reveal that the White House carefully considered the domestic and foreign policy implications of the president’s address on June 29, 1947. If anything, these advisors focused more on the international implications of this rhetorical occasion. But as the analysis below will demonstrate, both President Truman and the other speakers at the closing session

³¹⁸ Undoubtedly Niles was referring to several events, including the 1946 beating and blinding of Sergeant Isaac Woodward in Batesburg, South Carolina (and the jury’s decision to find the South Carolina police officer not guilty despite his admission of carrying out the attack), the February 1947 kidnapping and lynching of Willie Earle in Greenville, South Carolina (and the nine-day trial in May 1947 trial in which five defendants were acquitted) and the April 1947 Freedom Rides in North Carolina.

³¹⁹ David K. Niles to Matthew J. Connelly, “Memorandum for: Honorable Matthew J. Connelly,” June 16, 1947, Papers of George Elsey, Box 17, Folder: 1947 – June 29 – NAACP Speech, Harry S. Truman Library.

³²⁰ Miscellaneous Note, no author, no date, Papers of George Elsey, Box 17, Folder: 1947 – June 29 – NAACP Speech, Harry S. Truman Library.

continually emphasized that the United States needed to first take steps to “put our own house in order” if the nation were to provide moral leadership to the rest of the world.³²¹

June 29, 1947

As part of a meticulously planned public relations campaign, President Truman’s speech to the NAACP on June 29, 1947, followed speeches by Republican Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, and an introduction of the president by Walter White. As White outlined in a memo to David K. Niles, the program would run “56 minutes with an allowance of 4 minutes for applause, etc. By adhering strictly to this schedule it is our hope that we shall be able to get the entire one-hour program broadcast by all of the networks.”³²² Because Truman’s audience included both those who were physically present at the Lincoln Memorial and those listening via radio within the United States and around the world, it is important to consider what these individuals saw and heard prior to the president’s speech. A brief analysis of the speeches of Senator Morse, Mrs. Roosevelt, and Mr. White reveals the import not only of Truman’s address, but how his rhetoric built on these earlier remarks and how the immediate and extended audience would have understood the president’s speech within this larger contextual frame.

The closing program began with an invocation by the Reverend Stephen Gill Spottswood, pastor of the John Wesley AME Church, and a vocal performance by New

³²¹ Truman, “Address to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.”

³²² White to Niles, April 11, 1947, Truman Library.

York singer Carol Brice of “Star Spangled Banner” and “Ride On King Jesus.”³²³

Although earlier NAACP planning documents indicated that Marian Anderson would perform at the event, it seems as if this changed during the planning process, most likely due to Anderson’s illness during the spring and summer of 1947.³²⁴ According to the president’s daily schedule, Eleanor Roosevelt lunched with Truman at the White House before driving to the Lincoln Memorial with the president.³²⁵ Truman and Mrs. Roosevelt arrived at the event at 4:00 pm, just as an introductory musical program concluded, and took their seats moments before the Rev. Spottswood’s prayer.

Senator Morse, an outspoken advocate for civil rights, delivered the first formal address of the afternoon. The U.S. senator began his speech, entitled “Making Democracy Work,” by noting the significance of the location, what he described as “one of the cathedrals of American democracy”:

It is fitting that we should gather at this great national shrine of human rights and rededicate ourselves to the principle that there shall be no discrimination in our democracy because of race, color, sex or creed. Would that every American could come frequently to this memorial spot on the banks of the Potomac and renew his faith in the principles of individual liberty and of representative government

³²³ “Thirty-Eighth Annual Conference, NAACP, June 24-29, 1947, Washington D.C.” (official program), found in Annual Convention, 1947, including program and resolutions, Mar 25, 1947 – Jun 29, 1947, Folder: 001412-012-0000, Papers of the NAACP, Part 01: Meetings of the Board of Directors, Records of Annual Conferences, Major Speeches, and Special Reports, ProQuest History Vault, accessed July 2015, <http://congressional.proquest.com/histvault?q=001412-012-0000>.

³²⁴ See Keiler, *Marian Anderson: A Singer's Journey*, 247.

³²⁵ Presidential Appointments Calendar for June 29, 1947, accessed August 3, 2015, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/calendar/main.php?currYear=1947&currMonth=6&currDay=29>. According to a note in the White House Central Files, Truman wrote to Mrs. Roosevelt and asked her to meet him at the White House and join him on the ride over to the Lincoln Memorial. See Untitled Memo, June 19, 1947, White House Central Files, Official File 413 – National Association for the Advancement of Colored People [1 of 2], Box 1382, Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

which are epitomized in the spirit of the great emancipator who, seemingly alive but in the silence of stone, looks down upon us.

Morse's emphasis on the physical setting of this event is quite important, for his remarks set the stage for what was to come. Because the majority of the audience was not physically present in front of the Lincoln Memorial, Morse's introductory comments reminded the U.S. public why this particular location was significant and reinforced the symbolic reappropriation of this place as a site for civil rights activism. This was a "great national shrine of human rights," a sacred space where "every American" should come to "renew his faith in the principles of individual liberty . . . epitomized in the spirit of the great emancipator" who presided over the event. Morse acknowledged that there were "wide gaps between the universal truths of man's responsibilities to man, so simply stated in the teachings of Lincoln carved into the granite walls of this memorial, and our practices as a people one toward another." There was, he said, "much to be done if we are to make democracy work in carrying out its full potentialities for human happiness through self-government." He juxtaposed bigotry with democracy, intolerance with the Declaration of Independence, discrimination with the Emancipation Proclamation, and lynch law with the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. In essence, Morse argued that civil rights reform was a requirement if democracy was, in fact, going to work.³²⁶ In this direct and unapologetic assessment of the current state of race relations within the United

³²⁶ "Making Democracy Work," Senator Wayne Morse, June 29, 1947, found in Annual Convention, 1947, including discrimination and segregation in housing, Jun 24, 1947 – Jun 29, 1947, Folder: 001412-012-0126, Papers of the NAACP, Part 01: Meetings of the Board of Directors, Records of Annual Conferences, Major Speeches, and Special Reports, ProQuest History Vault, accessed July 2015, <http://congressional.proquest.com/histvault?q=001412-012-0000>.

States, Morse diagnosed the problem while also arguing that there was a way forward—and that none other than Abraham Lincoln would provide inspiration for the days ahead.

Eleanor Roosevelt spoke after Senator Morse.³²⁷ The former first lady's presence at this particular event was notable for several reasons. First, Mrs. Roosevelt had been an outspoken advocate for civil rights during her husband's administration and famously resigned from the Daughters of the American Revolution after they refused to allow Marian Anderson to sing in Constitution Hall in 1939. Following FDR's death in April 1945, Truman nominated Eleanor Roosevelt as a U.S. Representative to the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 21, 1945.³²⁸ Just over a year later, on January 27, 1947, Mrs. Roosevelt was unanimously selected as the chair of the United Nations Human Rights Commission, the group that authored the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.³²⁹ When Mrs. Roosevelt spoke at the Lincoln Memorial on June 29, 1947, she was in the midst of drafting language for this bill, and thus her remarks reflected her belief that principles of equality and liberty needed to be extended to all peoples, including African American citizens of the United States. "Mrs. Roosevelt pointed out that she was currently working, with other United Nations delegates, on writing an international bill of rights for all people," reported the *Pittsburgh Courier*. The paper

³²⁷ No full text of Eleanor Roosevelt's speech exists. I consulted several sources, including the Anna Eleanor Roosevelt Collection at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library in Hyde Park, New York, and the online collection of the Papers of the NAACP where full texts for the speeches of Senator Morse and President Truman were archived. According to an archivist at the Roosevelt Library, Mrs. Roosevelt often delivered speeches extemporaneously and did not record her formal remarks. However, several newspaper accounts have proved helpful in capturing the general themes of the former First Lady's remarks. I rely on them here.

³²⁸ Appointment of Eleanor Roosevelt as U.S. Representative to the United Nations, 03/15/1946 (ARC ID 597839), Official Civilian Personnel Files, 1921 – 1979, U.S. Civil Service Commission, National Archives and Records Administration, accessed August 3, 2015, <http://www.archives.gov/historical-docs/todays-doc/?dod-date=315>.

³²⁹ Steve Neal, "Eleanor & Harry: The Correspondence of Eleanor Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman, Correspondence: 1947," accessed December 17, 2015, <https://www.trumanlibrary.org/eleanor/1947.html>.

explained that Mrs. Roosevelt referenced the bill's opening words: "All men are brothers." She then continued:

If all men are brothers we must try to build a world in which all men can live as brothers. . . . All the world watches what we do here in the United States. We are leaders of spiritual thought . . . so on us there rests the responsibility for showing that in our land democracy really works. . . . We can not live with the blood of lynching in our land We must first of all examine ourselves. We must see that we do the things that are in our Bill of Rights.

Mrs. Roosevelt's remarks foreshadowed the Cold War foreign policy argument President Truman would make later in the program. The eyes of the world were on the nation, she argued, and thus the United States had a moral responsibility to demonstrate "that in our land democracy really works. . . . We must first of all examine ourselves." In her conclusion, Mrs. Roosevelt stated, "We can proudly lead the nations of the world to peace . . . but only if we make democracy work here at home." Only by turning the focus inward could the nation lead on the world stage. According to the *Pittsburgh Courier's* report, the "former First Lady of the land . . . received the most enthusiastic ovation of any speaker on the program."³³⁰

After Mrs. Roosevelt's remarks, NAACP executive secretary Walter White strode to the podium to introduce the president. White began by locating his audience in time and place, and acknowledged the national and global audience gathered around their radios: "There are 100,000 people here today at the feet of Abraham Lincoln in

³³⁰ Lem Graves, "Truman Raps Prejudice: Urges Laws with Teeth to Fight Mob Violence," *Pittsburgh Courier*, July 5, 1947.

Washington. I am told that between thirty and forty million other Americans may be listening to the radio at this hour. Countless others listen overseas via short-wave broadcast. We are gathered together because of our deep concern for human rights.” These remarks reveal, yet again, that the afternoon’s speakers understood their audience to extend far beyond those assembled on the National Mall. Instead, this event had national and global implications, with U.S. citizens tuning in from around the country and individuals around the world watching to see how the United States would make democracy work within its own borders. White then recounted a brief history of the NAACP, noting that racial progress had been made in the United States, but that there was still much to do. “The NAACP came into being 38 years ago because decent Americans just could not take the evils of mob violence and racial bigotry. We carry on today because we just can’t take the gouging out of the eyes of a Negro war veteran by a South Carolina policeman who was speedily set free.” Here White alluded to the beating and blinding of Sergeant Isaac Woodward, the U.S. veteran he told Truman about in their Oval Office meeting just nine months earlier. The incident was widely known not just in African American circles, but around the world as an example of the racial bigotry so prevalent in the United States.³³¹

White then addressed members of the platform, specifically foreign ambassadors to the United States. White’s public acknowledgement of these platform guests communicated the domestic and foreign policy implications of this event while also insuring that the audience—both those assembled at the steps of the Lincoln Memorial

³³¹ Dudziak lists the Woodward incident as one example of “[l]ynchings and beatings of African Americans, sometimes involving local law officials, [that] were covered in the media in this country and abroad.” Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy*, 23.

and those listening via radio—understood that representatives from around the world were in physical attendance.

Today there sit among the special guests upon the platform ambassadors from many of the nations of the earth. We ask you, gentlemen, to tell your countrymen that although the stories of lynching and denial of justice to Americans because of race, creed, or national origin are tragically true, those outrages do not accurately represent the majority of American citizens. We confess to our shame that ours is not yet a perfect democracy. We have grievous faults. But this great assemblage of American citizens and the presence of the President of the United States, of Mrs. Roosevelt and of the distinguished Republican Senator from Oregon attest that a determined incessant attack is being made upon our racial shortcomings. We are resolved to make our nation truly a “government of the people, by the people and for the people.”

White’s mention of foreign ambassadors was not simply a rhetorical gesture; recall that the NAACP executive secretary specifically invited these individuals to attend the event. As White mentioned this group of international ambassadors and witnesses, he underscored the symbolic importance of their presence at this event and also reminded his larger audience listening via radio that the world literally was watching as the President of the United States articulated his plan for civil rights reform. Even as White acknowledged the abysmal state of race relations, he asked these individuals to “tell your countrymen . . . [that] these outrages do not accurately represent the majority of American citizens” and underscored the symbolic significance of those who were in

attendance. The physical “presence” of Truman, Mrs. Roosevelt, Senator Morse, and the “great assemblage of American citizens” was evidence that the U.S. government and the wider U.S. public was committed to addressing “our racial shortcomings.” If the country could guarantee that “no man is denied any right of citizenship because he is dark of skin or worships his God in a different place or was born elsewhere, then democracy can never be destroyed.” Here White argued that U.S. democracy would continue to flourish if, and only if, the nation could translate its cherished ideals from theory to practical application. “To this high objective we today rededicate our every energy,” White concluded. “We welcome this struggle whose outcome will help to determine the future of mankind, every citizen who believes that the Bill of Rights means what it says. Ladies and Gentlemen: The President of the United States.”³³²

Truman’s Address at the Lincoln Memorial

When Truman delivered the keynote address to the NAACP’s thirty-eighth annual conference, his physical presence before this audience in this particular location at this historical/temporal moment was profoundly rhetorical. Before he ever opened his mouth, the fact that this president, a man who described himself as the descendant of Confederates, dared to challenge the institutionalized *doxa* of white supremacy and Jim Crow while standing in the literal and symbolic shadow of Abraham Lincoln spoke volumes. In what follows, I examine how Truman defined his presidential authority and

³³² Walter White, “Address by Walter White,” June 29, 1947, found in Papers of Clark Clifford, Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, accessed July 22, 2015, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/civilrights/documents/index.php?documentdate=1947-06-29&documentid=8-6&pagenumber=1.

ethos, constituted his audience as a nation of citizens responsible for extending the rights of citizenship to “all Americans,” and constructed this historical/temporal moment as a turning point in U.S. civil rights. My analysis focuses specifically on the language Truman used to constitute his rhetorical authority, define this occasion both as a specific moment in U.S. history and a kairotic opportunity to change the national conversation on race, and rededicate this national monument as a site symbolizing racial equality. Ultimately, this analysis reveals how Truman used deictic indicators first to situate his audience in place and time before extending these relational, spatial, and temporal metaphors beyond the immediate physical situation and onto the international stage as he set forth his vision for the metaphorical place the United States would occupy at the dawn of the Cold War.

The president began by acknowledging the other guests on the platform, particularly NAACP chairman Walter White, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, Senator Morse, and other “distinguished guests.” He then expressed his pleasure in attending this event, stating: “***I*** am happy to be present at the closing session of the 38th Annual Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. The occasion of meeting with ***you here at the Lincoln Memorial*** affords ***me*** the opportunity to congratulate ***the association*** upon its effective work for the improvement of ***our*** democratic processes.”³³³ In these opening remarks, Truman hinted at what made this moment so extraordinary. As the first president to address the NAACP in person, Truman’s presence before this particular audience underscored his support for the

³³³ Truman, “Address Before the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.” All successive quotations from here unless otherwise noted. Deictic indicators have been bolded and italicized.

organization's civil rights agenda. The *New York Amsterdam News* later observed, "[n]o occasion in the affairs of the United States is of more importance than when and where the president is the speaker," and "by appearing in person and making forthright declarations on the burning question of race prejudice . . . [Truman] made a notable contribution to the fight for democracy and decency in this country."³³⁴ The rhetorical significance of Truman's attendance was compounded by his physical location "**here at the Lincoln Memorial.**" By speaking to this audience in this place, Truman suggested that he would align himself not just with the NAACP, but also with the organization's strategic deployment of this national shrine. In so doing, Truman countered Harding's earlier dedication of the Lincoln Memorial and instead reaffirmed Lincoln's status as the "Great Emancipator." Put another way, Truman's presidential rhetoric in place lent institutional authority to the NAACP's symbolic adaptation of this place-as-rhetoric. When Truman underscored the fact that he was "**here**" to reaffirm freedom and equality for "all Americans," this deictic reference helped his audience, those assembled on the National Mall and those listening to the radio, to envision the scene.

The president then declared the overall purpose for this address: "**I** should like to talk to **you** briefly about civil rights and human freedom." In language very similar to the way President Roosevelt would tell his audience that he wanted to converse with them at the beginning of his "Fireside Chats," Truman described his address as an opportunity to "talk" with the nation about the ideals and values that defined the country and, by extension, the principles of democracy. Employing the presidential "I," Truman reinforced his executive authority to define the bounds of "civil rights and human

³³⁴ "Mr. Truman and Human Rights," *New York Amsterdam News*, July 5, 1947.

freedom” and characterize this particular moment in U.S. history. “It is *my* deep conviction that *we* have reached *a turning point* in the *long history* of *our* country’s efforts to guarantee freedom and equality to all *our* citizens.” Notice how Truman’s use of pronouns in this passage quickly assigned agency to the rest of the audience. Speaking both as President of the United States and as a fellow citizen, Truman transferred his own view (“*my* deep conviction”) of civil rights to the rest of his audience when he argued that “*we* have reached a *turning point*” or a kairotic moment within “the *long history* of *our* country’s efforts to guarantee freedom and equality to all *our* citizens.” In the span of one sentence, Truman shifted the temporal view of race relations in the United States from one of gradual progress (“*long history*”) to a definitive moment requiring an immediate response (“*turning point*”). And yet, it was precisely because 1947 was situated within this “*long history*”—a history that had taken far too long, Truman suggested—that this particular moment could now be understood as kairotic. But Truman’s use of “*turning point*” had more than temporal implications. The phrase also implies deliberate bodily movement, a shift in direction in a particular place, turning away from something and moving toward something else. In this instance, Truman argued that this moment required the nation to reject the idea that racial progress would happen over time (a view that Harding had advocated at the Lincoln Memorial’s dedication in 1922) and instead take specific steps to “guarantee freedom and equality to all *our* citizens.”

Having defined this moment as a critical juncture in U.S. race relations, the president gestured toward “[r]ecent events *in the United States* and *abroad* [that] have

made *us* realize that it is more important *today* than *ever before* to insure that all Americans enjoy *these rights*.” In this sentence, Truman used temporal and spatial metaphors to describe the current domestic and international situation. The president’s references to time reinforced the *chronos/kairos* dimensions of this moment in U.S. history. “*Recent* events”—temporally proximate and also physically near—brought about this change in perspective: “*today*” it was more important than “*ever before*” to extend “*these* rights”—the “freedom and equality” Truman had mentioned in the previous sentence—to “all Americans.” Although “*today*” referred to June 29, 1947 (a distinct moment within the nation’s history), “*today*” now also suggested a larger temporal frame for this moment in time, a kairotic occasion that required communal reflection and deliberate action.

These “*recent* events” also had material implications for the audience’s daily existence “*in the United States*” and for the nation’s broader relationship with the rest of the world (“*abroad*”). Truman did not elaborate the specifics of these recent events, but instead invited his audience to supply their own evidence. Although the “*recent* events *in the United States*” of mob violence, police brutality, and lynching in the United States would have been all too familiar to the African American members of Truman’s audience, they also were widely reported throughout the nation and around the world as evidence that the United States did not adhere to the democratic ideals it espoused. These “*recent* events” also applied to international developments in the post-World War II world, most notably the failing economies in Greece and Turkey. Recall that just three months earlier, in his “Truman Doctrine” pronouncement of March 12, 1947, the

president had pledged that the United States would provide military and economic aid to help European democracies withstand the tide of Soviet communism. Thus, in pointing his audience toward the “*recent* events” at home and abroad, Truman gestured toward his later argument that the nation should become a beacon of democratic values to the rest of the world.

By the time Truman reached the two-minute mark of his address, he had underscored the significance of this particular occasion and his presidential presence in place, defined the urgency of this particular moment, and linked the United States’ racial progress to a larger Cold War foreign policy narrative. After laying this contextual groundwork for his immediate and extended audience, the president delivered what was perhaps the most striking line of his address—one that Truman added himself during the speechwriting process.³³⁵ In an extension of the previous sentence (“...it is more important *today* than *ever before* to insure that all Americans enjoy *these rights*”), Truman specified who was included in the category of “all Americans”: “When *I* say all Americans[,] *I* mean all Americans.”³³⁶ Truman’s delivery of this particular line was forceful and determined, and the president put particular emphasis on the second half of the sentence: “*I* mean *all Americans*.” To an audience accustomed to identifying vocal cadences over the radio, this shift would have been quite obvious. The implicit argument here was that although any U.S. citizen could identify himself/herself as an “American,”

³³⁵ “4th Draft, 6-29-47,” Address to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, President’s Secretary’s Files, Box 38, Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library; “Original Reading Copy Used by President Truman at the Closing Session of the 38th Annual Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Lincoln Memorial, Washington, D.C.,” President’s Secretary’s Files, Box 24, Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

³³⁶ To listen to Truman’s speech as captured via radio, please visit the recording provided by the University of Virginia’s Miller Center (<http://millercenter.org/president/truman/speeches/speech-3345>). This particular line begins at -10:39.

this title offered nothing but an empty signifier to non-whites. For millions of black Americans, many of whom had fought for their country during World War II, the rights and privileges guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution were non-existent. Significant as well is how Truman's use of the presidential "*I*" lent executive authority to his statement. Where his predecessor refused to support congressional anti-lynching legislation because he feared losing the support of Southern Democrats, Truman employed his presidential *ethos* to underscore the dichotomy between what the government proclaimed in principle and what it actually meant. The qualifier "all" suggested more than total inclusion; it also subtly linked Truman's declaration with the emancipatory connotations of "all"—a phrase Lincoln used to describe the reach of his Emancipation Proclamation that "all persons held as slaves . . . shall be . . . forever free."³³⁷

After defining who could claim the title of "American," Truman suggested that the "civil rights laws written in the *early years of our Republic*," although precious, were not enough. These original laws were designed "to protect the citizen against any possible tyrannical act by the new government in *this country*," the president explained. "But *we* cannot be content with a civil liberties program which emphasizes only the need of protection against the possibility of tyranny by the Government. *We* cannot *stop* there." Here Truman continued his description of U.S. history as a chronological timeline interrupted by the urgency of this particular moment. The "civil rights laws" of the past were just that—legislative initiatives developed in response to previous historical exigencies but incapable of solving the pressing needs of the present. If the nation

³³⁷ Abraham Lincoln, "Emancipation Proclamation," January 1, 1863, accessed March 22, 2016, https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured_documents/emancipation_proclamation/transcript.html.

continued to rely on these relics of the past, any historical progress would “*stop*”—a spatial and temporal metaphor that implied stagnation and even backward momentum. Instead, Truman argued that the United States “must *keep moving forward*, with new concepts of civil rights to safeguard *our* heritage. The extension of civil rights *today* means, not protection of the people against the Government, but protection of the people by the Government.” It was only through active, thoughtful, deliberate action that the nation would “safeguard *our* heritage” and keep the promise of democracy alive “*today*.” Truman emphasized that “*[w]e*”—both he and the rest of his audience—“must make the Federal Government a friendly, vigilant defender of the rights and equalities of all Americans. And again *I* mean all Americans.” Truman’s implicit argument here was that many government officials, particularly those in the south, were the primary cause of racial violence and disenfranchisement. The president directly challenged the status quo of Jim Crow and state’s rights, arguing that securing civil rights for “all Americans” necessitated a federal response to those who threatened the rights of “all Americans”—even if that meant government officials themselves.

Truman continued to underscore the urgency of this moment in U.S. history and stated in no uncertain terms that racial discrimination was inexcusable.

Our immediate task is to remove the last remnants of the barriers which stand between millions of *our* citizens and *their* birthright. There is no justifiable reason for discrimination because of ancestry, or religion, or race, or color. *We* must not tolerate such limitations on the freedom of *any of our people* and on *their enjoyment* of basic rights which every citizen in a truly democratic society must

possess.

In this passage, Truman used spatial and temporal metaphors to characterize the issue of racial discrimination in the United States. Having already established that previous civil rights laws were not enough to ensure racial justice for “all Americans,” the president argued that today’s “*immediate task*”—one shared by all U.S. citizens—was to “remove” the “barriers” and “limitations” that stood between “millions of *our* citizens and *their* birthright.” In an earlier draft, this last sentence read “millions of *our* citizens and *their* heritage.” But in a draft edited the day before Truman’s address to the NAACP, an unidentified individual replaced “heritage” with “birthright,” a switch that further underscored Truman’s claim that simply relying on the country’s supposed historical commitment to extending democratic liberties was not enough.³³⁸ Moreover, Truman’s usage of “barriers” and “limitations” offered a mental picture of a concrete roadblock preventing one from moving forward to their intended destination. This metaphor suggested that the current state of civil rights in the United States was not only a roadblock for African American citizens, but for the entire nation. If millions of U.S. citizens could not access their constitutionally-guaranteed rights, how could the rest of the nation expect to achieve theirs?

It is also important to note Truman’s frequent usage of “*our*” in this passage. This inclusive collective pronoun suggested that the task of extending basic civil rights to racial minorities belonged to the entire nation, not just the president; it was a moral

³³⁸ “3rd Draft,” June 28, 1947, Papers of George Elsey, Box 17, Folder: 1947 – June 29 – NAACP Speech, Harry S. Truman Library. The phrase “birthright” also has biblical connotations, particularly in relation to the inheritance rights first-born males enjoyed (such as Esau’s inheritance from his father, Isaac, that he sold to his brother Jacob).

responsibility to be shared by all. At the same time, “*our*” described the individuals who currently did not experience the “basic rights which every citizen in a truly democratic society must possess.” Thus, “*our* citizens” and “*our* people” worked to describe blacks and other racial minorities as full-fledged citizens who were already part of the nation but were being treated as outsiders. If these individuals were living and working as fellow members of the nation, why were they not treated as such? In the final sentence of this particular passage, Truman’s larger Cold War foreign policy argument came to the forefront; if “[w]e” tolerated discrimination against “any of *our people*,” how could the United States claim that it was the paramount example of “a truly democratic society”?

But Truman went beyond generalities and specified what rights “all Americans” should be able to access. “Every man should have the right to a decent home, the right to an education, the right to adequate medical care, the right to a worthwhile job, the right to an equal share in making the public decisions through the ballot, and the right to a fair trial in a fair court.” It is notable that the president described these concrete rights for equal housing, access to education and medical care, employment, universal suffrage, and the right to a fair trial as fundamental to U.S. citizenship, particularly because these issues were the source of rampant racial discrimination in both the North and the South in 1947 (and still today). The Truman Administration archival files even betray a certain level of discomfort with this statement during the speechwriting process. In a “3rd Draft” of the speech contained in the files of George Elsey, an unidentified author (presumably Elsey himself) wrote in the margin of this particular passage, “These are more than civil

rights.”³³⁹ And yet, Truman was insistent that the federal government take action to ensure that “these rights—on equal terms—are enjoyed by every citizen. To these principles *I* pledge *my* full and continued support.”

But although these rights should be “enjoyed by every citizen,” Truman directly acknowledged this was not the case for African Americans. “Many of *our people* still suffer the indignity of insult, the harrowing fear of intimidation, and, *I* regret to say, the threat of physical injury and mob violence. [The] prejudice and intolerance in which these evils are rooted still exist.” It is rhetorically significant that Truman characterized what many in the South considered social norms as inherently “evil.” As President of the United States, Truman’s description of the current state of civil rights in explicitly moral terms had long-lasting implications. Where previous U.S. presidents (most notably FDR) had refused to take a stand against anti-lynching legislation and other civil rights initiatives, Truman called these actions what they were—morally repugnant and evil. Worse yet, the president continued, was that “[t]he conscience of *our Nation*, and the legal machinery which enforces it, have not yet secured to each citizen full freedom from fear.” Not only did African Americans experience the threat of physical violence and intimidation on a daily basis; the country’s “legal machinery” stood idly by as these evils were perpetuated. Additionally, Truman’s final description of “freedom from fear” was an obvious reference to FDR’s 1941 State of the Union Address, one that the audience would be well aware of not just because of the historical proximity between 1941 and 1947, but also because of Norman Rockwell’s iconic paintings depicting FDR’s “Four Freedoms.” These four images were printed on the cover of the *Saturday Evening Post* in

³³⁹ “3rd Draft,” June 28, 1947, Truman Library.

February and March of 1943, circulated widely as war bond posters, and came to represent basic human rights enjoyed by U.S. citizens.³⁴⁰ Thus, when Truman argued that state and local governments had denied millions of citizens “full freedom from fear,” he acknowledged that these images of U.S. democracy popularized by Rockwell and espoused by the U.S. government were unidentifiable to black U.S. citizens.

Characterizing the situation in moral terms, Truman appealed to the nation’s conscience to emphasize the urgency of the moment. “*We* cannot wait *another decade* or *another generation* to remedy these evils. *We* must work, as *never before*, to cure them *now*.” This was a direct attack on Southern Democrats who argued that racial prejudice was a lingering symptom of the Civil War, one that would require time and gradual progress. Having already enumerated specific injustices faced by African American citizens, the president then extended the urgency beyond national borders and linked civil rights progress in the United States to his Cold War foreign policy:

The aftermath of war and the desire to keep faith with *our Nation’s* historic principles make the need a pressing one. The support of *desperate populations* of *battle-ravaged countries* must be won for the free way of life. *We* must have *them* as allies in *our continuing struggle* for the peaceful solution of the *world’s* problems. Freedom is not an easy lesson to teach, nor an easy cause to sell, to *peoples beset by every kind of privation*. *They* may surrender to the false security offered so temptingly by *totalitarian regimes* unless *we* can prove the superiority of democracy.

³⁴⁰ For more on the relationship between these cover images and FDR’s 1941 State of the Union address, see James J. Kimble, “The Illustrated Four Freedoms: FDR, Rockwell, and the Margins of the Rhetorical Presidency,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 45, no. 1 (2015): 46-69.

The moral view of domestic race relations was now a tactical move within Truman's Cold War foreign policy. The president's deictic indicators quickly elevated the United States to a position of moral and political authority on this metaphorical chessboard. The "*desperate populations of battle-ravaged countries*" looked to the United States for leadership to solve "the *world's* problems." If the United States failed to prove the "superiority of democracy" to "*peoples beset by every kind of privation*," the nation would fall short of continuing "*our Nation's* historic principles." How was the United States to convince the rest of the world that democracy was the best choice in this post-war world?

The answer, argued Truman, was to deal directly with the issue of civil rights at home. The most persuasive case for U.S. democracy, Truman argued, was to show the rest of the world "practical evidence that *we* have been able to put *our own house* in order." Describing the nation as a house evoked what Merrill D. Peterson has called "one of the most famous utterances in American history," namely, Lincoln's warning that "[a] house divided against itself cannot stand."³⁴¹ Although this phrase was originally from the New Testament, Lincoln used it to compare the United States to a house divided between North and South, half slave and half free.³⁴² When the president compared the

³⁴¹ Peterson, *Lincoln in American Memory*, 132.

³⁴² On June 16, 1858, Lincoln accepted the Republican Party's nomination for the U.S. Senate race in Illinois, a contest he eventually would lose to Democratic incumbent Stephen Douglas. In the speech, Lincoln used a similar metaphor to describe the nation's division over the question of slavery: "A house divided against itself cannot stand." He continued, "I believe this government cannot endure, permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved – I do not expect the house to fall – but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing, or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery, will arrest this further spread and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is on a course of ultimate extinction; or its advocates shall press it forward, until it shall become alike lawful in all of the States, old as well as new – North as well as South." Abraham Lincoln, "A House Divided," June 16, 1858, accessed March 22, 2016, <http://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/lincoln-a-house-divided-speech->

nation's current state as a house in need of (re)order, he invoked not only the memory of Abraham Lincoln, but also used the reference to specify the "version" of Lincoln he wished to summon. To an audience assembled at the base of a national shrine to the slain president, Truman insisted that a national commitment to democratic principles would transcend sectional divisions or racial prejudice so that the rest of the world could see firsthand the merits of democracy.

To those who may have missed his indirect reference to Lincoln or who, like Warren G. Harding, argued that Lincoln was primarily concerned with unification and would have ceded to popular opinion on the question of slavery, Truman was explicit:

*[W]e can **no longer** afford the luxury of **a leisurely attack** upon prejudice and discrimination. There is much that State and local governments can do in providing positive safeguards for civil rights. But **we** cannot, **any longer, await** the growth of a will to action in the slowest State or the most backward community. **Our** National Government must show the way.*

This was a direct attack on the South. Although the president stated that local governments were capable of taking steps to eradicate racial prejudice, he did not say they actually acted on this ability. In fact, one way to read Truman's statement is to contrast what "State and local governments can do" with what "we," the president and the rest of the U.S. public, "cannot" do: wait for these regional entities to act. Because local governments refused to exercise their state sovereignty to take action against racial violence and lynch law, the nation could not afford to wait. Truman's use of "any longer," a phrase he inserted himself during the speechwriting process, further

underscored the urgency of the moment.³⁴³ In other words, the nation had waited, and black citizens were beaten, tortured, and murdered as a result. Now, Truman declared, it was the federal government's responsibility to lead the nation forward, regardless of states and/or communities who refused to enact change.

Truman acknowledged that this would be a "difficult and complex undertaking," one that would require executive action and federal oversight. Noting that the government would require "better tools to do the job," Truman then employed the presidential "I" to establish his executive authority in providing these tools. One of the first steps in this process was the President's Commission on Civil Rights: "**I** appointed an Advisory Committee on Civil Rights last December. Its members, fifteen distinguished private citizens, have been surveying **our** civil rights difficulties and needs for several months. **I** am confident that the product of **their** work will be a sensible and vigorous program for action by **all of us**." Notice the various pronouns operating in these three sentences and how they assign certain duties to the audience. First, Truman used "I" to describe the actions he took as president and the expectations he had for the PCCR's report. He then described the committee members as "distinguished private citizens," emphasizing that this survey of "**our** civil rights difficulties"—difficulties the entire nation shared and suffered from—was a joint effort of the federal government and everyday citizens. Truman then shifted back to his presidential "I" to express his confidence that the committee's work would provide "a sensible and vigorous program for action by **all of us**." In other words, he used his rhetorical authority as president to

³⁴³ "4th Draft, 6-29-47," Address to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, President's Secretary's Files, Box 38, Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

lend credibility to the committee's report—even before it was issued—and remind his audience that these findings would require all citizens, not just government officials or elected politicians, to act. The president also advocated that the country should “advance civil rights wherever it lies within *our* power,” urging the U.S. Congress to extend “basic civil rights to the people of [U.S. territories] Guam and American Samoa,” a step that Truman predicted would provide further “evidence to the rest of the world of *our* confidence in the ability of all men to build free institutions.”

As he moved toward the conclusion of his address, the president returned to his use of spatial and temporal metaphors in order to underscore the present moment as a kairotic one. To do this, he first acknowledged that “[*t*]he way ahead is not easy,” a phrase that suggested forward movement from a particular spatio-temporal from one point and toward another. To get there, Truman said, “[*w*]e shall need all the wisdom, imagination and courage *we* can muster.” And yet, this decisive action was not optional. “*We* must and shall guarantee the civil rights of all *our* citizens,” the president continued. “*Never before* has the need been *so urgent* for skillful and vigorous action to *bring us closer* to *our* ideal. *We* can *reach our* goal.” Depicting this moment as a singularly opportune one, Truman contrasted June 29, 1947, with earlier historical markers, arguing “[*n*]ever before” had the need for deliberate federal action been greater. These steps, although difficult, would push the nation forward toward “*our* ideal” of ensuring that the rights guaranteed in the Declaration of Independence, the U.S. Constitution, and the Bill of Rights were accessible to “all Americans.” Acknowledging that the “*way ahead*” toward racial justice would not be easy, Truman argued, “*we* can reach *that goal*.” These

spatial and temporal metaphors described the nation's gradual movement toward ensuring freedom and equality for "all Americans" even as they identified an attainable goal—one that "*we*," Truman and the rest of his audience, would reach together. To inspire this "way ahead," the president asked his audience to look backward in time. "When *past difficulties* faced *our Nation*, *we* met the challenge with inspiring charters of human rights—the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the Emancipation Proclamation." The majority of Truman's audience would have immediately recognized the first three documents as sacred texts of U.S. democracy. What, however, is to be made of the fourth document on the list—the Emancipation Proclamation, a text that Lincoln authored but appeared nowhere on the national shrine behind him?

Truman's inclusion of this particular document achieved at least four rhetorical purposes. First, it subtly rejected Harding's assessment in 1922 that "the supreme chapter in history is not emancipation" and instead reaffirmed the NAACP's strategic deployment of the Lincoln Memorial as a site for civil rights activism.³⁴⁴ Second, it suggested that the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights were not simply foundational texts but "charters of human rights"—rights that extended to "all Americans." Third, when Truman added the Emancipation Proclamation to this list, he extended the reach of Lincoln's initial proclamation from a relatively small geographical region to the entire nation and the global stage—a move that reinforced Lincoln's status as the Great Emancipator even as it expanded the connotations of "all" to "all classes and conditions of mankind." Fourth, it propelled the audience toward a new

³⁴⁴ Harding, "Address," in Conklin, *The Lincoln Memorial in Washington*, 87.

international vision of human rights. In identifying the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a modern-day appropriation of these earlier documents, Truman asserted that this document would be “a *great landmark* in man’s *long search* for freedom since its members consist of such distinguished citizens of the world as *Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt*.” The president’s audience would have heard Mrs. Roosevelt speak just moments before about her work on this initiative. Thus, when Truman pointed his audience to Mrs. Roosevelt’s physical presence on the dais next to him, he linked his rhetorical authority to this outspoken proponent of civil rights.

Connecting the “inspired charters” produced by “past difficulties” with the present moment, Truman held up these sacred texts as a metaphorical North Star. “With *these noble charters* to guide *us*, and with faith in *our hearts*, *we* shall make *our land* a *happier home* for *our people*, a *symbol of hope* for *all men*, and a *rock of security* in a *troubled world*.” Here Truman extended his argument for civil rights from the local to the global. If the nation put “*our own house* in order,” it would then be able to become a “*happier home*” for all its citizens, regardless of race. “Home” suggested not only comfort, but also described a place where one could be at ease and at rest—a dwelling place. And if the United States offered a safe harbor for “all Americans,” the nation could then provide an example to other nations seeking a democratic way of life. These spatial and relational images elevated the nation to the global stage as “a *symbol of hope*” and “a *rock of security*” in a “*troubled world*” threatened by Soviet communism.

In the final moments of his speech, Truman concluded by linking Abraham Lincoln’s memory and the symbolic status of this particular location when he confidently

asserted, “*Abraham Lincoln* understood so well the ideal which *you* and *I* seek *today*.” To Truman’s immediate audience, it would have been impossible to listen to these words and not also see the current president’s body dwarfed by the giant statue of the Great Emancipator behind him. Even to those assembled several blocks (or miles) down the National Mall or those listening via radio, it would have been difficult to forget the symbolic significance of Truman’s physical location. Thus, when Truman concluded his speech with a quote from Lincoln himself, it was as if the martyred sixteenth president was speaking instead of Truman. Two presidential bodies—one living, the other carved in stone—proclaimed to the nation and the world that the United States had a moral duty to extend freedom and democracy not just to its own citizens but to all people. “As this conference closes,” Truman continued, “*we* would do well to keep in mind *his* words, when *he* said, “if it shall please the Divine Being who determines the destinies of nations, *we* shall remain a united people, and *we* will, humbly seeking the Divine Guidance, make *their* prolonged national existence a source of new benefits to *themselves* and *their* successors, and to all classes and conditions of mankind.”³⁴⁵ In this little-remembered passage from a speech to a small group of Lutheran pastors in 1862, Lincoln argued that the nation would best express its unity by extending “new benefits” to “all classes and conditions of mankind.” At first glance, this particular passage seems like a conciliatory way to conclude remarks that Truman knew would, at the very least, make Northern politicians nervous and Southern Democrats angry. Indeed, here Lincoln stressed his desire that the nation would “remain a united people,” a statement that reflected the

³⁴⁵ Abraham Lincoln, “Response to Evangelical Lutherans,” May 13, 1862, in *The Works of Abraham Lincoln*, ed. John H. Clifford and Marion M. Miller (New York, NY: Newton & Cartwright, 1907), 156-157.

“Savior of the Union” image Southern Democrats cherished. However, the larger context of Lincoln’s words is important and reveals yet again how Truman used this particular occasion not just to advance his civil rights agenda but also articulate his Cold War foreign policy.

Prior to the passage that Truman quoted, Lincoln thanked his guests for “their assurances of the sympathy and support . . . in an important crisis which involves, in my judgment, not only the civil and religious liberties of our own dear land, but in a large degree the civil and religious liberties of mankind in many countries and through many ages.” Here Lincoln argued that the Civil War directly affected “not only the civil and religious liberties” within the United States, but also the rights and liberties of citizens in other countries around the world. This was the same argument Truman would make eighty-five years later. Lincoln continued, “You well know, gentlemen, and the world knows, how reluctantly I accepted this issue of battle forced upon me, on my advent to this place, by the internal enemies of this country.” Although Lincoln referred specifically to the sectional divide between the North and the South, and the resulting Civil War, Truman would express similar sentiments about his unexpected ascendance to the presidency and the actions he took to combat racial prejudice and lynch law during his tenure as chief executive. Indeed, even the day before he delivered this address to the NAACP, Truman wrote to his sister, Mary Jane, that he wished he “didn’t have to make it Mamma won’t like what I say because I wind up quoting old Abe. But I believe what I say and I’m hopeful we may implement it.”³⁴⁶ In many ways, Truman was quite

³⁴⁶ Harry S. Truman to Mary Truman, June 28, 1947, Papers of Harry S. Truman: Post-Presidential File, Harry S. Truman Library, accessed December 17, 2015,

reluctant to address these civil rights issues because of his personal history and his own inexcusable racial prejudice. And yet, as discussed earlier in this chapter, Truman advocated for civil rights because of his allegiance to the Union transcended any sectional affiliation. As president, Truman believed it was his job to ensure that all citizens, regardless of race or religion, enjoyed the liberties guaranteed to them in the U.S. Constitution. Anything less would be a direct violation of his oath of office.

Thus, when Truman told his audience that they would do well to “keep in mind [Lincoln’s] words,” he was not merely reminding his audience that the slain president wanted to unify the country, although he did. Instead, Truman was suggesting that the task the U.S. public faced in 1947, although difficult and even uncomfortable, was one that could redeem the nation’s past sins of slavery and racial injustice. Truman channeled Lincoln’s hope for a “united people,” calling his audience to transcend sectional differences between North and South (as he had) and rededicate themselves to the democratic values first set forth in the Declaration of Independence, the U.S. Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and even the Emancipation Proclamation. Relying on Lincoln’s argument as evidence for his own, Truman suggested that the nation’s “prolonged national existence” in a postwar world required a specific response: extending civil rights and human freedom at home and abroad. Yet again, Truman invoked the emancipatory connotations of “all,” yet pushed them even further. Not only did “all Americans” deserve the rights laid out in the nation’s “inspiring charters of human rights,” but these liberties should be extended to “all classes and conditions of mankind”

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/flip_books/index.php?collectionid=ihow&groupid=3722&tldate=1947-06-28.

around the globe. Concluding his speech with this quote from the nation's sixteenth president, Truman reaffirmed Lincoln's symbolic status as the "Great Emancipator" even as he directed his audience to the visual and material elements of the speech situation to support his argument for extending civil rights to "all Americans"—and the rest of the world.

The Public Response

The public response to Truman's speech was immediate, and the varied reactions to his address reveal not only the symbolic significance of Truman's decision to speak at the Lincoln Memorial but also a nation sharply divided over the issue of race. In this final section, I consider responses in three categories: 1) personal reflections from individuals who attended the event and/or were affiliated with the NAACP or the PCCR; 2) mediated coverage of the event; and 3) letters U.S. citizens wrote to Truman following his speech found at the Truman Library archives.

Personal Reflections

In their July 11, 1947, press release following the event, the NAACP declared that Truman's speech at the Lincoln Memorial "would produce far reaching effects of a beneficial nature in domestic race relations as well as some in sections of international relations. The President's speech, which closed the 38th Annual Conference of the NAACP, was broadcast over four major networks and by short wave to every section of

the globe where American influence was being maintained.”³⁴⁷ In a private letter to the president dated July 9, Walter White told Truman that the organization had “been swamped with telegrams, letters, telephone calls and other expressions of enthusiastic approval of the speech which you made at [the] Lincoln Memorial on June 29th and of the occasion generally. As I told you then, it was the most forthright pronouncement any American president has yet made on this issue.”³⁴⁸ In his autobiographical account published just a year later, White compared Truman’s speech to Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address. Although he “did not believe that Truman’s speech possessed the literary quality of Lincoln’s speech,” White observed that “in some respects it had been a more courageous one in its specific condemnation of evils based upon race prejudice which had too long disgraced America, and its call for immediate action against them.” According to White’s account, when Truman returned to his seat he asked what the NAACP executive secretary thought of the speech. “When I told him how excellent I believed it to be,” White recalled, “he assured me, ‘I said what I did because I mean every word of it—and I’m going to prove that I do mean it.’”³⁴⁹

Channing Tobias, a prominent black leader and one of the fourteen members of the PCCR, also wrote to Truman to express his enthusiasm: “Never before in the history

³⁴⁷ Press Release, “Far Reaching Benefits Seen in Truman Speech,” July 11, 1947, found in Annual Convention, 1947, including program and resolutions, Mar 25, 1947 – Jun 29, 1947, Folder: 001412-012-0000, Papers of the NAACP, Part 01: Meetings of the Board of Directors, Records of Annual Conferences, Major Speeches, and Special Reports, ProQuest History Vault, accessed July 2015, <http://congressional.proquest.com/histvault?q=001412-012-0000>.

³⁴⁸ Walter White to Harry S. Truman, July 9, 1947, PPF 200; Folder: 6/29/47 – Speech at the Closing Session of the 38th Annual Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Pro), Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

³⁴⁹ White also noted the fierce Southern response to Truman’s speech, writing that “[i]f [Truman] had any premonition of the savage assaults which were destined to be made upon him by Southern governors, senators, and congressmen when he asked the Congress to act upon the issues he had discussed in his speech, or if he had any fear of the consequences, he showed no signs of it.” White, *A Man Called White: The Autobiography of Walter White*, 348-349.

of our country has any president been quite as explicit as you were in challenging the nation to a single standard of citizenship for all Americans,” he wrote. Tobias told Truman that he was “encouraged as I have never been before, to believe that this is an ideal possible of achievement and I want you to know that your spirit and your spoken word have been the chief influence that has brought this outlook of optimism to the tenth of the nation with which I happen to be identified.”³⁵⁰

Just three days after the speech, Eleanor Roosevelt made the event the subject of her “My Day” newspaper article, the widely syndicated column that Mrs. Roosevelt wrote six days a week from 1935 to 1962.³⁵¹ Because millions of U.S. citizens read her daily column, the former First Lady’s emphasis on the place of the event further amplified Truman’s presidential presence there while reaffirming the Lincoln Memorial’s symbolic status in national life.

I looked out over the sea of faces below us and thought how significant this meeting before the Lincoln Memorial must be to most of the people there. Lincoln said that there should be no more slaves in our country, but he did not want to give people a freedom that meant nothing or that carried with it the bitterness of inferiority. Now, some 80 years later, we were gathered here to try really to achieve the ends which he envisioned but could not fully accomplish. President Truman spoke words for the Government, in the presence of his chief justice and his attorney general, which should give hope that tangible strides toward the

³⁵⁰ Channing Tobias to Harry S. Truman, July 8, 1947, PPF 200, Folder: 6/29/47 – Speech at the Closing Session of the 38th Annual Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Pro), Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

³⁵¹ “My Day, Key Events,” American Experience, PBS.org, accessed December 30, 2015, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/primary-resources/eleanor-my-day>.

fulfillment of Lincoln's vision can now be taken. I was very proud that these words were being spoken. It made me feel that our country would be stronger because they were fearlessly spoken. The sun made the top of the Washington Monument glisten before us, and somehow it seemed as tho years of our history lay between the two monuments. And in my heart I said a prayer that this meeting might be the symbol that we really would lead the world in justice and brotherhood, and by so doing make it possible for peace to grow in men's hearts and justice to exist between man and man.³⁵²

What is particularly fascinating about Eleanor Roosevelt's description is how she provided her readers with an eyewitness account to the event. Even if her audience missed the speech via radio broadcast or had not seen actual pictures of the event, the former First Lady's column offered a clear description of where the event was, why this particular location was rhetorically significant, and how the president's text interacted with and built upon the Lincoln Memorial's status in U.S. political culture.

Mediated Coverage of Truman's Address

Several prominent newspapers published photos of Truman's speech at the Lincoln Memorial, including the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, the *New York Amsterdam News*, and the *Atlanta Daily World*.³⁵³ Several newspapers also published the

³⁵² Newspaper Clipping of Eleanor Roosevelt, "My Day" Column, July 2, 1947, found in Papers of George Elsey, Box 17, Folder: 1947 – June 29 – NAACP Speech, Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

³⁵³ "'U.S. Must Lead Anti-Hate Drive': Complete Text of Truman's Speech," *New York Amsterdam News*, July 5, 1947; "Truman Urges Equality for All," *Atlanta Daily World*, July 3, 1947; "Text of Talk by Truman to NAACP," *Washington Post*, June 30, 1947; "President Truman's Speech to NAACP on Human Rights," *New York Times*, June 30, 1947.

complete text of Truman's address so the U.S. public could refer back to the speech themselves.³⁵⁴ Others simply published portions of the address or included brief quotations in their analyses of the event. Many of these press reports referenced the location of Truman's address, although some of these mentions may simply have been to locate the event in time and place. However, other newspapers commented explicitly on the symbolic significance of Truman's rhetoric in place.

For example, *The Christian Science Monitor* noted the scene/setting of the president's address, writing, "Few are the Americans, we think, who will find fault with the ideals of human rights and freedom to which President Truman pledged himself the other day as he stood on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial and addressed a great throng, with the Washington Monument and its mirrored reflection beyond forming a symbolic setting such as few cities of the world can provide."³⁵⁵ An article in the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* specifically noted the significance of the speech location. "President Truman chose an excellent place and occasion for his assertion of the importance of 'positive safeguards for civil rights.' He spoke in the shadow of the marble memorial to his great predecessor, whose Emancipation Proclamation first gave the very first of civil rights—freedom—to many thousands of Americans."³⁵⁶ *The Chicago Defender*, a prominent African American newspaper, was explicit about the significance of Truman's placement:

"[Truman] stood in the shadow of that great liberator, Abraham Lincoln, at the Lincoln Memorial and delivered a second emancipation speech to the throngs

³⁵⁴ "Text of Talk by Truman to NAACP; "President Truman's Speech to NAACP on Human Rights; "U.S. Must Lead Anti-Hate Drive': Complete Text of Truman's Speech."

³⁵⁵ "Not What, But How," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 1, 1947.

³⁵⁶ "Mr. Truman on Civil Rights," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, June 30, 1947.

who had come to hear him. He was flanked by diplomats from our sister nations and other internationally known dignitaries. Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt and Senator Wayne Morris [sic], Republican of Oregon, shared the platform and spotlight with Mr. Truman. Throughout the world, his liberation speech was carried by short wave and four major networks in America brought it to the ears of millions here at home.”³⁵⁷

And the *Atlanta Daily World* suggested that the Lincoln Memorial offered a location for reaffirmation of national values, noting that Truman’s address, “broadcast over all major networks to the nation, was made from the grounds of Lincoln Memorial where thousands assembled for a spiritual re-dedication of America to the ideals and principals [sic] upon which the United States was founded.”³⁵⁸

Other news reports focused on the rhetorical circulation of the president’s speech both in the United States and around the world. The *New York Amsterdam News* declared Truman’s address “one of the most far-reaching addresses against race prejudice ever propounded by a President of these United States. . . . which was broadcast over the four major radio networks, and short-waved by the State Department to foreign countries—to an estimated unseen audience of nearly fifty million.”³⁵⁹ The *Atlanta Daily World* reported that, “[a]ccording to reliable observers, the foreign press devoted a good deal of editorial space to the Chief Executive’s discussion of civil rights. It was considered significant that the short-wave transmission of Mr. Truman’s speech was made through

³⁵⁷ "Truman Asks Action 'Now' on Racism," *Chicago Defender*, July 5, 1947.

³⁵⁸ "Gov't Must Insure Rights to All -- Truman Stresses 'All Americans' Must Benefit," *Atlanta Daily World*, July 1, 1947.

³⁵⁹ "'U.S. Must Lead Anti-Hate Drive': Complete Text of Truman's Speech."

direct State Department request.” Moreover, the article noted, the “fact that many Southern newspapers devoted part of their editorial pages to the speech was considered one of the more immediate benefits.”³⁶⁰ The *New York Amsterdam News* emphasized the various ways Truman’s speech reached the U.S. public, writing that citizens “[n]o one who heard his speech at the Lincoln Memorial, or over the radio, or who has read it in the newspapers” would forget the president’s bold stand.³⁶¹

Still others remarked how important it was that the President of the United States, himself a former Southerner, was the one delivering this message to the U.S. public. In a July 4, 1947, editorial, the *Kansas City Call*, a nationally prominent black newspaper headquartered less than ten miles from Harry Truman’s home in Independence, declared the president’s speech to be “the most forthright speech on race relations ever made by a President in modern times.” The paper also made note of Truman’s decision to address the NAACP in person, writing, “There was a time when it would have been considered ‘too radical’ for the chief executive of the land to appear before a gathering dedicated to fight for equal rights for Negro citizens.” But while “[o]ther presidents have sent messages of greeting to the association . . . Truman is the first to appear in person.” To conclude, the paper opined:

³⁶⁰ “Benefits Seen from Truman Rights Speech: Southern Press Comments with Favor on Talk,” *Atlanta Daily World*, July 17, 1947. Two points are important to note here. First, Garth E. Pauley writes that although the NAACP and other newspaper reports such as this one claimed that there was wide foreign press attention of Truman’s address, his research “indicate[s] that many major international newspapers and magazines did not cover Truman’s speech” (see Pauley, *The Modern Presidency & Civil Rights: Rhetoric on Race from Roosevelt to Nixon*, 52). Second, although I have consulted the Southern periodicals available in the University of Minnesota Library system, the university collection does not have many of the more prominent newspapers of the day. This will be an area for future research at the National Archives, the Library of Congress, and perhaps a southern academic institution when I turn this project into a monograph.

³⁶¹ “Mr. Truman and Human Rights.”

When Truman went to Washington, he forgot the customs and habits of Missouri and became a true representative of democratic government [sic]. In his speech at the Lincoln Memorial Sunday, he stated in words similar to those used for years by the Negro press and the N.A.A.C.P. that the United States must make democracy work at home before it can preach it abroad.”³⁶²

In another telling account, the *Los Angeles Sentinel* declared that “[i]n telling the world that it is high time for the national government to step in and show the way to guarantee basic civil rights to all citizens regardless of race or color . . . the President lashed out at that firmly knit band of southern Democrats which has long held the whip-hand over the policies and practices of the Democratic party.” The editorial continued,

It is indeed heartwarming when these words come not from the Negro Press or Negro spokesmen alone, but when they are uttered by the highest elective [sic] official in the country. Having thus openly and courageously defied the rabid reactionaries in his own party, Mr. Truman is in an excellent position to push through the present session . . . the anti-lynching bill, FEPC and the anti-poll tax bill, all of which, as he so clearly implies, are sorely needed if American democracy is to be accepted throughout the world as good coin.³⁶³

But perhaps the most candid assessment of Truman’s speech to the NAACP came from the *Pittsburgh Courier* almost two weeks after the event. In an editorial entitled “Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Truman,” the paper called the president’s address “remarkably

³⁶² “Truman’s Speech Makes History,” *The Call*, July 4, 1947, found attached to a letter from Emmett A. Scanlan, Jr., to Matt Connelly, July 7, 1947, PPF 200, Folder: 6/29/47 – Speech at the Closing Session of the 38th Annual Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Pro), Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

³⁶³ “Truman Tells the World,” *Los Angeles Sentinel*, July 3, 1947.

sincere and forceful . . . not only highly praiseworthy but invited comparison with his predecessor who enjoyed to far greater degree the affection of colored Americans.” After this indirect reference to FDR, the paper made its comparison explicit:

The NAACP was never able to get Mr. Roosevelt on its conference platform at any time during his occupancy of the White House, although he did send a routine message to each annual conference as a President does to all gatherings of national importance. We cannot recall when the gentleman who now sleeps at Hyde Park made such a forthright statement against racial discrimination, mob violence, color prejudice and in favor of “freedom and equality to all our citizens,” except on the occasion in the autumn of 1933 when two white men were mobbed and killed at San Jose, Calif. . . . Here we have a President saying that a revolution in American mores must be worked here and now, and this is the more remarkable when one considers Mr. Truman's origin and antecedents as contrasted with those of Mr. Roosevelt.

In this remarkable statement, the *Pittsburgh Courier* went so far as to state openly that Truman “in speech and action where colored Americans are concerned he is looming, on the record, to greater stature than his predecessor” and deserved “high praise for his sincerity and forthrightness after a long era of double-talk and political expediency.”³⁶⁴

In addition to widespread newspaper coverage of Truman’s address to the NAACP, *Universal International Newsreel* also featured a one and a half minute clip of Truman’s speech in their June 30, 1947, newsreel broadcast circulated around the

³⁶⁴ "Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Truman," *Pittsburgh Courier*, July 12, 1947.

country.³⁶⁵ This report, entitled “Truman Asks Equality for All Americans,” featured powerful images of Truman standing on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial, his body dwarfed by the large statue of the former president behind him. The voice-over reported that 10,000 individuals gathered at the “memorial to the Great Emancipator in Washington” listened as “President Truman strongly advocate[d] freedom and equality for all United States citizens.” The camera angle included footage of Truman behind the podium with Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt directly to the president’s left. These images, coupled with live footage of Truman’s declaration that “all Americans” should enjoy the rights of citizenship, visually emphasized the importance of Truman’s location. Moreover, this coupling of text and image invited viewers to interpret the president’s definitive statement, “When I say all Americans, I mean all Americans,” in relation to Abraham Lincoln’s status as the “Great Emancipator” and previous rhetoric in this place.

These newspaper reports and newsreel coverage of Truman’s speech to the NAACP on June 29, 1947, reinforce the rhetorical significance not just of the Lincoln Memorial, but the inherent symbolism of President Truman’s presidential presence in that place. These accounts also suggest that Truman’s audience saw his speech as both a presidential directive for domestic policy and as a clear articulation of the United States’ foreign policy at the dawn of the Cold War. These themes were also reflected in the mail U.S. citizens sent to Truman after his address, the subject of the final analysis section of this chapter.

³⁶⁵ Ed Herlihy, “Truman Asks Equality for All Americans,” *Universal International Newsreel*, Universal News Vol. 20, Rel. 52, Story 1. June 30, 1947, National Archives and Records Administration, accessed December 30, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bdNMhmcVqCU&feature=youtu.be>.

Citizen Letters

Many ordinary citizens wrote letters to the president following his June 29, 1947, speech to the NAACP. These responses are particularly insightful because they provide first-person accounts of audience reactions to Truman's speech and also reflect civic attitudes of the day. Because the Truman Library did not keep all letters received following this speech, I do not make the claim that these are representative of U.S. public opinion or even a representative sampling of Truman's audience. However, they do offer important insights in thinking about how Truman linked his political authority to advancing civil rights on the domestic front and also setting up the United States as an example of democratic liberty for the rest of the world.

Several citizens made Truman's political authority and sectional affiliation the focus of their remarks, with some even commenting on their own Southern affiliation. Elinore Cowan Stone of Wilkinsburg, Pennsylvania, wrote to Truman immediately after his speech. Although she confessed that she believed "writing my President a letter is just spilling words into the air," she told him that she "felt that you had hit the nail on the head when you said that if we did not put our own race situation in order – or words to that effect – we could not hope to make the rest of the world believe that our democracy was honest." She then explained that, "[i]n case it makes any difference, I do not belong to the 'colored' race. As a matter of fact, my mother, whose ancestors were slave-owners in Virginia, would probably turn over in her grave if she knew that her daughter was sponsoring the idea that Negro citizens should have an even break." And yet, explained Cowan Stone, "I very much hope that you will stand behind what you said to-night as

courageously as you have stood behind some of your other convictions in the past weeks.”³⁶⁶ Abmond Maxwell also referenced his Southern upbringing in his letter to the president, and yet noted that “[w]ithout any qualification, [Truman’s address to the NAACP] thrilled me more than any speech of any president I have heard. I am white, born, reared and educated in Georgia, but the things you said are the chief reasons I am glad to be an American. Those faults in our country you humbly acknowledged, and the high ideals the people and yourself are dedicated, give the strongest, frankest, clearest, and most [undecipherable] statement to our Foreign policy that I have heard.”³⁶⁷

But for others, Truman’s stance on civil rights was a violation of his Southern ancestry—and their own political freedom. L.H. Moore from Norfolk, Virginia, wrote, “Your speech disgusted me a Democrat Missouri born.”³⁶⁸ Otis Chandler of Birmingham, Alabama, made the point succinctly: “In the south I don’t like what you are doing with the Negroes you won’t get any where.”³⁶⁹ Catherine J. Moroney of Washington, D.C., wrote: “Will you consider the feelings of the American people and stop trying to solve the world’s problems. The speech you gave for the NAACP is your opinion. But why has the President a right to force his opinion and choice of race on the masses of people. You, Mrs. Roosevelt and fellow travelers are entitled to associate or work with all the Negroes

³⁶⁶ Elinore Cowan Stone to Harry Truman, June 29, 1947, PPF 200, Folder: 6/29/47 – Speech at the Closing Session of the 38th Annual Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Pro), Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

³⁶⁷ Abmond Maxwell to Harry Truman, July 1, 1947, PPF 200, Folder: 6/29/47 – Speech at the Closing Session of the 38th Annual Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Pro), Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

³⁶⁸ L.H. Moore to Harry Truman, June 29, 1947, PPF 200, Folder: 6/29/47 – Speech at the Closing Session of the 38th Annual Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Con), Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

³⁶⁹ Otis Chandler to Harry Truman, June 29, 1947, PPF 200, Folder: 6/29/47 – Speech at the Closing Session of the 38th Annual Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Con), Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

you want to, but there are many Americans that do not want to. Will you please remember this is a free country. And let us be free. And not forced. You are only the President, not all of the American people.”³⁷⁰

Another prominent theme in these letters is the clear understanding many citizens had of the relationship between civil rights at home and the United States’ role abroad. Thomas L. Cowan from Brooklyn, New York, told the president that he had listened to his “magnificent and eloquent address delivered against intolerance at the Lincoln Memorial” and was confident that “millions of Americans, in all parts of the Country applauded your vigorous attacks against this cancer that affects the body politic, and will support every move to eradicate it.” Mr. Cowan told Truman that his speech demonstrated a “bold but immortal stand” and “America through you and with you in the vanguard will lead the world out of the nightmare of promises unkept, into the daylight of the Four Freedoms with Liberty and Justice for all.”³⁷¹

Bishop Buford F. Gordon of Charlotte, North Carolina, sent a telegram congratulating the president on his “address at the Lincoln Memorial today. It was prophetic and expressed the convictions of all people interested in the fulfillment of a vigilant exemplary democracy.”³⁷² Dr. Evalyn Lowes Davis of Los Angeles, California, wrote, “I believe in every statement you made, and do admire your courage in giving to

³⁷⁰ Catherine J. Moroney to Harry Truman, June 30, 1947, PPF 200, Folder: 6/29/47 – Speech at the Closing Session of the 38th Annual Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Con), Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

³⁷¹ Thomas L. Cowen to Harry Truman, June 29, 1947, PPF 200, Folder: 6/29/47 – Speech at the Closing Session of the 38th Annual Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Pro), Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

³⁷² Buford F. Gordon to Harry S. Truman, June 29, 1947, PPF 200, Folder: 6/29/47 – Speech at the Closing Session of the 38th Annual Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Pro), Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

the world the true democratic law as expressed in our Constitution.”³⁷³ Andrew G. Freeman of Freeman, Ohio, told the president that his speech “should meet with the approval of All Americans. It certainly does with mine. Americans may disagree on how to secure civil rights for all, but we should all present a united front in matters affecting the implementation of democratic principles and the effect such action has in our relationships with nations all over the world.”³⁷⁴ Louise M. Spoerri of Santa Monica, California, expressed similar sentiments when she told Truman that if things remained as they were in the United States, “I do not blame those nations across the water for pointing their fingers at us in derision as they do when we speak of democracy. . . . If things go on as they have been most of the people who are fine and true and just will be ashamed of being white people and ashamed of what we stand for and do not enforce.”³⁷⁵

Other citizens described the newfound pride and ownership they felt upon hearing Truman’s speech. Percival Sills of Rockaway Beach, New York, wrote to “His Excellency Harry S. Truman” to tell him that he was “electrified by your words.” “Surely a Government which has the power to transport its citizens in far-off lands in the country’s defense when danger threatens is not impotent to grant these same citizens the necessary protection when danger to liberty threatens here at home.” In language

³⁷³ Evalyn Lowes Davis to Harry Truman, June 29, 1947, PPF 200, Folder: 6/29/47 – Speech at the Closing Session of the 38th Annual Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Pro), Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

³⁷⁴ Andrew G. Freeman to Harry Truman, no date, PPF 200, Folder: 6/29/47 – Speech at the Closing Session of the 38th Annual Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Pro), Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

³⁷⁵ Louise M. Spoerri to Harry Truman, July 3, 1947, PPF 200, Folder: 6/29/47 – Speech at the Closing Session of the 38th Annual Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Pro), Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

strikingly similar to John F. Kennedy's declaration sixteen years later in West Berlin, Mr. Sills remarked:

In ancient days the expression "Civis Romanus sum" meant a great deal. I, as a naturalized citizen and U.S. soldier in World War I, want to be able to lift up head high and say with pride, when the occasion warrants it: "I am an American citizen," something I have been unable to say until now because so many wrongs and injustices were committed against the individual and these with impunity and without a word of protest from those charged with the enforcement of the provisions of the Constitution of the United States.³⁷⁶

For Sherman Briscoe of Washington, D.C., Truman's speech convinced him "for the first time that I had a full share in the American way of life." Mr. Briscoe also predicted that "white Americans, too, must have felt better after hearing your talk. For they realized that at last their country was ready to take a responsible attitude in the matter of racial relations."³⁷⁷

Several letters, both those in support of the president's speech and those adamantly opposed to his proposals, commented that Truman's remarks had cost him votes in the 1948 presidential election. Lowell C. Frost wrote the president to offer "heartly commendation of your speech at the Lincoln Memorial last night. . . . That speech (as you knew it would) lost for you many votes. But I believe that its sincerity and

³⁷⁶ Percival Sills to Harry Truman, June 30, 1947, PPF 200, Folder: 6/29/47 – Speech at the Closing Session of the 38th Annual Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Pro), Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

³⁷⁷ Sherman Briscoe to Harry Truman, July 2, 1947, PPF 200, Folder: 6/29/47 – Speech at the Closing Session of the 38th Annual Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Pro), Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

forthrightness gave to you a firm foundation and the staunch support of many more friends who feel as you do about the essential unity of the American people.”³⁷⁸ An attorney from Chicago, Truman K. Gibson, Jr., told the president that “[t]here is no better person than yourself to impress the facts of life on the citizens of our country. There are too many of us today who do not yet realize that we cannot longer drift along letting things take care of themselves.” Although the president’s speech would “probably be criticized in many quarters,” Mr. Gibson said that he was “writing to let you know that there are many who heartily agree with you in this and other issues.”³⁷⁹

Those who disapproved of Truman’s address were much more direct—and nasty. Cecil H. Piatt from Tucson, Arizona, wrote: “Your idiotic speech to NAACP means only you approve negro social equality. I for one am ready to fight from now on. If you are willing to face war at home keep on this track. Cecil H. Piatt Yesterday, Today, Forever Ku Klux Klan.”³⁸⁰ Louis F. Lawler of San Diego, California, wrote: “I have just read the newspaper account of your speech to the National Society for the Advancement of the Colored Race. Scratch one Democratic vote for ’48.”³⁸¹ Mrs. J.M. McCreary of Wichita Falls, Texas, wrote, “I agree with you for the Negro’s rights but was so glad to notice you

³⁷⁸ Lowell C. Frost to Harry Truman, June 30, 1947, PPF 200, Folder: 6/29/47 – Speech at the Closing Session of the 38th Annual Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Pro), Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

³⁷⁹ Truman K. Gibson, Jr. to Harry Truman, June 30, 1947, PPF 200, Folder: 6/29/47 – Speech at the Closing Session of the 38th Annual Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Pro), Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

³⁸⁰ Cecil H. Piatt to Harry Truman, July 1, 1947, PPF 200, Folder: 6/29/47 – Speech at the Closing Session of the 38th Annual Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Con), Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

³⁸¹ Louis F. Lawler to Harry Truman, July 2, 1947, PPF 200, Folder: 6/29/47 – Speech at the Closing Session of the 38th Annual Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Con), Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

did not use the word equality with the races as Mrs. Roosevelt so much wants and that I know Mrs. Truman was not for.”³⁸²

Although the majority of these public opinion letters were written to thank President Truman for his courageous remarks, several were particularly degrading. I quote two of them below, not to privilege this perspective in any way, but because I believe these letters offer an important insight into the daily realities black citizens faced. These letters also reveal just what Truman was up against as he sought to make civil rights a reality for “all Americans.”

Sherman Riley, Sr. of Lufkin, Texas, was, to put it mildly, livid. “Referring to your talk at the Lincoln Memorial regarding ‘racial prejudice.’ Of course, anyone knows your words were uttered for one purpose – to try to secure the nigger votes.” Mr. Lufkin continued,

But will you tell me why such a speech was necessary, why stir up this question, it only leads the nigger to believe he is equal to the white man, which any schoolboy knows is not true, and it gives the nigger a license to become insulting and overbearing, and the words and deeds of nigger loving Mrs. Roosevelt is already manifesting itself in the actions of the Southern nigger, while previously there was no strife, no trouble, between niggers and whites. Such speeches as yours only tends [sic] to make the race question become a thousand times more serious and dangerous. . . . I have the first person yet to meet who has any good word for this woman [Eleanor Roosevelt], who wants to attend to everyone else’s

³⁸² Mrs. J.M. McCreary to Harry Truman, June 30, 1947, PPF 200, Folder: 6/29/47 – Speech at the Closing Session of the 38th Annual Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Pro), Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

affairs, but her own. She is the laughing stock of the country, and from your speech it is apparent she now has you ‘roped in.’”³⁸³

Riley’s letter expresses not only his deep hatred for African American citizens, but his belief (shared by many other Southerners) that that any political support for racial equity made the issue “a thousand times more dangerous.” This particular missive also demonstrates why Truman’s presidential presence before the NAACP at the Lincoln Memorial was so radical—and offensive to Southerners. In publically declaring his support for the NAACP and extending civil rights to “all Americans,” Truman deflated white supremacist hopes that this “son of a unreconstructed rebel mother” would carry on the status quo.³⁸⁴

In another particularly offensive missive, Rufus R. Todd from Opelika, Alabama, wrote to Truman:

I have just returned from the theater where I heard your speech on equality of the races. Never have I heard a silence so elequent [sic] from both the white audience, and the colored in the balcony finally from the colored balcony there arose a murmer [sic] of despair, of rage, and fear, on the street as I left the theater I heard a young negro say ‘Yankees are the worst enemys [sic] a pore [sic] niggers got if they would have these white folks down here alone we would get along a lot better.’ . . . I feel a deep sympathy for them, but knowing their good points I understand also their weaknesses and short comings that so unfit them for full

³⁸³ Sherman Riley, Sr. to Harry Truman, June 30, 1947, PPF 200, Folder: 6/29/47 – Speech at the Closing Session of the 38th Annual Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Con), Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

³⁸⁴ Leuchtenburg, *The White House Looks South: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, Lyndon B. Johnson*, 160.

equality with white people . . . You must consider that it was but a few short generations ago that the negroes was [sic] brought from the Jungles, so the race as a whole can not be judged by a few of the most intelligent ones, as thinking people we must accept the negro for what he is[,] not what we would like him to be. . . . I'm afraid your speech gave the confirdence [sic] of the people of the south a severe jolt.”³⁸⁵

Indeed, Truman's speech to the NAACP, and his major domestic initiatives on civil rights gave the South more than a “severe jolt.”

Despite these examples of overt racism and pure hatred for African American citizens, Truman's address to the NAACP had far-reaching implications at home and abroad. In one of the most rhetorically potent missives from the archive, Dorothy W. Chance of Memphis, Tennessee, explained why the president's speech was so significant to her—and for the entire nation.

It is only a couple of months now since I was in Japan with the American Red Cross. I am an American Negro. It was often difficult to answer interrogating Japanese who wanted to know more about our democracy and why we as Negroes who “are Americans too” are segregated and discriminated against. I listened to many of our soldiers try to explain to them the stages of American History, of Negro slavery, its abolition and the progress of the race that is being made today. But always they were as able as we to point to phrases in the Emancipation Proclamation and the Constitution of the United States of America – “the liberty

³⁸⁵ Rufus R. Todd to Harry Truman, July 6, 1947, PPF 200, Folder: 6/29/47 – Speech at the Closing Session of the 38th Annual Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Con), Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

and justice to all” phrases. It was not simple to try to explain American democracy in the light of all the questions they asked us. Your speech today brought more faith and hope than all the speeches I’ve ever heard anywhere. My prayers are for you that your words will not fall on deaf ears of those who are able to help make civil rights a realization for all people, and that all Americans will always be worthy of equal civil rights.³⁸⁶

For Mrs. Chance, and millions of African American citizens, the president’s speech to the NAACP on June 29, 1947, offered at least a hope that the United States of America would take steps to secure the rights and liberties guaranteed in the nation’s foundational documents, steps that would enable the nation to make the case for democracy to the world.

Conclusion

Harry S. Truman’s address to the NAACP on June 29, 1947, reveals the transformative potential of presidential presence in place. Speaking from the steps of the Lincoln Memorial, Truman activated the symbolic resonances of Lincoln’s political legacy and the memories embedded in this particular location while linking his own *ethos*—as expressed through his rhetorical authority as president of the United States and his personal history with race relations—to the NAACP. Although he spoke from within the United States, Truman’s rhetoric in place transcended his immediate location and circulated around the globe as a powerful argument at the dawn of the Cold War. Keenly

³⁸⁶ Dorothy W. Chance to Harry Truman, June 30, 1947, PPF 200, Folder: 6/29/47 – Speech at the Closing Session of the 38th Annual Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Pro), Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.

aware of the inconsistencies between “our protestations of freedom and our practice of them,” the president used this occasion to tell the nation and the world that the United States would “get its own house in order” to prove to the world that U.S. democracy was, in fact, superior to Soviet communism.³⁸⁷

Truman’s speech at the Lincoln Memorial also lent institutional authority to the NAACP’s strategic adaption of the site as a locus for civil rights activism. Building on the symbolism and shared public memory of Marian Anderson’s 1939 Easter Sunday concert, the president’s physical presence in this place and before this audience solidified once and for all the Lincoln Memorial as a commonplace symbolizing the United States’ commitment to extending the rights and liberties laid out in the U.S. Constitution to “all Americans.”³⁸⁸ After Truman, other U.S. presidents returned here to honor Lincoln’s memory as the Great Emancipator and to call for advances in civil rights. Of course, the March on Washington and the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “I Have a Dream” speech on August 28, 1963, offered the most powerful invocation of Lincoln’s memory and the place-as-rhetoric of the Lincoln Memorial. Yet the very choice of the Lincoln Memorial as the site for King’s address suggests that earlier rhetorical work in this place—such as Anderson’s 1939 concert and Truman’s 1947 address to the NAACP—made it a particularly persuasive rhetorical resource.

Of particular note is Lyndon B. Johnson’s frequent return to the Lincoln Memorial during his civil rights campaign. In December 1963, just one month after John F. Kennedy’s assassination, Lyndon B. Johnson spoke at a candlelight vigil at the Lincoln

³⁸⁷ Truman, “Address to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.”

³⁸⁸ Truman, “Address to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.”

Memorial. Four weeks earlier, in an Address to a Joint Session of Congress on November 27, Johnson had argued that the best way to honor Kennedy's memory was to ensure "the earliest possible passage of a civil rights bill for which he fought so long."³⁸⁹ Johnson continued this argument in his ceremonial remarks at the Lincoln Memorial, reassuring his audience that they had been "bent in sorrow, but not in purpose. We buried Abraham Lincoln and John Kennedy, but we did not bury their dreams or their visions. They are our dreams and our visions for today."³⁹⁰ Less than two months later, Johnson used the occasion of Lincoln's 155th birthday to reaffirm the United States' moral obligation to carry out "the new birth of freedom that [Lincoln] promised" for "[t]his is the unfinished work to which we, the living, must dedicate ourselves."³⁹¹ Three years later, in 1967, Johnson returned to the national shrine and described Abraham Lincoln as "the 'Great Emancipator'—of black and white alike."³⁹² And in 1968, Johnson spoke at a ceremony commemorating Lincoln's 159th birthday, telling his audience that "[a]cross the world, whenever men have sought to breath free and stand tall—they have looked to Lincoln." Johnson went on to describe how Lincoln's legacy extended beyond the United States and across the globe: "On five continents, in shacks and huts and slums, and in drawing rooms as well—if men sought dignity, there was a picture of Abraham Lincoln tacked on

³⁸⁹ Lyndon B. Johnson, "Address Before a Joint Session of Congress," November 27, 1963, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed March 22, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25988>.

³⁹⁰ Lyndon B. Johnson, "Remarks at a Candlelight Memorial Service for President Kennedy," December 22, 1963, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed March 22, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26576>.

³⁹¹ Lyndon B. Johnson, "Remarks at the Lincoln Memorial," February 12, 1964, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed March 22, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26071>.

³⁹² Lyndon B. Johnson, "Remarks at a Ceremony at the Lincoln Memorial," February 12, 1967, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed March 22, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=28549>.

the wall. Those pictures in the places where men dream of freedom give us a true perspective of America's role in the world over the last 100 years." Like Truman, Johnson held up Lincoln's memory as an inspiration to millions seeking freedom—a description particularly poignant in 1968, twenty years into the Cold War. Like Truman, Johnson also insisted that the U.S. public look inward, not simply outward, and consider how the "revolutionary American dream of human dignity and quality for all" was enacted at home. In his conclusion, Johnson noted the symbolic significance of his location—and the previous rhetorical action that happened in this place:

These marble steps in recent years have borne eloquent witness to responsible dissent. A hundred years after the Emancipation Proclamation, a vast convocation of peoples have met here peacefully and dramatically to call upon all of us to honor our commitment to human rights for all of us. Today, we rededicate ourselves at this place to Lincoln's cause, the cause of full equality.³⁹³

Here, in this place, Johnson called his audience yet again to rededicate themselves to Lincoln's vision for "full equality" for all citizens—a vision that Truman had first articulated from the steps of the Lincoln Memorial and one that Johnson was determined to carry out.

William Leuchtenburg argues that Truman's civil rights agenda "proved to be the end of the Solid South, at least of a South solid for the Democrats," writing that although it was Lyndon Johnson who "pushed through far-reaching civil rights legislation . . .

³⁹³ Lyndon B. Johnson, "Remarks at a Ceremony Commemorating the 159th Birthday of Abraham Lincoln," February 12, 1968, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed March 22, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29360>.

Truman is the one who opened the fissure that would never be mended.”³⁹⁴ Through his rhetoric in place on June 29, 1947, Truman constituted the Lincoln Memorial as a Cold War commonplace, a place of return for future civil rights activists and U.S. presidents to deploy as a material means of persuasion. But what was even more remarkable about Truman’s address to the NAACP is that he, a son of the South, was speaking on behalf of the organization at a site originally designed to promote national unity—and silence Lincoln’s stance on slavery and emancipation. It is precisely because of these inherent tensions that Truman’s speech was so remarkable—and rhetorically significant. Only Truman could speak in this place, on this occasion, about this issue. Only Truman could speak at the Lincoln Memorial.

³⁹⁴ Leuchtenburg, "The Conversion of Harry Truman."

Chapter Four: Kennedy in Berlin

On June 26, 1963, John F. Kennedy delivered his famous “Ich bin ein Berliner” declaration before a capacity crowd in front of City Hall in West Berlin. Kennedy’s argument was simple: those who thought communism was a peaceful system of government and “the wave of the future” should come to Berlin and see for themselves. Speaking as the representative of the United States, Kennedy told his audience that the American people took “the greatest pride that they have been able to share with you, even from a distance, the story of the last 18 years,” namely that of Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe following World War II. The U.S. public stood with the West Berliners, Kennedy stated, even from across the Atlantic Ocean. Although separated by a great distance, the president said that Americans saw themselves as resolute allies of West Berlin, a “defended island of freedom” on the “front lines” of the Cold War.³⁹⁵

The city of West Berlin, perhaps more than any other geographical location during the Cold War, provided a physical and metaphorical symbol of the ideological struggle between democracy and communism. In what was often a symbolic struggle of words, the dividing line between East and West Berlin was a tangible instantiation of the verbal and psychological clash between the United States and the Soviet Union. In a government report assessing the political and military background of Berlin from 1945 to 1965, U.S. Air Force military historian Royce E. Eckwright noted that, unlike other Cold War military conflicts in Vietnam or Korea, “it was only in Berlin that the world’s two

³⁹⁵ John F. Kennedy, “Remarks in the Rudolph Wilde Platz, Berlin,” June 26, 1963, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed March 23, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9307>.

great nuclear powers—the United States and the Soviet Union—met like flint and steel in a tinder box. Berlin was the only geographical point in the world where military forces and political commitments of the United States and the Soviet Union were locked continuously in a direct confrontation.”³⁹⁶ This reality became even more apparent in 1961, when East German leader Walter Ulbricht (under the direction of Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev) erected the Berlin Wall just after midnight on August 13. In a report issued just days after the Berlin Wall went up, the U.S. State Department was explicit about Berlin’s symbolic status not only for the United States, but the entire Western world:

West Berlin is a lighthouse of freedom in a dark totalitarian sea. It demonstrates the material superiorities of a free society which allows and encourages individual initiative. More important, it is a shining model of political, intellectual, and spiritual freedom in which individual liberties are assured and the people choose those who govern them. . . . All peoples throughout the globe who enjoy or aspire to freedom, including the captive peoples of the Communist empires, have a vital interest in the preservation of freedom—of self-determination—in West Berlin. In defending Free Berlin we defend not only Bonn, Paris, London, Oslo, Ottawa, Washington, Kansas City, Boise, but, in fact, every citizen in the North Atlantic community. Equally we defend New Delhi, Kuala Lumpur, Tokyo, Lagos, Tunis,

³⁹⁶ Royce E. Eckwright, "United States Air Access to Berlin, 1945-1965: Part I, the Political-Military Background," ed. United States Air Force Europe Historical Division Office of Information (1966), 1.

Cairo, Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo, and every other city and village and people who wish to be free.³⁹⁷

The city of West Berlin was a testing ground, the fulcrum on which U.S. Cold War foreign policy rested. Moreover, the German capital quickly became the hottest spot of the Cold War during Kennedy's presidency—a place that Khrushchev described as “the most dangerous place in the world” during the 1961 Vienna Summit.³⁹⁸

Kennedy's decision to visit West Berlin in June 1963 was inherently symbolic. As the first U.S. president to travel to the besieged city since Truman's visit in 1945, his presidential presence in this besieged city offered tangible proof of his commitment to defending West Berliners from Soviet encroachment. To fully understand the rhetorical significance of speech at the Rudolph Wilde Platz, it is essential to consider first the rhetorical history of Berlin itself and how—and why—this city dominated much of Kennedy's foreign policy rhetoric in 1961 and 1962. I then turn to the archival record to demonstrate the White House's goals for Kennedy's trip to Europe in 1963 and, specifically, their view of the president's visit to West Berlin. These materials reveal that the president, his White House advisors, and West German officials saw Kennedy's physical presence in Berlin as a rhetorical act in itself and carefully planned the events of June 26 to reaffirm the United States' commitment to West Berlin and present Kennedy as a strong and confident leader of the Western Alliance. After this historical and contextual background, I conduct a close reading of Kennedy's speech at the Rudolph

³⁹⁷ Bureau of Public Affairs Office of Public Services, “Berlin—1961,” ed. U.S. Department of State (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1961), 28-29.

³⁹⁸ Frederick Kempe, *Berlin 1961: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth* (New York, NY: Berkley Books, 2011), xiii.

Wilde Platz in West Berlin. Through my analysis, I show how the president drew on his physical location—the city of West Berlin—as tangible proof of the failures of communism even as he challenged his audience to look beyond their physical situation to a more hopeful future. I conclude this chapter by considering the public reaction to Kennedy’s speech in West Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States and describe how this case study extends our understanding of presidential rhetoric in place.

Berlin as a Cold War Commonplace

The very existence of West Berlin was a result of Allied negotiations at the end of World War II. In 1944, the Allies agreed to divide Germany and “Greater Berlin” following the conclusion of World War II into three zones controlled by the United States, Great Britain, and Russia.³⁹⁹ At the Yalta conference in February 1945, the Allies agreed to add France as a governing entity. Germany was divided into four zones. The city of Berlin, located 110 miles inside Soviet territory, was also partitioned into four zones. The United States, Great Britain, and France controlled areas on the west side of the city, and the Soviet Union occupied the eastern zone. In July 1945, the Big Three powers met for the Potsdam conference just fifteen miles outside of Berlin.⁴⁰⁰ Historian Michael Neiberg notes the symbolic importance of holding this meeting in Berlin, the

³⁹⁹ The European Advisory Commission (comprised of representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union) outlined a plan for a divided Germany in 1944. In a telegram to President Roosevelt, Secretary of State Cordell Hull passed along the Commission’s “Draft Protocol” outlining the Allied plans for “the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of Greater Berlin” as discussed at an August 2, 1944 meeting. See Cordell Hull to Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Memorandum to the President,” September 11, 1944, Folder: Jan.-Sept. 1944 (i297) Index, German Diplomatic Files, Box 31, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, accessed January 25, 2016, <http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box31/folo297.html>.

⁴⁰⁰ Neiberg, *Potsdam: The End of World War II and the Remaking of Europe*, 118.

city where Hitler once paraded through the streets to millions of Berliners at the height of World War II. “Not only would it drive home to the Germans the cold reality of their defeat,” Neiberg writes, “but it would underscore the magnitude of the Soviet contribution to that defeat. . . . The Germans of 1945—above all, those in the capital—would know the totality of their defeat, which would be symbolized by their former enemies determining Germany’s future not in a luxurious Paris or a distant Alaska, but in an occupied and shattered Berlin.”⁴⁰¹ The day before the conference began, Truman took a driving tour of the decimated city with Secretary of State George Byrnes and Admiral William D. Leahy, motoring down the same roads that were filled with Berliners cheering Hitler at the height of Nazi power and that John F. Kennedy would visit eighteen years later.⁴⁰² At the conference, the Big Three explicitly recognized Berlin as the capital city of Germany, yet failed to determine the access rights for U.S., British, and French troops to Berlin.⁴⁰³

On June 24, 1948, Soviet troops halted road and rail traffic between the Western occupation zones and Berlin, in effect cutting off the Western sections—and 2.5 million people—from food, water, fuel, and medical supplies. On June 26, the U.S. military commander in Berlin, General Lucius Clay, ordered the first flight shipments from Wiesbaden Air Base to the German capital. Two days later, President Truman ordered a full-scale military operation to supply the necessary food and fuel to keep the city alive.

⁴⁰¹ The Soviets also wanted Truman and Churchill to see the war devastation for themselves. As Neiberg notes, “Bringing the Big Three conference to Berlin would reinforce the brutality of the war to the new American leadership and boost Russian demands for heavy reparations and a brutal postwar treatment of Germany.” Neiberg, *Potsdam: The End of World War II and the Remaking of Europe*, 63.

⁴⁰² McCullough, *Truman*, 413.

⁴⁰³ Eckwright, “United States Air Access to Berlin, 1945-1965: Part I, the Political-Military Background,” 5-6.

Just three weeks after the airlift began, *Washington Post* reporter John G. Norris interviewed military chiefs on the situation in Berlin. “Berlin has become the symbol of American determination,” he wrote. “The fact that the odds are against us makes victory in the ‘cold’ war all the more important. Firmness when our position is weak will have greater effect on western Europe than if it were strong.”⁴⁰⁴ From June 1948 to September 1949, the U.S.-British airlift transported more than two million tons of food, coal, and other supplies to the city of Berlin.⁴⁰⁵ To the U.S. public and the Western world, Berlin quickly became a Cold War symbol of the struggle between democracy and communism.

Berlin’s symbolic status in the U.S. national imaginary would be solidified permanently by John F. Kennedy’s declaration on June 26, 1963—the fifteenth anniversary of the beginning of the Berlin Airlift—that he, too, was a Berliner. But the president saw Berlin as critical to U.S. Cold War foreign policy even as a U.S. senator and presidential candidate. During a March 1960 campaign stop in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, then-Senator John F. Kennedy delivered a speech entitled, “Our Stake in Berlin.” In this speech, Kennedy articulated West Berlin’s importance to the United States, noting particularly its physical proximity to Soviet-controlled East Germany, the rest of Eastern Europe, and the USSR. He described West Berlin as “a small island of

⁴⁰⁴ John G. Norris, “Firmness Can Win ‘Cold’ War, U.S. Chiefs in Berlin Agree,” *Washington Post*, July 14, 1948.

⁴⁰⁵ Eckwright, “United States Air Access to Berlin, 1945-1965: Part I, the Political-Military Background,” xi. For more details on the Berlin Airlift, see Robert P. Grathwol and Donita M. Moorhus, *Berlin and the American Military: A Cold War Chronicle* (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1999); Daniel F. Harrington, *Berlin on the Brink: The Blockade, the Airlift, and the Early Cold War*, vol. University Press of Kentucky (Lexington, KY, 2012); Michael D. Haydock, *City Under Siege: The Berlin Blockade and Airlift, 1948-1949* (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1999); Roger G. Miller, *To Save a City: The Berlin Airlift, 1948-1949* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2000); Thomas Parrish, *Berlin in the Balance, 1945-1949: The Blockade, the Airlift, and the First Major Battle of the Cold War* (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1998).

free men in the midst of communist territory,” one sustained by “the courage and vitality of its people” and “reinforced by our own determination that Berlin shall—and must—remain free.”⁴⁰⁶ Moreover, Kennedy argued,

the spirit of a free city in the midst of despotism and alien rule . . . [serves] as a beacon to inspire all the enslaved countries of Eastern Europe with the hope of eventual freedom. And Berlin is more than a symbol of personal liberty. It is a living contradiction of the Soviet dogma that only a communist society can bring material prosperity.⁴⁰⁷

Later on in the speech, Kennedy reasserted West Berlin’s status as a symbol during the Cold War struggle between democracy and communism. “Berlin is important as a symbol—as perhaps the chief symbol of the free world’s determination not to yield to Russian threats and Russian pressure.” But Kennedy did not stop there; instead, he linked U.S. interests to Berlin’s fate, arguing that “[t]he protection of the freedom of Berlin is the surest protection of our own freedom.” In fact, he said, for much of the world Berlin was “the touchstone of American determination—the measure of our dedication to freedom. It is this belief which makes the cause of Berlin the cause of free men everywhere.”⁴⁰⁸ It is significant that from the very beginning, Kennedy described West Berlin as a living, breathing representation of the ideological clash between U.S. democracy and Soviet communism. In language rife with spatial metaphors, the

⁴⁰⁶ John F. Kennedy, “Our Stake in Berlin,” March 24, 1960, 2, found in Papers of John F. Kennedy, Pre-Presidential Papers, Presidential Campaign Files, 1960, Speeches and the Press, Speeches, Statements, and Sections, 1958-1960, Foreign affairs: Our Stake in Berlin, accessed February 2016, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKCAMP1960-1030-018.aspx>.

⁴⁰⁷ Kennedy, “Our Stake in Berlin,” 2-3.

⁴⁰⁸ Kennedy, “Our Stake in Berlin,” 5, 6.

presidential candidate set forth the city as a metaphorical and literal commonplace—a “touchstone of American determination” that was both material and symbolic.

Just over a year later, as the White House prepared for the new president’s trip to Europe to meet with French president Charles de Gaulle and Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev in June 1961, National Security Council consultant Henry Kissinger suggested that Kennedy should consider a personal visit to West Berlin before or after his meeting in Paris with de Gaulle.⁴⁰⁹ In a memo to the president dated April 5, 1961, Kissinger suggested that the physical presence of the president in West Berlin would have an important persuasive effect. “One of the difficulties is how we can bring home to the Soviets our determination to maintain our rights in Berlin,” he wrote. “Words may not be enough. Representatives may be ignored. . . . Thus it may be worthwhile to consider whether it may not be wise to stake the President’s prestige deliberately to the freedom of Berlin. The forthcoming visit with President de Gaulle may provide such an opportunity.” The advantages of such a visit, Kissinger noted, were “obvious: (1) It would signify as nothing else our commitment to the freedom of Berlin. (2) It would be a tremendous boost for the morale of the population of Berlin. (3) It would make a profound impact in public opinion in the Federal Republic.”⁴¹⁰ Kissinger’s memo emphasized that because “[w]ords alone may not be enough,” physically going to Berlin would “signify as nothing

⁴⁰⁹ According to the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Kissinger served as an “occasional consultant to both the National Security Council and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency” under Kennedy while also working as an associate professor of government at Harvard University. “News Release: Henry Kissinger’s Kennedy Administration Files Opened,” March 2, 2004, accessed January 26, 2016, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/About-Us/News-and-Press/Press-Releases/Henry-Kissingers-Kennedy-Administration-Files-Opened.aspx>.

⁴¹⁰ Henry A. Kissinger to John F. Kennedy, “Memorandum for the President: Subject: A Possible Visit to Berlin,” April 5, 1961, found in Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, President’s Office Files, Countries, Germany: Security, 1961: January-June, accessed February 2016, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-117-005.aspx>.

else” the United States’ commitment to the city. Although the president would not go to West Berlin until two years later, the physical presence of U.S. officials in the city quickly became a key rhetorical strategy in the months that followed.

As much as Berlin symbolized U.S. commitment to protecting and defending democracy during the Cold War, it was also the issue over which Kennedy and Khrushchev came to verbal blows at the Vienna Summit. In June 1961, the U.S. president and the Soviet premier met to discuss a variety of subjects related to U.S.-Soviet relations, including Cuba, Laos, a ban on nuclear testing, and German reunification.⁴¹¹ But it was the issue of Berlin that caused the greatest disagreement between the two leaders, a rift that would continue throughout the summer of 1961 and led to Khrushchev’s order to build the Berlin Wall in August. Reemphasizing demands he first made in 1958, Khrushchev told Kennedy that he intended to sign a peace treaty with East Germany that would permanently establish the division between East and West Germany and cut off all Western access to areas inside the East German zone—including the city of West Berlin.⁴¹² When Kennedy stated emphatically that the United States would not abandon its commitment to West Berlin and denounced Khrushchev’s attempt to “disturb the balance of power” in Europe, Khrushchev was incensed.⁴¹³ In their final meeting, the

⁴¹¹ This was not their first meeting. The two men met during Khrushchev’s American tour in 1959, when Kennedy was a junior senator from Massachusetts.

⁴¹² Ted Sorenson, *Kennedy* (New York, NY: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1965), 583.

⁴¹³ As historian Michael Beschloss explains, Kennedy’s insistence “came just six weeks after he himself had tried to change [the power balance] at the Bay of Pigs. . . . Now, in Khrushchev’s view, he was arrogantly brandishing the superior might of the United States. Despite his earlier rhetoric about parity, Kennedy seemed to be saying that since America was more powerful, it could afford to ignore Soviet concerns about Berlin.” Michael R. Beschloss, *The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963* (New York, NY: Edward Berlingame Books, 1991), 217. For a detailed account of the conversations between Kennedy and Khrushchev in Vienna, see Beschloss, *The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963*, 191-236.

president attempted to smooth things over by telling Khrushchev that he “would not present him with a situation so deeply involving our national interest”—the United States’ long-standing commitment to Berlin—and again emphasized “the difference between a peace treaty and the rights of access to Berlin.”⁴¹⁴ The Soviet leader replied that if the United States maintained its right of access to West Berlin following the signed peace treaty (thus violating East German borders), “force would be met by force.”⁴¹⁵ Kennedy responded by telling Khrushchev that his statements left him no other option but to tell British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan that the Soviet Union gave him a choice between “accepting the Soviet action on Berlin or having a face-to-face confrontation.”⁴¹⁶ Khrushchev then put the option in Kennedy’s hands: “I want peace,” he said, slamming his hand down on the table. “But if you want war, that is your problem.” The meeting ended with Khrushchev telling Kennedy, “War will take place only if the U.S. imposes it on the U.S.S.R. It is up to the U.S. to decide whether there will be war or peace.”⁴¹⁷

Suddenly, Berlin was no longer just a political problem; it was personal. Secretary of State Dean Rusk later wrote that “Kennedy was very upset” and “wasn’t prepared for the brutality of Khrushchev’s presentation. . . . Khrushchev was trying to act like a bully to this young President of the United States.”⁴¹⁸ By Kennedy’s own assessment, the Soviet premier “just beat the hell out of me. . . . I’ve got a terrible problem. If he thinks

⁴¹⁴ John F. Kennedy, as quoted in Kempe, *Berlin 1961: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth*, 252.

⁴¹⁵ Nikita Khrushchev, as quoted in Kempe, *Berlin 1961: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth*, 252.

⁴¹⁶ John F. Kennedy, as quoted in Beschloss, *The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963*, 223.

⁴¹⁷ Beschloss, *The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963*, 223-224.

⁴¹⁸ Dean Rusk, as quoted in Beschloss, *The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963*, 224.

I'm inexperienced and have no guts, until we remove those ideas we won't get anywhere with him. So we have to act."⁴¹⁹ The Soviets gave the U.S. delegation an aide-memoire that demanded a German settlement within six months. The Berlin Crisis had begun.⁴²⁰

On July 25, Kennedy delivered a televised address to an audience of 50 million viewers to outline the official U.S. policy on West Berlin.⁴²¹ The president had delivered earlier reports to the U.S. public on his meeting with Khrushchev in a June 6 televised speech⁴²² and a June 28 press conference⁴²³, but this speech was designed, in the words of speechwriter Ted Sorenson, to "explain the nature of the Berlin issue, our rights, obligations and objectives from which we will not back down an inch" and "make clear our intent to defend Berlin at all costs."⁴²⁴ In the address, Kennedy summarized the developments since his return from meeting with Khrushchev and reiterated Berlin's importance to U.S. foreign policy. The Soviet premier's intention to sign a treaty with the East German government and dissolve previous Allied agreements over the governance of Berlin would "end, through a stroke of a pen, first our legal rights to be in West Berlin—and secondly our ability to make good on our commitment to the two million

⁴¹⁹ John F. Kennedy, as quoted in Beschloss, *The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963*, 225.

⁴²⁰ The "Berlin Crisis" of 1961 has been the subject of ample scholarship. See, for example, Sorenson, *Kennedy*, 583-601; Beschloss, *The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963*; Kempe, *Berlin 1961: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth*; Grathwol and Moorhus, *Berlin and the American Military: A Cold War Chronicle*, 79-106; Robert Dallek, *An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917-1963* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 2003), 418-435.

⁴²¹ Vito N. Silvestri, *Becoming JFK: A Profile in Communication* (Greenwood, CT: Praeger, 2000), 184.

⁴²² John F. Kennedy, "Radio and Television Report to the American People on Returning from Europe," June 6, 1961, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed March 23, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=8180>.

⁴²³ John F. Kennedy, "The President's News Conference," June 28, 1961, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed March 23, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=8209>.

⁴²⁴ Theodore C. Sorenson to John F. Kennedy, "Memorandum to the President: The Decision on Berlin," July 17, 1961, 3, found in Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, President's Office Files, Countries, Germany: General, July 1961, accessed February 2016, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-116b-006.aspx>.

free people of that city. That we cannot permit.” Although the “immediate threat to free men is in West Berlin,” Kennedy argued that “that isolated outpost is not an isolated problem. . . . We face a challenge in our own hemisphere, and indeed wherever else the freedom of human beings is at stake.”⁴²⁵ The Soviet challenge to U.S. rights in West Berlin was not limited to the German capital. Instead, it represented a physical and metaphorical outpost of freedom surrounded by totalitarianism.

The president then referred his audience to a map of divided Germany and the physical placement of Berlin within the East German zone so that they could visualize the geopolitical situation. “This map makes very [clear] the problem that we face,” he said. After orienting his audience to the map and what it represented, the president quickly explained the significance of West Berlin to his audience:

For West Berlin lying exposed 110 miles inside East Germany, surrounded by Soviet troops and close to Soviet supply lines, has many roles. It is more than a showcase of liberty, a symbol, an island of freedom in a Communist sea. It is even more than a link with the Free World, a beacon of hope behind the Iron Curtain, an escape hatch for refugees. West Berlin is all of that. But above all it has now become—as never before—the great testing place of Western courage and will, a focal point where our solemn commitments stretching back over the years since 1945, and Soviet ambitions now meet in basic confrontation.⁴²⁶

In this passage, the president described the city in language that was both literal and

⁴²⁵ John F. Kennedy, “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis,” July 25, 1961, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed March 23, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=8259>.

⁴²⁶ Kennedy, “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis.”

symbolic. West Berlin was situated physically “inside East Germany,” encircled by Soviet troops, and a place where East Germans could find freedom from communist rule. But it was also a “showcase of liberty,” a “symbol,” “an island of freedom in a communist sea,” “a beacon of hope behind the Iron Curtain,” and “the great testing place of Western courage and will.” These characterizations of West Berlin reinforced the city’s status as a geographic location behind enemy lines and a metaphorical representation of the ideological war being waged between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The president then outlined the specific steps he intended to take, which included an increase in defense spending, active duty military personnel in West Berlin and overall reserves, and the retention of tanks, airplanes, and ships scheduled for retirement. Kennedy noted that these actions would require national sacrifice, acknowledging that “many American families will bear the burden of these requests,” but the president reminded his audience that “these are the burdens which must be borne if freedom is to be defended—Americans have willingly borne them before—and they will not flinch from the task now.” He also directly refuted Khrushchev’s charge that the United States would decide if there would be war or peace, putting the blame squarely on the Soviet Union: “The source of world trouble and tension is Moscow, not Berlin. And if war begins, it will have begun in Moscow and not Berlin.” To conclude, the president reemphasized West Berlin’s symbolic significance to the United States during the Cold War, pledging that “[t]he solemn vow each of us gave to West Berlin in time of peace will not be broken in time of danger. If we do not meet our commitments to Berlin, where

will we later stand? If we are not true to our word there, all that we have achieved in collective security, which relies on these words, will mean nothing.” Again, the president described West Berlin as the testing ground for U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. In his view, what happened in West Berlin would determine the fate of all other nations seeking freedom. “To sum it all up,” Kennedy said, “we seek peace—but we shall not surrender.”⁴²⁷

The speech was hailed by the West and sharply criticized by the Soviet Union. Over seventy percent of U.S. respondents polled said they were willing to go to war to protect West Berlin.⁴²⁸ The day after the address, West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer wrote to Kennedy, thanking him for his July 25 speech. “It is good to know that in times such as these the United States assume the leadership in the NATO alliance, in the conflict between the free world and the Communist world.”⁴²⁹ According to U.S. diplomat John McCloy, who met with Khrushchev just after the president’s address, the Soviet premier said that the United States had just declared “preliminary war” on the

⁴²⁷ Kennedy, “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis.”

⁴²⁸ Steven R. Goldzwig and George N. Dionisopoulos, *"In a Perilous Hour": The Public Address of John F. Kennedy* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995), 108. In a poll conducted just prior to Kennedy’s July 25 address, eighty-five percent of respondents said they were in favor of keeping U.S. troops in West Berlin even if it meant risking war. When asked how important it was “to give hope to the people of Eastern Europe by keeping our troops in West Berlin even at the risk of war,” seventy-eight percent of respondents said it was “very important.” Nine percent said “fairly important,” six percent said it was “not too important,” and seven percent had “no opinion.” Interviews were conducted July 12-19, 1961 and sent to the White House on July 31, 1961. Deputy National Security Advisor Walt W. Rostow passed the data on to White House Press Secretary Pierre Salinger on August 2, 1961, with a note: “The President should see.” “U.S. Public Opinion and the Berlin Crisis – 1961,” Public Opinion Surveys, Inc., July 31, 1961, found in Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, President’s Office Files, Countries, Germany: Berlin Crisis polls, July 1961, accessed February 2016, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-117a-005.aspx>.

⁴²⁹ Konrad Adenauer to John F. Kennedy, July 26, 1961, Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, President’s Office Files, Countries, Germany: General, July 1961, accessed February 2016, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-116b-006.aspx>.

Soviet Union.⁴³⁰ In McCloy's estimation, the situation was "not yet ripe for any negotiation proffers by us but too dangerous to permit it to drift into a condition where cramped time could well lead to unfortunate action."⁴³¹ Khrushchev later wrote to Kennedy that his speech was "belligerent."⁴³² In their analysis of Kennedy's July 25 speech, Steven R. Goldzwig and George N. Dionisopoulos suggest, "The July 25 address was successful in convincing Khrushchev of Kennedy's willingness to employ the U.S. nuclear arsenal in defense of Berlin, but the cost was a dramatic increase in superpower tensions and an avowed policy of escalation." In fact, they argue that "[a]lthough Khrushchev bridled over the tough talk, his chief response was to authorize the construction of the Berlin Wall."⁴³³

Just after midnight on August 13, 1961, the Soviet Union closed the border between West and East Berlin. Later that morning, East German soldiers drilled holes for concrete pillars and strung barbed wire across the border. The Berlin Wall began to take shape, physically dividing the city.⁴³⁴ Kennedy confidante Ken O'Donnell later wrote that the president saw the wall

as the turning point that would lead to the end of the Berlin crisis. He said to me,

"Why would Khrushchev put up a wall if he really intended to seize West Berlin?

There wouldn't be any need of a wall if he occupied the whole city. This is his

⁴³⁰ Beschloss, *The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963*, 262.

⁴³¹ Beschloss, *The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963*, 263.

⁴³² Sorenson, *Kennedy*, 592.

⁴³³ Goldzwig and Dionisopoulos, *"In a Perilous Hour": The Public Address of John F. Kennedy*, 108.

⁴³⁴ Kempe, *Berlin 1961: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth*, 323-362.

way out of his predicament. It's not a very nice solution, but a wall is a hell of a lot better than a war."⁴³⁵

But for eight days after the wall went up, Kennedy said not a word about Berlin in public.⁴³⁶ On August 16, three days after the wall went up, 300,000 West Berliners protested in front of the City Hall of West Berlin holding signs that read "Betrayed by the West" and "The West is Doing a Second Munich."⁴³⁷ Willy Brandt, the current mayor of West Berlin who would become chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1969, addressed the angry crowd and acknowledged their frustration. "Without them [the Americans], the tanks would have rolled on . . . [But] Berlin expects more than words. It expects political action."⁴³⁸

The president dispatched Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson and General Lucius Clay—the beloved U.S. commander of the Berlin airlift twelve years earlier—to West Berlin as his envoys. In remarks at the Tempelhof Airport just after his arrival on August 19, Johnson hailed West Berlin as a "fortress of the free" and "home of the brave," clearly echoing the famous words from the United States' national anthem.⁴³⁹ Later that afternoon, in an address to the West German Parliament, Johnson said, "To the survival and to the creative future of this city we Americans have pledged, in effect, what our ancestors pledged in forming the United States: 'Our lives, our fortunes and our sacred

⁴³⁵ Kenneth P. O'Donnell, David F. Powers, and Joe McCarthy, *"Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye": Memories of John Fitzgerald Kennedy* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1970), 303.

⁴³⁶ Beschloss, *The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963*, 277.

⁴³⁷ Robert Schlesinger, *White House Ghosts: Presidents and Their Speechwriters* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 2008), 138-139; Beschloss, *The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963*, 275.

⁴³⁸ Kempe, *Berlin 1961: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth*, 375.

⁴³⁹ Andreas W. Daum, *Kennedy in Berlin*, trans. Dona Geyer (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 52.

honor.”⁴⁴⁰ But according to *New York Times* correspondent Sydney Gruson, “[t]he Vice President said nothing essentially new. That did not seem to matter. The West Berliners wanted the words said at this time in their city and, above all, they wanted his presence as a tangible expression of the link that sustains them.”⁴⁴¹ West German mayor Willy Brandt echoed similar sentiments years later, writing, “The fact that the vice president was there in West Berlin . . . was a most effective way of counteracting this feeling of uncertainty which was spreading during these days following August 13.”⁴⁴²

Over the coming months, the Kennedy Administration continued to support West Berlin publically, sending U.S. troops to stand guard at the West Berlin border and “Checkpoint Charlie.” In February 1962, Kennedy’s brother and attorney general Robert Kennedy traveled to West Berlin with his wife, Ethel. He spoke to a crowd of 150,000 gathered in front of City Hall; another 100,000 lined the streets to greet him.⁴⁴³ In his speech, the attorney general stated that the U.S. public identified with West Berliners as family. “You are our brothers,” he said, and equated a military attack on West Berlin with one on American soil.⁴⁴⁴ “[A]n attack on West Berlin is an attack on Chicago, New York,

⁴⁴⁰ Lyndon B. Johnson, as quoted in Sydney Gruson, “300,000 Applaud: Vice President Tells Them Washington Will Not Forget,” *New York Times*, August 20, 1961.

⁴⁴¹ Gruson, “300,000 Applaud: Vice President Tells Them Washington Will Not Forget.”

⁴⁴² Gerald S. Strober and Deborah H. Strober, *Let Us Begin Anew: An Oral History of the Kennedy Presidency* (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993), 367-368. When Johnson returned to the United States, he reported his observations to the president in a memo marked “SECRET”: “I returned from Germany with new pride in America’s leadership but with an unprecedented awareness of the responsibility which rests upon this country. The world expects so much from us, and we must measure up to the need, even while we seek more help from our allies. For if we fail or falter or default, all is lost, and freedom may never have a second chance. Kempe, *Berlin 1961: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth*, 389-390.

⁴⁴³ “Berlin Salutes Robert Kennedy: He Vows Support,” *New York Times*, February 23, 1962.

⁴⁴⁴ Daum, *Kennedy in Berlin*, 58. After the Attorney General’s visit, Adenauer penned a note to Kennedy, thanking the president for “for your message of friendship and sympathy which the Attorney General brought us. . . . The people of West Berlin have recovered from the shock of last year and are looking forward full of confidence into the future. The Wall remains as a grave affliction for all those concerned.

Paris, London,” he said, a statement which reportedly garnered the loudest cheers from the crowd.⁴⁴⁵ The *New York Times* explained that RFK’s “visit was a symbol of the United States’ commitment to West Berlin, an especially powerful symbol because he is the President’s brother. Such symbols are important to the West Berliners in their mood of apprehension about the Communist threat.”⁴⁴⁶ For West Berliners (and the watching world), the physical presence of U.S. officials in the besieged city offered physical proof of the United States’ commitment to defending West Berlin from the threat of communism. This commitment, however, was crystalized by President Kennedy’s visit to West Berlin on June 26, 1963.

“To See and Be Seen”: Planning Kennedy’s Trip to West Berlin

Although the White House announced President Kennedy’s trip to Germany at the beginning of 1963, the president’s visit to West Berlin was not on the official itinerary. In fact, whether or not Kennedy would go to Berlin generated much discussion and debate within the administration, and these internal dialogues provide important insights into how and why the president and his staff ultimately decided that a visit to West Berlin was an important foreign policy move. These exchanges also underscore Berlin’s symbolic status as a bastion of democracy during the Cold War and demonstrate the persuasive power of presidential presence in place. Ultimately, Kennedy’s visit to West Germany—

But nothing will be able to prevent us from continuing to build up West Berlin economically and culturally. I know from my talks with the Attorney General that in these spheres too we can depend on the understanding and help of our American friends.” Konrad Adenauer to John F. Kennedy, February 23, 1962 (rec’d 4/11/62), found in Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, President’s Office Files, Countries, Germany: General, 1962: January-April, accessed February 2016, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-116b-009.aspx>.

⁴⁴⁵ Robert F. Kennedy as quoted in "Berlin Salutes Robert Kennedy: He Vows Support."

⁴⁴⁶ "Berlin Salutes Robert Kennedy: He Vows Support."

and particularly Berlin—was designed to “give the President an opportunity to see—and be seen by—as many Germans as possible.”⁴⁴⁷

The Question: To Go or Not to Go

In January, the U.S. State Department hinted through back channels that the president would welcome an invitation to visit the Federal Republic of Germany later that year. This visit, officials noted, would correspond with Kennedy’s trip to Rome to meet with the Pope. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer quickly issued an official invitation to President Kennedy on January 18, telling the president that “it would constitute an honor and a very great pleasure, indeed, to welcome you, the President of the leading power of the free world.”⁴⁴⁸ Kennedy replied the next day, telling the chancellor that he was “delighted to have this opportunity to go to Germany and look forward to the opportunity it will give me for further personal exchanges with you. . . . I will be in touch again as plans for my trip to Bonn and Rome further crystallize.”⁴⁴⁹ The White House announced Kennedy’s intention to visit West Germany immediately, and the *New York Times* reported that U.S. officials in Washington expected West Berlin mayor Willy Brandt to invite the president to visit the city soon after hearing the announcement. “With the situation in Berlin now quiet, most sources here felt that Mr. Kennedy would accept such

⁴⁴⁷ “President’s European Trip, June 1963, Briefing Book, White House – Mr. Salinger,” 2, National Security Files, Trips & Conferences, Box 239, Folder: President’s Trip: Europe, 6/63-7/63, Salinger Briefing Book (1 of 4 Folders), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

⁴⁴⁸ Konrad Adenauer to John F. Kennedy, January 18, 1963, Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, President’s Office Files, Countries, Germany: General, 1963: January-June, accessed February 2016, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-117-002.aspx>.

⁴⁴⁹ John F. Kennedy to Konrad Adenauer, January 19, 1963, Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, President’s Office Files, Countries, Germany: General, 1963: January-June, accessed February 2016, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-117-002.aspx>.

an invitation, even only for a visit of a few hours,” correspondent Max Frankel noted.⁴⁵⁰

But the question was far from decided.

Just after the White House announced the president’s trip to West Germany, Secretary of State Dean Rusk sent a telegram to E. Allan Lightner, chief of the U.S. Berlin Mission, cautioning that it was “difficult at this time [to] make any definite decision” over whether the president would visit the city during his European tour later that year.⁴⁵¹ Two weeks later, Lightner summarized a personal meeting he had with Brandt and also offered his thoughts on a possible presidential visit to the city. A Kennedy trip to West Berlin “would have positive effect of underscoring Western solidarity re: Berlin and basic Western policy objectives,” Brandt reportedly asserted. Both men were careful to note, however, that the relative quiet in West Berlin made it difficult to claim “that Berlin morale urgently needed a boost such as President’s visit would certainly provide. However, Berliners would be greatly encouraged by, and appreciative of, this personal manifestation of President’s support for their cause.” But Brandt also cautioned that if the president decided not to visit the city, West Berliners would “draw unfavorable comparison with recent Khrushchev visits East Berlin, as well as broader and unwarranted political conclusions.”⁴⁵² Here Lightner emphasized what would become a key deciding factor in planning the president’s trip to Europe: how Kennedy could counteract Khrushchev’s multiple visits to East Berlin as Soviet premier.

⁴⁵⁰ Max Frankel, “President Plans to See Adenauer on Trip in Spring,” *New York Times*, January 19, 1963.

⁴⁵¹ Telegram, Dean Rusk to E. Allan Lightner, January 19, 1963, National Security Files, Trips & Conferences, Box 241, Folder: President’s Trip: Europe, 6/63-7/63, Germany, 1/17/63-6/10/63 (1 of 2 folders), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

⁴⁵² Telegram, E. Allan Lightner to Dean Rusk, February 5, 1963, National Security Files, Trips & Conferences, Box 241, Folder: President’s Trip: Europe, 6/63-7/63, Germany, 1/17/63-6/10/63 (1 of 2 folders), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

This comparison between Khrushchev and Kennedy continued within private discussions between U.S. and West German officials and in the West German press. On March 5, First Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Bonn, Robert McGill, reported that German officials frequently cited personal visits by Khrushchev to East Berlin as warranting a response from the West. If the Soviet premier had gone to East Germany multiple times, the logic went, shouldn't the President of the United States make a similar symbolic trip? According to McGill's report, Socialist Democratic Party vice chairman Herbert Wehner was emphatic that it was "of utmost importance that [the president] also visit Berlin" and

thought it a mistake to show undue restraint about seeking to influence German policy in the Atlantic-Community sense. Khrushchev had used his visit to Pankow in an open attempt to influence German policy. De Gaulle's tour of Germany had been used to influence German policy. The President, in Wehner's opinion, should present himself to the Germans as the leader of the nation wielding the real power in the Alliance. It should be demonstrated "who is cook and who is waiter" (*wer ist Koch und wer ist Kellner*).⁴⁵³

According to this report, Kennedy's visit to West Berlin would not only offer a symbolic rebuttal to Khrushchev's multiple visits to East Berlin; it would affirm his leadership role in the Western Alliance and remind West Germans (and the rest of the world) that the United States was committed to a free Berlin.

⁴⁵³ Telegram, Robert McGill to Department of State, March 8, 1963, National Security Files, Trips & Conferences, Box 241, Folder: President's Trip: Europe, 6/63-7/63, Germany, 1/17/63-6/10/63 (1 of 2 folders), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

On March 6, however, these internal debates became the subject of public discussion when the *New York Times* published an article stating that Kennedy had told West German officials that he would not visit Berlin after all. "Officials here believe that President Kennedy's decision to skip Berlin is based on a desire not to make a political 'demonstration' that might needlessly increase tension in that divided city and possibly impede constructive discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union," the paper reported.⁴⁵⁴ This story quickly circulated in the West German press, and Lightner sent off a telegram to the Secretary of State a day later, informing him that the "Mission intends to say in reply to queries that as far as mission is informed no decision has been made on President's travel plans."⁴⁵⁵ Curiously, there is no record of any response from the White House or the State Department in the archives, only evidence that U.S. officials in Bonn and Berlin were trying to control the story as they waited for an official word from Washington. Although one cannot be sure, perhaps the Kennedy Administration leaked this report in order to gauge public opinion from the Soviets and the West German press.

Regardless of the original source, the March 6 *Times* story spurred a flurry of editorials in the West German press, snippets of which were quickly forwarded to the Secretary of State. According to one report from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service dated March 14, the German paper *Bild Zeitung* declared that a visit by President Kennedy to Berlin would "demonstrate to the Kremlin that the Americans will act in

⁴⁵⁴ "President is Said to Bar Berlin Visit," *New York Times*, March 6, 1963.

⁴⁵⁵ Telegram, E. Allen Lightner to Dean Rusk, March 7, 1963, National Security Files, Trips & Conferences, Box 241, Folder: President's Trip: Europe, 6/63-7/63, Germany, 1/17/63-6/10/63 (1 of 2 folders), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

Berlin with the same determination they showed in Cuba” and even implied that such a trip would counteract former Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s “flirtation with Moscow.” Moreover, the report continued, West Berlin papers warned of

serious repercussions if the President leaves Berlin out of his itinerary, adding that a most convincing argument of US advocates of the Berlin visit is the fact that Khrushchev visited East Berlin six times; the last time was in 1963. At that time the political situation was calm, given as little attention as today. However, no one spoke about provocation in connection with the visit by the Kremlin Chief. . . . Is it not understandable that the US president should visit the city for whose freedom his country and the West is on guard. The papers ask.”⁴⁵⁶

This particular excerpt provides powerful evidence of why Kennedy’s trip to West Berlin was so important at this particular moment and perhaps even suggests how this trip offered the president not just a foreign policy stop but also a personal vindication after his 1961 meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna.

After the March 6 story in the *New York Times*, officials at the State Department wrote several memos articulating the foreign policy goals for President Kennedy’s trip to the Federal Republic of Germany. In a March 14 memorandum to Bundy, State Department official William Brubeck emphasized that the first objective of Kennedy’s trip to West Germany “should be to bring about a demonstration of popular support for the President personally—a support which exists without question—and for US-German relations in the Atlantic framework.” Furthermore, Brubeck stressed: “He must visit

⁴⁵⁶ Memorandum, L.J. Legere to Carl Kaysen, March 15, 1963, National Security Files, Trips & Conferences, Box 241, Folder: President’s Trip: Europe, 6/63-7/63, Germany, 1/17/63-6/10/63 (1 of 2 folders), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

Berlin. . . .We should make it clear from the outset that it is the President's intention to go to West Berlin."⁴⁵⁷ Six days later, on March 20, L.J. Legere, assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, passed along a State Department memorandum to Bundy's deputy at the NSC, Carl Kaysen. This memo, Legere noted, was "from an office in State which will appreciate respect for its anonymity. If you want an official Departmental position, signed Rusk, I have a suspicion you will wait quite a while for a waffle." However, Legere told Kaysen that, regardless of the source, this one-pager offered "some argumentation in support of the strongly recommended Berlin visit."⁴⁵⁸

Entitled "Reasons Why President Should Visit Berlin," the memo listed eleven bullet points in support of a presidential trip to the German capital. The "[b]est reason" for a visit, the memo began, was articulated by West German mayor Willy Brandt in a letter to President Kennedy on March 12: "[Y]our visit to outpost of freedom would become demonstration of unity of Western community that could not be overlooked anywhere in world. Joint welcome by three Western garrisons in addition to certain turnout of entire population would also help make quite clear that when facing common dangers, Western interdependence is fact there." This first (and best) reason emphasized by the State Department would become an overarching theme for Kennedy's entire visit: reaffirm the United States' support for West Berlin. The State Department memorandum also noted that Kennedy's visit to the city would provide "a tremendous boost to morale

⁴⁵⁷ Memorandum, William H. Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, March 14, 1963, National Security Files, Trips & Conferences, Box 241, Folder: President's Trip: Europe, 6/63-7/63, Germany, 1/17/63-6/10/63 (1 of 2 folders), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

⁴⁵⁸ Memorandum, L.J. Legere to Carl Kaysen, March 20, 1963. National Security Files, Trips & Conferences, Box 241, Folder: President's Trip: Europe, 6/63-7/63, Germany, 1/17/63-6/10/63 (1 of 2 folders), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

of West Berliners as well as to East Berliners and East and West Germans.” This emphasis on boosting public morale went beyond a simple foreign policy statement; by going to West Berlin personally, the president would offer tangible proof of his own commitment to the city—and those who desperately wished to be free. The confidential document also emphasized Khrushchev’s frequent trips to East Berlin as impetus for Kennedy’s own presence in the city:

Khrushchev has visited East Berlin several times, as recently as January. No US President has visited Berlin since Truman went to Potsdam. This makes it appear that Soviets are much more interested in Berlin than is US. As Marguerite Higgins [a longtime foreign correspondent for the *New York Herald Tribune*] said, “If Kennedy does not show his face in the free part of Berlin after Khrushchev had himself praised in the enslaved part of Berlin – what will the world, and particularly the Kremlin, think of Western determination.”⁴⁵⁹

This last point not only emphasized the president’s visit to West Berlin as a symbolic countermove to Khrushchev’s multiple stops in East Berlin, but it also suggested that Kennedy’s reputation as a world leader was at stake. To a president who was humiliated over the Berlin question less than two years earlier, a visit to West Berlin offered a chance to reinstate his foreign policy credentials and prove to West Berliners, the U.S. public, and the rest of the world who was boss.

The very next day, on March 21 in a presidential press conference, a reporter asked Kennedy if he would visit Berlin on his upcoming trip to Europe. “I would hope

⁴⁵⁹ Memorandum, “Reasons Why President Should Visit Berlin,” no author and no date, attached to Memorandum, Legere to Kaysen.

that when I go to Germany that I would go to Berlin,” the president responded.⁴⁶⁰ Perhaps the timing was coincidental; perhaps not. But the West German response was immediate. The U.S. Embassy in Bonn sent a telegram to Rusk noting that West German news “[r]eports that President Kennedy would visit Berlin during forthcoming European tour received top attention [in] many Friday papers. . . . Reports stated visit would be greeted with ‘enthusiasm’ because Berliners feel President is strongest defender of their independence, and that personal observation will strengthen his conviction that compromises should not be considered in Berlin negotiations.”⁴⁶¹ With the public now aware of the president’s decision to visit West Berlin, the White House started planning Kennedy’s tour of the city in earnest.

The Symbolic Goals for Kennedy’s Visit to West Berlin

The archives reveal three predominant goals for Kennedy’s visit to Berlin: (1) reaffirm U.S. commitment to maintaining and defending a free West Berlin; (2) offer a psychological boost to West Berliners and even those East Germans living on the other side of the wall; and (3) demonstrate Kennedy’s status as world leader and use his physical presence in West Berlin as a symbolic antidote to Khrushchev’s frequent visits to East Germany. These goals reveal the rhetorical potential of presidential presence in place and demonstrate how the White House saw Kennedy’s trip as distinctly rhetorical move.

⁴⁶⁰ John F. Kennedy, “The President’s News Conference,” March 21, 1963, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed March 23, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=9124>.

⁴⁶¹ Telegram, U.S. Embassy in Bonn, Germany to Dean Rusk, March 22, 1963, National Security Files, Trips & Conferences, Box 241, Folder: President’s Trip: Europe, 6/63-7/63, Germany, 1/17/63-6/10/63 (1 of 2 folders), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

The first goal of Kennedy's visit was to reassure West Berliners (and the rest of the world) that the United States was committed to defending their city from Soviet encroachment, and U.S. officials saw the president's physical presence in the city as a powerful testament to this fact. As the White House and State Department considered whether or not Kennedy would travel to West Berlin, Edward R. Murrow, the director of the United States Information Agency (USIA), expressed his belief that the president should wait to travel to West Berlin. "The time may come when a Presidential visit will be necessary to sustain morale in Berlin or underscore our negotiating position," Murrow wrote to Bundy. "We should hold this weapon in reserve until we need it."⁴⁶² This observation—from the United States' propaganda chief—is particularly insightful, for it emphasizes the persuasive power the White House attributed to the president's presence in place. Four months later, Murrow's deputy Thomas C. Sorenson (the brother of Kennedy speechwriter Ted Sorenson) wrote that the goal of the president's trip was "[t]o foster a better and more sympathetic understanding of U.S. policy regarding Europe. It needs to be done now; the President is the only one who can do it, and he can do it more effectively in Europe than here."⁴⁶³ Although the president had sent the Vice President and the Attorney General to West Berlin in 1961 and 1962, nothing could replace the symbolic power of Kennedy's own visit to the besieged city. In the final days leading up to the president's European tour, State Department official George R. Ball reminded

⁴⁶² Memorandum, Edward R. Murrow to McGeorge Bundy, February 13, 1963, National Security Files, Trips & Conferences, Box 241, Folder: President's Trip: Europe, 6/63-7/63, Germany, 1/17/63-6/10/63 (1 of 2 folders), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

⁴⁶³ Thomas C. Sorenson to McGeorge Bundy, "Memorandum on Reasons for the President's Trip to Europe," June 14, 1963, National Security Files, Trips & Conferences, Box 239, Folder: President's Trip: Europe, 6/63-7/63, General (2 of 4 folders), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

Kennedy in a personal memo, “We should never forget that the United States is the leader of the Atlantic world and that the great mass of Europeans look to America—and specifically to you, as President—for guidance and direction.” Ball told Kennedy that he should make “a special effort” to identify with the German people because they were “closest to the firing line. Berlin is a Soviet hostage, and the German people know that their only defense is the American strength and commitment.”⁴⁶⁴

A second major goal for Kennedy’s visit to the city was to provide the president with a “representative impression of the Berlin setting and spirit” and use his physical presence in place to provide a “psychological lift” to West Berliners.⁴⁶⁵ The U.S. Berlin Mission and the White House structured the president’s day around events that would enable the largest number of people to see him in the flesh. One State Department official noted that “it would be desirable for him to spend as much of the day as possible driving around West Berlin by automobile in order to be seen by the maximum number of West Berliners throughout the city and to see for himself the actual situation in West Berlin, including of course the Wall.”⁴⁶⁶ In a telegram to Secretary of State Dean Rusk dated May 1, the U.S. Berlin Mission underscored the symbolic aspects of Kennedy’s trip both for West Berlin citizens and the rest of the watching world:

⁴⁶⁴ Memorandum, George R. Ball to John F. Kennedy, June 20, 1963, National Security Files, Trips & Conferences, Box 239, Folder: President’s Trip: Europe, 6/63-7/63, General (3 of 4 folders), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

⁴⁶⁵ Telegram, U.S. Berlin Mission to Dean Rusk, May 1, 1963, National Security Files, Trips & Conferences, Box 241, Folder: President’s Trip: Europe, 6/63-7/63, Germany, 1/17/63-6/10/63 (1 of 2 folders), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

⁴⁶⁶ Memorandum, John A. Calhoun to McGeorge Bundy, April 30, 1963, National Security Files, Trips & Conferences, Box 241, Folder: President’s Trip: Europe, 6/63-7/63, Germany, 1/17/63-6/10/63 (1 of 2 folders), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

While US-Berlin solidarity [is] already well known, its reaffirmation in impressive and personalized form on June 26 seems likely to produce advantageous political impression internationally and to give Berliners themselves helpful (albeit at moment not essential) psychological lift. Therefore, we especially interested in maximum (preferably record) public attendance. While there little doubt Berliners will wish turn out in record numbers to see, hear and cheer president, it necessary [that a] program be arranged to make it possible for them to do so.⁴⁶⁷

Kennedy's physical presence in Berlin would reaffirm his commitment to the city—and all it symbolized—in a particularly “impressive and personal form,” one that the U.S. Berlin Mission hoped would boost public morale and provide a “psychological lift.” What no one could have anticipated, however, was that the president's “Ich bin ein Berliner” declaration would accomplish this better than any public rally or planned event.

Finally, Kennedy's trip offered the opportunity to create a symbolic antidote to Khrushchev's many visits to East Berlin and, more importantly, a chance for the president to reassert himself as the leader of the Western alliance. The U.S. Berlin Mission emphasized the “Symbolic and Qualitative Aspects” of the president's trip, noting, “Careful attention should be given certain qualitative aspects of President's Program, such as appearances at important symbolic sites and participation in significant representative actions.”⁴⁶⁸ Chief among these “sites” would be Kennedy's visit to the Berlin Wall. During the White House advance trip in May, West Berlin mayor Willy

⁴⁶⁷ U.S. Berlin Mission to Rusk, May 1, 1963, Kennedy Library.

⁴⁶⁸ U.S. Berlin Mission to Rusk, May 1, 1963, Kennedy Library.

Brandt expressed his opposition to a presidential stop because he felt it underscored Ulbricht's victory over West Berlin. But White House officials overruled him, stating that from public relations viewpoint in US, it [is] necessary [that the] president visit Checkpoint Charlie. This site has been and could become again focal point of direct confrontation between Soviet and US forces requiring important decisions by [the] President. Failure of President [to] visit checkpoint could elicit criticism from American correspondents detrimental to objective of achieving maximum worldwide impact of presidential visit.⁴⁶⁹

The White House's insistence that Kennedy stop at Checkpoint Charlie suggests that they saw the president's presence in this particular location—and the visual images of him at the East-West border—as an important part of his visit. Moreover, the archives suggest that the Kennedy Administration was attuned to what Khrushchev had done during his own visits to East Berlin. If the Soviet premier made the border crossing a stop on his itinerary, so too would the president.

These three rhetorical goals were further emphasized in the official briefing book prepared for White House staff prior to the trip. In an introductory memo for the German portion of the trip, the narrative argued that although “officially labeled an ‘informal working visit’, the President’s trip to West Germany and Berlin will have many of the trappings of a state visit and can be expected to attract more public attention and interest than any previous visit by a foreign statesman to modern Germany.” The memorandum noted that this would be first visit of a U.S. president to Berlin since 1945 and only the

⁴⁶⁹ Telegram, Hulick (WHO) to Dean Rusk, May 10, 1963, National Security Files, Trips & Conferences, Box 241, Folder: President's Trip: Europe, 6/63-7/63, Germany, 1/17/63-6/10/63 (1 of 2 folders), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

third presidential tour of post-war Germany. Additionally, Kennedy's visit came "at a time of change and flux in Western Europe when the role and influence of the American President have acquired added significance in German eyes." According to the official White House briefing book, the "broad objectives" for Kennedy's trip to Germany included "furnish[ing] tangible evidence of American good will toward the German people," "underscor[ing] our abiding interest in the welfare, stability and freedom of Germany as an integral part of Europe and the Western community," and "provid[ing] graphic emphasis to the continuing American presence in and responsibility for Europe." Moreover, the memorandum stressed the goal of "emphasiz[ing] for the benefit of all Germans—both West and East—our continued recognition of the importance of Berlin, and our determination to defend and maintain our position there."⁴⁷⁰ One way the White House planned to communicate these goals was through Kennedy's rhetoric in West Berlin.

The Evolution of Kennedy's "Ich bin ein Berliner" Address

As the White House worked with the U.S. Berlin Mission to coordinate every detail of Kennedy's stop in West Berlin, the president's public statements in the city were of utmost importance. Of the three major speeches Kennedy would deliver in Berlin on June 26, his address outside the West Berlin's City Hall was intended to reach the largest audience. Because U.S. officials wanted to ensure "maximum (preferably record) public attendance,"⁴⁷¹ they selected this particular spot because it could hold 300,000 people and

⁴⁷⁰ "President's European Trip, June 1963, Briefing Book," Kennedy Library.

⁴⁷¹ U.S. Berlin Mission to Rusk, May 1, 1963, Kennedy Library.

offered the best location for what the West German government would describe as a “public rally.”⁴⁷²

The goals for President Kennedy’s public statements on June 26 aligned with the overall aims of his trip to West Berlin: reaffirm U.S. commitment to West Berlin, boost public morale, and underscore Kennedy’s leadership of the Western Alliance. In a May 3 memorandum, USIA official Morrill Cody noted that a statement by the president “on German soil” would be particularly persuasive in reaffirming the United States’ leadership of the Atlantic Alliance and “underlin[ing] the sacrifices made by the United States for Germany and our other European partners.” Because Germans “continue to feel the need for acceptance by their erstwhile enemies and present-day allies” just eighteen years after the end of World War II, the memo recommended that the president “should welcome the Germans fully into the camp of civilized peoples defending freedom.”⁴⁷³ West German officials also emphasized that Kennedy’s speech should acknowledge the East German citizens living on the other side of the Wall. As one German foreign minister told Dean Rusk in a personal meeting in May, the president should keep in mind the effect of the President’s words both in West Berlin and in the Soviet Zone of Germany. The population in the Soviet Zone will listen very attentively and would feel left out if nothing were said by the President significant

⁴⁷² Invitation, Chief of Protocol of Land Berlin to John F. Kennedy, no date, found in Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers, President’s Office Files, Countries, Germany: JFK visit, June 1963, accessed February 2016, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-117a-007.aspx>.

⁴⁷³ Memorandum, Morrill Cody to Mr. Tyler, May 3, 1963, National Security Files, Trips & Conferences, Box 241, Folder: President’s Trip: Europe, 6/63-7/63, Germany, 1/17/63-6/10/63 (1 of 2 folders), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

to their situation. The lines do not have to be too pointed; the people in East Germany can read between them.⁴⁷⁴

In his speech at the Rudolph Wilde Platz, Kennedy would express his personal sympathies for the German people on both sides of the Berlin Wall, making specific references to the difficulty of “their situation” and pledging his continued support to a free West Berlin and the eventual reunification of Germany.

The U.S. Mission Berlin contributed the first draft for Kennedy’s speech outside West Berlin’s City Hall (Rathaus Schöneberg). Although most of these remarks would be rewritten by White House speechwriter Ted Sorenson (and then scrapped by the President himself at the actual event), they did set the tone for Kennedy’s approach on June 26. Of particular note is their emphasis on Berlin’s symbolic status during the Cold War. “The name Berlin has unique significance for Americans and evokes strong and vivid associations,” the draft began. “Fate seems to have chosen this city to become in many ways a mirror and symbol of our world today, a microcosm reflecting its hopes and fears, its progress and its problems, its unity as well as its division.” However, what made Berlin “a synonym for the indomitable courage of free men” was its people: “Your stand, your accomplishments, and the important role you continue to play in the persistent quest for German reunification in peace and freedom have made you an inspiration to the American people and to free men everywhere.”⁴⁷⁵

⁴⁷⁴ Memorandum of Conversation between Heinrich Krone and Dean Rusk, May 13, 1963, National Security Files, Trips & Conferences, Box 241, Folder: President’s Trip: Europe, 6/63-7/63, Germany, 1/17/63-6/10/63 (1 of 2 folders), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

⁴⁷⁵ Telegram, Arthur R. Ray to Department of State, May 28, 1963, National Security Files, Trips & Conferences, Box 241, Folder: President’s Trip: Europe, 6/63-7/63, Germany, 1/17/63-6/10/63 (2 of 2 folders), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. Kennedy asked Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., a Special Assistant to the President, to review speech drafts for the European tour prepared by the State

Kennedy advisor and speechwriter Ted Sorenson took these remarks and crafted the president's speeches for Europe—including Kennedy's remarks at the Rudolph Wilde Platz on June 26 in West Berlin. Sorenson drafted a fine speech—an emotional, stirring address that cited historical milestones such as the Berlin Airlift and the 1961 Berlin Crisis to remind the audience why West Berlin was so important to the United States. Kennedy would also praise the courage of West Berliners, telling that while the “story of West Berlin is many stories – valor, danger, honor, determination, unity, and hardship,” it was, “above all . . . the story of achievement.” The president would continue,

From a ruin of rubble you have made a glowing center of free life. This thriving city is a major asset to the west – it is the greatest industrial city in all of Germany. And it is the future capital of Germany reunited. Meanwhile it is protected by our forces – and as long as your freedom requires it, those forces will remain. West Berlin is free, and it will stay free.

Kennedy would go on to acknowledge that “today life in Berlin is hard. It takes courage and endurance – on both sides of the Wall. Here in West Berlin, it is not easy to live under the shadow of harassment and threat, surrounded by a hostile regime, often cut off by the Wall from family and friends.” He would describe the Wall as “not only a political problem” but “a human problem” separating family and friends, calling it “not only an

Department. His assessment, Schlesinger later wrote, was “of their predominant banality and vapidness. These speeches could have been given just as easily by President Eisenhower—or President Nixon. They fail to convey any sense of a fresh American voice or distinctive Kennedy approach.” The problem was that the State Department was “constitutionally opposed to exploiting abroad the benefits of the change in administration in Washington. . . . This attitude denies one of the most powerful weapons we have in winning the confidence and the enthusiasm of other peoples.” Memorandum, Arthur M. Schlesinger to John F. Kennedy, June 8, 1963, National Security Files, Trips & Conferences, Box 239, Folder: President's Trip: Europe, 6/63-7/63, General (2 of 4 folders), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. See also Arthur M. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), 883-884.

offense against history,” but “an offense against humanity.” Then, in what would be perhaps his most direct challenge to the Soviet Union, he would predict: “And sooner or later it will come down”—a statement that would gesture toward the reunification of Germany apart from communist rule. To conclude, the president would reassure West Berliners: “You are not merely the object of our admiration – you are partners in the common purpose. . . . and I tell you once again that your liberty is ours, and your defense our own.”⁴⁷⁶ These remarks composed by Sorenson constitute the final draft of Kennedy’s speech to be delivered on June 26.

Five days before the president left for Europe, however, he met with his interpreter for the trip, Robert H. Lochner, Margaret Plischke, a language instructor at the State Department, and McGeorge Bundy.⁴⁷⁷ It was during this June 18 meeting that Kennedy and Bundy brainstormed several phrases for his arrival speech in Berlin and his remarks at the Rudolph Wilde Platz. According to Plischke’s account, Kennedy added the phrase “I am a Berliner” himself and they met several times to practice the German together.⁴⁷⁸ The Kennedy archives contain just one document referencing this meeting, but one that proves that the president’s declaration of “Ich bin ein Berliner” was not hastily written up just hours before the speech or delivered extemporaneously. A typed

⁴⁷⁶ Speech Cards, “Remarks at the Berlin Rathaus, June 26,” Papers of John F. Kennedy, President’s Office Files, Speech Files, Remarks on signing the Golden Book, Rudolph Wilde Platz, Berlin, 26 June 1963, accessed January 2016, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-045-026.aspx>.

⁴⁷⁷ Meeting recorded in the president’s daily schedule for June 18, 1963, Evelyn Lincoln Personal Papers, Schedules and Diaries, 1953-1963, Folder: President’s appointments, June 1963, accessed February 2016, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/ELPP-006-007.aspx>. See also Daum, *Kennedy in Berlin*, 149-151.

⁴⁷⁸ For a complete account of Plischke’s meetings with Kennedy, see Margaret H. Plischke, “Teaching the Berliner,” *American Heritage* 48, no. 4 (1997): 26-27. According to Daum, Plischke kept the original document with Kennedy’s handwritten notation and put it up for sale in January 1978. The West Berlin Senate bought it for \$8,000, and it remains at the city archives in Berlin, Germany. See Daum, *Kennedy in Berlin*, 151 and notes 160 and 162.

document entitled “Berlin” features German phonetic spelling of the following sentences in English: “I am proud to be in free Berlin, the city which is a shining symbol, not only for Europe but for the whole world. Your courage and your perseverance have made the words ‘I am a Berliner’ a proud declaration.” Below the side-by-side translations in German and English, the secretarial note reads: “These translations are somewhat literal. The German is a very good free translation of what the President wrote on Tuesday, June 18.”⁴⁷⁹ Because a copy of this document is found both in the President’s Office Files (collected by Evelyn Lincoln, the president’s personal secretary) and the National Security Files at the Kennedy Library, it is likely that Mrs. Lincoln typed up the handwritten notations after the meeting and sent a copy to Bundy’s office. However, these lines never made it into the notecards prepared for the president to use in Berlin.

This omission explains why numerous White House officials report that Kennedy wrote out “Civis Romanus sum [I am a citizen of Rome],” “Ich bin ein Berliner [I am a citizen of Berlin],” and “Lass’ sie nach Berlin kommen [Let them come to Berlin]” on his notecards on the flight from Bonn to Berlin on the morning of June 26. More than likely, the president reviewed his prepared remarks and, noticing that they did not contain the phrases he and Bundy had written on June 18, decided to write them out himself.⁴⁸⁰

“When we were arriving in Berlin,” White House advisor Ken O’Donnell later recalled, “he said to me, ‘What was the proud boast of the Romans—Civis Romanus sum? Send

⁴⁷⁹ “Berlin,” no author and no date, found in National Security Files, Trips & Conferences, Box 241, Folder: President’s Trip: Europe, 6/63-7/63, Germany, 6/11-7/12/63 (2 of 4 folders) and President’s Office Files, Countries, Box 117, Folder: Germany: JFK visit, June 1963, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

⁴⁸⁰ During the afternoon and evening of June 25, Bundy (who was traveling with the president in Bonn) and Kaysen (who was on call in Washington, D.C.) exchanged “emergency” telegrams making last-minute changes to the president’s Rudolph Wilde Platz speech. These sentences do not appear anywhere in these final drafts.

Bundy up here. He'll know how to say it in German.' When Bundy translated the phrase into 'Ich bin ein Berliner,' the President said, as he wrote it down, 'Now tell me how to say in German, "Let them come to Berlin."'"⁴⁸¹ It makes sense that the president would have asked specifically for Bundy, since he was familiar with the June 18 exchange. West Berlin mayor Willy Brandt also recalled practicing the phrase with Kennedy just before his speech: "My own contribution to the speech was that before he went out—he was at my office of the city hall—he tried to get a reasonable pronunciation of the sentence, 'Ich bin ein Berliner.' Well, it was a moving thing. And he worked hard at it, at the pronunciation."⁴⁸²

As these archival materials and firsthand accounts demonstrate, the president played a crucial role in the development of this speech and personally supplied the "Ich bin ein Berliner" declaration. Charting the evolution of this speech from the U.S. Berlin Mission's initial draft, Sorenson's rewrite, and Kennedy's own edits reveals the important role this speech would play in the White House's overall goals for the trip. Moreover, the president's description of West Berlin as a "shining symbol" and his personal identification with Berliners showcases how the city and its people offered a potent rhetorical resource. In his remarks, the president would identify himself with the Berliners—and all that the city symbolized—even as he held up Berlin as proof of the failures of communism. The place of Kennedy's speech, therefore, was more than a simple backdrop or geographical location; it was a symbolic and literal commonplace of evidence, a material means of persuasion.

⁴⁸¹ O'Donnell, Powers, and McCarthy, *"Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye": Memories of John Fitzgerald Kennedy*, 361.

⁴⁸² Strober and Strober, *"Let Us Begin Anew": An Oral History of the Kennedy Presidency*, 371.

Countdown to Europe

As the White House and the State Department finalized plans for Kennedy's trip to Europe and his visit to West Berlin on June 26, the president made two important decisions that set the stage for his trip. The first took place in public; the second occurred behind closed doors. But both had profound implications for how Kennedy's trip to Europe—and specifically his tour of West Berlin—would be interpreted in the United States, the Soviet Union, and the rest of the world.

On June 10, just thirteen days before he left for Europe, the president delivered an important foreign policy speech at American University in Washington, D.C. In his remarks, the president laid out a bold new vision for U.S.-Soviet relations and called on the West to reconsider its Cold War opposition to the Soviet Union.⁴⁸³ Calling for a “genuine peace” between the two countries, Kennedy told his audience that the United States needed to “reexamine our own attitude—as individuals and as a Nation” toward the Cold War and outlined his intention to pursue a nuclear test-ban treaty.⁴⁸⁴ According to White House advisors Ken O'Donnell and David Powers, Kennedy called the speech “the peace speech” because “it was an appeal for a lasting peace between the United States and the Soviet Union, directed at Khrushchev, who had hinted that such a new message from the President might help to bring a favorable reaction to Kennedy's

⁴⁸³ For an analysis of this speech, see Denise M. Bostdorff and Shawna H. Ferris, “John F. Kennedy at American University: The Rhetoric of the Possible, Epideictic Progression, and the Commencement of Peace,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 100, no. 4 (2014): 407-441.

⁴⁸⁴ John F. Kennedy, “Commencement Address at American University in Washington,” June 10, 1962, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, accessed March 23, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=9266>.

proposal for a nuclear atmospheric test ban treaty.”⁴⁸⁵ The American University speech “brought an immediate thaw in our relationship with the Soviets,” and suggested a new approach to Cold War foreign policy.⁴⁸⁶ A significant speech in its own right, many believed that the American University speech also offered a glimpse into what Kennedy would say during his trip to Europe two weeks later. As Carroll Kilpatrick of the *New York Times* noted, Kennedy’s speech “at the American University . . . was designed as a curtain-opener to the European visit, where the President will speak directly to the people on America’s commitment to Europe and America’s interest in a united Europe, and America’s devotion to peace.”⁴⁸⁷

As the president discussed the United States’ relationship with the Soviet Union at American University and prepared for his European tour, some suggested that he should cancel his trip to attend to domestic matters: specifically, racial violence in Birmingham, Alabama. In his June 4 syndicated column, influential newspaper columnist Walter Lippmann argued that Kennedy should cancel his European trip and focus on domestic concerns. “It is hard to see how the President can leave the country until this critical legislative battle is won,” Lippmann wrote. “For one thing the legislative battle demands

⁴⁸⁵ O'Donnell, Powers, and McCarthy, *"Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye": Memories of John Fitzgerald Kennedy*, 357.

⁴⁸⁶ O'Donnell and Powers also note that they considered it “the most important foreign policy speech of his career, and probably one of the best speaking performances of his lifetime,” and Jackie Kennedy thought it “one of the President's three best speeches, along with his inaugural address and the spirited talk that he gave in West Berlin two weeks later.” Moreover, they report that “Khrushchev told Averill Harriman later that it was the best speech delivered by any American President since Franklin D. Roosevelt. It was the first important speech by a United States government official in many years that was allowed to be heard in its entirety in a Voice of America radio broadcast to Russia and other Eastern European countries without being interrupted or jammed by Soviet monitors. Russian newspapers published the full text. And a few weeks later Khrushchev made a speech in East Berlin, endorsing Kennedy's atmospheric test ban proposal.” O'Donnell, Powers, and McCarthy, *"Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye": Memories of John Fitzgerald Kennedy*, 357-358.

⁴⁸⁷ Carroll Kilpatrick, “Kennedy Differs With His Critics on Necessity of European Trip,” *Washington Post*, June 16, 1963.

his continuous personal attention. For another, he needs to have mastered the crisis in American national life before he can speak with self-confidence on the cause of democracy in world affairs.”⁴⁸⁸ The next day, on June 5, the *New York Times* editorial page made a similar point, writing that it was “unfortunate that [the president] will be away in Europe at a crucial stage in the mobilization of national opinion in support of a strong [federal] program” on civil rights. “The fatefulness of the debate over civil rights makes it a critical time to stay” at home, the paper concluded.⁴⁸⁹ Kennedy delivered a televised message to the nation on civil rights on June 11, outlining his plan for federal civil rights legislation.⁴⁹⁰ Privately, however, the president expressed doubts about whether he should go ahead with his European tour.

In a June 12 memorandum, National Security Council member Frederick D. Vreeland wrote to Kennedy, “You asked me last night why you should go to Europe—in view of the objections expressed by Mr. Lippmann, the N.Y. Times and others—and what you can accomplish in Germany.” Vreeland then offered a two-page memorandum outlining the negative results of canceling the trip and the positive arguments for going ahead with the tour. If the president decided to stay at home, Vreeland noted, the “public and governmental reaction in West Berlin and West Germany would be one of shock, disbelief and profound disillusionment” and “would deal a gratuitous blow to our relations with the Federal Republic from which we could not soon recover.” In fact, the

⁴⁸⁸ Walter Lippmann, “Today and Tomorrow: On Seeing it Through,” *Washington Post*, June 4, 1963.

⁴⁸⁹ “Civil Rights Program,” *New York Times*, June 5, 1963; “Cancel That Trip,” *New York Times*, June 5, 1963.

⁴⁹⁰ John F. Kennedy, “Radio and Television Report to the American People on Civil Rights,” June 11, 1963, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, accessed March 23, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=9271>.

NSC official noted that because Kennedy's American University speech was so "well received throughout Western Europe," going forward with the visit to Germany would reassure West Berliners of U.S. commitment and resolve while also "increas[ing] the latitude you have for achieving an East-West détente, or even an acceptable Berlin arrangement." To conclude, Vreeland emphasized the persuasive power of Kennedy's presence in West Berlin:

By your presence and statements in West Berlin (where you will get an emotional welcome such as you have never experienced) you will provide the Berliners with the reassurance they require during a period of protracted cold squeeze, such as they are now experiencing, even more than during a hot squeeze, when, after all, we demonstrate our policy by deeds rather than words.⁴⁹¹

President Kennedy and the White House went forward with trip as planned. As *New York Times* writer Carroll Kilpatrick explained on June 16, the president believed canceling the trip would be "abandon[ing] his role as a leader in a most critical time" and White House officials "insist[ed] that it is immensely important for the President to speak to and be seen by the people of Italy and Germany at this time."⁴⁹² Foreign leaders and press outlets also noted the foreign policy implications of Kennedy's personal visit to West Berlin. In May, Mayor Willy Brandt stated, "the West will not let itself be pushed out of Berlin" a fact that would "be underlined emphatically by President Kennedy's visit

⁴⁹¹ Memorandum, Frederick D. Vreeland to John F. Kennedy, June 12, 1963, National Security Files, Trips & Conferences, Box 241, Folder: President's Trip: Europe, 6/63-7/63, Germany, 6/11-7/12/63 (1 of 4 folders), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

⁴⁹² Kilpatrick, "Kennedy Differs With His Critics on Necessity of European Trip."

next month.”⁴⁹³ J. Emlyn Williams of the *Christian Science Monitor* reported that Berliners were eagerly anticipating Kennedy’s visit “not only as still further proof of American determination to defend the city against possible Communist threats but also of a common bond friendship with the West Berliners.”⁴⁹⁴ Although Kennedy Administration officials—like Vice President Johnson and the president’s brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy—had come to West Berlin as the president’s special envoys, the *Chicago Tribune* noted that West Berliners were waiting “to hear from his own lips the guarantees his representatives, who have come here since the communist border closure two years ago, have given in his name.”⁴⁹⁵ According to *Wall Street Journal* reporter Phillip Geyelin, “almost everything the president will do has been carefully measured for the impression it will give Europeans of him—as a young and vigorous alliance leader, eloquent, understanding, knowledgeable, and resolute.” Noting that the White House was adamant that Kennedy get an outside seat on the three-hour motorcade tour of West Berlin (instead of being “sandwiched between” German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and West Berlin mayor Willy Brandt in the back of a Lincoln-Mercury convertible), Geyelin described Kennedy’s European visit as “a diplomatic mission which promises to be much more of a political campaign tour.”⁴⁹⁶

As officials in West Berlin prepared to showcase Kennedy’s tour of the city, East Germans made arrangements to downplay the president’s visit. According to a Central Intelligence Agency report from inside East Berlin, building wardens were to monitor

⁴⁹³ “Berlin Mayor Sees Omen in Kennedy Visit,” *Los Angeles Times*, May 12, 1963.

⁴⁹⁴ J. Emlyn Williams, “Germans Ponder Kennedy Visit,” *Christian Science Monitor*, June 8, 1963.

⁴⁹⁵ Larry Rue, “Huge Welcome Prepared by West Berlin,” *Chicago Tribune*, June 26, 1963.

⁴⁹⁶ Phillip Geyelin, “Kennedy in Europe: President to Use Trip to Enhance U.S. Image,” *Wall Street Journal*, June 20, 1963.

their apartment buildings and new jamming stations were installed to combat live radio and television coverage of Kennedy across the Berlin Wall. Party organizations, trade unions, and youth organizations planned rallies to prevent people from listening to the coverage. Finally, the report noted that “[a]n as yet unidentified ‘very high personality’ from Moscow (but in no event Khrushchev) is expected to come to East Berlin. The presence of this personage and a visit on his part to the wall are designed to counter the propaganda effects of the Kennedy visit.”⁴⁹⁷

The media coverage of Kennedy’s trip also ensured that his physical presence in Europe and West Berlin would reach a national and international audience. The *Los Angeles Times* reported that “[m]uch of Western Europe will see a seven-hour step-by-step telecast of his motor tour through [West Berlin] as it is beamed within range of more than 25 million television receivers in 12 countries.”⁴⁹⁸ In the United States, the president’s trip would be covered by the three television networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC) with “at least 22 special reports varying from 15 minutes to an hour.” The *New York Times* wrote that U.S. public could expect “from one to three special TV reports daily in evening hours. Picture coverage will be relayed here by the Telestar II and Relay communications satellites and televised the day the events occur.”⁴⁹⁹ The U.S. Berlin Mission noted that every possible effort would be made to accommodate the press during the president’s visit. Elevated platforms were built so that Kennedy could look into East Berlin at the Brandenburg Gate and Checkpoint Charlie—and so that the president would

⁴⁹⁷ Telegram, Unnamed CIA Source to State Department, May 31, 1963, National Security Files, Trips & Conferences, Box 241, Folder: President’s Trip: Europe, 6/63-7/63, Germany, 1/17/63-6/10/63 (2 of 2 folders), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

⁴⁹⁸ “Kennedy Off to Spur European Good Will,” *Los Angeles Times*, June 23, 1963.

⁴⁹⁹ Val Adams, “22 TV Shows Set on Kennedy Trip,” *New York Times*, June 17, 1963.

“be elevated above the crowd for the benefit of photographers and the Berliners.”

Arrangements were made for a designated pick-up spot where camera crews could bring television footage “for immediate shipment to the United States.” U.S. officials in West Berlin also made sure that West Berliners—and their East German neighbors—would see and hear as much of the president’s visit as possible. Loudspeakers would be set up in the Rudolph Wilde Platz to “carry live coverage of the President’s city tour prior to his arrival at the City Hall.”⁵⁰⁰

In its final press briefing prior to the president’s departure for Europe, the White House underscored Kennedy’s status as a foreign policy leader and emphasized the persuasive effect of Kennedy’s physical presence would have in Europe and, specifically, West Berlin. National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy told the press that Kennedy’s goal was “to visit a number of places that are important in American foreign policy, or else of great personal importance to the President.”⁵⁰¹ This visit, Bundy explained, would provide “a lot of opportunity for the President to speak directly and not simply to the people of Germany, but also to Europeans, standing, as he will be, in the center of Europe.” Bundy also emphasized Kennedy’s persona as “the spokesman of American policy,” noting, “[t]here is a sense in which only he can make clear the purposes and the direction of American policy, the continuity of the American commitment in Europe. He will be doing that under what seem to us to be favoring and friendly auspices in

⁵⁰⁰ Telegram, U.S. Embassy Berlin to Department of State, “Presidential Visit Berlin Press Aspects,” June 1, 1963, National Security Files, Trips & Conferences, Box 241, Folder: President’s Trip: Europe, 6/63-7/63, Germany, 1/17/63-6/10/63 (2 of 2 folders), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

⁵⁰¹ “Background Briefing (European Trip) at the White House with Pierre Salinger,” June 19, 1963, 1, Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, President’s Office Files, Subjects, Trips: Germany, June 1963: 22-26, accessed February 2016, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-108-013.aspx>.

Germany.”⁵⁰² Implicit in these remarks was the White House’s understanding that the best way for Kennedy to demonstrate U.S. commitment to West Germany (and the overall NATO alliance) was to go there physically.

The press also inquired about the president’s plans to visit West Berlin, and Bundy noted that the president’s stop in the city would be “one of the important elements of the trip.” He continued,

I think those of you who have been there would agree that to see and be seen in Berlin is something different from most travels, and that there is a real advantage to both parties in knowing whom they have to deal with. The President of the United States has been the man who is speaking for the country, whose will and determination has been essential to the freedom of Berlin for a long time, and the courage and spirit of the Berliners has been equally essential to the policy of the West. That confrontation will not only be in the immediate sense a dramatic one, but I think in the wider sense a useful one to all concerned.⁵⁰³

Here Bundy stressed the importance of Kennedy “see[ing] and be[ing] seen” in the city of West Berlin. His visit would provide the opportunity to interact with West Berliners personally and for them to see him in the flesh. One reporter asked specifically about Kennedy’s visit to the Berlin wall: “Is there any particular advantage in the President of the United States being seen and seeing or peering over the Wall?” Bundy replied, “I can’t imagine the President of the United States going to Berlin without looking at the

⁵⁰² “Background Briefing (European Trip),” 2.

⁵⁰³ “Background Briefing (European Trip),” 7.

wall, which is so large and tragic a fact in that city's current situation.”⁵⁰⁴ Although Bundy could not have anticipated the full events of the June 26 visit, and the emotional impact the wall would have on the president, he accurately predicted that the interaction between Kennedy and West Berliners would be “a dramatic one”—an exchange that would reverberate throughout the entire Western world and one that numerous presidents after Kennedy would try to recreate.

June 26, 1963

The president's plane arrived at Berlin's Tegel Airport at 9:45 am local time.⁵⁰⁵ After delivering brief remarks to the crowd assembled to welcome him, Kennedy's motorcade departed for a tour of the city. Waving, cheering crowds lined the motorcade route, at times ten to twelve persons deep.⁵⁰⁶ “Thousands of them tried to touch his hand,” reported the *Chicago Tribune*. “He was showered with flowers and confetti.”⁵⁰⁷ White House officials later said it was the largest reception Kennedy ever had.⁵⁰⁸ “More than a million West Berliners gave Mr. Kennedy the greatest spontaneous welcome in the memory of the former German capital,” summarized the *Christian Science Monitor*. “The Associated Press quoted old-timers as saying that not even Hitler with his famous parades, had brought out the people the way the American President did. The screaming, cheering, flag-waving, confetti-tossing welcome exceeded the mammoth reception West

⁵⁰⁴ “Background Briefing (European Trip),” 13.

⁵⁰⁵ Final European Itinerary, June 21, 1963, 6, National Security Files, Trips & Conferences, Box 239, Folder: President's Trip: Europe, 6/63-7/63, General (3 of 4 folders), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

⁵⁰⁶ Laurence Burd and Larry Rue, “Berlin, Irish Hail Kennedy,” *Chicago Tribune*, June 27, 1963.

⁵⁰⁷ Burd and Rue, “Berlin, Irish Hail Kennedy.”

⁵⁰⁸ Burd and Rue, “Berlin, Irish Hail Kennedy.”

German crowds gave Mr. Kennedy earlier this week.”⁵⁰⁹ According to a *Chicago Tribune* correspondent stationed in East Berlin, “[t]he more the West Berlin crowd cheered, the happier were the faces of the crowd in the east.”⁵¹⁰ Although East Berliners did not see the president personally, they could watch everything on their television screens.⁵¹¹ The president made three stops along the motorcade route before arriving at West Berlin’s City Hall. The motorcade first stopped at Congress Hall where Kennedy delivered brief remarks to the Trade Union Congress.

The president then departed for two symbolic stops at various places along the Berlin Wall. The first was at the Brandenburg Gate (*Brandenburger Tor*), a neoclassical triumphal arch built on the site of a former city gate in 1791 and “a crossing point between East and West Berlin before the Wall went up.” Communist officials draped the arches with red cloth and an East German flag “so the President could not see the once famed Unter Den Linden boulevard beyond the gate.”⁵¹² From a raised platform built especially for his visit, Kennedy looked over the Wall into East Berlin and was handed a bouquet of flowers thrown over the wall with a note asking that it be given to the president.⁵¹³ As a British military officer oriented him to the scene, Kennedy “looked up from the map several times at the scene opposite and shook his head in sad disbelief.”⁵¹⁴ The motorcade then proceeded to Checkpoint Charlie, the crossing point between East and West Berlin. Kennedy “walked to within three feet of the white line boundary” as “a

⁵⁰⁹ "Berlin Acclaims President's Words: Spontaneous Welcome," *Christian Science Monitor*, June 27, 1963.

⁵¹⁰ Michael Goldsmith, "Thousands in East Berlin Defy Reds to Hear Kennedy Welcome," *Chicago Tribune*, June 27, 1963.

⁵¹¹ "Berlin Acclaims President's Words: Spontaneous Welcome."

⁵¹² Burd and Rue, "Berlin, Irish Hail Kennedy."

⁵¹³ O'Donnell, Powers, and McCarthy, *"Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye": Memories of John Fitzgerald Kennedy*, 360-361.

⁵¹⁴ Burd and Rue, "Berlin, Irish Hail Kennedy."

dozen East German soldiers watched from their own checkpoint, about 40 yards inside the communist sector”⁵¹⁵ and “a small group of East Berliners beyond the gate waved and cheered him.”⁵¹⁶ Kennedy confidant Ken O’Donnell (who was on the trip with the president) recalled that Kennedy “was carried away by the courage of the West Berliners, and shocked by the sight of the Berlin Wall.”⁵¹⁷ White House advisor Arthur M. Schlesinger later wrote that Kennedy’s personal encounter with the Berlin Wall “shocked and appalled the President, and he was still angry when he came out of the city hall and faced the seething crowd in the Rudolph Wilde Platz, compressed into a single excited, impassioned mass.”⁵¹⁸

The president’s motorcade departed from Checkpoint Charlie and made its way to West Berlin’s City Hall. The Rudolph Wilde Platz was filled to capacity with bodies “packed so closely together that those who fainted just slumped or were held in a sort of standing position until help came. Many persons had been standing in the square for several hours in raincoats because of the threatening skies.”⁵¹⁹ Loudspeakers were set up to project the president’s speech beyond the plaza, and East Berliners tuned in over television to see images of Kennedy parading through the streets. “Young and old, mothers with babies, workers in overalls, crippled war veterans and women with tears streaming down their faces all looked to the President as the symbol of their freedom,”

⁵¹⁵ Burd and Rue, "Berlin, Irish Hail Kennedy."

⁵¹⁶ O'Donnell, Powers, and McCarthy, *"Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye": Memories of John Fitzgerald Kennedy*, 360-361.

⁵¹⁷ O'Donnell, Powers, and McCarthy, *"Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye": Memories of John Fitzgerald Kennedy*, 360.

⁵¹⁸ Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House*, 884.

⁵¹⁹ Lawrence Townsend, "Kennedy Stirs Tears in Berlin Address," *Chicago Tribune*, June 27, 1963.

wrote *Washington Post* reporter Robert H. Estabrook.⁵²⁰ By the time Kennedy strode to the podium in front of the cheering, waving crowd chanting “Ken-Ne-Dy,” his presence in West Berlin had already accomplished important rhetorical work. Although he had sent Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy to reassure West Berliners of the United States’ commitment to defending the city after the wall went up in August 1961, the president’s decision to visit the city himself signaled his commitment to defending West Berlin—and, by extension, the entire free world—against the spread of Soviet communism. What made Kennedy’s speech at the Rudolph Wilde Platz remarkable, however, was his personal identification with the people of West Berlin and his elevation of the city—and its inhabitants—as an example to the rest of the world. This was particularly significant because Kennedy, the President of the United States and leader of the Western Alliance, came to the former capital of Nazi Germany and declared that “all free men, wherever they may live, [were] citizens of Berlin.”⁵²¹ In what follows, I analyze how Kennedy drew on his physical location—the city of West Berlin—as tangible proof of the failures of communism even as he challenged his audience to look beyond their physical situation to a more hopeful future. To do this, the president used deictic language and visual imagery to shift between the immediate and the imaginary. These spatial and temporal shifts repeatedly asked the audience to look at the city of Berlin and the historical/temporal moment as a means of evidence even as they elevated West Berlin and its inhabitants as inspiration for the future.

⁵²⁰ Robert H. Estabrook, “JFK Realism Impresses Berlin,” *Washington Post*, June 27, 1963.

⁵²¹ Kennedy, “Remarks in the Rudolph Wilde Platz, West Berlin.”

Kennedy's Address at the Rudolph Wilde Platz in West Berlin

The president began by locating himself in relation to the city, his German hosts, and U.S. General Lucius Clay, the military commander who oversaw the Berlin Airlift in 1948:

I am proud to come to ***this city*** as the guest of ***your*** distinguished Mayor, who has symbolized ***throughout the world*** the fighting spirit of ***West Berlin***. And ***I*** am proud to visit ***the Federal Republic*** with ***your*** distinguished Chancellor who for so many years has committed ***Germany*** to democracy and freedom and progress, and to come ***here*** in the company of ***my fellow American***, General Clay, who has been in ***this city*** during its great moments of crisis and will come again if ever needed.⁵²²

This description set the tone Kennedy would take throughout the rest of the speech; he was here as a guest of the German people, to learn from them and identify himself with them, rather than speak to them as President of the United States. In his prepared remarks, Kennedy had planned to simply nod to “Mr. Chancellor, Mr. Mayor, Citizens of Berlin” before narrating significant moments in the history of West Berlin, such as the 1948 airlift and the building of the wall two years earlier. Through his extended references to these three individuals, however, Kennedy credited Willy Brandt (“***your*** distinguished Mayor”) and Konrad Adenauer (“***your*** distinguished Chancellor”) for ensuring that West Germany and West Berlin remained free. Adding in a reference to General Clay, the president subtly nodded to Clay’s leadership of the Berlin Airlift in

⁵²² Kennedy, “Remarks in the Rudolph Wilde Platz, West Berlin” All successive quotations from here unless otherwise noted. Deictic indicators have been bolded and italicized.

1948. To West Berliners, Clay was the hero who helped them survive nineteen months in a besieged city. The president's privileging of Brandt, Adenauer, and Clay also demonstrated his own understanding of the political climate in West Berlin, a city and nation on the verge of political transition as Adenauer retired and Brandt ran for the chancellorship.⁵²³ Even as Kennedy acknowledged the service these men had rendered to West Berliners and the cause of freedom worldwide, he also gestured toward the symbolic significance "*this city*" held "*throughout the world*."

After these introductory remarks, the president fully departed from the script Sorenson had prepared and turned instead to the lines he had written a week earlier and practiced with McGeorge Bundy on their descent into West Berlin that morning. "*Two thousand years ago* the proudest boast was 'civis Romanus sum' [*I am a citizen of Rome*']. *Today, in the world of freedom*, the proudest boast is 'Ich bin ein Berliner' [*I am a citizen of Berlin*']". In these two sentences, Kennedy advanced arguments that would structure the rest of his speech. First, he equated West Berliners with Roman citizens two centuries earlier, a parallel construction that elevated his German audience to iconic heights. Cicero used the phrase "Civis Romanus sum" in his *In Verrem* to remind his audience of the legal rights Roman citizens enjoyed, and the apostle Paul cited his Roman citizenship as grounds for a full and fair trial during his arrest and imprisonment in Jerusalem.⁵²⁴ In the Roman era, the coveted status of Roman citizen supplied

⁵²³ See Daum, *Kennedy in Berlin*, 66-73.

⁵²⁴ Cicero, *In Verram*, 2.5.162, accessed February 2016, <http://perseus.uchicago.edu/perseus-cgi/citequery3.pl?dbname=PerseusLatinTexts&query=Cic.%20Ver.%202.5.162&getid=1>. For more on Roman citizenship, see Sean A. Adams, "Paul the Roman Citizen: Roman Citizenship in the Ancient World and Its Importance for Understanding Acts 22:22-29," in *Paul: Jew, Greek, and Roman*, ed. Stanley E. Porter (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 309-326; Charlotte E. Goodfellow, *Roman Citizenship: A Study of Its Territorial and Numerical Expansion from the Earliest Times to the Death of Augustus* (Lancaster:

membership in and protection by the most powerful empire in the world. Not only did the citizen enjoy particular legal rights, but it also conferred a certain level of prestige on any man lucky enough to be part of the club. Thus, when Kennedy equated Roman citizenship with Berlin citizenship, he argued that being a Berliner supplied the most cherished identity “in the world of freedom.” To an audience who just eighteen years earlier had been members of the Third Reich under Adolf Hitler, this was no small shift. In fact, recall the USIA’s recommendation that Kennedy use his public statements to “welcome the Germans fully into the camp of civilized peoples defending freedom.”⁵²⁵ By equating his current audience—Berliners—with Roman citizens, the president suggested that this tiny landlocked city in the middle of communist-controlled East Germany held the same celebrated status as the Roman Empire two centuries earlier.

The president furthered his identification with Berliners through his sentence construction and verb usage in the phrase, “Ich bin ein Berliner”—a statement that received much popular press coverage for years after Kennedy’s trip to West Berlin. Because German grammatical rules do not require an indefinite article (*ein*) before the verbs *sein* (to be), *bleiben* (to remain), and *werden* (to become), some popular press outlets in Germany and the United States (including the *New York Times* and *Newsweek*) later reported that Kennedy’s audience interpreted this statement as “I am a jelly doughnut” because of a cream-filled pastry some called a *Berliner*.⁵²⁶ However, State Department translator Margaret Plischke recalled that including “*ein*” in the translation

Lancaster Press, 1935); Jamie F. Gardner, *Being a Roman Citizen* (London: Routledge, 1993); A.N. Sherwin-White, *The Roman Citizenship* 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980). This exchange between Paul and a Roman centurion takes place in Acts 22.

⁵²⁵ Cody to Tyler, May 3, 1963, Kennedy Library.

⁵²⁶ Daum, *Kennedy in Berlin*, 148.

was a deliberate decision by the president.⁵²⁷ Although we cannot be sure of the exact reason why Kennedy decided to include “*ein*” in the speech, German historian Andreas W. Daum offers this poignant insight:

Saying *ein Berliner* is grammatically correct if it is used metaphorically. To take a more common parallel example, the sentence “*Er ist Schauspieler*” (he is an actor) is a statement of fact about a man’s profession; the sentence “*Er ist ein Schauspieler*” means the man is putting on an act. Kennedy was not formally stating his actual place of residence. He was, rather, metaphorically identifying with the citizens of Berlin although not a citizen himself. Kennedy’s declaration was a symbolic expression of solidarity with West Berlin, with America’s Berlin. It was a rhetorical intensification of a symbolic common identity linking Americans and Berliners. Indeed, his visit was to be the highpoint of this special relationship.⁵²⁸

Daum’s observation gives greater weight to Kennedy’s declaration that “[*t*]oday, in *the world of freedom*, the proudest boast is ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’ [*I am a citizen of Berlin*].” Identification is, as Kenneth Burke observes, the recognition of shared

⁵²⁷ According to Plischke’s account, Robert H. Lochner translated Kennedy’s English phrase, “I am a Berliner,” into “Ich bin ein Berliner” even though, according to Plischke, “most Germans would say ‘Ich bin Berliner.’ When I pointed out this minor difference in usage, the President seemed a little startled. He must have discussed it with Mrs. Kennedy because the next day he said he wanted to leave *ein* in the text. This was later criticized by people who did not like the speech, or the President, or his trip to Berlin. I had told the President it was all right because I remembered an old Prussian song, written in 1831 by Bernhard Thiersche: ‘Ich bin ein Preusse, kennt ihr meine Farben’ [I am a Prussian, know ye my colors?]. No German would have thought that was wrong.” This song, the “Preußenlied,” was the national anthem of the Kingdom of Prussia from 1830-1840, and the first four stanzas ended with “Ich bin ein Prusse.” Plischke, “Teaching the Berliner,” 26-27.

⁵²⁸ Daum, *Kennedy in Berlin*, 148.

interests, principles, and ideologies between two parties.⁵²⁹ In this particular instance, Kennedy aligned himself, the United States, and the “world of freedom” with citizens of Berlin and their shared struggle to defend democracy against the spread of Soviet communism. Although much of this struggle was metaphorical and ideological in nature, the citizens of West Berlin were foot soldiers on the literal front lines of the Cold War.

Continuing his extemporaneous performance in front of the roaring crowd, the president offered a striking narrative of the differences between democracy and communism:

There are many people in the world who really don't understand, or say *they* don't, what is the great issue between *the free world* and *the Communist world*. Let *them* come to *Berlin*. *There are some* who say that communism is the *wave of the future*. Let *them* come to *Berlin*. And *there are some* who say *in Europe* and *elsewhere we* can work with *the Communists*. Let *them* come to *Berlin*. And *there are even a few* who say that it is true that communism is an evil system, but it permits *us* to make economic progress. Lass' sie nach *Berlin* kommen. Let *them* come to *Berlin*.

In this passage, the president told his audience again and again that the city of Berlin itself offered sufficient evidence to refute arguments for appeasement or détente. The succession of four separate “There are...” statements offered specific arguments in support of (or deference toward) Soviet communism followed by the same response: “Let them come to Berlin.” This combination of repetition and parallelism amplified the absurdity of an indifferent attitude towards communism even as it revealed one piece of

⁵²⁹ Kenneth Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969), 20-23.

evidence powerful enough to refute all claims in support of communism:

1. “*There* are *many people in the world* who really don’t understand, or say *they* don’t, what is the great issue between *the free world* and *the Communist world*.”
2. “*There* are *some* who say that communism is the *wave of the future*.”
3. “And *there* are *some* who say *in Europe* and *elsewhere we* can work with *the Communists*.”
4. “And *there* are even *a few* who say that it is true that communism is an evil system, but it permits *us* to make economic progress.”

Each of these statements described various approaches to the Cold War ideological struggle between U.S. democracy and Soviet communism—and the city offered an irrefutable response.

To those who were confused about the core differences between “the free world and the Communist world,” Berlin offered a side-by-side comparison with images of vibrant West Berliners cheering Kennedy’s motorcade juxtaposed with red banners blocking any view into deserted East Berlin. To those who thought communism was “the wave of the future,” Berlin displayed the backward nature of a system that prohibited free movement of its citizens. To those who said that “we can work with the Communists,” the president countered: “Let them come to Berlin.” This third line was particularly striking because Kennedy himself had made a similar argument in his June 10 American University speech when he suggested that the U.S. public should “reexamine our attitude toward the Soviet Union” and “direct attention to our common interests and to the means

by which those differences can be resolved.”⁵³⁰ But Kennedy had come to Berlin, looked over the Wall, and seen for himself the realities of living under Communist rule. Finally, to those who suggested that communism paved the way for Western economic progress, Kennedy argued that one simply had to come to Berlin and witness the bleak existence of East German citizens to recognize the incompatibility of Soviet rule and free trade. On four separate occasions—the last spoken first in German and then in English—the president supplied the city of West Berlin as his most powerful form of evidence. “***This city***” offered physical proof of the stark differences between democracy and communism, a contrast made so apparent by the Berlin Wall Kennedy had witnessed personally just hours earlier. And yet, Kennedy was not telling his audience something new; he was describing their daily existence, a reality they knew all too well. Thus, Kennedy’s repetition of “Let them come to Berlin” demonstrated his personal understanding of the West Berliners plight even as it reaffirmed West Berlin’s status as the Cold War battle line.

The final thing to note about this passage is how the president used deictic language and spatial metaphors to shift his audience between the immediate and the imaginary, from what they could see physically to what they could imagine. Each time he described those in favor of communism, he employed abstract deictic indicators: “***There*** are ***many people***,” “***There*** are ***some***” (repeated twice), and “***there*** are even ***a few***.” These identifiers—completely void of specificity or identification—could describe everyone and no one all at once. Moreover, they included anyone who harbored any support for or indifference toward Soviet communism. To this broad public, regardless of their

⁵³⁰ Kennedy, “Commencement Address at American University in Washington.”

identification or location, Kennedy had one response: “Let *them* come to *Berlin*.” To those listening to the president’s speech, the abstract arguments in favor of communism—that there was no great issue between democracy and communism, that communism was the “wave of the future,” that the United States (and other Western powers) could “work with the communists,” and even that communism was economically profitable for the West—were challenged directly by concrete evidence: Berlin. Kennedy refuted the abstract with the physically real—and what he had experienced personally.

Kennedy then shifted to his role as the U.S. president and leader of the Western Alliance to juxtapose further stark differences between democracy and communism. “Freedom has many difficulties and democracy is not perfect,” he said, “but *we* have never had to put *a wall* up to keep *our people* in, to prevent *them* from leaving *us*.” In this sentence, the president used deictic pronouns to differentiate between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although “*we*,” “*our*,” “*them*,” and “*us*” described U.S. government officials and citizens, these pronouns also underscored the stark difference between “*we*”—the U.S. government—and the unnamed adversary: the USSR. “*We*” had never done what “they” had: construct a concrete barrier to keep citizens from fleeing for a better life. The president continued by addressing Berliners (both those in West and East Germany) as a representative of the U.S. public. “*I* want to say, on behalf of *my countrymen*, who live *many miles away on the other side of the Atlantic*, who are *far distant from you*, that *they* take the greatest pride that *they* have been able to share with *you*, even *from a distance*, the story of *the last 18 years*.” In this sentence, Kennedy spoke directly to his immediate audience for the first time. Although he made references

to “*your distinguished mayor*” and “*your distinguished chancellor*” in the opening lines of his speech, the president now singled out the U.S. public’s relationship to “*you*,” the West Berliners. The deictic pronoun “*you*” was a form of direct address, singling out each and every member of his audience. Notice, however, that this “*you*” implicated all citizens of Berlin—on both sides of the Wall. Kennedy very specifically defined the temporal bounds of Berlin’s symbolic status. In the eighteen years since the end of World War II and the division of Berlin and Germany by the Allied powers, the citizens of Berlin had participated in a critical narrative. Identification as a citizen of Berlin was not limited to those who happened to be on the “right” side of the city when the wall went up on August 13. Instead, the entire city—both those who personal liberties in the West and those controlled by the East German communist government—played a key role in “in the story of *the last 18 years*.” It was this story, this struggle for democratic freedom that the U.S. public was proud to share. Although U.S. citizens were “*far distant*” from West Berliners and separated by continents and the Atlantic Ocean, Kennedy argued that the United States and the city of Berlin were linked metaphorically, relationally, and ideologically. A shared commitment to individual liberty transcended time and space.

The president continued his form of direct address by identifying the lived experiences of his German audience, again making room for free West Berliners and those listening to him in East Berlin.

I know of no town, no city, that has been besieged *for 18 years* that still lives with the vitality and the force, and the hope and the determination of *the city of West Berlin*. While *the wall* is the most obvious and vivid demonstration of the failures

of the Communist system, for *all the world to see*, *we* take no satisfaction in it, for it is, as *your Mayor* has said, an offense not only against history but an offense against humanity, separating families, dividing husbands and wives and brothers and sisters, and dividing a people who wish to be joined together.

In this passage, Kennedy held up “*the city of West Berlin*” as a model democracy standing strong against communist oppression. And although the Berlin Wall offered “the most obvious and vivid demonstration” of communism’s failures for “*all the world to see*,” the president lamented its effect on Berliners. It was an “offense” not just in abstract historical terms, but in the material realities of their daily lived experience, dividing families, husbands, wives, brothers, sisters, and the entire German people. In naming the specific ways the division of East and West Berlin affected German citizens, Kennedy demonstrated his personal understanding of and sympathy for his audience on both sides of the Wall. A reporter from the *Chicago Tribune* wrote that the woman next to him started to cry at this point in the president’s speech. “The woman in gray beside me began to cry when President Kennedy mentioned the wall” and “sobbed into a handkerchief” as she “recounted how families have been divided, husbands separated from wives, and parents from children.”⁵³¹

After acknowledging the very real struggles and sacrifices of Berliners on both sides of the Wall, Kennedy held up these examples as evidence of the broader division of East and West Germany and, ultimately, the division of the democratic West and communist East.

What is true of *this city* is true of *Germany*—real, lasting peace *in Europe* can

⁵³¹ Townsend, “Kennedy Stirs Tears in Berlin Address.”

never be assured as long as one German out of four is denied the elementary right of free men, and that is to make a free choice. In **18 years** of peace and good faith, **this generation of Germans** has earned the right to be free, including the right to unite **their families** and **their nation** in lasting peace, with good will to all people. Here Kennedy referenced the subject of German reunification, the issue that caused a permanent wedge between Kennedy and Khrushchev during their 1961 meeting in Vienna and one that would not be resolved until 1989. The division of families, neighbors, and friends was a poignant reminder not only of the Soviet-imposed division of the German people, but the physical and ideological front line of the Cold War. As Kennedy moved toward his conclusion, he held up the city of West Berlin as a symbol for the rest of the democratic world and reemphasized Berliners' connection to other freedom-loving peoples. "**You** live in **a defended island of freedom**, but **your life** is part of the main," the president stated. This was a clear reference to John Donne's meditation, "No man is an island, entire of it self, every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main,"⁵³² suggesting that each and every citizen of Berlin was linked to the larger Western world.

However, this metaphor also described the city of West Berlin as "a defended island of freedom" standing tall and proud in the midst of a communist sea. Kennedy built off this individual and collective identity when he asked his audience to look beyond their immediate spatial and temporal present and toward a brighter future:

So let **me** ask **you**, as **I** close, to lift **your eyes** beyond the dangers of **today**, to the

⁵³² John Donne, "No Man is An Island," lines 1-4. Ernest Hemmingway used the quotation (in Donne's original spelling) as the epigraph for his classic work, *For Whom the Bell Tolls*.

hopes of *tomorrow*, beyond the freedom merely of *this city of Berlin*, or *your country of Germany*, to the advance of freedom *everywhere*, *beyond the wall* to the *day of peace with justice*, *beyond yourselves and ourselves to all mankind*.

This passage offered a stylistic counterpart to the “There are some. . . . Let them come to Berlin” repetition at the beginning of Kennedy’s address. Where Kennedy had used that progression to shift the focus from abstract arguments to the immediate physical situation, the president now used deictic references to space and time to extend his argument from the local to the global.

BEYOND

TO

“dangers of *today*”

“hopes of *tomorrow*”

“freedom merely of *this city of Berlin*,
or *your country of Germany*”

“advance of freedom *everywhere*”

“*beyond the wall*”

“to the *day of peace with justice*”

“*beyond yourselves and ourselves*”

“*to all mankind*”

Each grouping or phrase moved beyond the immediate to the imaginary. This stylistic device of *gradatio* suggested a spatial and temporal progression towards the ultimate goal: a united city, country, and world free from communism. These four groupings also underscored the link between West Berliners’ lived experience and the symbolic work their struggle accomplished for the rest of the world. “Lift *your eyes*” suggested a deliberate looking up and beyond from one thing and toward another. Although their immediate physical situation offered powerful evidence for the evils of communist rule, the president asked his audience to look toward and hope for what they could not see. This also reminded the audience of their symbolic status for the rest of the world—and

that their struggle was not in vain. In fact, their daily experiences accomplished important rhetorical work on the “front lines” of the ideological Cold War. The “dangers of *today*” would be eclipsed by the “hopes of *tomorrow*.” Attaining freedom for “*this city of Berlin*” and “*your country of Germany*” would also contribute to the “advance of freedom *everywhere*.” Looking “*beyond the wall*” and toward “the *day of peace with justice*” encouraged West Berliners to aspire for more than their individual freedom—this was a struggle for “*all mankind*.”

Kennedy continued this gradual progression from the immediate to the imaginary when he said, “Freedom is indivisible, and when *one man* is enslaved, *all* are not free. When *all* are free, then *we* can look forward to *that day* when *this city* will be joined as one and *this country* and *this great Continent of Europe* in a peaceful and hopeful globe.” Again, Kennedy proceeded from one to many, specific to broad. This causal argument suggested that the limitation of freedom anywhere threatened freedom everywhere. But when “all” were free—including the East Berliners watching Kennedy on television on the other side of the Wall—West Berliners, U.S. citizens, and all freedom-loving nations could anticipate the reunification of Berlin, Germany, and Europe. Kennedy predicted that when “*that day*”—a temporal moment hoped for but not seen—finally arrived, “*the people of West Berlin* can take sober satisfaction in the fact that *they* were *in the front lines* for almost *two decades*.” Here Kennedy reminded his audience of their status as West Berliners and constituted them as foot soldiers stationed on the Cold War “*front lines*.”

In the final sentence of his address, the president returned to his opening declaration that the proudest boast in the world of freedom was to be called a citizen of Berlin. “*All free men*, wherever *they* may live, are *citizens of Berlin*, and, therefore, as a free man, *I* take pride in the words ‘Ich bin ein Berliner.’” Here Kennedy identified himself as a Berliner, a symbolic gesture that far exceeded the president’s earlier claim. Here was the President of the United States telling his German audience that he proudly identified as one of them. He recognized their sacrifices and shared their hopes for a unified city, country, and world.

The crowd’s immediate reaction was electric. Arthur M. Schlesinger later wrote that the crowd “shook itself and rose and roared like an animal. . . . The hysteria spread almost visibly through the square. Kennedy was first exhilarated, then disturbed; he felt, as he remarked on his return, that if he had said, ‘March to the wall—tear it down,’ his listeners would have marched.”⁵³³ Speechwriter Ted Sorenson called Kennedy’s speech in West Berlin “one of his best, and most remembered—a speech designed to salute the citizens of West Berlin for their courage and patience in peacefully maintaining an island of freedom amid a sea of Communist military and political power.”⁵³⁴ White House advisor Ken O’Donnell later suggested that the president’s personal interaction with West Berliners and his own personal encounter the Berlin Wall had a profound effect on his address outside West Berlin’s City Hall.

Kennedy’s fighting speech in Berlin, as magnificent as it was, actually was a grave political risk, and he knew it. Such a heated tribute to West Berlin’s

⁵³³ Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House*, 885.

⁵³⁴ Ted Sorenson, *Counselor: A Life at the Edge of History* (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 2008), 323-324.

resistance to Communism could have undone all of the success of his appeal for peace and understanding with the Soviets in his American University speech two weeks earlier. But Kennedy could not prevent himself from saying what his heart wanted him to say. He was carried away by the courage of the West Berliners, and shocked by the sight of the Berlin Wall that he had seen that morning, and he had to tell the people how he felt about them.⁵³⁵

Moved as he was by the West Berliners and his personal encounter with the Wall, Kennedy's extemporaneous performance also caused a bit of a scramble as White House advisors tried to backtrack his disparaging remarks about the Soviet Union. As Ted Sorenson later recalled, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy told him they "need[ed] to correct the tenor of the speech, particularly its reference to the West's inability to work with the Communists, weeks before negotiations were to begin in Moscow on the nuclear test ban treaty." To do this, Bundy and Sorenson "inserted new material into his afternoon speech to students at the Free University of Berlin, talking about the winds of change blowing over the Iron Curtain and the rest of the world."⁵³⁶

After a lunch at City Hall and his speech at the Free University, Kennedy made one more stop at the U.S. military headquarters in West Berlin before proceeding to the airport. "Plans to give the American President a fitting reception were carefully laid, but the high-spirited warmth of the crowds was not on the program," reported the *New York Times*. "As the Presidential plane rose from Tegel Airport Wednesday evening, [Chancellor] Adenauer was heard to murmur, 'The response of the German people—I

⁵³⁵ O'Donnell, Powers, and McCarthy, *"Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye": Memories of John Fitzgerald Kennedy*, 360.

⁵³⁶ Sorenson, *Counselor: A Life at the Edge of History*, 325.

was amazed.”⁵³⁷ Aboard *Air Force One* en route to Ireland, the president “was glowing from his reception,” Sorenson later recalled. “It would make Americans recognize that their efforts and risks had been appreciated, he said.” Kennedy also said that he would leave a note for his successor “to be opened at the time of some discouragement”: “Go to Germany.” As he told Sorenson, “We’ll never have another day like this one as long as we live.”⁵³⁸

The Public Response

Kennedy’s visit to West Berlin was, in the words of the U.S. Ambassador to Germany, “an outstanding success.”⁵³⁹ West German mayor Willy Brandt told Kennedy, “You will have seen yourself how much this occasion meant to my fellow-citizens and to myself and how intense are the feelings of gratitude and of confidence in you that found expression during that memorable day.”⁵⁴⁰ In his memoir years later, Brandt offered this further reflection: “The Berliners fêted him as something more than a powerful friend and guarantor of their freedom. Their homage contained an element of gratitude towards a former enemy who was demonstrating to the Germans that the West’s foremost power

⁵³⁷ Arthur J. Olson, “Bonn-Washington Ties are Seen Stronger,” *New York Times*, June 30, 1963.

⁵³⁸ Sorenson, *Kennedy*, 601. According to West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt’s autobiography, Jackie Kennedy later told him that the president watched the documentary of his visit to Berlin several times after the trip. Willy Brandt, *People and Politics: The Years 1960-1975*, trans. J. Maxwell Brownjohn (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1976), 73.

⁵³⁹ George McGhee to John F. Kennedy, July 4, 1963, Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, President’s Office Files, Countries, Germany: General, 1963: July-August, accessed February 2016, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-117-003.aspx>.

⁵⁴⁰ Willy Brandt to John F. Kennedy, July 3, 1963, Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, President’s Office Files, Countries, Germany: General, 1963: July-August, accessed February 2016, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-117-003.aspx>.

had made its peace with them—that that they had rejoined the family of nations.”⁵⁴¹ The day after the president’s visit, U.S. Ambassador to Germany George McGhee wrote to Dean Rusk that a “good part of [the] Fed[eral] Rep[ublic of Germany] spent June 26 watching television of President’s visit to Berlin. Events were rebroadcast and summarized on TV and radio and some persons viewed or listened [a] second or even third time.”⁵⁴² In a later telegram to Rusk, McGhee reported that

more than 7-1/2 million television sets brought [the] personality of [the] president and [the] effect of his dynamic expressions of assurance and guarantees of freedom into [the] homes of additional millions. Both television channels combined to bring live broadcasts of almost [the] entire four-day visit. Many persons viewed or listened to repeat broadcasts and summarizations a second or even third time. (Statistics on viewers are still being compiled, but exact figures will be difficult to ascertain because of problem of estimating large numbers of guests who were invited into private homes to watch president’s tour and because of thousands more who stood in television salesrooms throughout Federal Republic and West Berlin in watching with almost hypnotic fascination.)⁵⁴³

James H. Polk, the United States Commander in Berlin, wrote to Kennedy: “Words are most inadequate to express the impact of your visit to Berlin on June 26th. . . . It was impossible for me to anticipate the ovation extended to you by the citizens of Berlin, but

⁵⁴¹ Brandt, *People and Politics: The Years 1960-1975*, 72.

⁵⁴² Telegram, George McGhee to Dean Rusk, June 27, 1963, National Security Files, Trips & Conferences, Box 241, Folder: President’s Trip: Europe, 6/63-7/63, Germany, 6/11-7/12/63 (3 of 4 folders), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

⁵⁴³ Telegram, George McGhee to Dean Rusk, June 28, 1963, National Security Files, Trips & Conferences, Box 241, Folder: President’s Trip: Europe, 6/63-7/63, Germany, 6/11-7/12/63 (3 of 4 folders), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

it was a tribute which I feel I shall never see duplicated in its warmth and sincerity. Your visit has made my job ever so much easier here in this divided city.”⁵⁴⁴ Martin J.

Hillenbrand, a State Department official stationed in Berlin, wrote that of all the presidential visits to the city Kennedy’s trip “was certainly the most spectacular, and perhaps—if spectacular is equivalent to successful—then it was also the most successful of presidential visits.”⁵⁴⁵

The public response in West Berlin was almost giddy, and news outlets frequently cited the president’s “Ich bin ein Berliner” statement as the most important declaration of the day. “Women and even men wept as the chief executive of the world’s most powerful free nation told them that the proudest thing he could say is ‘I am a Berliner,’” wrote the *Chicago Tribune*. “The effect of his words was electric. He spoke the language Berliners understood.”⁵⁴⁶ In a June 27 telegram to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the U.S. Embassy in Bonn reported that the German press

rejoiced at fact that president had personally identified himself with Berlin.

President’s ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’ widely headlined. Most of press printed full texts of president’s Berlin statements. . . . [and] concluded that if president ever had any doubts about Berlin or Berliners, or they about him, all were swept away by his reaffirmation of US support for Berlin and acclaim with which he was received by people.⁵⁴⁷

⁵⁴⁴ James H. Polk to John F. Kennedy, July 16, 1961, Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, President’s Office Files, Countries, Germany: General, 1963: July-August, accessed February 2016, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-117-003.aspx>.

⁵⁴⁵ Strober and Strober, *Let Us Begin Anew: An Oral History of the Kennedy Presidency*, 371.

⁵⁴⁶ Burd and Rue, “Berlin, Irish Hail Kennedy.”

⁵⁴⁷ McGhee to Rusk, June 27, 1963.

The following day, the Embassy made further note of the widespread media coverage of Kennedy's address at the Rudolph Wilde Platz: "No other quote came to fore . . . more often than Berlin statement, 'Ich bin ein Berliner.' This [was] used in headlines of almost all Thursday papers," and the press focused heavily on the "president's personal identification with Berlin."⁵⁴⁸ *Deutsche Zeitung*, a German newspaper in Cologne, wrote that "President Kennedy's symbolic words 'Ich bin ein Berliner' opened a new chapter of German-American relations."⁵⁴⁹ In the weeks that followed, the full text of Kennedy's "Ich bin ein Berliner" speech was printed for distribution in Berlin schools.⁵⁵⁰

Kennedy's speech at the Rudolph Wilde Platz and his physical presence in West Berlin were also the subject of press coverage in the United States. "The President's City Hall speech was the emotional high point of a spectacular welcome accorded the President by West Berlin. He saluted the city as the front line and shining example of humanity's struggle for freedom," wrote Arthur J. Olson of the *New York Times*.⁵⁵¹ *Washington Post* reporter B. Carroll Kilpatrick focused specifically on the persuasive elements of Kennedy's decision to travel to Europe, noting that some diplomacy could only be accomplished in person:

More than ever, the President is committed to personal diplomacy and to direct appeals to people. He entered the White House critical of President Eisenhower's travels, which he thought were primarily grand tours and did little to advance

⁵⁴⁸ McGhee to Rusk, June 28, 1963, Kennedy Library.

⁵⁴⁹ "Opinion of the Week: Kennedy and Europe," *New York Times*, June 30, 1963.

⁵⁵⁰ Telegram, John A. Calhoun to Dean Rusk, July 6, 1963, National Security Files, Trips & Conferences, Box 241, Folder: President's Trip: Europe, 6/63-7/63, Germany, 6/11-7/12/63 (3 of 4 folders), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

⁵⁵¹ Arthur J. Olson, "President Hailed by Over a Million in Visit to Berlin," *New York Times*, June 27, 1963.

American interests. Today Mr. Kennedy is convinced that his own travels, designed for special purposes, do advance the national interest. He believes that he can strengthen relationships with foreign officials by conversations with them on detailed problems. He believes he can explain and elucidate American policy by carefully prepared speeches in their midst.⁵⁵²

The impression Kennedy made on the German people was already clear, wrote Kilpatrick, and the correspondent further predicted “the impression they made on him will affect German-American relations, and indeed world politics, for a long time.”⁵⁵³ According to Robert H. Estabrook of the *Washington Post*, “the response in Berlin was far more than [simple applause], and no one who witnessed it will soon forget it. This was the outpouring of a whole people, who have learned something about war and the meaning of freedom. Mr. Kennedy was a symbol.”⁵⁵⁴

The symbolic significance of Kennedy’s visit was further amplified by Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev’s decision to visit East Berlin two days after Kennedy’s triumphal procession through the streets of West Berlin. According to a Central Intelligence Agency report dated June 20, officials in East Berlin “intend[ed] to counter the impact of President Kennedy’s 26 June Berlin visit by holding a mass rally for all six Soviet cosmonauts in East Berlin. . . . Rumors have been current among East German party members that some top Soviet personality—perhaps even Khrushchev—would visit

⁵⁵² B. Carroll Kilpatrick, "Kennedy's Visit to Germany Will Have Long-Term Effects," *Washington Post*, June 28, 1963.

⁵⁵³ Kilpatrick, "Kennedy's Visit to Germany Will Have Long-Term Effects."

⁵⁵⁴ Robert H. Estabrook, "JFK Tour Valve: Renewed Idealism," *Washington Post*, June 30, 1963.

East Berlin at the time of the presidential visit.”⁵⁵⁵ Although the publically-stated reason for the trip was the occasion of East German leader Walter Ulbricht’s seventieth birthday, the Western press described the Soviet premier’s visit as a clear countermove to Kennedy’s visit to West Berlin.⁵⁵⁶ As Murrey Mardner of the *Washington Post* observed, “Both leaders, grappling with challenges to their programs on either side of the Berlin Wall, are trying to exhibit vitality, cohesion and forward momentum in their own spheres of influence.”⁵⁵⁷

East German officials asked Western correspondents to report the “triumphal drive” of Khrushchev in East Berlin but, as Larry Rue of the *Chicago Tribune* explained, “[t]o those who had witnessed the overwhelming reception of President Kennedy by West Berliners Wednesday, Khrushchev’s welcome in East Berlin today did not even attain the level of an anti-climax.”⁵⁵⁸ In a special report from East Berlin, *Washington Post* correspondent Katherine Clark reported that although Khrushchev “did his Communist best to match the recent Kennedy visit to West Berlin . . . he failed.” Because the “[i]ntensity of Mr. Kennedy’s understanding of Berliner’s emotional feelings over the plight of their city surprised many observers and infuriated the East German Communists,” the Soviet premier’s visit “was intended to give them a psychological lift. But while his arrival pleased Communist [leaders] it obviously did not impress Berliners of either East or West.”⁵⁵⁹ In his remarks to welcome Khrushchev to the city on June 28,

⁵⁵⁵ Memorandum, Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence, “Presidential Visit to Berlin,” June 20, 1963, National Security Files, Trips & Conferences, Box 241, Folder: President’s Trip: Europe, 6/63-7/63, Germany, 6/11-7/12/63 (4 of 4 folders), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum.

⁵⁵⁶ Larry Rue, “E. Berliners Await Visit by Nikita Today,” *Chicago Tribune*, June 28, 1963.

⁵⁵⁷ Murrey Mardner, “2 K’s in Berlin.... The Aim’s the Same,” *Washington Post*, June 28, 1963.

⁵⁵⁸ Larry Rue, “Sparse Crowd Greets Nikita in East Berlin,” *Chicago Tribune*, June 29, 1963.

⁵⁵⁹ Katherine Clark, “K Berlin Visit Fails to Offset JFK Trip,” *Washington Post*, June 29, 1963.

East German leader Walter Ulbricht said that the president had attempted to pit “one part of the German people against the other part in the interest of American imperialism.”⁵⁶⁰

Later in the day, in his speech at East Berlin’s city hall, the Soviet premier compared Kennedy’s remarks in West Berlin to his speech at American University two weeks earlier: “One would think that the speeches were made by two different Kennedys.”⁵⁶¹

This exchange between Kennedy and Khrushchev reveals how presidential rhetoric in place was used as a symbolic weapon during the Cold War. As noted previously in this chapter, West Berlin was the only place where U.S.-Soviet forces met in direct confrontation. The East-West border was the literal front line of the Cold War, and although shots were never fired, Kennedy’s presidential presence in place and his speech at the Rudolph Wilde Platz declared in no uncertain terms that the United States was there to stay. Khrushchev’s trip to East Berlin two days after Kennedy’s visit reflects the Soviet angst over the U.S. president’s widespread popularity with West Berliners and, more broadly, his position as head of the Western Alliance. Although Kennedy assumed this role in 1960, the president’s bruising meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna had demonstrated the young chief executive’s lack of foreign policy experience and what many saw as an inability to challenge the Soviet Union. As the archival record demonstrates, the White House saw Kennedy’s visit to West Berlin as the perfect opportunity to reassert the president’s leadership at home and abroad. In fact, this was one of the main reasons Kennedy decided to go ahead with his visit when congressional leaders and news outlets said he should cancel the European tour. In many ways, then,

⁵⁶⁰ Clark, “K Berlin Visit Fails to Offset JFK Trip.”

⁵⁶¹ Khrushchev as quoted in Silvestri, *Becoming JFK: A Profile in Communication*, 232.

Khrushchev's immediate attempt to counteract the president's triumph in West Berlin offers the best evidence that Kennedy's visit to West Berlin was rhetorically effective. During a Cold War being waged with words and images as symbolic weapons, Kennedy's presidential presence in place was a direct assault on the front lines of freedom—a battle that Khrushchev could not afford to lose.

Conclusion

John F. Kennedy's visit to West Berlin on June 26, 1963, was a powerful symbol of U.S. commitment to the city that stood "as a defended island of freedom" whose "life was part of the main."⁵⁶² To a U.S. public deeply concerned about the spread of communism in Western Europe, West Berlin had become a symbolic discursive resource of the very real threat the Soviet Union posed to free nations around the world. Through his presidential presence and rhetoric *in situ*, Kennedy constituted West Berlin as a Cold War commonplace that was materially real. Being in place allowed Kennedy to see for himself the failures of communism and activate West Berlin's place-as-rhetoric through his rhetoric in place. To West Berliners, Kennedy's "Ich bin ein Berliner" declaration reinforced the United States' commitment to their city and reaffirmed their status as soldiers on the "front lines" of the Cold War.⁵⁶³ As the president held up West Berlin as a tangible argument for maintaining U.S. influence in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East during the Cold War, he crystalized the city as a Cold War commonplace, a site to which successive U.S. presidents would return to recommit the United States to supporting the

⁵⁶² Kennedy, "Remarks in the Rudolph Wilde Platz, West Berlin."

⁵⁶³ Kennedy, "Remarks in the Rudolph Wilde Platz, West Berlin."

cause of freedom even after the Cold War ended.

Going to Berlin also offered the president a chance to reassert his foreign policy leadership on the world stage, particularly after his failed meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna in 1961. Years later, Martin Hillenbrand, the deputy chief of mission in West Berlin in 1963, noted how the Kennedy's visit to West Berlin established a precedent that later chief executives found difficult to follow:

It was absolutely part of the required drill that the high-level visitor go to Berlin and repeat the American commitment to the protection of the city. Failure to do that would have been an enormous blow to Berlin morale, so it was automatically assumed that when Kennedy came to the Federal Republic, a visit to Berlin would have to be part of that visit. Every subsequent president has been in exactly the same position. The problem that we have faced—parenthetically, I might add this—with subsequent presidents was that Kennedy's visit to both West Germany and to Berlin was such a triumphal thing that subsequent presidents have always felt somehow or other that they had to duplicate it at least.⁵⁶⁴

This reflection emphasizes an important dimension of presidential rhetoric in place: U.S. presidents not only harness the symbolic significance of place-as-rhetoric and the memories embedded in that location, but they also can invoke previous presidential rhetoric *in situ* for their own persuasive purposes. In this particular example, later U.S. presidents went to Berlin to demonstrate not just their support for the city, but to achieve a similar level of popularity or widespread appeal.

⁵⁶⁴ Strober and Strober, *"Let Us Begin Anew": An Oral History of the Kennedy Presidency*, 369-370.

After Kennedy's 1963 visit, U.S. presidents felt obligated to go to Berlin and do as Kennedy had done. In 1969, Richard Nixon told West Berliners that it was "a very moving occasion . . . to travel through this city and to realize again what Berlin means to all the people of the world."⁵⁶⁵ Similarly, Jimmy Carter reinforced the city's symbolic status for the West when he compared Berlin to a "city on a hill" during a 1978 visit:

The Bible says a city that is set on a hill cannot be hidden. What has been true of my own land for 3 1/2 centuries is equally true here in Berlin. As a city of human freedom, human hope, and human rights, Berlin is a light to the whole world; a city on a hill—it cannot be hidden; the eyes of all people are upon you. *Was immer sei, Berlin bleibt frei.* (No matter what happens, Berlin will stay free.)⁵⁶⁶

In 1982, Ronald Reagan traveled to the city and spoke in front of the Charlottenburg Palace, just five miles from where Kennedy spoke in 1963. In his remarks, Reagan reaffirmed the United States' commitment to the city, declaring that "a[s] long as Berlin exists, there can be no doubt about the hope for democracy." To conclude, Reagan channeled Kennedy's memory directly: "We all remember John Kennedy's stirring words when he visited Berlin. I can only add that we in America and in the West are still Berliners, too, and always will be."⁵⁶⁷ Five years later, in what perhaps is the most famous reappropriation of West Berlin after Kennedy's "Ich bin ein Berliner"

⁵⁶⁵ Richard Nixon, "Remarks at the Signing of the Golden Book at the Charlottenburg Palace, West Berlin," February 27, 1969, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed March 23, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2426>.

⁵⁶⁶ Jimmy Carter, "Berlin, Federal Republic of Germany Remarks at a Wreathlaying Ceremony at the Airlift Memorial," July 15, 1978, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed March 23, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=31086>.

⁵⁶⁷ Ronald Reagan, "Remarks to the People of Berlin," June 11, 1982, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed March 23, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=42623>.

declaration, Reagan spoke in front of the Brandenburg Gate and uttered this well-known line: “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!”⁵⁶⁸

Even after the wall fell, however, U.S. presidents continued their pilgrimages to Berlin. In 1994, William J. Clinton recounted the United States’ ongoing commitment to the city and told the German people that

in the name of the pilots whose airlift kept Berlin alive, in the name of the sentries at Checkpoint Charlie who stood face-to[-]face with enemy tanks, in the name of every American President who has come to Berlin, in the name of the American forces who will stay in Europe to guard freedom’s future, in all of their names I say, *Amerika steht an ihrer Seite, jetzt und fur immer*. America is on your side, now and forever.⁵⁶⁹

Less than a year after 9/11, George W. Bush visited Berlin and addressed a special session of the German Bundestag, telling his audience that “[t]he history of our time is written in the life of Berlin. . . . One American president came here to proudly call himself a citizen of Berlin. Another President dared the Soviets to tear down that wall. And on a night in November, Berliners took history into their hands and made your city

⁵⁶⁸ Ronald Reagan, “Remarks on East-West Relations at the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin,” June 12, 1987, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed March 23, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=34390>. For a detailed analysis of Reagan’s address, see Robert C. Rowland and John M. Jones, “Reagan at the Brandenburg Gate: Moral Clarity Tempered by Pragmatism,” *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 9, no. 1 (2006): 21-50.

⁵⁶⁹ William J. Clinton, “Remarks to the Citizens of Berlin,” July 12, 1994, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed March 23, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=50478>. Clinton also spoke to the German people in West Berlin in 1998. See William J. Clinton, “Remarks to the People of Germany in Berlin,” May 13, 1998, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed March 23, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=55950>.

whole.”⁵⁷⁰ In the remainder of his address, the president argued that the United States and Germany should support each other in the War on Terror, just as they did during the Cold War. For Bush, speaking in Berlin provided him the opportunity to reactivate the U.S.-West German alliance so central to U.S. foreign policy against the Soviet Union.

Barack Obama visited Berlin on two occasions, once during his 2008 presidential campaign and once as President of the United States. In 2008, U.S. Senator and Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama made a major foreign policy speech in front of the Victory Column in the Tiergarten in Berlin. Although the Obama campaign wanted the senator to speak at the Brandenburg Gate, German chancellor Angela Merkel vocalized her opposition to this plan because, in the words of her spokesman, she did not want the national landmark to be used “as a campaign backdrop.”⁵⁷¹ In his speech, then-Senator Obama told a crowd of more than 200,000⁵⁷² Berliners: “I come to Berlin as so many of my countrymen have come before. Tonight, I speak to you not as a candidate for president, but as a citizen—a proud citizen of the United States, and a fellow citizen of the world.” Here Obama suggested that he and the rest of this audience were joined not just by their common identification with the city of Berlin, but as citizens of the world. In his remarks, Obama also drew an explicit comparison between the setting of his address and a post-Cold War foreign policy. “The walls between old allies on either side of the Atlantic cannot stand,” he said. “The walls between the countries with the most and those

⁵⁷⁰ George W. Bush, “Remarks to a Special Session of the German Bundestag,” May 23, 2002, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed March 23, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=63159>.

⁵⁷¹ Nicholas Kulish and Jeff Zeleny, “Prospect of Obama at Brandenburg Gate Divides German Politicians,” *New York Times*, July 10, 2008.

⁵⁷² “Obama Live Ticker: ‘America Has No Better Partner than Europe,’” Spiegel Online International, July 24, 2008, accessed March 23, 2016, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/obama-live-ticker-america-has-no-better-partner-than-europe-a-567821.html>.

with the least cannot stand. The walls between races and tribes, natives and immigrants, Christian and Muslim and Jew cannot stand. These now are the walls we must tear down.”⁵⁷³ Again, Obama appropriated earlier themes of U.S. presidential rhetoric—most notably, a reference to walls that needed to be torn down—to argue toward a more inclusive foreign policy. As *New York Times* writers Jeff Zeleny and Nicholas Kulish observed, “On a perch steeped in history, Mr. Obama said it was time to reprise the spirit that conquered communism, and use it to heal divisions and forger closer partnerships to deal with nuclear proliferation, global warming, poverty and genocide.”⁵⁷⁴

President Obama returned to Berlin in 2013, this time speaking in front of the Brandenburg Gate. Throughout his remarks, Obama used the location of his speech—and the symbolic associations of previous U.S. presidential rhetoric in this place—to argue that “the tests of our time demand the same fighting spirit that defined Berlin a half-century ago.” Kennedy’s famous words delivered in this city, Obama said, were “timeless because they call upon us to care more about things than just our own self-comfort, about our own city, about our own country. They demand that we embrace the common endeavor of all humanity.” To reinforce the point, Obama (re)appropriated Kennedy’s “Ich bin ein Berliner” declaration for his twenty-first century audience when he stated, “we are not only citizens of America or Germany, we are also citizens of the world. And

⁵⁷³ Barack Obama, “Address in Berlin at the Victory Column in Tiergarten Park,” July 24, 2008, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed March 23, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=77689>.

⁵⁷⁴ Jeff Zeleny and Nicholas Kulish, “Obama, in Berlin, Calls for Renewal of Ties with Allies,” *New York Times*, July 25, 2008.

our fates and fortunes are linked like never before.”⁵⁷⁵ Through his rhetoric in place, Obama attempted to bolster U.S. foreign policy abroad by arguing that the United States (and the rest of the world) should consider how to achieve Kennedy’s vision in a new era of globalization.⁵⁷⁶

The day after President Obama’s address, London newspaper *The Independent* offered an analysis that perfectly captured how West Berlin offered U.S. presidents a Cold War commonplace, but one that has been less effective after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

When John F[.] Kennedy spoke in Berlin half a century ago and uttered the words “Ich bin ein Berliner”, he unwittingly set the standard for every US president who came after him. Ronald Reagan memorably used his set-piece Berlin speech to call on Mikhail Gorbachev to “tear down this wall”, something he can never have dreamt would happen two years later. Barack Obama—who had drawn ecstatic crowds in Berlin as a presidential candidate—clearly felt he had some hard acts to follow yesterday. And the welcome was warm. But the response to his offer of nuclear reductions was tepid, seeming as it did to reflect another age. Mercifully, Berlin no longer exudes a sense of danger, and the Brandenburg Gate no longer marks the frontier between freedom and oppression. But that also means that it is time for US presidents visiting Berlin to leave the long shadow of JFK’s speech

⁵⁷⁵ Barack Obama, “Remarks at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, Germany,” June 19, 2013, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed March 23, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=103842>.

⁵⁷⁶ For more on changes in U.S. presidential during an era of globalization, see Carney, “The Constitution of the President as Global Virtual Representative.”

behind.⁵⁷⁷

Perhaps, then, the constant return of U.S. presidents to Berlin after Kennedy points to the limits of presidential rhetoric in place. For rhetoric *in situ* to be effective, the speaker must access and activate the material and symbolic elements of the speech setting that advance their present argument, not just the memories of previous invocations of place. Although rhetoric in place will always channel (to some degree) previous rhetorical action that happened in that location, it is up to the speaker to select those rhetorical resonances particularly appropriate for that moment in time and place.

⁵⁷⁷ "Mr. Obama's Farewell to Arms in Berlin," *Independent*, June 20, 2013.

Chapter Five: Reagan at Pointe du Hoc

On June 6, 1984, Ronald Reagan spoke in Normandy, France, on the fortieth anniversary of D-Day. In his relatively brief remarks, Reagan praised the U.S. Army Rangers who scaled the cliffs of France and used the story of D-Day to support the West's ongoing commitment to "protect and defend democracy" in Europe.⁵⁷⁸ He compared the struggles of World War II to the challenges facing European democracies in the shadow of Soviet communism, pledging that the United States would stand with other nations seeking freedom. For Reagan, this historic occasion offered the opportunity to display (*epideixis*) the lessons of Normandy—duty, heroism, sacrifice, and moral clarity—as the underlying value justification for continuing to free Europe from Soviet communism in 1984. One of the primary ways the president accomplished this feat was by recounting the stories of the men who fought at Pointe du Hoc. Reagan amplified these eyewitness accounts⁵⁷⁹ with visuals of the individuals he described, such as the sixty-two U.S. Army Rangers who sat on stage with Reagan on the cliffs of Pointe du Hoc. These visual images—circulated via live network news coverage, still pictures, and the video montages that would follow—brought these remembrances of D-Day home to the U.S. public, ushering them into the events of the past and urging support for the president's foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. In this chapter, I analyze Reagan's speech at Pointe du Hoc as an exemplar of commemoration in place. Drawing on the

⁵⁷⁸ Ronald Reagan, "Remarks at a Ceremony Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the Normandy Invasion, D-day," June 6, 1984, accessed March 23, 2016, <https://reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/speeches/1984/60684a.htm>.

⁵⁷⁹ When I use the term eyewitness accounts, I mean that the president drew on the stories and narratives of others who were physically present at Normandy on D-Day to commemorate their action rather than simply explain why this date was important in national memory.

theoretical principles of deixis, I argue that Reagan used the place of his address to anchor his audience in the present moment while also transporting them back to the events of D-Day forty years earlier and projecting a specific course for future action. Unlike my two earlier case studies, Reagan's speech at Pointe du Hoc falls most explicitly within genres of classical rhetoric—specifically, the epideictic address. Understanding how the president's speech operated within and extended these classical rhetorical norms helps uncover why this particular rhetorical act was so powerful.

As defined by Aristotle, epideictic speech concerns matters of “either praise [*epainos*] or blame [*psogos*]” and focuses on the present moment.⁵⁸⁰ “[I]n epideictic the present is the most important,” Aristotle explains, “for all speakers praise and blame in regard to existing qualities, but they often make use of other things, both reminding [the audience] of the past and projecting the course of the future.”⁵⁸¹ Epideictic, then, looks backward and forward even as it remains in the immediate situation, the temporal present.⁵⁸² In a note to Aristotle's admonition that “in epideictic the present is the most important,” George Kennedy writes, “[p]erhaps meaning the occasion on which the speech is being given.”⁵⁸³ This emphasis on occasion underscores the ceremonial or ritualistic element of epideictic speech—a particular moment in time the *demos* considered important in national and political life.⁵⁸⁴ Aristotle's description of the

⁵⁸⁰ Aristotle, *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*, 1.3.3.

⁵⁸¹ Aristotle, *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*, 1.3.4.

⁵⁸² Classical examples of epideictic included speeches of praise (*enkomion*), speeches delivered at festivals (*panegyrikos logos*), and the funeral oration (*epitaphios logos*), categories that, as Edward Schiappa argues, collapsed into Aristotle's refiguring of the epideictic. As these various types or uses indicate, epideictic speech adapted itself for various ends, all with the purpose of displaying (*epideixis*) the skill of the orator and the evidence at hand. See Schiappa, *The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece*.

⁵⁸³ Aristotle, *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*, 48, note 80.

⁵⁸⁴ Although there is a tendency to discount the political potential of the epideictic, Jeffrey Walker argues

epideictic audience also reflects the temporal shifts between past, present, and future.

Where he calls judicial and deliberative audience members judges [*krites*], he describes the epideictic audience as witnesses [*theōros*]. “The term *theōria*,” writes Megan Foley, “implies not only a vision but a double vision” of times past and times present. “*Theōria* is a seeing-seen, a seen-seeing, a double vision in double time. The vision of the *theōros* is doubled in its temporality, simultaneously progressive and perfect: ‘One is seeing and one has seen at the same time.’”⁵⁸⁵ As these two tenses of *theōria* suggest, the epideictic audience is rooted in the present moment but also looks backward and forward.

Constituted as *theōria* by the orator’s epideictic oratory, these witnesses are responsible for reflecting on the past and adjusting actions, attitudes, values, and beliefs for the good of the present community and for generations to come. But how do speakers remind their audiences of the past events and future potentialities? And what are these “other things” Aristotle says orators utilize to accomplish these temporal shifts?⁵⁸⁶ I argue that the emphasis on sight within Aristotle’s description of the *theōros* goes beyond techniques of rhetorical vision and instead describes a mechanism by which orators can display

that it is this form of rhetorical exchange that provides the underlying grounds for civic deliberation and the morals of a community, writing, “‘epideictic’ appears as that which shapes and cultivates the basic codes of value and belief by which a society or culture lives; it shapes the ideologies and imageries with which, and by which, the individual members of a community identify themselves; and, perhaps most significantly, it shapes the fundamental grounds, the ‘deep’ commitments and presuppositions, that will underlie and ultimately determine decision and debate in particular pragmatic forums.” In affirming the morals or values the nation prizes, epideictic speech cements these ideals as that which should be emulated in public life. Similarly, Mary E. Stuckey argues that “[i]n offering praise or blame, in fact, epideictic works to affirm a community’s values. . . . Epideictic, then, may well serve as a way not just to create adherence to a thesis but also to intensify allegiance to one.” See Walker, *Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity*, 9-10; Mary E. Stuckey, *Slipping the Surly Bonds: Reagan’s Challenger Address* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2006), 17.

⁵⁸⁵ Foley, “Time for Epideictic,” 211.

⁵⁸⁶ Aristotle, *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*, 1.3.4.

(*epideixis*) people, places, and objects that spark memories of the past and inspire future action.⁵⁸⁷

At Normandy, Reagan offered a retelling of D-Day rooted in place, and yet extended across time, that called his audience to communal reflection and renewal. This physical display intensified the rhetorical potency of the president's speech, for both the occasion and the location required a special type of commemoration. I use the term commemoration deliberately here, for it connotes something more than simply remembering or reflecting. Edward Casey describes it as "*intensified remembering*" communities do together.⁵⁸⁸ It requires active communal participation in a shared social ritual, one that must be by definition situated in place. When communities remember together, this sacred act of remembrance "points both backward to the vanished event or person and forward (by means of the resolute wish to preserve the memory of the event or person, or even to act on it)."⁵⁸⁹ And when this commemoration occurs in a place of national importance and public memory, this intensification multiplies, chaining out into

⁵⁸⁷ A prime example of how this tangible display works persuasively is evidenced in Thucydides' account of the physical construction of the Athenian public funeral. In his introduction to Pericles's *epitaphios logos*, Thucydides described the scene: "Three days before the celebration, they erect a tent in which the bones of the dead are laid out, and everyone brings to his own dead any offering he wishes. At the time of the funeral, the bones are placed in chests of cypress wood, which are conveyed in hearses; there is one chest for each tribe. They also carry a single empty litter decked with a pall for all whose bodies have not been found and recovered. . . . The public cemetery is situated in the most beautiful suburb of the city; there they always bury those who fall in war; only after the battle of Marathon, in recognition of their preeminent valor, the dead were interred on the field. When the remains have been laid in the earth, a man, chosen by the city for his reputed sagacity of judgment and moral standing, delivers the appropriate eulogy over them; after which the people depart." Speaking in the presence of the dead, it would have been impossible for Pericles and his audience to ignore the coffins and fresh graves before them. The coffins were material—if mute—evidence, an important means of persuasion. This example of the *epitaphios logos* only goes so far, however, in that it necessitated a trained orator speaking on behalf of the nation, to an immediate audience all gathered in the same time and place, and on the occasion of a public funeral and burial. At Normandy, Reagan spoke about an event far removed in time and yet one he made present through the physical display (*epideixis*) of bodies in place. Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, 2.34.1-8, quoted in Nicole Loraux, *The Invention of Athens*, trans. Alan Sheridan (Brooklyn, NY: Zone Books, 2006), 45-46.

⁵⁸⁸ Casey, *Remembering: A Phenomenological Study*, 257, 273.

⁵⁸⁹ Casey, "Public Memory in Place and Time," 35.

shared networks of meaning and symbolism. Commemoration in place, then, is both spatial and temporal. Situated in a particular location, this place provides “the ground and resource, the location and scene of the remembering we do in common.”⁵⁹⁰ With their location fully fixed, speakers and audience members can look backward to what happened here many years ago and apply the lessons of these events to present and future circumstances.

On June 6, 1984, Reagan spoke to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the Allied invasion of France, the date when nearly 175,000 U.S., British, Canadian, Free French, Polish, and Norwegian soldiers invaded France by air and sea to take back France from Hitler’s Nazi empire.⁵⁹¹ Nearly 5,000 men died.⁵⁹² This place, therefore, was holy ground—coastline secured by blood of hundreds of thousands and the death of thousands. The occasion carried great significance as well. This was an anniversary, a term that connotes a sacred ritual, remembrance, and return. The word comes directly from the Latin *anniversārius*, which is formed from *annus* (“year”), *versus* (“turned, a turning”), and *ārius* (“see”). Interestingly enough, the word first referred to the ecclesiastical calendar as days “wherein the Martyrdoms or Deaths of Saints were celebrated yearly in the Church.”⁵⁹³ In his speech at Pointe du Hoc, the president used active language, vivid imagery, and the physical presence of bodies in place to help his audience look back into the past and “see” the events of D-Day unfold before their eyes. These visual images and

⁵⁹⁰ Casey, “Public Memory in Place and Time,” 36.

⁵⁹¹ Stephen E. Ambrose, *D-Day, June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1994), 24-25.

⁵⁹² Ambrose, *D-Day, June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II*, 576.

⁵⁹³ *Oxford English Dictionary*, s.v. “anniversary, adj. and n.,” accessed March 23, 2016, <http://www.oed.com.ezp1.lib.umn.edu/view/Entry/7909>.

the physical composition of the speech setting amplified Reagan's spoken text and made the story of D-Day literally come alive through a sensory *accumulatio*. The physical display of bodies in place also provided a living link between past and present and an inspiration for future action.

In the analysis that follows, I first consider how U.S. presidents prior to Reagan commemorated the anniversary of D-Day to show how Normandy operated as a commonplace for Cold War presidential rhetoric. I then discuss how Reagan's speech to the British Parliament in 1982 and his address to the National Association of Evangelicals in 1983 laid the groundwork for his foreign policy narrative at Pointe du Hoc. After this historical background, I draw on archival materials from the Reagan Library to describe how White House officials saw the place of Reagan's speech—Pointe du Hoc—and the bodies in that place—the U.S. Army Rangers—as an important means of persuasion. I then turn to my analysis of the text, paying specific attention to the ways in which Reagan rooted his audience in place and time while reflecting on the past and charting a clear course for future action. I conclude this chapter by considering how the media coverage and circulation of Reagan's presidential presence at Normandy amplified the site's importance and discussing the implications of this case study for studying presidential commemoration in place.

Normandy in the National Imaginary: A Cold War Commonplace

When Ronald Reagan commemorated the fortieth anniversary of D-Day at Pointe du Hoc and Omaha Beach in June 1984, he drew on the site's symbolic resonances in

U.S. public memory even as he appropriated this symbolism for his present and future purposes. To audiences watching Reagan in the United States on June 6, 1984, the story of D-Day was familiar, and yet a poignant rhetorical resource for this particular moment in Cold War history. As a place of national and international significance, Normandy offered a physical and metaphorical commonplace—a location to which U.S. presidents (and other public officials) could return as inspiration and justification for U.S. attempts to defeat Soviet communism at home and abroad. Because battlefields intern “memories of the transformative power of war and the sacrificial heroism of the warrior,” they provide a space for national reflection on shared values—a commonplace.⁵⁹⁴ These sites also inspire language that reinforces “the primal themes of patriotic orthodoxy: war as holy crusade, bringing new life to the nation and the warrior as a culture hero and savior, often likened to Christ.”⁵⁹⁵ Beginning in 1944, U.S. presidents held up Normandy as a prime example of U.S. leadership, moral resolve, and virtue, arguing that the events of June 6, 1944, offered prophetic lessons for the present and future. Here I examine these presidential commemorations briefly to trace the overarching metaphors and themes that became bundled in Normandy as a storehouse of shared meaning for the U.S. public during the Cold War.⁵⁹⁶ As I demonstrate below, themes of the story of D-Day—courage, sacrifice, good triumphing over evil—quickly became guiding principles for the battle between democracy and communism.

⁵⁹⁴ Linenthal, *Sacred Ground: Americans and Their Battlefields*, 3.

⁵⁹⁵ Linenthal, *Sacred Ground: Americans and Their Battlefields*, 4.

⁵⁹⁶ I used *The American Presidency Project* online database to search the Public Papers of the Presidents from 1944 to 1984. Here I have focused specifically on presidential addresses marking the anniversary of D-Day in some form.

The mythic description of Normandy as a moral crusade began with General Dwight D. Eisenhower's "Order of the Day" delivered to all Allied troops just days before their invasion.⁵⁹⁷

Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen of the Allied Expeditionary Forces: You are about to embark upon the Great Crusade, toward which we have striven these many months. The eyes of the world are upon you. The hopes and prayers of liberty-loving people everywhere march with you. In company with our brave Allies and brothers-in-arms on other Fronts you will bring about the destruction of the German war machine, the elimination of Nazi tyranny over oppressed peoples of Europe, and security for ourselves in a free world.⁵⁹⁸

Although Eisenhower did not name Normandy explicitly in this "Order of the Day," these words became forever linked to the Allied invasion of France. This was a "Great Crusade," one with worldwide implications for "liberty-loving people everywhere." Later that evening in the United States, President Franklin D. Roosevelt led the nation in prayer over radio, asking God to give the nation "[f]aith in our united crusade" as the Allied soldiers fought "not for the lust of conquest. . . . [but] to end conquest."⁵⁹⁹ From the very beginning, Normandy was rhetorically constituted as a place that represented an inherent moral struggle and the ability of freedom-loving peoples to defeat evil.

⁵⁹⁷ Stephen E. Ambrose writes that copies of this "Order of the Day" were handed to troops as they boarded their military transports and landing craft. See Ambrose, *D-Day, June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II*, 171.

⁵⁹⁸ Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Order of the Day," June 6, 1944, accessed March 23, 2016, <http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/dwigtheisenhowerorderofdday.htm>.

⁵⁹⁹ Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Prayer on D-Day," June 6, 1944, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed March 23, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=16515>.

These themes continued throughout later presidential commemoration of D-Day. In 1954, Eisenhower, who was now President of the United States, released a statement to mark the tenth anniversary of the Allied invasion. After reminding his audience that “[t]his day is the tenth anniversary of the landing of the Allied Expeditionary Force in Normandy,” Eisenhower noted that the heroic action displayed on June 6, 1944, “set in motion a chain of events which affected the history of the entire world” and noted that the “lessons of unity and cooperation have by no means been lost in the trying period of reconstruction since the fighting stopped. Rather, we see peoples, once bitter enemies, burying their antagonisms and joining together to meet the problems of the postwar world.” In an indirect reference to the Soviet Union, Eisenhower noted that even if some members of the Grand Alliance have not maintained in time of peace the spirit of that wartime union, if some of the peoples who were our comrades-in-arms have been kept apart from us, that is cause for profound regret, but not for despair. The courage, devotion and faith which brought us through the perils of war will inevitably bring us success in our unremitting search for peace, security and freedom.⁶⁰⁰

In this statement, Eisenhower reminded his audience that the same “courage, devotion and faith” exhibited during World War II would also see the nation through this new period in U.S. history: the Cold War. In this frame, Normandy symbolized past triumphs

⁶⁰⁰ Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Statement by the President on the 10th Anniversary of the Landing in Normandy,” June 6, 1954, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed March 23, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=9912>.

against evil and offered hope and inspiration for the nation as it continued its “unremitting search for peace, security and freedom.”⁶⁰¹

In 1964, with the nation still reeling from President Kennedy’s assassination the previous November, Lyndon B. Johnson sent a U.S. delegation to Normandy for the twentieth anniversary of D-Day. On June 3, in a ceremony in the Rose Garden at the White House, the president offered a poignant tribute to those who fought at Normandy and also interpreted these past sacrifices for the present moment. He told the delegation that their journey to Normandy

must be a mission of remembrance. For your country it is a mission of resolve.

You remember, and will never forget, the 6th of June in 1944 when America’s sons and those of our gallant allies helped carry freedom back to the continent where it was cradled. Your country remembers and will never forget, the resolve born on that D-Day, that, so long as we are able, and other men are willing to stand together, we shall not permit the light of freedom to be extinguished on any continent again.

Here Johnson explicitly linked the delegation’s physical journey to Normandy—a geographic location—with what that place symbolized in the U.S. national imaginary even as he described the country’s role in “carry[ing] freedom back to the continent where it was cradled.” The “resolve born on that D-Day” inspired the nation’s current

⁶⁰¹ Eisenhower also spoke about D-Day with a group of reporters who traveled to Normandy for the tenth anniversary of D-Day. However, because his remarks were not released to the public, I have not included them in my analysis. Two years later, Eisenhower linked D-Day with the current focus on “waging a peace.” See Dwight D. Eisenhower, “The President’s News Conference,” June 6, 1956, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed March 23, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=9907>.

support of freedom and democracy around the world so that the “light of freedom” would not “be extinguished on any continent again.” The president also called the delegation—and the broader U.S. public—to remember and not forget the sacrifices of that day twenty years earlier, sacrifices that enabled the United States to continue this cause.

“In these last 20 years,” Johnson continued, “we and the world have lived between the darkness of midnight for civilization and the brightness of a new dawn, for the rays of that dawn are piercing through the shadows.” Here the president was clear that since the events of D-Day, the world had engaged in a ideological struggle between “the darkness of midnight” and “the brightness of a new dawn”—light and dark metaphors frequently used to describe U.S. democracy versus Soviet communism. But the place of Normandy, and all that Normandy symbolized, offered hope for present and future generations. “The beachheads of Normandy have been opened into beachheads of hope for us all—hope for a world without tyranny, without war, without aggression, without oppression.” Johnson’s use of “beachhead” here is particularly notable, a military term referring to “a fortified position of troops landed on a beach.”⁶⁰² Obviously, this definition describes the story of D-Day, but Johnson added a metaphorical connotation to the term. Normandy as a literal, physical beachhead was now a “beachhead of hope for us all,” the promise that the principles of freedom and liberty could triumph over fascism, totalitarianism, and Soviet communism. Reagan would use this same term in 1984, yet with a slightly different twist that could be interpreted as extending an olive branch to the Soviet Union.

⁶⁰² *Oxford English Dictionary*, s.v. “Beachhead, n.,” accessed March 23, 2016, <http://www.oed.com.ezp1.lib.umn.edu/view/Entry/16443?redirectedFrom=beachhead#eid25800022>.

Although it was not widely publicized like Reagan's speech in 1984, Johnson's address on the twentieth anniversary of D-Day is important because it offers a clear and compelling explanation for why D-Day still mattered as U.S. involvement in Vietnam was escalating quickly.⁶⁰³ In his conclusion, the president reemphasized the centrality of Normandy as a physical and metaphorical location symbolizing the nation's commitment to defending freedom. "So let all the world know that when this Nation has stood 2,000 years[,] we shall not have forgotten the lands where our sons lie buried, nor the cause for which our sons died." The nation would never forget Normandy, for it represented the values and ideals for which so many men gave their lives on June 6, 1944. Just as the United States did not abandon its moral responsibility to defend liberty during World War II, Johnson pledged that "[w]here we have commitments to the cause of freedom, we shall honor them—today, tomorrow, and always." Implied here was the presence of twenty thousand U.S. military advisors in South Vietnam, a country whose "freedom" from North Vietnamese communist influence the United States took seriously.⁶⁰⁴ Johnson then extended this commitment beyond U.S. interests and to the rest of the world. "Freedom is not the cause of America alone, however, nor the hope of Western man alone," he said. "It is the one cause and the one hope which unites in spirit all men around the globe, whatever their country or their color or their creed. After these last 20 years we can believe that freedom is the tide of history—and we of the West stand astride that

⁶⁰³ See Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, *The Great Silent Majority: Nixon's 1969 Speech on Vietnamization* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2014), 22-40.

⁶⁰⁴ Campbell, *The Great Silent Majority: Nixon's 1969 Speech on Vietnamization*, 29.

wave, confident of what lies ahead.”⁶⁰⁵ Here Johnson described freedom as the active agent in this particular scenario—the tide of history that could not be stopped. The United States simply stood astride that wave, although quite certainly helping it along. “On this anniversary,” the president concluded, “the memory of yesterday’s battles in war only move us all to fight more valiantly today’s battles for tomorrow’s peace.”⁶⁰⁶ It is notable here that Johnson described “this anniversary” as an occasion warranting reflection on the past and consideration of the present to ensure future security. In this description, Johnson used Normandy and the events of D-Day to constitute a shared community of fellow citizens dedicated to “fight[ing] more valiantly today’s battle’s for tomorrow’s peace”—whether in South Vietnam or along the Iron Curtain.

Two days after Johnson’s remarks in the Rose Garden, *CBS News* aired a special broadcast entitled “D-Day + 20” for CBS Reports. In the ninety-minute special, news anchor Walter Cronkite and former supreme commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force and former president Dwight D. Eisenhower led the nation on a tour of key sites at Normandy. CBS’s announcement of the broadcast described the program as one in which Eisenhower would give “his personal recollections of D-Day and the liberation of France, as well as his reflections on the meaning of the wartime events for today’s world.” According to the executive producer Fred W. Friendly, ““There will be no other generals or politicians or statesmen on the program. It will be one soldier’s personal way of saying

⁶⁰⁵ Lyndon B. Johnson, “Remarks to Members of the Delegation to the D-Day Ceremonies,” June 3, 1964, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed March 23, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26292>.

⁶⁰⁶ Johnson, “Remarks to Members of the Delegation to the D-Day Ceremonies.”

it was all worthwhile.”⁶⁰⁷ The program aired on Friday night, June 5, from 8:30 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. around the country, and the *New York Times* reported that “West Germany and 18 other countries . . . purchased [access to] the show.”⁶⁰⁸ There was much press anticipation of the broadcast, and the news media focused on the eyewitness account Eisenhower would provide of June 6, 1944. The *Los Angeles Times* wrote that the general and former president would offer “personal recollections of D-Day decisions and experiences as well as place the day and the invasion in historical perspective.”⁶⁰⁹

This special broadcast brought the nation—and world—to the scene of battle, with the general who commanded the invasion narrating events. Citizens saw images of Pointe du Hoc, Omaha Beach, and the bunkers where German soldiers tried to stop the Allied advance. The program also offered sweeping views of the French coastline and moving images of the thousands of white crosses at the Normandy American Cemetery. Although the U.S. public would have seen print images of Normandy and perhaps even newsreel footage of D-Day just weeks after the invasion, these televised images would offer a new personal connection to the events twenty years earlier. Eisenhower offered his own recollections of D-Day as they moved from place to place, and these reflections were interspersed from camera footage CBS obtained of the D-Day landings. In the final segment of the broadcast, with Eisenhower and Cronkite sitting on a stone wall by with white crosses in the background, the former president offered this interpretation of June 6, 1944:

⁶⁰⁷ Val Adams, "Eisenhower Going to Normandy to Film D-Day Program for TV," *New York Times*, July 15, 1963.

⁶⁰⁸ Paul Gardner, "D-Day Remembered: Sites of Normandy Invasion Visited by Old Soldier Who Was There," *New York Times*, May 31, 1964.

⁶⁰⁹ "Eisenhower to Return to Normandy for TV," *Los Angeles Times*, July 15, 1963.

These men came here, British, and our other Allies, and Americans, to storm these beaches for one purpose only, not to gain anything for ourselves, not to fulfill any ambitions that America had for conquest, but just to preserve freedom, systems of self-government in the world. Many thousands men have died for ideals such as these. And here again, in the twentieth century for the second time, Americans, along with the rest of the free world, but Americans had to come across the ocean to defend those same values.⁶¹⁰

Like Johnson, Eisenhower stressed the Allies' ultimate goal for the Normandy invasion: liberating Europe from Nazi Germany and ensuring that the ideals of freedom and democracy would triumph over tyranny.

New York Times writer Jack Gould described the program as “90 minutes of quietly moving television.” He noted that “[l]ittle was added to history’s record of the turning point in World War II,” but he emphasized the power of listening to Eisenhower’s memory in place. “[S]haring first-hand the Allied commander’s illustrated remembrance of D-Day was an effective and novel commemoration of the occasion,” he wrote. “For both General Eisenhower and the individual viewer it was an experience in nostalgia and a reminder of D-Day’s cost, particularly in the closing scene of 9,000 American graves at St. Laurent-on-the-sea.”⁶¹¹ These visual images of Pointe du Hoc, Omaha Beach, the German bunkers, and the U.S. military cemetery coupled with the

⁶¹⁰ Dwight D. Eisenhower and Walter Cronkite, “D-Day Plus 20 Years: Eisenhower Returns to Normandy: CBS Reports,” CBS Nightly News, June 5, 1964, accessed January 4, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qNsi4Z8Q12M>.

⁶¹¹ Jack Gould, “TV: Omaha Beach, as It Was and Is,” *New York Times*, June 6, 1964.

general's first-hand account made the events of the past come alive to those watching in the present moment, even if they were far removed from the scene of battle.

One year later, in 1965, President Johnson made mention of the twenty-first anniversary of D-Day in a commencement address at Catholic University and argued that Normandy offered the prime example the “moral duty” supplying the “wellsprings of American purpose.”

Twenty-one years ago today, on the 6th day of June 1944, it was neither isolationism nor imperialism that sent our sons ashore in Normandy to intervene in the destiny of the continent of Europe where our culture was cradled. . . . Nor is it militarism now that motivates America to stand her sons by the sons of Europe and Asia and Latin America in keeping a vigil of peace and freedom for all mankind. What America has done—and what America is doing around the world—draws from deep and flowing springs of moral duty, and let none underestimate the depth of flow of those wellsprings of American purpose.⁶¹²

In this speech, Johnson equated Normandy and D-Day with current U.S. foreign policy abroad—including military action in South Vietnam. Just as the nation's “sons [were sent] ashore in Normandy to intervene in the destiny of the continent of Europe” in 1944, so also would the United States send “her sons” as soldiers around the world to secure “peace and freedom for all mankind.”

After three years of presidential silence on the sixth of June in 1966, 1967, and 1968, the White House issued a presidential proclamation to commemorate the twenty-

⁶¹² Lyndon B. Johnson, “Commencement Address at Catholic University,” June 6, 1965, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed March 23, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=27022>.

fifth anniversary of D-Day in 1969. “Twenty-five years ago on June 6,” it read, “Allied Forces under the leadership of Dwight David Eisenhower, made a successful landing on the beaches of Normandy.” Yet again, the president’s linkage of D-Day with its physical location—the “beaches of Normandy”—underscored the site’s symbolic significance in national memory. “What happened on that day—and in the days and months immediately following—is now part of the acts of valor which have been the inspiration and often the salvation of Western civilization. The Sixth of June was transformed on that day from a date on the calendar to a historical landmark in the history of freedom.” This proclamation articulated exactly how—and why—Normandy and June 6, 1944, had become potent symbols in the national imaginary. It was through human action, valor, courage, and commitment that a calendar date (and Normandy itself as a physical site) was “transformed . . . to a historical landmark in the history of freedom.” In this particular description, place and time were inextricably linked. Normandy achieved significance because of what happened there on June 6, and the sixth of June meant something because of the action that took place at Normandy. “Our Nation and nations of free men everywhere are forever grateful for the sacrifices made in Normandy,” the statement read. “Twenty-five years have not diminished but have, rather, enhanced the profound importance of that day.” In this description, time amplified the symbolic significance of Normandy, constituting a shared commonplace that represented democratic ideals not just for U.S. citizens, but “nations of free men everywhere”—including those in the present moment during the Cold War.⁶¹³

⁶¹³ Richard Nixon, “Proclamation 3915 – D-Day Twenty-Fifth Anniversary,” May 31, 1969, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed March 23, 2016,

After Nixon's proclamation in 1969, there was no formal presidential commemoration of the anniversary of D-Day until 1982.⁶¹⁴ This absence is notable, particularly in light of larger political issues at home and abroad such as the Vietnam War and Watergate. With national morale at an all time low after Watergate and the failure of U.S. military actions in Southeast Asia, the lessons of D-Day seemed much murkier. In a May 28, 1984, *Time* magazine article, columnist Lance Morrow captured these sentiments particularly well:

If there has sometimes been a messianic note in American foreign policy in postwar years, it derives in part from the Normandy configuration. America gave its begotten sons for the redemption of a fallen Europe, a Europe in the grip of a real Satan with a small mustache. . . . But when the U.S. has sought to redeem other lands—South Viet Nam, notably—from encroaching evil, the drama has proved more complex. The war in Viet Nam, in fact, had many Americans believing that the evil resided in themselves. So the experience of Normandy, bloody as it was, has a kind of moral freshness in the American imagination, a quality of collective heroic virtue for which the nation may be wistful. *Liberation* meant something very wonderful and literal then. It had not acquired the cynical,

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=105930>.

⁶¹⁴ In January 1978, Jimmy Carter visited the site of the D-Day landings and became the first sitting president to travel to Normandy. He delivered brief public remarks with French president Giscard d'Estaing, stating that the United States was "determined, with our noble allies here, that Europe's freedom will never again be endangered. We now have about 200,000 Americans, fighting men, in Europe to make sure that this threat is never before us again." Carter closed by telling the audience that it was a great honor for him, "as President of the United States, to come here to pay homage to the brave men and women of the past who have ensured our precious freedom today." See Jimmy Carter, "Normandy, France Remarks of the President and President Giscard d'Estaing on Visiting the Site of the D-Day Landings," January 5, 1978, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed March 23, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29994>.

even Orwellian overtone one hears in, say, “the liberation of Saigon.” And there were things that seemed worth dying for without question. Today the questions always seem to overshadow the commitment. The morals of sacrifice, so clear then, are more confusing now.⁶¹⁵

If, as Morrow argues, Normandy provided “a kind of moral freshness in the American imagination” throughout Vietnam and Watergate, it is curious that Nixon, Ford, and Carter did not utilize this nationalistic commonplace as a mythic antidote to a discouraged citizenry. In 1976, Ford made a passing reference to D-Day in a speech in Cleveland on June 6, but he only mentioned it to emphasize what the nation was *not* doing. “On this day, the anniversary of D-day on the beaches of Normandy, no American soldier is fighting on battlefield anywhere in the world.”⁶¹⁶ Where earlier presidential commemorations had focused on Normandy as a shining example of U.S. values and ideals, here Ford emphasized the nation’s inward focus and assured a war-weary public that it was time of peace.

After thirteen years of presidential silence on the anniversary of D-Day, Ronald Reagan delivered two speeches from Paris, France, in 1982: a videotaped message to the citizens of France broadcast over national TV and a radio address to the U.S. public at home. In the first, Reagan told his French audience that D-Day was significant because the Allied nations “fought shoulder to shoulder for democracy and freedom—and won.”

⁶¹⁵ Lance Morrow, “June 6, 1944,” *Time*, May 28, 1984. Clipping of this article included in Current News: Special Edition, D-Day + 40 Years, 23 July 1984, p. 41-42, White House Office of Speechwriting, Research Office, 1981-1989, Box 161, Folder: President’s Trip to Normandy (5), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.

⁶¹⁶ Gerald R. Ford, “Remarks in Cleveland at the National Awards Dinner of the National Conference of Christians and Jews,” June 6, 1976, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed March 23, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=6098>.

The president noted that today's freedoms were "secured by great men and at a great cost" and asked his audience to "remember their courage and pray for the guidance and strength to do what we must so that no generation is ever asked to make so great a sacrifice again."⁶¹⁷ In this framing, the sacrifices of D-Day required a certain type of response; the Western world needed "guidance and strength" to take necessary steps so that world war would not happen again. In the radio address to the U.S. public, Reagan was more explicit about what D-Day meant for the present moment when he noted that "[o]ne lesson of D-Day is as clear now as it was 38 years ago: Only strength can deter tyranny and aggression. . . . it was a mighty endeavor, an endeavor of liberty, sacrifice, and valor. As we honor these men, I pledge to do my utmost to carry out what must have been their wish—that no other generation of young men would ever have to repeat their sacrifice in order to preserve freedom."⁶¹⁸ Reagan's return to this nationalistic commonplace demonstrates a careful balance between holding up Normandy as an inspiring lesson of the past and assuring the U.S. public that he was committed to keeping the nation out of war.

The purpose of this section has been to outline how previous U.S. presidents commemorated D-Day prior to Reagan and to demonstrate how they returned to Normandy as a commonplace of Western values and U.S. patriotism during the Cold War. But where Roosevelt, Eisenhower, and Johnson celebrated Normandy as a pivotal

⁶¹⁷ Ronald Reagan, Remarks Commemorating the 38th Anniversary of the Normandy Invasion, D-Day," June 5, 1982. online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed March 23, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=42604>.

⁶¹⁸ Ronald Reagan, "Radio Address to the Nation on the Trip to Europe," June 5, 1982, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed March 23, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=42605>.

moment in U.S. history representing the nation's steadfast commitment to protecting and defending democracy around the world, this interpretation waned during the late 1960s and 1970s. When Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, however, he revitalized this messianic narrative not just in commemorations of D-Day, but within his larger U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. To fully appreciate the president's address at Pointe du Hoc, it is essential to understand how this commemorative occasion reflected and advanced earlier statements on his "peace through strength" philosophy.

Reagan's Cold War Diplomacy

When Ronald Reagan defeated incumbent Jimmy Carter in the 1980 presidential election by more than eight million votes, many saw Reagan's victory as a direct rejection of the president's policies at home and abroad.⁶¹⁹ According to a *New York Times*/CBS News Poll, voters ousted Carter because of two main issues: the failing U.S. economy and the nation's foreign policy dealings, especially its relationship to the Soviet Union. The *New York Times* reported that two-thirds of voters "cited economic problems such as unemployment, taxes and inflation as a key reason for their vote." Moreover, those polled said they wanted the United States "to be more forceful in dealing with the Soviet Union 'even if it increased the risk of war'" by a margin of almost 2 to 1.⁶²⁰ "When Ronald Reagan took office in early 1981," writes Paul Fessler, "the United States appeared weak and faltering. In foreign affairs, the United States, still reeling from defeat in Vietnam, faced not only a Soviet Union expanding into Afghanistan but also a major hostage crisis

⁶¹⁹ H.W. Brands, *Reagan: The Life* (New York, NY: Doubleday, 2015), 237.

⁶²⁰ Adam Clymer, "The Collapse of a Coalition," *New York Times*, November 5, 1980.

in Iran. . . . It seemed as if America's self-image as a confident and strong international superpower was fading into a distant memory."⁶²¹ Reagan addressed this perception of a weakened America in his inaugural address, pledging that as the nation took steps to "renew ourselves here in our own land, we will be seen as having greater strength throughout the world. We will again be the exemplar of freedom and a beacon of hope for those who do not now have freedom."⁶²²

Early in his first administration, Reagan delivered several important foreign policy addresses that outlined his view on the Cold War, communism, and the Soviet Union. In a 1997 interview, Anthony "Tony" Dolan, one of Reagan's chief speechwriters, explained that Reagan's foreign policy rhetoric from 1981 to 1983 displayed the "evolution of a counter-strategy to the Soviets" that accomplished two things:

First, it reject[ed] the notion that you cannot be morally candid and confront the Soviet Union. In other words, it establishes a sort of dual strategy—a paradoxical strategy—of candor and reconciliation. Tough rhetoric and at the same time an offer of diplomatic engagement—many offers of diplomatic engagement. But it did something else: It rejected containment. It said the Soviet Union is about to collapse and we're gonna push it. That's all it's ever really needed. And we're not going to stay on our side of the fifty yard line anymore.⁶²³

⁶²¹ Paul Fessler, "Ronald Reagan, Address to the National Association of Evangelicals ("Evil Empire Speech") (8 March 1983)," *Voices of Democracy* 2(2007): 26.

⁶²² Ronald Reagan, "Inaugural Address," Inaugural Address," January 20, 1981, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed March 23, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=43130>.

⁶²³ Martin J. Medhurst, "Writing Speeches for Ronald Reagan: An Interview with Tony Dolan," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 1, no. 2 (1998): 247.

Thirty-five years later, it is difficult to fully appreciate how radical this approach was. But after a long history of détente, with U.S. presidents striving to appease the Soviet Union, Reagan took a bold—and to many, idealistic—approach. Yet Reagan’s strength, writes Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis, “lay in his ability to see beyond complexity to simplicity. And what he saw was simply this: that because détente perpetuated—and had been meant to perpetuate—the Cold War, only killing détente could end the Cold War.”⁶²⁴

Two speeches in particular—the 1982 Address to Members of the British Parliament and 1983 speech to the National Association of Evangelicals—set forth a substantive view of Reagan’s foreign policy and provided a foundation for his later speeches in Normandy.⁶²⁵ On June 8, 1982, just two days after his radio address to the U.S. public on the thirty-eighth anniversary of D-Day, Reagan spoke in the Royal Gallery of Westminster to members of the British Parliament. In this speech, the president highlighted European nations who were seeking freedom from Soviet domination and predicted the “the march of freedom and democracy which will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash-heap of history.”⁶²⁶ He evoked the idea of a special partnership between the United States and Great Britain, one that was cemented during World War II and fostered by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. As leaders on the world stage, Reagan declared that the United States and Great Britain had a responsibility to learn

⁶²⁴ Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History*, 217.

⁶²⁵ Reagan Attorney General and confidante Edwin Meese later wrote that these two speeches were significant because they “set forth [Reagan’s] view of communism, the Soviet system, and the required free world response in comprehensive fashion.” Edwin Meese, *With Reagan: The Inside Story* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1992), 164.

⁶²⁶ Ronald Reagan, “Address to Members of the British Parliament,” June 8, 1982, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, accessed March 23, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=42614>.

from the mistakes of World War II and act as “[f]ree people, worthy of freedom and determined not only to remain so but to help others gain their freedom as well.”⁶²⁷ The Westminster Address was Reagan’s opportunity to chart a new course for U.S. foreign policy towards the Soviet Union and renew the United States’ partnership with Great Britain. Although Reagan’s willingness to relegate Soviet communism to the “ash-heap of history” struck many critics as reckless and naïve, his prediction proved correct over time.⁶²⁸ Less than a year later, on March 8, 1983, Reagan delivered a speech at the annual meeting of the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida. The president called on his audience to resist the temptation “to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil.” Reagan also maintained that the struggle between democracy and communism was not ultimately a matter of military might, but a spiritual crisis, “a test of moral will and faith.”⁶²⁹ Instead of simply presenting U.S. democracy and Soviet

⁶²⁷ Reagan, “Address to Members of the British Parliament.” Reflecting on the address after his presidency, Reagan called it “one of the most important speeches I gave as president.” He noted that although many considered 1982 a watershed year for his domestic and economic policy initiatives, “the real story of 1982 is that we began applying conservatism to foreign affairs.” Ronald Reagan, *Speaking My Mind* (New York: NY: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 107.

⁶²⁸ In their study of Reagan’s Westminster Address, Robert C. Rowland and John M. Jones explain that although this speech is hailed by neoconservatives “as the moment when Reagan and Britain’s Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher put ‘freedom on the offensive where it belonged [Thatcher’s assessment],” Reagan’s address “was not recognized as particularly important or effective at the time.” Instead, Rowland and Jones argue that the speech offered a vision for a post-Cold War world that was difficult to imagine in 1982: “At the time, few shared Reagan’s optimism about the cold war, and almost no one thought that the survival of the Soviet Union was in doubt. . . . A quarter-century later, Reagan’s claim that the cold war was at a ‘turning point’ seems clearly correct, but few agreed with him in 1982.” Robert C. Rowland and John M. Jones, *Reagan at Westminster: Foreshadowing the End of the Cold War* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2010), 13-15.

⁶²⁹ Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at the Annual Conference of the National Association of Evangelicals,” March 8, 1983, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, accessed March 23, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=41023>.

communism as two competing views of the world, Reagan pronounced one good and the other evil. The explicit argument was that the United States was on the side of what was right and good, and that the nation had a responsibility to extend democratic liberties to those oppressed by Soviet Communism.⁶³⁰

These two speeches established an important foundation for Reagan's rhetoric at Normandy in at least two ways. First, the president's address at Westminster and remarks to the National Association of Evangelicals emphasized a shared democratic alliance between the United States and other Western democracies, most notably Great Britain. In 1982, the president emphasized the vitality of a U.S.-British partnership throughout history. He reminded his British audience (and the U.S. audience at home) that the two nations had worked together to defeat Nazi Germany and linked the world situation in 1941 with the current struggle against Soviet communism. Reagan argued that "[i]f history teaches anything it teaches that self-delusion in the face of unpleasant facts is folly" and praised Prime Minister Winston Churchill's courageous leadership during "the dark days of the Second World War." The choice of the two allies in 1982 was the same as it was during World War II: would the United States and Great Britain let "freedom wither in a quiet, deadening accommodation with totalitarian evil?" At the end of his speech, Reagan set forth a vision for this U.S. / British partnership. "[T]ogether . . . [l]et us now begin a major effort to secure the best—a crusade for freedom that will engage the faith and fortitude of the next generation."⁶³¹ This explicit link between the Allied

⁶³⁰ For an analysis of this particular speech, see Fessler, "Ronald Reagan, Address to the National Association of Evangelicals ("Evil Empire Speech") (8 March 1983)."

⁶³¹ Reagan, "Address to Members of the British Parliament."

commitment during World War II and the present situation continued in Reagan's D-Day commemoration in 1984.

The second way these speeches provided a foundation for Reagan's rhetoric at Normandy was in his portrayal of the Cold War as a moral struggle between good and evil. Reagan's declaration that communism was an "evil empire" was radical in 1983; all previous U.S. presidents had argued for a policy of accommodation and détente towards the Soviet Union. When Reagan spoke at Normandy in 1984, he softened his tone but still hinted at the underlying spiritual ethic of fighting totalitarianism. Reagan referred to the Allies' "rockhard belief that Providence would have a great hand in the events that would unfold here; that God was an ally in this great cause." Naming God as an "ally," the president argued that Providence was on the side of those who fought Nazi Germany. He stated that the Allies were "bound today by what bound us 40 years ago, the same loyalties, traditions, and beliefs."⁶³² Linking the present struggle between democracy and communism to World War II, Reagan implicitly stated that God was on the side of the Allies in 1984.

Although Reagan's main focus at Pointe du Hoc was to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of D-Day and honor the sixty-two U.S. Army Rangers who were present with him on stage, the president and his staff also saw this event as an important moment within the White House's larger foreign policy agenda and in the president's reelection campaign. I now turn to archival evidence and personal memoirs to recount the planning process for the president's trip. These documents offer a behind-the-scenes narrative of

⁶³² Reagan, "Remarks at a Ceremony Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the Normandy Invasion, D-day."

the White House's goals for Reagan's speech at Pointe du Hoc. Of more importance, however, they show how Reagan Administration officials saw the cliffs of Pointe du Hoc and the bodies of the U.S. Army Rangers as crucial rhetorical resources for the president to display through his speech.

Setting the Stage for Normandy

The president's trip to Normandy in June 1984 was part of a ten-day European tour designed to strengthen U.S. ties with its Western allies, particularly Great Britain, France, and Ireland. "[O]ur objective," wrote National Security Advisor Robert C. McFarlane to Deputy Chief of Staff Michael K. Deaver, "by the time the trip is completed, will be to reassert U.S. interest in a stronger and viable Europe within a larger policy context embracing both the Atlantic and Pacific communities, while stressing shared democratic values."⁶³³ The White House chose specific geographic locations that would highlight these themes. In an April 1984 memo, William Flynn Martin, the Director of International Economic Affairs for the National Security Council, noted that certain places would play a significant role in the president's trip. He wrote that Reagan's visits to Ireland, Normandy, and London would "provide the President with an ideal backdrop for his themes of peace and prosperity and the importance of Allied support and cooperation in the achievement of both." At Normandy, wrote Martin, Reagan should

Focus on Normandy as a landmark in the transatlantic relationship. Pay tribute to the Americans and other Allies who gave their lives in the fight for liberation and

⁶³³ "Preserving Peace and Prosperity: The President's Trip to Europe, June 1984 (Public Diplomacy Action Plan)," 2, folder "June 1984 European Trip (1)," Richard G. Darman Files Box 3, Ronald Reagan Library.

link the events at Normandy forty years ago with the reconciliation of former adversaries and the establishment of the current period of unprecedented peace and prosperity of Europe, based on the continued and continuing US commitment to the security of Europe.⁶³⁴

As both an “ideal backdrop” for the president’s foreign policy goals and “a landmark in the transatlantic relationship,” the physical scene and symbolic significance of Normandy in U.S. public memory offered powerful visual imagery. In addition, as Martin noted, this place would provide a tangible link between past and present; what happened at Pointe du Hoc forty years earlier offered an inspiration for future Allied cooperation in Europe.

Reagan would deliver two addresses on the fortieth anniversary of D-Day—one at Pointe du Hoc and the other at Omaha Beach—but the White House saw Pointe du Hoc as especially significant.⁶³⁵ In the same April memo, Martin outlined the stops Reagan would make on June 6:

Visit to Normandy: (Three sites: Point [sic] du Hoc, the American cemetery memorial and Utah Beach.) Normandy symbolizes the US commitment to

⁶³⁴ Memo, William F. Martin to Robert C. McFarlane, April 10, 1984, page 2, folder “President’s Trip to Normandy (2),” Box 161, White House Office of Speechwriting: Research Office, 1981-1989, Ronald Reagan Library.

⁶³⁵ Historian Douglas Brinkley writes that of the two speeches—one at Pointe du Hoc and the other at Omaha Beach—the second was considered the major foreign policy speech. “Some in the White House simply referred to Omaha Beach as ‘the Speech’ and Pointe du Hoc as ‘Brief Remarks.’” White House principal speechwriter Tony Dolan was assigned the Omaha Beach speech, and “Pointe du Hoc was considered a sideshow on June 6, a feel-good, non-policy-based moment. Therefore, Peggy Noonan was tasked with penning the ‘impressionistic’ oration, while Dolan’s ‘realist’ policy speech would be headlined by prominent U.S. newspapers on June 7.” Brinkley’s account was published in 2005, when multiple documents related to the “Pointe du Hoc” speech had not been declassified. During my visit to the Reagan Library in June 2013, I accessed a number of documents (all of which were declassified after 2005) that show that the Reagan White House planned for “Pointe du Hoc” to be the centerpiece of Reagan’s visit to Normandy. See the National Security Council’s official briefing book, “The President’s Trip to Europe: Ireland, UK and Normandy, June 1-10, 1984,” RAC Box 4, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Trip File, Ronald Reagan Library and Douglas Brinkley, *The Boys of Pointe du Hoc: Ronald Reagan, D-Day, and the U.S. Army 2nd Ranger Battalion* (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2005), 163.

Europe, which led directly to the Atlantic Alliance. The President will make brief (10-15 minutes) remarks at the Point [sic] du Hoc ceremony to about 500 people, including veteran groups. This should be emotional, stirring, and personal. The themes include reconciliation of former adversaries, how postwar cooperation has kept the peace for the longest period in modern European history, Alliance solidarity, and the strength of the American commitment to Europe.⁶³⁶

Writing that Reagan's Pointe du Hoc address should be "emotional, stirring, and personal," Martin set the tone for what would become one of the president's most celebrated addresses.

Secretary of State George P. Schultz extended the idea further in a May 1984 memorandum to Reagan when he explained why the location of the president's speech was so important:

It was here on June 6, 1944 that the US Army Rangers scaled the cliffs under heavy fire and secured the area to protect the landings at Omaha and Utah Beaches... Here you will make your principal statement of the day -- a 15 minute speech stressing the bravery of the fallen and the survivors of this battle and emphasizing that Normandy marked the beginning of a continuous U.S. commitment to the security of Europe.⁶³⁷

Here Secretary Schultz stressed the foreign policy goals of Reagan's address at Pointe du Hoc: memorialize the dead, honor the living, and show how the events of D-Day worked

⁶³⁶ Martin to McFarlane, April 10, 1984, 9, Reagan Library.

⁶³⁷ Memo, George P. Schultz to Ronald Reagan, May 14, 1984, folder "The President's Trip to Europe: Ireland, UK, and Normandy, June 1-10, 1984 – The President (3 of 5)," RAC Box 4, Executive Secretariat, NSC: Trip File, Ronald Reagan Library.

to strengthen U.S.-European ties in the future. A handwritten note on the top of a May 21, 1984, speech draft summarized the speech's overarching theme: "Pointe du Hoc a symbol of our selfless effort – against impossible odds men willing to do great deeds."⁶³⁸ This notation hinted at the connection Reagan would draw between the U.S. Army Rangers' heroic action in 1944 and the United States' ongoing commitment to defending democracy against Soviet expansion.

But it was not simply what happened at Pointe du Hoc that made this place significant; the power of the visuals associated with this place was of great importance. A speech draft from the National Security Council focused specifically on what one saw from the site: "The Cliffs which fall away to this often rough sea witnessed extraordinary heroism. Forty years ago -- as part of a great Allied effort -- brave American Rangers scaled these heights under fire. This ceremony and this place honors them."⁶³⁹ A month later, in an article for the *New York Post* just a few days before the commemorative ceremonies, journalist Jack Schnedler noted that Pointe du Hoc offered the best "real" view of D-Day. "[I]t is hard to visualize that a great and fearsome battle raged only 40 years ago" at many of the historical sites at Normandy, he wrote. "Time and reconstruction have erased the evidence. But Pointe du Hoc, eight miles northwest of the U.S. cemetery, is an exception. Atop this 100-foot cliff, which the Germans were thought to have fortified with massive 155-mm. guns, the terrain is still a moonscape of craters

⁶³⁸ Speech Draft, "Presidential Address: Pointe du Hoc, Wednesday, June 6, 1984, (Noonan/BE), May 21, 1984, 3:30 p.m.," folder "President's Trip to Normandy (8)," Box 162, White House Office of Speechwriting: Research Office, 1981-1989, Ronald Reagan Library.

⁶³⁹ Speech Draft, "Draft No. 4, The President's Normandy Speech June 6, 1984," April 30, 1984, folder "Pointe du Hoc Address, Normandy (4)," Box 161, White House Office of Speechwriting: Speech Drafts, 1981-1989, Ronald Reagan Library. Draft also found in folder "June 1984 European Trip (3)," Box 3, Richard G. Darman Files, Ronald Reagan Library.

and shattered bunkers from the Allied bombardment of June 6, 1944.”⁶⁴⁰ Not only did this place symbolize extraordinary heroism and sacrifice; it offered a glimpse into the past and the ideal backdrop for Reagan’s retelling of D-Day. Both the White House and the Reagan-Bush ’84 reelection campaign planned to use these images to connect with U.S. citizens at home and a larger international audience. The White House timed the “Pointe du Hoc” speech so it could be broadcast live on U.S. networks over the morning news. The “Draft Notional Schedule – Trip of the President to Europe” dated May 7, 1984, specified that Reagan would arrive at the Pointe du Hoc landing zone at 8:20 am EDT (2:20 pm local time), tour the Ranger Memorial for ten minutes with two survivors of the Pointe du Hoc landing, and begin his “Remarks to assembled Veterans and unveiling of plaque commemorating Point [sic] du Hoc” at 8:40 am EDT (2:40 pm local time).³⁶

White House speechwriter Peggy Noonan was tasked with writing Reagan’s speech at Pointe du Hoc. In her memoir of her years at the White House, she described the challenge of crafting a speech that would use “big, emotional words and images so [the White House Office of] advance and Mike Deaver would be happy” and also retell the story of D-Day so anyone, young or old, would understand what the day symbolized for the Allies in 1944 and freedom-loving nations in 1984. “I thought that if I could get at what impelled the Rangers to do what they did,” she wrote, “I could use it to suggest

⁶⁴⁰ Jack Schnedler, “France Ready for Another Invasion,” *New York Post*, May 29, 1984. Clipping included in Current News: Special Edition, D-Day + 40 Years, 23 July 1984, 76, White House Office of Speechwriting, Research Office, 1981-1989, Box 161, Folder: President’s Trip to Normandy (5), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.

what impels us each day as we live as a nation in the world. This would remind both us and our allies of what it is that holds us together.”⁶⁴¹

Noonan wrote for two audiences: the U.S. public watching the speech on the morning news and Reagan’s immediate audience in France, particularly the U.S. Army Rangers who had climbed the cliffs on which the president would stand. She knew that the speech would be broadcast live in the United States and she imagined the “kids watching TV at home in the kitchen at breakfast.” By describing the events of D-Day, Noonan wanted to place “it all in time and space for myself and, by extension, for the audience. If we really listen to and hear the snap of the flags, the reality of that sound . . . will help us imagine what it sounded like on D-Day. And that would help us imagine what D-Day itself was like. . . . History is real.”⁶⁴² By using the images of sight and smell and sound, Noonan said she “wanted American teenagers to stop chewing their Rice Krispies for a minute and hear about the greatness of those tough kids who are now their grandfathers. . . . Pause, sink in, bring it back to now, history is real.”⁶⁴³ The goal was to help the U.S. audience, although far removed from the scene of battle, to connect past history with the present. As important as the U.S. public was, Noonan structured the speech so the president could speak directly to the heroes of his story: the U.S. Army Rangers. In the midst of her preparations, the head of Reagan’s advance office told Noonan that the men who scaled the cliffs of Pointe du Hoc would be sitting right in front of Reagan as he spoke. Noonan later recalled how this information changed her approach

⁶⁴¹ Peggy Noonan, *What I Saw at the Revolution: A Political Life in the Reagan Era* (New York, NY: Random House, 1990), 85, 83-84.

⁶⁴² Noonan, *What I Saw at the Revolution: A Political Life in the Reagan Era*, 85.

⁶⁴³ Noonan, *What I Saw at the Revolution: A Political Life in the Reagan Era*, 86.

to the speech: “[T]he Rangers were going to be sitting all together in the front rows, sitting right there five feet from the president. . . . Well then he should refer directly to them. He should talk to them. He should describe what they did and then say—. . . . ‘These are the boys of Pointe du Hoc.’”⁶⁴⁴ By talking “directly to them,” Reagan could celebrate their heroic actions and call on his audience to show similar resolve and bravery in the fight between democracy and communism.

The bodily presence of these U.S. Army Rangers—and the thousands buried in the American Memorial Cemetery down the road—triggered another important symbolic link in the mind of at least one member of the speechwriting time. In a miscellaneous series of notes in the speechwriting files for this address, an unidentified author scratched out the following passage from Thucydides’ famed account of Pericles’ Funeral Oration:

For her[oes] have the E[arth] for their tomb; and in lands far from their own, where the column w/ its epitaph declares it, there is enshrined in every breast a record unwritten w/ no tablet to preserve it, except that of the heart.⁶⁴⁵

Below this paragraph, the author wrote: “Remind people this was written in [the] 400 b.c. Funeral oration of Pericles.”⁶⁴⁶ Although the date of Pericles’ oration was incorrect, the author of these notes obviously knew his or her history enough to recognize that Reagan’s speech at Pointe du Hoc followed the ancient Athenian tradition of memorializing the dead through public speech. This specific quotation suggests the

⁶⁴⁴ Noonan explained that this line came easily because she had just read Roger Kahn’s memoir of the Brooklyn Dodgers, *The Boys of Summer*. See Noonan, *What I Saw at the Revolution: A Political Life in the Reagan Era*, 87.

⁶⁴⁵ This passage is almost identical to Thucydides’ actual account. The only differences are that “her” is actually “heroes” and “E” stands in for “earth.”

⁶⁴⁶ Miscellaneous Note, no date, folder “President’s Trip to Normandy (4),” Box 161, White House Office of Speechwriting: Research Office, 1981-1989, Ronald Reagan Library.

commemorative function Reagan's speech would fulfill. Although he would not confront the immediate shock of death in 1984, he would use this occasion to honor the heroes of D-Day who epitomized the values driving the Allied forces in 1944: freedom from tyranny, love of country, and moral resolve. Just as the citizens of Athens would listen to a revered orator deliver a eulogy over the dead, Reagan's audience would hear the president retell the story of Pointe du Hoc to the very men who enacted the daring feat forty years earlier.

And yet, it would be naïve to assume that the White House had no political goals behind Reagan's trip to Normandy, particularly in the lead up to the 1984 presidential election in November. As Secretary of State George P. Schultz wrote to Reagan in May, "[t]he public relations highlight of your trip to Europe will undoubtedly be the celebrations in Normandy. . . . [t]he intense media interest provides an opportunity for you personally, and allied leaders as a group, to reach an unprecedented audience on both sides of the Atlantic."⁶⁴⁷ In a February 1984 memorandum, the campaign stressed the importance of using "the pre-convention period to positively reinforce the President's image as President and leader,"⁶⁴⁸ and the president's trip to Europe was a key element of this strategy. As Robert McFarlane wrote in a confidential memorandum to White House deputy chief of staff Michael Deaver in May 1984, the "Primary Perception" the White House sought to advance was that of a "Strong President and the American Renewal:

⁶⁴⁷ Schultz to Reagan, May 14, 1984, Reagan Library.

⁶⁴⁸ "Election Year Scheduling," February 27, 1984, 3, folder "Election Year Scheduling (Binder) – 2/27/1984," Series IV: Subject Files, Files of Michael Deaver, Box 33, Ronald Reagan Library.

assertive leadership is essential to world peace and prosperity.”⁶⁴⁹ Deaver planned to use footage of the president’s speech at Pointe du Hoc during the 1984 Republican National Convention, and a campaign camera crew shadowed Reagan throughout the D-Day festivities to secure the perfect visuals for campaign television commercials later in the fall.

The White House capitalized on this widespread media coverage, even granting CBS anchor Walter Cronkite (the same broadcaster who interviewed General Eisenhower in Normandy twenty years earlier) an exclusive interview with Reagan just after the president’s speech at Pointe du Hoc. Five days before the event, Michael Dobbs of the *Washington Post* offered a synopsis of the White House’s adaptation for prime time:

With its gaze firmly fixed on the presidential elections in November, the White House has been anxious to see that photogenic ceremonies coincide with breakfast-time television back home. A speech by Reagan at the Pointe du Hoc, scene of a heroic assault by 225 U.S. Rangers to seize a gun emplacement at the top of a 100-foot cliff, will be beamed back live by all major U.S. networks Wednesday morning. Pool arrangements between U.S., French and British television stations will provide live coverage by over 30 camera crews of ceremonies at the American cemetery above Omaha Beach and at Utah Beach. . . . Each network is planning to deploy its big guns, from Walter Cronkite broadcasting live from Pointe du Hoc for CBS to Ted Koppel hosting a one-hour reconstruction of the D-Day events on ABC’s Nightline. The biggest effort is

⁶⁴⁹ “Preserving Peace and Prosperity: The President’s Trip to Europe, June 1984 (Public Diplomacy Action Plan),” 2, Reagan Library.

being mounted by NBC, which has hired its own satellite ground station and is fielding 12 camera crews.⁶⁵⁰

In the days leading up to the fortieth anniversary of D-Day, numerous television programs, radio specials, and newspaper articles also set the stage for the president's trip by interpreting the events of June 6, 1944, for the U.S. public. In May, NBC⁶⁵¹ and CBS⁶⁵² aired evening specials on the Allied preparations for and rehearsals of D-Day. The week before the anniversary, NBC Nightly News featured a five-part special offering a play-by-play of June 6, 1944.⁶⁵³ Newspapers around the country editorialized the meaning and significance of D-Day, with op-ed columnists often drawing comparisons between 1944 and the current Cold War.

One particular article is worth mentioning here, because it accurately predicted key elements of Reagan's speech at Pointe du Hoc and an underlined copy sits in Noonan's speechwriting files at the Reagan Library. *Time* columnist Lance Morrow underscored the anniversary of D-Day as a commemorative event, one that would encourage the U.S. public to reflect on its heroic action at Normandy and apply these moral lessons to the present moment.

⁶⁵⁰ Michael Dobbs, "Normandy Braces Itself for Another Invasion," *Washington Post*, June 1, 1984. Clipping included in Current News: Special Edition, D-Day + 40 Years, 24 July 1984, 1-2, White House Office of Speechwriting, Research Office, 1981-1989, Box 161, Folder: President's Trip to Normandy (5), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.

⁶⁵¹ "NBC Saturday Night News, NBC TV, 6:30 PM, May 19, D-Day Rehearsal Tragedy." Transcript of broadcast included in Current News: Special Edition, D-Day + 40 Years, 23 July 1984, 83, White House Office of Speechwriting, Research Office, 1981-1989, Box 161, Folder: President's Trip to Normandy (5), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.

⁶⁵² "CBS Saturday Evening News, CBS TV, 6:30 PM, May 26, D-Day Anniversary." Transcript of broadcast included in Current News: Special Edition, D-Day + 40 Years, 23 July 1984, 84-85, White House Office of Speechwriting, Research Office, 1981-1989, Box 161, Folder: President's Trip to Normandy (5), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.

⁶⁵³ For the transcripts of this NBC *Nightly News* five-part special, see Current News: Special Edition, D-Day + 40 Years, 23 July 1984, 86-91, White House Office of Speechwriting, Research Office, 1981-1989, Box 161, Folder: President's Trip to Normandy (5), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.

The ceremonies in Normandy will celebrate the victory and mourn the dead. They will also mourn, almost subliminally, a certain moral clarity that has been lost, a sense of common purpose that has all but evaporated. Never again, perhaps, would the Allies so handsomely collaborate. The invasion of Normandy was a thunderously heroic blow dealt to the evil empire. Never again, it may be, would war seem so unimpeachably right, so necessary and just. Never again, perhaps, would American power and morality so perfectly coincide.⁶⁵⁴

In this article, explains historian Douglas Brinkley, Morrow demonstrated “how the D-Day story had spellbinding, redemptive qualities that Reagan could sell to Cold War America. . . . Morrow, perhaps placing himself into the President’s mind-set or psyche, explained D-Day to *Time* readers as an American religious fable or sterling folklore moment.”⁶⁵⁵ Of course, Morrow’s decision to describe Nazi Germany as “the evil empire” was most certainly a direct reference to Reagan’s earlier characterization of the Soviet Union in 1983. Although the extent to which this article influenced Noonan’s writing is not clear, it accurately predicted how Reagan’s address at Pointe du Hoc would tap into the mythic heroism of the U.S. Army Rangers’ actions on D-Day.

June 6, 1984

When Reagan commemorated the fortieth anniversary of D-Day at Pointe du Hoc, he celebrated the heroic actions of the Allied soldiers, connected their valor and sacrifice to the present moment, and called for future action worthy of this sacrifice. Reflecting on

⁶⁵⁴ Morrow, "June 6, 1944."

⁶⁵⁵ Brinkley, *The Boys of Pointe du Hoc: Ronald Reagan, D-Day, and the U.S. Army 2nd Ranger Battalion*, 147.

the speech in 2004, *Washington Post* reporter and Reagan biographer Lou Cannon described the address as “elegiac,” a term that captures the cadence or repeated rhythms adopted by Greek poets to recite national history and memorialize the dead.⁶⁵⁶ Where most fables or folklore ask the audience to imagine the story in their minds, Reagan physically displayed (*epideixis*) the heroes of his narrative in the very place where they enacted their daring feats forty years earlier. In what follows, I analyze how Reagan utilized deictic spatial and temporal indicators to situate his audience in place and time while also “reminding [the audience] of the past and projecting the course of the future.”⁶⁵⁷ I argue that the bodies of the U.S. Army Rangers and Pointe du Hoc as place provided a tangible link between past and present, an enthymematic rhetorical resource that visually and physically displayed the lessons of Normandy—courage, sacrifice, moral resolve—to the world. And yet it was not enough to simply see the cliffs or the bodies withered with age. Instead, I contend that what made Reagan’s speech so powerful was how he ascribed meaning and value to “the boys of Pointe du Hoc” and “this place where the West held together.” As my analysis will show, Reagan’s references to bodies, place, and time offered a powerful nationalistic narrative that drew on the past for inspiration while casting a hopeful vision or the future. Each and every time he pointed his audience to the sixty-two U.S. Army Rangers seated beside him, the president reaffirmed their status as military heroes and linked their actions to the larger Allied operation on June 6, 1984, forever cementing their status in the annals of U.S. history.

⁶⁵⁶ Lou Cannon, “At 40th D-Day Tribute, Reagan Took the Occasion by Storm,” *Washington Post*, June 7, 2004.

⁶⁵⁷ Aristotle, *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse*, 1.3.4.

President Reagan spoke with his back to the English Channel with the “boys of Pointe du Hoc” seated on both sides of him. This staging was deliberate. A miscellaneous note scratched on the back of a White House notepad described the set up: “RR stands in front of memorial dagger w/ Rangers, Mrs. Rudder & Mrs. Reagan seated in front on same level – In horseshoe – vets dependents[,] other veterans[,] VIP – military brass[,] official. RR won’t even be announced. No one else speaks.”⁶⁵⁸ This arrangement had several important effects. Although U.S. presidents most often speak from an elevated podium or platform at some distance from the audience, Reagan would situate himself on the “same level” as the U.S. Army Rangers. The president and the “boys of Pointe du Hoc” would be featured together on the elevated stage, with the larger audience assembled around the stage in a “horseshoe” formation. This allowed two rhetorical exchanges to occur simultaneously. In the first, Reagan would speak directly to an intimate group of sixty-two U.S. Army Rangers who had fought to secure the very ground on which they sat. In the second, the physical display (*epideixis*) of the U.S. Army Rangers’ bodies would work rhetorically alongside Reagan. For the broader audience assembled around the stage—and the millions watching over live television—it would be impossible to look at Reagan without seeing the aged soldiers sitting on either side of him. The second part of the note reveals an unusual departure from protocol. The president would not be announced to the audience, but instead would just walk up behind the podium (which did not contain the typical presidential seal) and begin to speak. This

⁶⁵⁸ Miscellaneous Note, no date, folder “President’s Trip to Normandy (4),” Box 161, White House Office of Speechwriting: Research Office, 1981-1989, Ronald Reagan Library.

decision worked as a subtle reminder that the president was not the featured headliner of this event. Instead, “the boys of Pointe du Hoc” were the main attraction.

Reagan’s Address at Pointe du Hoc

Reagan began his address by noting the significance of this historical occasion: “*We’re here to mark that day in history* when the Allied armies joined in battle to reclaim *this continent* to liberty.”⁶⁵⁹ In his very first sentence, the president situated his audience in time and place. “*We*”—he and the rest of the audience, both those assembled at Normandy and the millions watching via television—were gathered “*here*” at the cliffs of Pointe du Hoc to “*mark*” or commemorate an event in the past. The verb tenses in this first sentence signal the first temporal shift: “*we’re* [we are] *here*” in the present moment to look backward to “*that day*” in history. The president’s use of “*that*” directed his audience to the past even as he noted that the Allied actions on “*that day*” secured “*this continent*”—the very ground upon which his immediate audience was seated—for liberty. Reagan then invited the audience to imagine the historical context of June 6, 1944: “For *4 long years, much of Europe* had been under a terrible shadow. Free nations had fallen, Jews cried out in the camps, millions cried out for liberation. Europe was enslaved, and the world prayed for its rescue.” The temporal marker of “*4 long years*” reminded the audience of the duration of Hitler’s shadow across the continent. The lack of conjunctions underscored the relationships among these events, and Reagan’s dual use of “cried” emphasized the horror of Nazi occupation and the concentration camps, as if

⁶⁵⁹ Reagan, “Remarks at a Ceremony Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the Normandy Invasion, D-day.” All successive quotations from here unless otherwise noted. Deictic indicators have been bolded and italicized.

the suffering continued, unbound, with no end in sight. These stylistic devices created a distinct rhythm that set the tone—solemn, reverent, patriotic—for the rest of the speech.

After situating his audience in the present moment while pointing them toward the past (“*we’re here to mark that day in history*”), Reagan rooted his audience in place:

“*Here in Normandy* the rescue began. *Here* the Allies stood and fought against tyranny in a giant undertaking unparalleled in human history.” The successive use of “*here*” reminded audience that this place was a marker not only on the timeline of “human history,” but also the physical location where the Allied rescue of Europe began. “*We stand on a lonely, windswept point on the northern shore of France*,” Reagan continued. In this sentence, the president defined the physical scene and setting (this place was “lonely” and “windswept”) even as he located his audience geographically on the cliffs of Normandy. Although the air was now “soft,” Reagan reminded his audience that “*40 years ago at this moment*, the air was dense with smoke and the cries of men, and the air was filled with the crack of rifle fire and the roar of cannon.” Again, the president transported his audience back in time to what had happened in this place. These powerful metaphors of sight, sound, and smell made the realities of war viscerally present. Booming verbs such as “crack” and “roar” anchored the sentence, causing it to flow rhythmically and heavily, almost like the sharp popping of artillery.

After positioning the audience in time and place, Reagan moved from a general description of the events at Normandy to a vivid description of what happened at this exact spot—Pointe du Hoc:

At dawn, on the morning of the 6th of June, 1944, 225 Rangers jumped off the British landing craft and ran to *the bottom of these cliffs*. Their mission was one of the most difficult and daring of the invasion: to climb *these sheer and desolate cliffs* and take out the enemy guns. The Allies had been told that some of the mightiest of these guns were *here* and they would be trained *on the beaches* to stop the Allied advance. The Rangers *looked up* and saw the enemy soldiers -- *the edge of the cliffs* shooting *down at them* with machineguns and throwing grenades. And the American Rangers began to climb. They shot rope ladders *over the face of these cliffs* and began to pull themselves *up*. When one Ranger fell, another would take his place. When one rope was cut, a Ranger would grab another and begin his climb again. They climbed, shot back, and held their footing. Soon, one by one, the Rangers pulled themselves *over the top*, and in seizing *the firm land at the top of these cliffs*, they began to seize back *the continent of Europe*. Two hundred and twenty-five came *here*. After 2 days of fighting, only 90 could still bear arms.

In this passage, Reagan relied on what was visually evident and physically present:

“these sheer and desolate cliffs,” the beachhead at *“the bottom of these cliffs,”* the hazardous climb to *“the top of these cliffs.”* These repeated references to the jagged boulders lining the shore of France fused Reagan’s spoken texts with its material context. *“These cliffs”* offered a powerful material testament to the courage, bravery, and sacrifice of the 225 U.S. Army Rangers who persevered under heavy German artillery fire to make it to the top of the embankment. Through deictic indicators (*“these cliffs”*) and vivid

verbal imagery, Reagan transported the audience back to the sights, sounds, and smells of the past, inviting them to respond kinesthetically with the Rangers who jumped and ran to the bottom of the cliffs upon which they were seated.

After providing this vivid historical account of the U.S. Army Rangers' heroic climb at Pointe du Hoc, Reagan made the past immediately present by introducing the human actors of his narrative:

Behind me is a memorial that symbolizes the Ranger daggers that were thrust into *the top of these cliffs*. And *before me* are *the men* who put them *there*. *These* are *the boys of Pointe du Hoc*. *These* are *the men who took the cliffs*. *These* are *the champions who helped free a continent*. *These* are *the heroes who helped end a war*.

To Reagan's immediate audience and the millions watching via television, it would have been impossible to look at the president and not see the sixty-two U.S. Army Rangers seated on either side of him. With the physical presence of these aged soldiers immediately before the eyes of all who were watching, Reagan amplified these visual images by pointing to these heroes with his words: "*These* are *the boys of Pointe du Hoc*." The president used the same word, "*these*," to describe the physical scene and heroes of the historical narrative. This word choice allowed Reagan to draw the audience's attention to the jagged rocks directly behind him and the elderly men in front of him. In a climax construction, Reagan redefined how this struggle had changed these warriors. Initially, they were "the boys of Pointe du Hoc"—a poetic description of their relative youth on June 6, 1944. But they were more than boys. Reagan described the U.S.

Army Rangers' climb as a movement of maturity; as they took the cliffs, they were transformed from boys to men, champions, and heroes who represented the thousands of men who fought at Normandy forty years earlier. In this way, Reagan's physical display of the U.S. Army Rangers' bodies offered a tangible instantiation of the sacrifices of D-Day while also shifting the discourse from the immediate to the imaginary.

With the aged soldiers now front and center for his immediate and extended audience, Reagan linked these brave men to other Allied troops, using vignettes vivid in their specificity to describe other soldiers and nations who had fought beside the U.S. Army Rangers. Scottish soldier Bill Millin of the 51st Highlanders cheerfully played his bagpipes as he led a group of reinforcements to rescue British soldiers trapped near a bridge, and Lord Lovat of Scotland apologized for being "a few minutes late" coming from "the bloody fighting on Sword Beach, which he and his men had just taken." There were others, too. Reagan praised the "impossible valor of the Poles who threw themselves between the enemy and the rest of Europe as the invasion took hold, and the unsurpassed courage of the Canadians who had already seen the horrors of war on this coast. They knew what awaited them there, but they would not be deterred." Reagan enumerated "a rollcall of honor": the Royal Winnipeg Rifles, Poland's 24th Lancers, the Royal Scots Fusiliers, the Screaming Eagles, the Yeomen of England's armored divisions, the forces of Free France, and the Coast Guard's "Matchbox Fleet." By specifically naming these groups, the president made their sacrifices present to the assembled audience and emphasized that the U.S. Rangers had not won the battle alone.

This listing also underscored the need for Allied cooperation in the present-day struggle against Soviet communism.

After recognizing the other nations who fought to free Europe in this historical narrative, Reagan returned to the present moment and spoke directly to the heroes of his story. “*Forty summers have passed* since the battle that *you* fought *here*.” In this first sentence, the president emphasized the passing of time while also emphasizing the inextricable link between this place and the events that unfolded on June 6, 1984.

Although “*forty summers [had] passed*,” the physical presence of the elderly veterans “*here*” at Pointe du Hoc reinforced the importance of this place and this commemorative occasion. Reagan then contrasted the U.S. Army Rangers’ physical appearance in the present moment with their youth in 1944:

You were young the day *you* took *these cliffs*; some of *you* were hardly more than boys, with the deepest joys of life before *you*. Yet, *you* risked everything *here*. Why? Why did *you* do it? What impelled *you* to put aside the instinct for self-preservation and risk *your lives* to take *these cliffs*? What inspired all the men of the armies that met *here*? *We* look at *you*, and somehow *we* know the answer. It was faith and belief. It was loyalty and love.

As Reagan translated the heroic actions of the men sitting before him, their physical bodies displayed the lessons of Normandy that so many U.S. presidents had referenced earlier. The enthymematic argument Reagan started developing was this: if these men had been willing to risk their lives and give up the “deepest joys of life” to free other

nations and defend their own country from Nazi tyranny, the United States had a moral obligation to follow their example forty years later.

The president continued his interpretation of the soldiers' bravery, extending the U.S. Army Rangers' action at Pointe du Hoc to the broader Allied alliance in 1944—and 1984.

The *men of Normandy* had faith that what *they* were doing was right, faith that *they* fought for all humanity, faith that a just God would grant *them* mercy on *this beachhead* or on the next. It was the deep knowledge -- and pray God *we* have not lost it -- that there is a profound, moral difference between the use of force for liberation and the use of force for conquest.

Again, the president's verbal pointing to the U.S. Army Rangers—and, by extension, all those who fought on D-Day—made their faith, courage, and sacrifice physically present. Reagan emphasized that the “*men of Normandy*” fought a battle “for all humanity,” and explained that it was this enduring belief in the justice of their cause that motivated the Allied forces forty years earlier. This reflection on the past quickly shifted to the immediate present when the president expressed his hope that the Allies had not forgotten the “profound, moral difference” between liberation and conquest. The president then interpreted the U.S. Army Rangers' action in light of this moral lesson: “*You* were *here* to liberate, not to conquer, and so *you* and *those others* did not doubt *your* cause. And *you* were right not to doubt.” Although Reagan did not mention U.S. military action after World War II explicitly, his language implied that any involvement by the United States overseas designed to “liberate, not to conquer” should receive similar support from the

citizenry and government officials—such as military campaigns more recent in the U.S. public’s memory, such as Vietnam and Grenada.⁶⁶⁰ “*You all* knew that some things are worth dying for,” Reagan continued. “One’s country is worth dying for, and democracy is worth dying for, because it’s the most deeply honorable form of government ever devised by man. *All of you* loved liberty. *All of you* were willing to fight tyranny, and *you* knew the people of *your* countries were behind *you*.” This bold claim positioned democratic freedom above all other governmental structures, in particular the “tyranny” the men of Normandy came to fight.

Reagan continued the narrative by linking the U.S. Army Rangers seated in front of him with concrete examples of civic patriotism on the home front and faith-filled soldiers at Normandy forty years earlier:

The Americans who fought *here* that morning knew word of the invasion was spreading through the darkness back home. *They* . . . felt in *their* hearts, though *they* couldn’t know in fact, that *in Georgia they* were filling the churches at 4 a.m., *in Kansas they* were kneeling on their porches and praying, and *in Philadelphia they* were ringing the Liberty Bell.

Reagan’s use of “*they*” applied not just to the U.S. soldiers fighting at Normandy, but the U.S. public in their specific locales—Georgia, Kansas, and Philadelphia. This inclusive pronoun worked to unify the Allied soldiers with their family members, neighbors, and friends and emphasized that the events of D-Day encompassed the patriotic citizenry

⁶⁶⁰ A miscellaneous note in the speechwriting files suggested that the president should tie the U.S. Army Rangers’ action in 1944 to the 1983 Grenada invasion: “Tie Rangers of WWII to Modern Rangers; Point Salinas in Grenada.” Miscellaneous comment on back of page, folder “President’s Trip to Normandy (8),” Box 162, White House Office of Speechwriting: Research Office, 1981-1989, Ronald Reagan Library.

back home. But there was “[s]omething else [that] helped *the men of D-day*,” Reagan explained: “*their* rockhard belief that Providence would have a great hand in the events that would unfold *here*; that God was an ally in this great cause.” In language quite similar to Eisenhower and Roosevelt forty years earlier, Reagan described D-Day as a “great cause” that went far beyond one soldier, commander, or Allied nation. Instead, the president argued that God was behind “the events that would unfold *here*” at Normandy on June 6, 1944. Again, sharply drawn examples made that point intensely. He told of Lt. Col. Robert Lee Wolverton, commander of the 101st Airborne Division of the U.S. Army, who, when he asked his parachute troops to kneel with him in prayer, said: “Do not bow your heads, but look up so you can see God and ask His blessing in what we’re about to do.” He told of General Matthew Ridgway, who relied for strength on the Bible, “listening in the darkness for the promise God made to Joshua: ‘I will not fail thee nor forsake thee.’” Reagan recreated the battle, the fears and hopes of those who fought there, and in so doing recreated intense patriotic and religious feelings about the rightness of the cause for which the U.S. and Allied forces fought and died.

Reagan then signaled a subtle shift in his narrative by summarizing: “*These* are the things that impelled *them*; *these* are the things that shaped the unity of the Allies.” Trusting in the moral uprightness of their cause, the support of their fellow citizens back at home, and the providence of God, the Allied soldiers (and the nations they represented) unified around a common goal: freeing Europe from Nazi tyranny and ensuring that other nations would remain free. After focusing the first half of his speech on the events of June 6, 1944, the president continued the historical narrative up to the present moment—

all while still relying on the place of Normandy and the U.S. Army Rangers' bodies as tangible evidence. "When the war was over, there were lives to be rebuilt and governments to be returned to the people. There were nations to be reborn. Above all, there was a new peace to be assured. These were huge and daunting tasks. But the Allies summoned strength from the faith, belief, loyalty, and love of *those who fell here*." Despite the difficulties of the post-war years in Europe and the rest of the world, Reagan argued that the Allies found inspiration because of the courage and sacrifice of those who died at Normandy. Again, the bodily presence of the sixty-two U.S. Army Rangers seated on stage offered a vivid reminder of the thousands who fought to free France. Here men fell and died while holding true to their faith, belief, loyalty, and love; thus, it was here, at Normandy, that strength and resolve could be found for the future.

From this inspiration, Reagan explained, the Allies "rebuilt a new Europe together." The United States "did its part, creating the Marshall plan to help rebuild *our allies* and *our former enemies*. The Marshall plan led to the Atlantic alliance -- a great alliance that serves *to this day* as *our shield* for freedom, for prosperity, and for peace." This emphasis on unity and cooperation was also fraught with spatial metaphors. What had been decimated by war, famine, and poverty was rebuilt through reconciliation and joint resolve. Those who were once enemies—most notably, the German people—were now friends and allies, and this friendship provided "*our shield*" for freedom (and against the spread of communism). Despite these shared efforts, "not all that *followed* the end of the war was happy or planned. Some liberated countries were lost. The great sadness of this loss echoes *down to our own time* in the streets of *Warsaw, Prague, and East*

Berlin.” The “loss” of nations to Soviet communism was a bitter blow still evident in specific foreign locations. Warsaw, Prague, and East Berlin offered tangible examples of the Soviet march across Europe:

Soviet troops that came to *the center of this continent* did not leave when peace came. *They’re* still *there*, uninvited, unwanted, unyielding, almost *40 years after the war*. Because of this, allied forces still stand on *this continent*. *Today*, as *40 years ago*, *our armies* are *here* for only one purpose -- to protect and defend democracy. The only territories *we* hold are *memorials like this one* and *graveyards where our heroes rest*.

Here Reagan used spatial and temporal indicators to emphasize the problems of the present moment. Unlike the Allied troops who came to Normandy “to liberate, and not to conquer,” Russian troops came and never left. It was because of their continued presence in places like Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany that the United States (and other Western nations) had stayed. Their one purpose, argued Reagan, was “to protect and defend democracy”—a mission that, according to his earlier historical narrative, was good and right. In this interpretation, the present-day Soviet presence in Europe was a continuation of the Second World War. How could the Allies not continue to defend the principles for which so many fought and died on June 6, 1944?

In the final minutes of the speech, Reagan offered the moral to this story, what was to be learned from these events:

We in America have learned bitter lessons from two World Wars: It is better to be *here* ready to protect the peace, than to take blind shelter *across the sea*, rushing

to respond only after freedom is lost. *We*’ve learned that isolationism never was and never will be an acceptable response to tyrannical governments with an expansionist intent.

It was more important to be “*here*”—here in Normandy and here in Europe—than living in willful ignorance on the other side of the world, Reagan argued. This was the lesson of the nation’s isolationist impulse prior to U.S. entry into World War II. The underlying implication was that earlier U.S. action against Nazi Germany would have saved thousands of lives—including those who died here at Pointe du Hoc. Yet learning was not enough; specific actions were necessary. “[*W*]e try always to be prepared for peace; prepared to deter aggression; prepared to negotiate the reduction of arms; and yes, prepared to reach out again in the spirit of reconciliation.” The rhythm underscored the importance of preparation to respond to possibilities and risks. Reagan stated that the United States welcomed reconciliation with the Soviet Union so that both countries could “lessen the risks of war, now and forever.” The shift was subtle and somewhat unexpected, the language reflecting a desire to reunite in an effort that echoed their past alliance.

This spirit of reconciliation was underscored by Reagan’s public recognition of Russian casualties during World War II. “It’s fitting to remember here the great losses also suffered by the Russian people during World War II: 20 million perished, a terrible price that testifies to all the world the necessity of ending war.” This mention was a last minute addition by the National Security Council and State Department. Officials pushed the speechwriting staff to include this line, noting that “an addition of a short paragraph

alluding to Soviet losses . . . will assist us in maintaining the moral high ground we have secured in our public diplomacy struggle with the Soviets.”⁶⁶¹ This mention also served as an indirect refutation to Soviet press reports charging that the president was attempting to “falsify the historic events of 40 years ago” and discount the Soviet’s role in defeating Hitler.⁶⁶² This acknowledgement of the millions of Russian citizens who perished during World War II humanized the Soviets. They, too, had lost men, women, and children—including the more than 4 million that died during the siege of Leningrad.⁶⁶³ Reagan’s statement also worked as a metaphorical olive branch to the Russians. “*I tell **you** from **my** heart that **we in the United States** do not want war. **We** want to wipe from the face of the Earth the terrible weapons that man now has in his hands.*” Although the president’s use of “**you**” could have referred to his immediate audience, it also could be interpreted as referring to Soviet leaders. He most certainly was aware that the Russians were listening to his speech, and Reagan’s personal admission “from [his] heart” made the point intensely personal. However, Reagan placed responsibility on the Soviet Union, stating that the Russians needed to demonstrate a willingness to work together with the United States and other Western allies. “***We** look for some sign from **the Soviet Union** that **they***

⁶⁶¹ Memorandum, Robert M. Kimmitt to Richard G. Darman, June 1, 1984, folder “President’s Trip to Normandy (11),” Box 162, White House Office of Speechwriting: Research Office, 1981-1989, Ronald Reagan Library.

⁶⁶² Two Soviet television programs that ran the week before Reagan’s speech in Prague and Moscow blasted the president for the upcoming “propaganda hullabaloo” in Normandy. “Normandy Ceremony to be Propaganda Show,” aired on Moscow Television Service in Russian on May 30, 1984. See also “West Said to Minimize USSR’s World War II Role,” aired on Prague Television Service in Czech and Slovak on May 27, 1984. Transcripts of broadcasts included in Current News: Special Edition, D-Day + 40 Years, 23 July 1984, 77-78, White House Office of Speechwriting, Research Office, 1981-1989, Box 161, Folder: President’s Trip to Normandy (5), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.

⁶⁶³ Historian Michael Walzer writes that “[m]ore civilians died in the siege of Leningrad than in the modernist infernos of Hamburg, Dresden, Tokyo, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki, taken together.” Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2006), 160. For more specific details, see David Glantz, *The Siege of Leningrad 1941-44: 900 Days of Terror* (Osceola, WI: Zenith Press, 2001).

are willing to *move forward*, that *they* share *our* desire and love for peace, and that *they* will give up the ways of conquest. There must be a changing there that will allow *us* to turn *our hope* into action.”

After describing his vision for a post-Cold War world, Reagan shifted his audience back to the present moment, immediate scene, and the bodies of the U.S. Army Rangers on stage. In these final sentences of his address, Reagan spoke as national priest, evoking themes of civic patriotism and religious ritual. “*We* will pray *forever* that *some day* that changing will come,” he said. This language recalled the prayers of the faithful who watched and prayed for some event to be realized in the future. “But for *now*, particularly *today*,” Reagan continued, “it is good and fitting to renew *our commitment* to each other, to *our freedom*, and to the alliance that protects it.” The president’s temporal references to “*now*” and “*today*” reminded his audience of their present obligation as witnesses (*theōros*) to what happened at Normandy forty years earlier. Today, on this commemorative occasion, how should they respond? Today, admonished the president, “it [was] good and fitting to renew *our commitment* to each other,” the principles of democracy, and the Western alliance that kept those ideals safe. Reagan’s choice of “good and fitting” mirrored Lincoln’s statement that “[i]t [was] altogether fitting and proper” that he and the rest of the audience would dedicate the fields at Gettysburg.⁶⁶⁴ Both of these phrases reflected a much earlier religious ritual: the prayer that immediately precedes the Eucharist in which the priest leads the congregation in a call and response. After the priest says, “Let us give thanks unto our Lord God,” the

⁶⁶⁴ Abraham Lincoln, “Address at the Dedication of the National Cemetery at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania,” November 19, 1863, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, accessed March 23, 2016, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=73959>.

congregants respond: “It is right and meet to do so.” More contemporary versions list the congregation’s response as: “It is right to give him thanks and praise.”⁶⁶⁵ Although few in Reagan’s immediate and extended audience would have made the connection between Reagan’s language and these canonical texts of U.S. civil religion and Christianity, the cadence was strikingly similar, encouraging those in attendance and watching around the world that now was the time for communal reflection, dedication, and a renewed commitment to the ideals and values of U.S. democracy.

The president’s concluding words continued this religious ritual as he reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to its Western allies. “*We* are bound *today* by what bound *us 40 years ago*, the same loyalties, traditions, and beliefs. *We’re* bound by reality. The strength of America’s allies is vital to the United States, and the American security guarantee is essential to the continued freedom of Europe’s democracies.” Reagan’s use of “bound” implied a covenanting; here, in this place where Allied troops fought and died together for freedom, he was renewing the United States’ commitment to defending liberty against Soviet communism.⁶⁶⁶ Moreover, the temporal shift between “*today*” and “*40 years ago*” reaffirmed the enduring covenant that neither time nor distance could sever. The president continued:

⁶⁶⁵ See Samuel Leuenberger, *Archbishop Cranmer's Immortal Bequest: The Book of Common Prayer of the Church of England: An Evangelistic Liturgy*, trans. Samuel Leuenberger and Lewis J. Gorin (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 1990), 306.

⁶⁶⁶ For more on Ronald Reagan’s covenanting rhetoric, see Margaret H. Kunde, “Ronald Reagan and the Resurgence of the Puritan Covenantal Tradition: The ‘City on a Hill’ and a Reorientation of the People of the United States into an ‘Economy of Grace’” (PhD diss., University of Minnesota, 2012), accessed March 2016, <http://search.proquest.com.ezp2.lib.umn.edu/dissertations/docview/1037989601/3F2A62C9E6DB4A74PQ/1?accountid=14586>.

We were with *you then*; *we* are with *you now*. *Your* hopes are *our* hopes, and *your* destiny is *our* destiny. *Here*, in *this place where the West held together*, let *us* make a vow to *our* dead. Let *us* show *them* by *our* actions that *we* understand what *they* died for. Let *our* actions say to *them* the words for which Matthew Ridgway listened: “I will not fail thee nor forsake thee.” Strengthened by *their* courage and heartened by *their* value [valor], and borne by *their* memory, let *us continue to stand* for the ideals for which *they* lived and died.

In this moving conclusion, Reagan employed deictic pronouns to shift between describing the United States (“*we*”; “*our*”) and their Allied partners (“*you*”; “*your*”) in the present moment (“*now*”) to those who fought at Normandy forty years earlier (“*our dead*”). It was “[*h*]ere, in *this place where the West held together*,” that the president called on the United States and other Western democracies to make a solemn vow—a vow not just to each other, but “to *our* dead.” Again, the bodily presence of the sixty-two U.S. Army Rangers who climbed the cliffs at Pointe du Hoc offered a tangible display (*epideixis*) of those men who had lived and died to liberate Europe. How could all freedom-loving nations not vow to honor their sacrifice and the thousands who perished on these very beaches forty years earlier? Just as the Allies had found strength in the “faith, belief, loyalty, and love” of the Allied soldiers during the post-war reconstruction of Europe, Reagan argued that the United States and the rest of the world had a moral responsibility to continue that mission in the present and future. Here, on this “lonely, windswept point on the northern shore of France,” Reagan rededicated this “place where the West held together” and constituted his immediate and extended audiences as

witnesses (*theōros*). Although many in the immediate audience were not present at Pointe du Hoc in 1944, the president invited them to become fellow soldiers for the cause of democratic freedom and demonstrate their moral resolve to “stand for the ideals for which [the Allied soldiers in 1944] lived and died.” This commemoration in place was particularly powerful because Reagan featured sixty-two U.S. Army Rangers to amplify his argument visually. These veterans—the real eyewitnesses to June 6, 1944—provided a living, breathing link between the past and the present.

In this analysis, I have shown how Reagan employed references to bodies, place, and time to fuse his spoken text with its immediate context. This close textual reading reveals how the president relied on what was physically present as a material means of persuasion. However, the majority of Reagan’s audience was not at Normandy. Instead, they were watching via live network news. Thus, to fully appreciate the extended appeal of Reagan’s speech at Pointe du Hoc, I turn to a discussion of the news network coverage of Reagan’s commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of D-Day to show how the president’s rhetoric in place was mediated and circulated in the United States and throughout Western Europe.

The Mediation and Circulation of Reagan’s Rhetoric in Place

The White House timed the Reagan’s address at Pointe du Hoc so it would be broadcast live on U.S. networks over the morning news.⁶⁶⁷ According to the White House

⁶⁶⁷ The “Draft Notional Schedule – Trip of the President to Europe” dated May 7, 1984, specified that Reagan would arrive at the Pointe du Hoc landing zone at 8:20 am EDT (2:20 pm local time), tour the Ranger Memorial for ten minutes with two survivors of the Pointe du Hoc landing, and begin his “Remarks to assembled Veterans and unveiling of plaque commemorating Point [*sic*] du Hoc” at 8:40 am EDT (2:40

Daily Diary, President and Mrs. Reagan arrived at Pointe du Hoc via Marine One at 8:02 am Eastern Daylight Time (2:02 pm France Daylight Time) and departed for Omaha Beach exactly one hour and one minute later.⁶⁶⁸ This hour slot perfectly coincided with television news network morning broadcasts, ensuring that Reagan's speech would receive full coverage. Sweeping panorama shots of Pointe du Hoc (what CNN anchor Bernard Shaw described as "the point of reverence") transported viewers to the beaches of Normandy, and camera crews followed the President and Mrs. Reagan as they inspected the concrete German Bunkers and walked along the edge of the cliffs. To the millions watching in the United States and throughout Western Europe, this live coverage offered a unique front row seat to Reagan's commemoration in place. Viewers heard the waves crashing against the rocky shore below and saw gusts of wind blow Reagan's hair out of place. A lone seagull flew out over the English Channel as Reagan spoke. Although it was impossible to fully appreciate the multisensory dimensions of Pointe du Hoc without being there in person, the dramatic visuals and live media coverage of Reagan's presidential presence in place further amplified the president's moving narrative.

News network correspondents on the ground editorialized the president's hour-long stop at Pointe du Hoc, offering poignant insights into how this place moved them personally. ABC correspondent Pierre Salinger described the effect: "You relive the day of D-Day, you see these enormous German bunkers . . . it still has the look of war around

pm local time. See Draft Notional Schedule, Trip of the President to Europe," May 7, 1984, folder "President's Trip to Normandy (2)," Box 161, White House Office of Speechwriting: Research Office, 1981-1989, Ronald Reagan Library.

⁶⁶⁸ Brinkley, *The Boys of Pointe du Hoc: Ronald Reagan, D-Day, and the U.S. Army 2nd Ranger Battalion*, 258.

it.”⁶⁶⁹ As the camera crew panned to the hundred-foot cliffs, Peter Jennings asked his viewers to look carefully and consider what it must have been like to scale the heights under enemy fire. “Look at how high above the water [Reagan] is, forty years ago today, imagine people trying to climb up there.”⁶⁷⁰ CNN anchor Bernard Shaw narrated the scene for those watching at home. “You can see how rocky the terrain is,” he said, explaining that Pointe du Hoc offered the most realistic picture of what D-Day actually looked like forty years earlier. As Reagan listened to two of the Rangers recount their climb just prior to his speech, reporter Richard Blystone encapsulated what everyone else had attempted to articulate: “These are men to stand in awe of when you stand at the place where they did what they did.”⁶⁷¹

During the president’s address, the network cameras focused their attention on Reagan and the sixty-two U.S. Army Rangers assembled on the platform, with images of the jagged cliffs and rocky coastline sprinkled throughout. When Reagan reminded his audience of Bill Millin, ABC showed a picture of the British soldier playing the bagpipes. Several minutes later, as Reagan recounted the scene of battle, the network played historical footage taken of the Allied invasion. These black and white images depicted crowded boats motoring toward shore, dead bodies floating in the water, and smoke billowing in the distance. After this brief return to the past, ABC returned to the

⁶⁶⁹ “D-Day + 40,” ABC News, June 6, 1984. Footage obtained from the White House Communication Agency videotape collection, “R2004A/B 06/06/1984 President Reagan at Pointe du Hoc, Normandy, France with speech (ABC, 60:00),” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.

⁶⁷⁰ “D-Day + 40,” ABC News, June 6, 1984. Footage obtained from the White House Communication Agency videotape collection, “R2004A/B 06/06/1984 President Reagan at Pointe du Hoc, Normandy, France with speech (ABC, 60:00),” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.

⁶⁷¹ “D-Day + 40,” CNN, June 6, 1984. Footage obtained from the White House Communication Agency videotape collection, “R2005 06/06/1984 President Reagan visit to Pointe du Hoc, Normandy, France with speech (CNN, 60:00),” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.

immediate scene and zoomed in on the U.S. Army Rangers as Reagan asked what motivated these men to sacrifice so much for their country. These images—both past and present—offered a physical display, an *epideixis*, of the courage, honor, and sacrifice of those who fought on D-Day. “You really do hope that a lot of the very young are watching,” Peter Jennings remarked just after the president’s speech, “because . . . there’s been this sense of urgency and almost sense of wistfulness” that the current generation “don’t have a real sense of what men and women went through to regain their freedom.”⁶⁷²

These live images from Reagan’s commemoration in place also transported the U.S. public to the beaches of Normandy, much like Eisenhower’s televised interview twenty years earlier. As Kathleen Hall Jamieson observes, “[t]elelevision enabled Reagan to transport the national audience to the stage he had set in Normandy. . . . The dramatization was compelling, the staging unsurpassable, the visual argument politically potent.”⁶⁷³ Later in the day, the evening news broadcasts featured similar imagery and reporters commented on the persuasive impact this place and the U.S. Army Rangers had on those who attended the ceremonies at Pointe du Hoc. ABC reporter Sam Donaldson noted that the president relied on the sixty-two veterans “to set the tone for the American remembrance.”⁶⁷⁴ The CBS *Evening News* highlighted how these men offered a living link between past and present:

⁶⁷² “D-Day + 40,” ABC News, June 6, 1984. Footage obtained from the White House Communication Agency videotape collection, “R2004A/B 06/06/1984 President Reagan at Pointe du Hoc, Normandy, France with speech (ABC, 60:00),” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.

⁶⁷³ Jamieson, *Eloquence in an Electronic Age: The Transformation of Political Speechmaking*, 162-163.

⁶⁷⁴ “D-Day Anniversary,” *World News Tonight*, ABC News (New York, NY: June 6, 1984), accessed from the Vanderbilt Television News Archive.

[T]he president of the United States came to the beaches of Normandy to touch history. The wind and waves were almost calm, unlike 1944, and the sun, not seen then, sparkled today over the legions of the dead. At Pointe du Hoc, a sheer granite knife-edge 100 feet above the sea, Mr. Reagan heard from men of the second ranger battalion how they scaled the cliff under a hail of machine gun fire, losing more than half their number before they took the summit, only to be trapped there for several days.⁶⁷⁵

As one CBS reporter explained, “This solemn occasion was the kind of opportunity that comes only to a president to demonstrate statesmanship to the world at large, as well as to those back home.”⁶⁷⁶

But the press also commented on Reagan’s larger goals for his commemoration at Normandy on June 6, 1984. “The White House saw Mr. Reagan’s participation today as the perfect moment to reassure Europe that the alliance is strong and to argue dramatically that he wants no war,” noted a CBS commentator.⁶⁷⁷ Tom Brokaw noted that the president “used this occasion to reach out to the Soviet Union, an American ally forty years ago.”⁶⁷⁸ But perhaps it was NBC reporter Chris Wallace’s assessment that so perfectly described the symbolic significance of this occasion and the White House’s goals for the president’s presence at Pointe du Hoc:

⁶⁷⁵ “D-Day Anniversary,” *Evening News*, CBS News (New York, NY: June 6, 1984), accessed from the Vanderbilt Television News Archive.

⁶⁷⁶ “D-Day Anniversary,” *Evening News*, CBS News (New York, NY: June 6, 1984), accessed from the Vanderbilt Television News Archive.

⁶⁷⁷ “D-Day Anniversary,” *Evening News*, CBS News (New York, NY: June 6, 1984), accessed from the Vanderbilt Television News Archive.

⁶⁷⁸ “D-Day Anniversary,” *Nightly News*, NBC News (New York, NY: June 6, 1984), accessed from the Vanderbilt Television News Archive.

For Ronald Reagan, this was a day to honor the past, and use it to shape the future. He began at Pointe du Hoc, a one hundred foot high spike of rock that U.S. Rangers scaled with heavy casualties against a German barrage. Thirty [sic] of the 225 Rangers who fought here returned today [sic]. Mr. Reagan said they saved democracy. As he would all day, [he] compared the alliance against the Nazis then, to the alliance to the Soviets now. . . . The White House saw this as a big event for the President, and used it. He spoke here before meeting French president Mitterrand to get on U.S. morning television. Every move had been carefully choreographed. White House advance men rushed in children in to wave goodbye to the Reagans and then tried to rush their teacher out of the picture. . . . The president drew parallels between D-Day and now. But the real pull of that June day may be that it seems so far off. The U.S. was fighting for right, and it won. After Vietnam and Lebanon, the world no longer seems so uncomplicated.⁶⁷⁹

For the millions of U.S. citizens watching at home, Reagan's rhetoric at Pointe du Hoc—and the bodies he displayed as evidence—presented a moral narrative of the past that also supported his present Cold War foreign policy.

The newspaper coverage of Reagan's address at Pointe du Hoc also stressed the linkages between 1944 and 1984. In a special report for the *New York Times*, military correspondent Drew Middleton noted that Reagan's speeches on the fortieth anniversary of D-Day "touched common themes, including the bravery of the German enemy and

⁶⁷⁹ "D-Day Anniversary," *Nightly News*, NBC News (New York, NY: June 6, 1984), accessed from the Vanderbilt Television News Archive.

sacrifices made by the Soviet Union during World War II.”⁶⁸⁰ The *Los Angeles Times* described how Reagan “issued a call to ‘wipe from the face of the earth the terrible weapons man now has in his hands,’” and made special mention of the president’s emphasis on “the 20 million Soviet citizens who lost their lives in the war.”⁶⁸¹ According to Benjamin Taylor, a writer for the *Boston Globe*, “[t]he now peaceful beaches of Normandy served as a dramatic backdrop yesterday for a ceremony commemorating the 40th anniversary of D-Day. . . . In remarks laced with emotion and patriotism, Reagan castigated the Soviet Union for its military domination of Eastern Europe even as he continued to extend the olive branch of reconciliation if ‘they will give up their ways of conquest.’”⁶⁸² These reports highlighted the clear dual message of Reagan’s speeches at Normandy: commemorate the past Allied triumph over Nazi tyranny and rededicate the Western alliance to defending—and spreading—democracy during the Cold War.

The circulation of Reagan’s speech at Pointe du Hoc continued into the 1984 presidential election cycle, most notably in the Reagan-Bush ’84 campaign video entitled “A New Beginning.” On the final evening of the Republican National Convention in Dallas, Texas, the campaign aired an eighteen-minute video highlighting iconic moments and key initiatives of Reagan’s first term in office.⁶⁸³ The film featured snippets of

⁶⁸⁰ Drew Middleton, "Reagan Honors D-Day; Calls for Spirit of Peace," *New York Times*, June 7, 1984.

⁶⁸¹ "D-Day Remembered: Allied Leaders Honor Heroes of Normandy," *Los Angeles Times*, June 6, 1984.

⁶⁸² Benjamin Taylor, "Reagan Lauds Men Who Died on D-Day," *Boston Globe*, June 7, 1984.

⁶⁸³ In a strategy memo dated June 19, 1984, the producers of the convention documentary detailed their plan for the film, noting that there would be no interviewer or narrator—only the voice of the President. “He is our guide, in effect, through the film. . . . as the President speaks, we begin to dissolve through and see those actual events of which he’s speaking. The verbal images become visual images. We see -- and hear -- those moments the President is talking about. And we begin to re-live those events and experiences on film.” Memorandum, Sig Rogich to Michael K. Deaver, June 19, 1984, folder "Convention Documentary (2)" Box 6, Richard G. Darman Files, Ronald Reagan Library. For a full record of how the campaign video worked within the sequence of events that final day of the campaign, see “August 23,

Reagan's speeches at Pointe du Hoc and Omaha Beach, including sweeping panoramic shots of the cliffs at Pointe du Hoc, endless rows of white crosses and Stars of David in the Normandy American Cemetery, and the large audience assembled for the joint ceremony at Omaha Beach. The most poignant aspect of this section was how the campaign interspersed Reagan's speeches at Pointe du Hoc and Omaha beach with actual footage of men storming the beaches on June 6, 1944. In addition, the video also contained close up shots of the sixty-two "boys of Pointe du Hoc" and Private Peter Zanatta's daughter, sons, and widow. As the audience listened to Reagan's narrative of the Allied landings at Normandy, they watched black and white footage of soldiers swimming to shore. When Reagan recounted the courageous climb of the U.S. Army Rangers forty years earlier, the camera zoomed in on the faces of the aged veterans. And as the president read aloud from Lisa Zanatta Henn's letter at Omaha Beach, the audience witnessed Zanatta Henn crying in the front row. This juxtaposition of text and image provided a striking tribute not just to the men who fought at Normandy, but it also reinforced Reagan's image as a focused, patriotic head of state dedicated to protecting U.S. democracy at home and preventing the spread of communism abroad.

The mediation and circulation of Reagan's commemoration in place reaffirms how Normandy—and, specifically, Pointe du Hoc—functioned as an important means of invention and enthymematic proof. The live television coverage of the president's visit transported the U.S. public to the physical scene and setting of Normandy, and the

1984, Republican National Convention, Day 4," *C-SPAN*, accessed October 21, 2015, <http://www.c-span.org/video/?124909-1/republican-national-convention-day-4>. For an analysis of the film itself, see Joanne Morreale, *A New Beginning: A Textual Frame Analysis of the Political Campaign Film* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1991).

images of President and Mrs. Reagan strolling through the American Military Cemetery, greeting U.S. veterans, and peering out of German bunkers made the past viscerally present. As the cable news networks, newspaper reports, and the 1984 Reagan-Bush campaign film circulated these images long after the president's trip to Europe, these visuals became inextricably linked to Reagan's address at Pointe du Hoc.

Conclusion

Ronald Reagan's speech on the fortieth anniversary of D-Day at Pointe du Hoc stands as an exemplar of presidential commemoration. Thirty years later, this address continues to receive critical acclaim. Indeed, Reagan is to Normandy as Kennedy is to Berlin; all successive presidential addresses at Normandy are judged by Reagan's speeches in 1984.⁶⁸⁴ In his speech at Pointe du Hoc, Reagan situated the daring acts of sixty-two U.S. Army Rangers within a broader historical context of World War II and the Cold War. These men, who had sacrificed so much to liberate Europe from Nazi tyranny in 1944, were the living, enduring link between the past and present. They had risked and even given their lives; how could the Allied coalition not honor their sacrifice? Here, in this sacred place, Reagan called on the Allies to consecrate themselves to the task set before them. By directing the audience's attention to Normandy's place-as-rhetoric and

⁶⁸⁴ See R. W. Apple, "Clinton in Normandy: Hands Across a Generation," *New York Times*, June 8, 1994; Mary L. Kahl and Michael Leff, "The Rhetoric of War and Remembrance: An Analysis of President Bill Clinton's 1994 D-Day Discourses," *Qualitative Research Reports in Communication* 7(2006): 15-21; Jill Abramson, "Bush Speaks of Heroism and Sacrifice at Cemetery at Normandy," *New York Times*, May 28, 2002; Richard W. Stevenson, "In D-Day Rite, Bush Praises Veterans of Normandy," *New York Times*, June 7, 2004; John McCormick, "Family Tapestry Part of Obama's Europe Trip," *Chicago Tribune*, June 4, 2009; Christina Bellantoni, "Obama Pays Homage to D-Day Veterans," *Washington Times*, June 7, 2009; John Ibbitson, "Barack Obama is No Ronald Reagan - Yet," *Globe and Mail*, June 10, 2009; "Reagan Set the Tone for D-Day Observances," *Daily Herald*, June 6, 2014.

the bodies of the U.S. Army Rangers who secured it forty years earlier, Reagan used these symbolic elements of his speech setting to motivate present and future action.

Indeed, although Reagan's address was epideictic in form and content, the president used this occasion to advance his broader Cold War foreign policy. In a 2013 interview, Reagan White House speechwriter Peggy Noonan commented on this larger goal:

The text of the speech—the ostensible thing that was being said—was, “Look, civilized nations of the West, look what you did forty years ago when you held together, joined together, you defeated a terrible tyranny called Hitler’s Germany.” So that’s what the speech is. Underneath that, Reagan was really saying to all the gathered leaders of the West who were there that day, “Guys, look what your parents and grandparents did. If we hold together as they did, we are going to defeat together the tyranny of our time—and that is Soviet communism.” So, by lauding the World War II generation, Reagan was also trying to inspire those who now still had to hold together—the Berlin Wall had not fallen—to push that wall over. So, he very consciously . . . used that speech to say, “Look what we did last time. We can still do it!”⁶⁸⁵

Noonan’s reflection offers insight into why this speech had such resonance in 1984, and why it continues to be ranked as one of Reagan’s most celebrated addresses.

After Reagan’s commemoration in place in 1984, three additional presidents—William J. Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama—have traveled to Normandy to

⁶⁸⁵ Peggy Noonan, “Peggy Noonan on Reagan’s D-Day Speech,” *The Kelly File*, December 4, 2013, accessed May 5, 2014, <http://video.foxnews.com/v/2893720031001/peggy-noonan-on-reagans-d-day-speech>.

commemorate the anniversary of D-Day and reaffirm the United States' commitment to maintaining freedom around the world. In 1994, Clinton promised the D-Day veterans assembled at Normandy, "We commit ourselves, as you did, to keep [freedom's] lamp burning for those who will follow. You completed your mission here. But the mission of freedom goes on; the battle continues."⁶⁸⁶ Ten years later, on the sixtieth anniversary of D-Day, George W. Bush told the surviving veterans, "[Y]ou will be honored ever and always by the country you served and by the nations you freed."⁶⁸⁷ In 2009, President Barack Obama commented on the historical significance of June 6, 1944, noting, "D-Day was a time and a place where the bravery and selflessness of a few was able to change the course of an entire century."⁶⁸⁸ And in 2014, on the seventieth anniversary of the Normandy invasion, Obama not only honored those who fought at Normandy, but he also acknowledged several U.S. service members who had served in Iraq and Afghanistan since 9/11. After introducing several of these individuals to the audience, he told the World War II veterans: "[Y]our legacy is in good hands. . . . this 9/11 generation of service members—they, too, felt something. They answered some call; they said 'I will go.' They, too, chose to serve a cause that's greater than self, many even after they knew

⁶⁸⁶ William J. Clinton, "Remarks on the 50th Anniversary of D-Day at Pointe du Hoc in Normandy, France," June 6, 1994, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed October 22, 2015, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=50297>.

⁶⁸⁷ George W. Bush, "Remarks on the 60th Anniversary of D-Day in Colleville-sur-Mer, France," June 6, 2004, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed October 22, 2015, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=72648>.

⁶⁸⁸ Barack Obama, "Remarks on the 65th Anniversary of D-Day in Normandy, France," June 6, 2009, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed October 22, 2015, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=86253>.

they'd be sent into harm's way.”⁶⁸⁹ In his remarks, Obama drew a parallel between the “Greatest Generation” and present-day military heroes fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. As Reagan had done before him, Obama used the story of D-Day to inspire patriotic sentiment and humble appreciation for these “generations of men and women who proved once again that the United States of America is and will remain the greatest force for freedom the world has ever known.”⁶⁹⁰

These examples of U.S. presidential commemorations of D-Day after 1984 demonstrate how Reagan’s speeches at Pointe du Hoc and Omaha Beach inaugurated an important commemorative tradition in U.S. political culture. As “interpreters-in-chief” of our shared history, U.S. presidents remind us of our national identity and shared values, and one of the primary ways they do this is through public speech.⁶⁹¹ At Normandy, Reagan used the physical display (*epideixis*) and visual imagery of the U.S. Army Rangers and the cliffs of Pointe du Hoc to link past and present in the “place where the West held together.” As a sacred battlefield of war, Reagan’s narrative reaffirmed the site’s symbolic significance in the United States’ national imaginary even as it (re)constituted it as a place of return in the most literal sense. By traveling to Normandy to mark the fortieth anniversary of D-Day, Reagan called his audience to pause, to reflect, to remember, and to rededicate themselves to the ideals and values for which so many Allied soldiers died. Narrating the events of June 6, 1984, to the nation and the world via

⁶⁸⁹ Barack Obama, "Remarks on the 70th Anniversary of D-Day in Normandy, France," June 6, 2014, online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*, accessed October 22, 2015, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=105250>.

⁶⁹⁰ Obama, "Remarks on the 70th Anniversary of D-Day."

⁶⁹¹ Stuckey, *The President as Interpreter-In-Chief*. See also Campbell and Jamieson, *Presidents Creating the Presidency: Deeds Done in Words*.

live television, Reagan translated the story of D-Day—in all its hardship and struggle and triumph—into the contemporary moment. To a nation recovering from economic inflation and a lost sense of self, the heroic actions of "the boys of Pointe du Hoc" and Private Peter Zanatta provided a moral lesson that was just as applicable in 1984 as it was on that "longest day" forty years earlier.⁶⁹²

⁶⁹² Cornelius Ryan, *The Longest Day: June 6, 1944* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959).

Chapter Six: The U.S. Presidency, Place, and the Cold War

The purpose of this study has been to argue for the significance of place in U.S. presidential public address. Put simply, place matters. In the preceding pages, I have suggested that when U.S. presidents speak in place, they do one or more of the following: (1) invest the location with symbolic meaning through speech; (2) harness the political and cultural symbols always already present to build conceptual and literal commonplaces (*topoi*) for the ideological metaphors, analogies, and networks of shared meaning embedded in that place; (3) constitute a specific geopolitical vision of the world and the United States' role in it; and (4) reaffirm their role as moral leader and head of state. In my introductory chapter, I outlined six guiding assumptions motivating this project. To conclude, I return to these assumptions to summarize the key implications of this study and to suggest areas for future research.

Place

Presidential invocations of place build on prior symbolic resonances even as they (re)appropriate such resonances for present and future purposes. Analyzing the significance of place in relation to public address requires that the critic write a rhetorical history of the place itself. Doing rhetorical history offers us, in the words of Kathleen J. Turner, "the opportunity to see rhetoric as a perpetual and dynamic process of social construction, maintenance, and change rather than as an isolated, static product."⁶⁹³ As

⁶⁹³ Turner, "Rhetorical History as Social Construction: The Challenge and the Promise," 4.

such, doing a rhetorical history of place reveals how places condition rhetorical acts and, conversely, rhetoric's potential to make and remake place.

For Truman, speaking at the Lincoln Memorial simultaneously challenged previous presidential rhetoric in place (namely, President Warren G. Harding's dedication speech in 1922) even as it supported the NAACP's strategic adaption of the Memorial through Marian Anderson's 1939 concert. After Truman's address, numerous speakers connected with the Civil Rights movement spoke or performed at the Lincoln Memorial. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s address in 1963 is the most notable, of course, but other political leaders, including several U.S. presidents, followed the precedent set by Truman and delivered civil rights addresses at the Lincoln Memorial. Kennedy's invocation of Berlin as evidence of the failures of communism built on the city's symbolic status during the Cold War, particularly its prominence during the 1948 Berlin Airlift and the 1961 Berlin Crisis. Since Kennedy's speech in 1963, six other U.S. presidents have traveled to Berlin to deliver significant foreign policy speeches. After D-Day, Normandy became a physical symbol of U.S. moral resolve and commitment to defending democracy abroad, one that early Cold War U.S. presidents invoked to support military operations overseas. When Reagan spoke at the fortieth anniversary of D-Day, he became the first U.S. president to attend a ceremony commemorating the occasion and used the story of D-Day—and Normandy's place-as-rhetoric—as physical evidence for his Cold War foreign policy. Since his visit in 1984, Presidents Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama have traveled to Normandy to honor the memory of those who died and apply the lessons of D-Day to the contemporary moment. These three case studies reveal why writing a rhetorical history of place is so important, for

it allows the critic to understand the symbolic resonances Truman, Kennedy, and Reagan activated through speech and how their rhetoric in place invited—and still invites—future presidential rhetoric *in situ*.

The U.S. Presidency

Presidential presence and oratorical performance in place amplifies the rhetorical dimensions of that location even as the physical speech setting contributes to the president's own authority and *ethos*. As U.S. presidents amplify a site's importance in the public imaginary by making place present, they also bolster their own rhetorical authority and *ethos* because that place matters to the U.S. public. As such, presidential presence in place reveals a co-constitutive relationship between presidential authority and rhetoric in place, a back and forth exchange between presidential authority as a function of *ethos* and the symbolism embodied in the history and memory of a place itself. My analyses of Truman, Kennedy, and Reagan reveal how presidential rhetoric *in situ* helps chief executives strengthen their rhetorical *ethos* even as they designate certain places as politically significant.

As the first president to address the NAACP in person, Truman used the place of his address to link his recent civil rights initiatives to Abraham Lincoln's legacy and Marian Anderson's 1939 Easter Sunday concert at the Lincoln Memorial. By speaking *to* the NAACP *at* the Lincoln Memorial, Truman marked himself as a staunch supporter of civil rights and reaffirmed the monument as a prominent site of racial struggle. For Kennedy, traveling to West Berlin was an attempt to bolster his foreign policy credentials and

leadership on the world stage. Kennedy's physical presence—"the vigorous, young American giving off hope and enthusiasm," wrote a *Washington Post* columnist—at the Berlin Wall made U.S. commitment to West Berlin tangible and personal, particularly when Kennedy introduced himself as a fellow citizen of Berlin.⁶⁹⁴ When Reagan spoke at Pointe du Hoc, he connected his Cold War foreign policy to the events at Normandy forty years earlier and underscored the United States' commitment to defending democracy in the present moment. For Reagan, the "boys of Pointe du Hoc" provided a living link between past triumphs and present realities, and the place symbolized the specific geopolitical policies the president sought to advance.⁶⁹⁵ In all three case studies, the presence of the president communicated that the place—and all that place symbolized—mattered on a national and global scale.

Materializing the *Topoi*

When U.S. presidents travel to and speak from place, they constitute civic commonplaces that are physically real, using their presidential authority to transform what was once a symbolic conceptual resource into a literal storehouse of shared values, ideologies, and ways of being in the world. Presidential rhetoric in place activates the conceptual "storehouses of social energy" publics find persuasive and adds a material dimension to them.⁶⁹⁶ My analyses of Truman, Kennedy, and Reagan demonstrate how

⁶⁹⁴ Marquis Childs, "President to See a Sunny Germany," *Washington Post*, June 17, 1963.

⁶⁹⁵ Reagan, "Remarks at a Ceremony Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the Normandy Invasion, D-day."

⁶⁹⁶ Citrón, "Democracy and Its Limitations," 100.

all three presidents (and their staff) saw the location of the president's address as a physical instantiation of their larger Cold War argument.

For Truman, the Lincoln Memorial offered a space for communal rededication and renewal. Speaking in the shadow of Abraham Lincoln and reaffirming the sixteenth president's status as the Great Emancipator, Truman called the nation to return to the ideals Lincoln represented and extend his Emancipation Proclamation to the nation and the world. Kennedy's decision to visit West Berlin in 1963 was directly related to the city's symbolic status at the height of the Cold War. As the first U.S. president to visit West Berlin since 1945, Kennedy made the place physically present to the U.S. public by being there himself and telling his immediate and extended audience that the city offered the most tangible evidence of the failures of communism "for all the world to see."⁶⁹⁷ Likewise, Ronald Reagan used the memories embedded in Normandy to advance his larger Cold War argument. To a nation still recovering from the failures of Vietnam and the Watergate scandal, Pointe du Hoc offered a hopeful commonplace that represented U.S. patriotism and moral resolve.

Mediation and Circulation

The mediation and circulation of presidential rhetoric in place—be it through photographs, newspaper coverage, radio, television, and/or the Internet—reveals how *in situ* rhetorical performances fuse spoken discourse with the visual and spatial elements of the rhetorical act and how these verbal/visual texts circulate in, around, and through place

⁶⁹⁷ Kennedy, "Remarks in the Rudolph Wilde Platz, West Berlin."

over time. My three case studies also demonstrate how the mediation of presidential rhetoric in place conditions how audiences perceive and experience this phenomenon.

Walter White and the NAACP made specific plans to circulate Truman's address via radio within the United States and around the world via a State Department broadcast. The NAACP also arranged for newsreel footage to be taken of the event, and audiences around the country listened to the president declare that "all Americans" should enjoy "these rights" from the steps of the Lincoln Memorial.⁶⁹⁸ Kennedy's visit to West Berlin was televised throughout both West and East Germany, and footage of the event was promptly flown back to the United States for the U.S. public. Moreover, the United States Department of Defense produced a thirty-five minute documentary of Kennedy's visit to Berlin and the United States Information Agency created another film that chronicled Kennedy's trip for audiences abroad.⁶⁹⁹ The Reagan White House specifically timed the president's speech at Pointe du Hoc to coincide with the morning news cycle in the United States, and news networks frequently interspersed their live coverage with images of D-Day forty years earlier. The mediation and circulation of presidential presence in place extends beyond the moment of utterance, pushing critics to consider, in the words of Ronald Walter Greene, "the need to redefine the object of public address as a spatial encounter at differential speeds of circulation and durations of attention."⁷⁰⁰ Because presidential rhetoric in place continues to circulate even after delivery, scholars of public

⁶⁹⁸ Truman, "Address to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People."

⁶⁹⁹ See "Five Cities of June, 1963," United States Government Agencies Collection, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, accessed March 2016, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/USG-01-15.aspx> and "One Day in Berlin," United States Government Agencies Collection, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, accessed March 2016, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/USG-02-B-1.aspx>.

⁷⁰⁰ Greene, "Rhetorical Pedagogy as a Postal System: Circulating Subjects through Michael Warner's 'Publics and Counterpublics,'" 438.

address must account for the ways in which these verbal/visual texts extend over time and in/through place, often (re)making place for future rhetoric *in situ*.

Rhetoric *In Situ*

Rhetoric *in situ* provides a conceptual storehouse—a commonplace—for organizing these separate but interrelated themes of place, presence, and the mediation and circulation of texts. Throughout this project, I have used the phrase *in situ* to describe rhetoric that has been designed for and delivered in place, rhetoric that is intentionally located within a geographic region and yet often circulates beyond a particular point on a map. As discussed in chapter two, classical orators used *in situ* performances to direct their audiences to monuments, statues, and temples that symbolized specific civic virtues and political ideologies as a material means of persuasion. More recent work on *in situ* rhetoric emphasizes the material or lived dimensions of rhetoric in place, whether it be the physical site of classical oratorical performance⁷⁰¹ or scholarly participation in “‘live’ rhetorics.”⁷⁰² This project adds another dimension to rhetoric *in situ* by suggesting that critics should attend more carefully to how speakers use language to activate, define, constitute, and even transform the persuasive elements of their speech setting. This perspective emphasizes the persuasive potential of rhetoric in place. It considers how speech deliberately located in place takes on another dimension as it harnesses the symbolic power of language and the persuasive power of the place itself. More specifically, this *in situ* orientation pushes scholars of presidential rhetoric to consider the

⁷⁰¹ Graff and Johnstone, “Greek Rhetoric In Situ: Reconstructing Ancient Sites of Oratorical Performance.”

⁷⁰² Middleton, Senda-Cook, and Endres, “Articulating Rhetorical Field Methods: Challenges and Tensions,” 391.

spatial, temporal, visual, and sensory dimensions of presidential speech. My analyses of Truman, Kennedy, and Reagan reveal how all three administrations saw the persuasive dimensions of the president's rhetorical act as directly linked to its physical placement. The presence of the president in place—and the mediation and circulation of his physical situatedness in that location—became a material means of persuasion.

A Rhetorical Theory of Deixis

An analysis of rhetoric as designed for and delivered in place requires a theoretical and methodological intervention that accounts for the variety of ways speakers use language to activate the material realities of the rhetorical situation and link text with context. To fully appreciate how orators activate the material elements of a speech setting as a means of persuasion, I have argued that a rhetorical theory of deixis orients the critic to the bodies, places, and temporalities implied in and displayed through speech. Because every rhetorical act is unique, a deictic approach to close textual criticism will operate differently in every instance. In this specific project, deixis reveals the persuasive power of presidential rhetoric in place. More broadly, however, this theoretical and methodological orientation offers some important insights into the principles of close textual analysis, the relationship between text and context, the practice of archival recovery, and the role of the critic.

First, it offers a program of close textual criticism motivated by a critical sensitivity to bodies, places, and moments in time. This perspective takes Bühler's "I/here/now" triad as a starting point, yet pushes beyond a simple identification of a

speaker's references to speaker, location, and temporality. It understands rhetoric as an embodied practice that is situated in place, located within a particular temporal moment, with political ideologies, material effects, socio-economic relationships, and bodily sensations interwoven throughout. Second, it pays particular attention to how texts activate their contexts and, at the same time, how contexts produce texts. This approach extends the bounds of context beyond simply providing the historical background to a particular speech act, inviting the critic to understand the rhetorical situation as materially real, as a living, breathing "multi-celled organism."⁷⁰³ Third, it obliges the critic to answer recent critical questions posed by in situ criticism, rhetorical fieldwork, and ethnography by recourse to archives so as to recover the sights, sounds, and embodied experiences the audience experienced firsthand. As many scholars have noted and any person who has done archival research knows well, the archive is itself a rhetorical phenomenon, a space that often protects privilege and conceals what might be the most important pieces of context.⁷⁰⁴ But what it offers far outweighs these challenges. Through speechwriting drafts, internal memos, audio recordings, fuzzy photographs, and yellowed newspaper clippings stapled together, the critic is ushered into another time and place, a moment that cannot be reproduced and yet is reflected in "the materiality of the trace, the immediacy of the recording, the visibility of the image."⁷⁰⁵ Fourth, and finally, a rhetorical theory of deixis affirms the critic's role in reconstructing the material dimensions of the rhetorical situation. Deixis offers the critic a way to identify where and

⁷⁰³ Hochmuth, "The Criticism of Rhetoric," 9.

⁷⁰⁴ See, for example, the special forum on "The Politics of Archival Research" edited by Charles E. Morris, III in *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 9, no. 1 (2006): 113-151 and Jaques Derrida, *Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression*, trans. Eric Prenowitz (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1995).

⁷⁰⁵ Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire," *Representations* 26(1989): 13.

how a speaker uses language to assemble a “foreground upon a background” of the speech setting—a metaphorical and literal display of the bodies, locations, objects, and temporalities the rhetor chooses to amplify through speech.⁷⁰⁶ Although it is impossible to reconstruct a historical speech event fully, a deictic approach to close textual criticism provides a theoretical and methodological approach to uncovering how texts speak in and through their contexts. For scholars interested in (re)discovering all the material means of persuasion, deixis offers a way to begin.

⁷⁰⁶ Hanks, "The Indexical Ground of Deictic Reference," 61.

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